Pedagogical Uptake: Credibility, Intelligibility, and Agency
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| Title: | Pedagogical Uptake: Credibility, Intelligibility, and Agency |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Authors: | Barbara Applebaum (ORCID |
| Source: | Studies in Philosophy and Education. 2024 43(2):195-210. |
| Availability: | Springer. Available from: Springer Nature. One New York Plaza, Suite 4600, New York, NY 10004. Tel: 800-777-4643; Tel: 212-460-1500; Fax: 212-460-1700; e-mail: customerservice@springernature.com; Web site: https://link.springer.com/ |
| Peer Reviewed: | Y |
| Page Count: | 16 |
| Publication Date: | 2024 |
| Document Type: | Journal Articles Reports - Descriptive |
| Descriptors: | Credibility, Intelligibility, Educational Practices, Social Justice, Educational Philosophy, Mental Health, Power Structure, Epistemology, Psychology, Social Theories, Resistance (Psychology) |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11217-023-09906-3 |
| ISSN: | 0039-3746 1573-191X |
| Abstract: | This essay begins with the story of Vincent Lloyd who recounts a disturbing experience he had while teaching a course to a group of students of color. What does pedagogical uptake under conditions of systemic oppression require of educators? In the first section, I explore philosopher Nancy Potter's (Nancy Potter. "Giving Uptake". "Social Theory and Practice" 26/3 (2000) 479-508; Nancy Potter. "The Virtue of Defiance and Psychiatric Engagement" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016)) work on uptake, whose focus on the mental health field is important because she acknowledges power imbalances. Nevertheless, her understanding of uptake may be insufficient for considering such classroom cases that introduced this essay. The second section shifts the focus of uptake from a psychological approach to a more epistemic understanding of uptake that underscores credibility and intelligibility. Uptake as credibility and intelligibility reveals the everyday patterns of uptake failure that marginalized knowers experience in the socio-epistemic world, described in section three. A recent turn in the scholarship of epistemic injustice towards epistemic agency and resistance is taken up in the subsequent section and applied to the conceptualization of uptake. In the concluding section, I begin to explore how these insights contribute to a notion of pedagogical uptake under conditions of systemic oppression. |
| Abstractor: | As Provided |
| Entry Date: | 2024 |
| Accession Number: | EJ1419524 |
| Database: | ERIC |
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| FullText | Links: – Type: pdflink Url: https://content.ebscohost.com/cds/retrieve?content=AQICAHj0k_4E0hTGH8RJwT4gCJyBsGNe_WN95AvKlDbXJGqwxwFhDlGY1pLnyKpgN2DXspxzAAAA4jCB3wYJKoZIhvcNAQcGoIHRMIHOAgEAMIHIBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHgYJYIZIAWUDBAEuMBEEDGWOtlTs6yK0rIo5igIBEICBmmkvYDXuyPQN9wFWu4stBLCU2Eu0xPDFVdPqLh5VZx4mgAMEFC8D6id3x33opNyG13gD6-920HYW23mX8JbEwUnFowRNmsl1SdEKBRN3I_DqnEfd7jfHraMrBAArXsdS4Rv3W_PeWuLE-q_K1hKu8nVv_A4mQcz24NKPkmaU0IkAZM_1c7vryr8fq3C_yXA4I5XiBhfUGgembKI= Text: Availability: 1 Value: <anid>AN0176467225;sps01apr.24;2024Apr10.05:39;v2.2.500</anid> <title id="AN0176467225-1">Pedagogical Uptake: Credibility, Intelligibility, and Agency </title> <p>This essay begins with the story of Vincent Lloyd who recounts a disturbing experience he had while teaching a course to a group of students of color. What does pedagogical uptake under conditions of systemic oppression require of educators? In the first section, I explore philosopher Nancy Potter's (Nancy Potter. "Giving Uptake". Social Theory and Practice 26/3 (2000) 479–508; Nancy Potter. The Virtue of Defiance and Psychiatric Engagement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016)) work on uptake, whose focus on the mental health field is important because she acknowledges power imbalances. Nevertheless, her understanding of uptake may be insufficient for considering such classroom cases that introduced this essay. The second section shifts the focus of uptake from a psychological approach to a more epistemic understanding of uptake that underscores credibility and intelligibility. Uptake as credibility and intelligibility reveals the everyday patterns of uptake failure that marginalized knowers experience in the socio-epistemic world, described in section three. A recent turn in the scholarship of epistemic injustice towards epistemic agency and resistance is taken up in the subsequent section and applied to the conceptualization of uptake. In the concluding section, I begin to explore how these insights contribute to a notion of pedagogical uptake under conditions of systemic oppression.</p> <p>Keywords: Uptake; Epistemic injustice; Agency</p> <p>Copyright comment Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.</p> <p>In early 2023, Vincent Lloyd, a Black professor and director of the Black Studies Program at Villanova University, published a piece titled, "A Black Professor Trapped in Anti-Racist Hell".[<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref1">1</reflink>] In this essay, Lloyd recounts a disturbing ordeal that he experienced while teaching a six-week seminar, "Race and the Limits of Law", to a group of high-school students as part of a highly selective summer program sponsored by the Telluride Association. As Lloyd emphasizes, until this experience he opposed linguist John McWhorter's claim that "antiracism is a new religion". However, after a "mutiny" by his students, led by a "charismatic" Black college student hired as a teaching assistant, whom Lloyd portrays as creating a "culture of anti-racism" (Lloyd refers to her as "Keisha"), he found confirmation of anti-woke arguments. As Lloyd puts it, "I found anti-racism to be a perversion of religion. I found a cult".[<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref2">2</reflink>]</p> <p>According to Lloyd, the seminar began well, but soon, amid political disagreements, students voted to expel two of their classmates from the program. One of the political disagreements that Lloyd describes occurred in a discussion of enslavement. One Asian-American student "pointed to a moment in our text where white slave owners were providing food for the enslaved and suggested this showed there were two sides to the issue of slavery".[<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref3">3</reflink>] Two Black students opposed the "both sides" reference, claiming that Lloyd's refusal to challenge this equivalence was harmful. Another conflict arose in a discussion of incarceration. An Asian-American student retorted that 60 percent of inmates in the United States are white. Seemingly in contrast to the view of Keisha, Lloyd states that teaching only succeeds "when multiple perspectives clash into each other, grapple with each other, and develop—and that became impossible".[<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref4">4</reflink>]</p> <p>Not long after, the remaining students presented Lloyd with a statement describing how his seminar perpetrated anti-black violence in its content and form, detailing how the Black students in the course had been harmed. Lloyd railed against the countless microaggressions he was accused of.They alleged: I had used racist language. I had misgendered Brittney Griner. I had repeatedly confused the names of two black students. My body language harmed them. I hadn't corrected facts that were harmful to hear when the (now-purged) students introduced them in class. I invited them to think about the reasoning of both sides of an argument, when only one side was correct.[<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref5">5</reflink>]</p> <p>Lloyd found the accusation that a Black professor, who has published books on anti-Black racism and led workshops on transformative justice, perpetrated anti-Black violence outrageously shocking and indicative that "centering blackness, tempts US elite, and particularly US elite educational institutions, to take a step too far, a step into incoherence—or worse".[<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref6">6</reflink>]</p> <p>Lloyd's essay went viral. He was interviewed in various venues. Most notably, he was embraced by conservative outlets on the political Right where he evoked much sympathy and where his students (whose voices remain absent) were vilified. Many of the interviews rehash how his virtuous pedagogy was hijacked by Keisha's evil indoctrination. In one interview,[<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref7">7</reflink>] however, Lloyd is asked about his views on epistemic privilege, or the idea that the knowledge developed from marginalized experience has unique credibility. Although in his essay Lloyd seems to disparage the proposition "trust Black women", he tells the interviewer,We need to trust Black women. We need to acknowledge the epistemic privilege of those who are marginalized in various and intersecting ways.[<reflink idref="bib8" id="ref8">8</reflink>]</p> <p>The point this interviewer calls attention to is crucial for social justice educators. I want to expand upon this idea by introducing a concept I refer to as "pedagogical uptake under conditions of systemic oppression".</p> <p>Although there are many issues arising from Lloyd's invective of anti-racist "indoctrination" that warrant critical analysis, in this essay I use this case as a springboard to inquire about the meaning and role of uptake in social justice education. Let me be clear, my point in this essay is not to judge this specific case. That would be difficult since the voices of the students are absent and, thus, important factors may be missing from Lloyd's account of the pedagogical challenges he faced. In addition, as a white woman reflecting upon a Black scholar who has vast publication record focusing on Black resistance to anti-Blackness, it is beyond the point of my project to comment on how his scholarship and pedagogy are interconnected, nor to comment on whether the students were right to protest his pedagogy. I use the story that Lloyd tells to raise the question of whether the students were given uptake, and as an entry point for examining what "giving uptake" might require.</p> <p>The opening story functions only as a prompt to generate ideas and concerns with pedagogy around the issue of uptake. Rather than return to the story and apply ideas that emanate from the scholarship on epistemic injustice, I offer possible questions to consider that employ these ideas and concerns because they have not been considered by Lloyd in his essay nor have these ideas and concerns been taken up in the media that responded to his essay. Understanding uptake, I submit, can be an important way to expose how the individual and the system work in concert to reinforce or to resist systemic social injustice.</p> <p>Much of the important philosophical scholarship on uptake is theoretically indebted to J.L. Austin's[<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref9">9</reflink>] work on illocutionary speech acts. These analyses seek global definitions, take interpersonal communication as the point of analysis focusing on communicative breakdowns or failed communication, and, most significantly, because power asymmetries are not seriously considered, presumes that everyone deserves uptake equally. While I will briefly allude to this work, I am specifically concerned with uptake in the context of systemic oppression, and, following Kristie Dotson,[<reflink idref="bib10" id="ref10">10</reflink>] my view is to conceptualize uptake in ways that does not assume that the ultimate remedy for oppression can be found exclusively at the interpersonal level. Transformation at the interpersonal level must go hand-in-hand with collectively working towards transforming unjust dominant frameworks. Consequently, I seek a definition of uptake that is not exclusively oriented towards those who perpetrate uptake failures (a focus that can slip into desires for innocence) but also concerned with those who have been historically harmed by those failures and how they survive and resist. What does uptake require of social justice educators? What are the challenges and complexities of such a requirement? I am interested in initiating a conversation around the type of uptake that enhances collective resistance to systemic injustice.</p> <p>In the first section, I explore philosopher Nancy Potter's[<reflink idref="bib11" id="ref11">11</reflink>] work on uptake, whose focus on the mental health field is important because she acknowledges power imbalances. Nevertheless, her understanding of uptake may be insufficient for considering such classroom cases that introduced this essay. The second section shifts the focus of uptake from a psychological approach to a more epistemic understanding of uptake that underscores credibility and intelligibility. Uptake as credibility and intelligibility reveals the everyday patterns of uptake failure that marginalized knowers experience in the socio-epistemic world, described in section three. A recent turn in the scholarship of epistemic injustice towards epistemic agency and resistance is taken up in the subsequent section and applied to the conceptualization of uptake. In the concluding section, I begin to explore how these insights contribute to a notion of pedagogical uptake under conditions of systemic oppression.</p> <hd id="AN0176467225-2">Uptake: Taking Power into Account</hd> <p>I begin with Nancy Potter's examination of uptake because she acknowledges that uptake is not independent of considerations of power, privilege, and oppression. Potter's approach to uptake falls at the intersection of philosophy and psychology/psychiatry, she is interested in helping clinicians understand what it means to give uptake to their clients, and she takes up disability studies scholarship. Potter's analysis begins with Austin's, <emph>How to Do Things with Words</emph>, but goes beyond it.</p> <p>Austin is known for uncovering the types of speech acts that are performative in the sense that they are not just descriptive. Rather, they do something, the speech itself constitutes an action. The concept of uptake arises in his analysis of "illocutionary speech acts" in which an action is constituted by the utterance. According to Austin, some illocutionary speech acts require being "taken up" in particular ways for the action to be successful. For example, if one makes a promise but the audience does not recognize the speech act as a promise then one has not actually made a promise. The illocutionary speech act of promising requires recognition by the one being promised that the words are issuing a promise.</p> <p>Here Potter finds an important but rudimentary requirement of uptake. Uptake requires recognition from the audience of what is being performed. Potter, however, points to several limitations with this account. This notion of uptake, for instance, only requires superficial recognition or acknowledgement. In addition, Austin only deals with relatively uncontroversial cases, like promising, and in doing so, he ignores how uptake is embedded in social relations and power dynamics or how social identity impacts uptake, even in seemingly uncontentious cases. Moreover, uptake applies to more than just words.</p> <p>Potter expands Austin's understanding of uptake highlighting that speech acts are always embedded in power structures and practices. In addition, uptake is more than just about the acknowledgement of words. Unlike Austin for whom uptake requires only a superficial recognition that misses the deeper intended meaning of the speech act, Potter maintains uptake requires responding to a speech act <emph>in the spirit in which it is expressed</emph>.[<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref12">12</reflink>] To understand Potter's view, she offers a case of a female employee who as a conscientious worker asks her boss for "more responsibility" at work. Her male boss, however, responds by giving her mounds of tedious, boring work, which is contra to what she requested. While the boss recognized that the employee was making a request, according to Potter, he did not recognize the speech act in the spirit that the employee intended. Moreover, should the employee explain that this is not what she meant, and the boss responded by saying "But you said you wanted more work and I responded to you, so what's the problem?" his response, again, would be a failure of uptake, and, according to Potter, could be willful.[<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref13">13</reflink>]</p> <p>Potter demonstrates what uptake is by establishing what it is not. Building on Marilyn Frye's[<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref14">14</reflink>] critical work on how women's justified anger is denied uptake, Potter underscores that anger can be a legitimate reaction to oppressive situations. In such cases, anger can be understood as a speech act since it is a way to claim that one has been wronged. According to Frye, to express anger is to make a claim about agency. For such anger to secure uptake, the intended audience must receive the anger <emph>as anger</emph>, be open to the possibility that the angry person was wronged which also implies that the angry person is asserting herself as someone who is capable of being wronged because they are worthy of respect. Women, however, are consistently denied uptake of their anger and, moreover, their anger is trivialized, derided, dismissed, and ignored by men. Such a failure of uptake is a way of refusing a woman's anger so that one does not have to acknowledge what the woman is angry about, and a way to ignore their role in provoking her anger. In the case of women's anger, thus, uptake requires one to reorient oneself to the other's anger treating them as a subject whose communications are worthy of serious consideration and to genuinely convey the message that one is heard.</p> <p>Claire Lockard[<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref15">15</reflink>] provides a relevant expansion of uptake failure in her excellent discussion of the unequal expectations of calls for charitable reading that reproduce epistemic oppression. Her main case involves a female undergraduate student in an introduction to philosophy course who questions why classical philosophers who have sexist and racist ideas continue to be at the center of the philosophical canon. The professor's response basically calls upon the student to be more charitable when she reads these scholars. Lockard gains deeper insight into this case through Maria Lugones'[<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref16">16</reflink>] analysis of "hard-to-handle anger", i.e., anger that is rich with knowledge. Lockard notes that when anger is denied uptake, as when the student's critique is shut down with calls for charitable reading, the individual is "prevented from following her anger".[<reflink idref="bib17" id="ref17">17</reflink>] As Lockard explains,The professor does not interpret her anger as conducive to her learning—it is, in his view, preventing her from engaging properly with the text. Indeed, he disregards the information conveyed by her anger. ... the student is expressing a cognitively rich anger that does indeed reveal knowledge of the world. This anger might be used to develop new or resistant interpretations of problematic text, but the call for charity blocks her from using her anger as a resource for knowledge or resistance to oppression.[<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref18">18</reflink>]</p> <p>Lockard adds something about uptake failure missing in Potter's account involving the shutting down of epistemic agency, a point that will be addressed in more detail in subsequent sections. We might apply Lockard's insight to the case that opened this essay.</p> <p>When Lloyd asked the students to consider "both sides", it is a call for marginally situated students to read charitably in ways that reproduce oppressive worlds. It is not that calls for interpretive charity are always counterproductive, but in the context of systemic oppression such call "can place unjust limits on an interlocutor's agency by demanding her presence and participation in...an oppressive world"[<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref19">19</reflink>] especially because calls for charitable interpretations are applied in inequitable ways. If during a discussion of the Black Lives Matter movement, the collective protest of the pattern of police brutality against Black Americans, a student claimed that "All Lives Matter", would asking Black students to give uptake to both sides reproduce injustice?</p> <p>The principle of charitable reading grounding the "both sides argument" is considered a cornerstone of civil dialogue. Yet under conditions of systemic injustice, refusing to try and understand the other side might be the ethically and epistemically superior choice. In "Wrongful Requests and Strategic Refusals to Understand", Gaile Pohlhaus Jr.[<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref20">20</reflink>] has demonstrated that while the call to take the perspective of the other is considered ethically and epistemically virtuous, when marginally situated knowers are implored to "understand" marginalizing practices, their agency is undermined, and possibly foreclosed. Pohlhaus distinguishes appropriate requests for understanding from inappropriate requests for understanding that burden marginalized knowers. She is explicit that she is not rejecting requests for understanding tout court. Moreover, she demonstrates how strategic refusals to understand "may provide a pathway toward new ways of knowing and being in resistance to oppressive regimes".[<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref21">21</reflink>] I return to this line of thought in a later section.</p> <p>Potter's remedy for uptake failure is the cultivation of a virtue of "giving uptake rightly", or a disposition to attend carefully and openly to the communication of another. She explains,To give uptake rightly, then, is not enough simply to receive another's speech act with the conventional understanding. One must appreciate and respond to the spirit in which something is expressed, take seriously what the speaker is trying to say and her reasons for saying it, and have the appropriate emotional and intellectual responses. Furthermore, one must recognize the responsibility attending social and political privilege. Indeed, giving uptake properly is partly constitutive of the kind of person one is—it requires cultivation of a certain kind of character.[<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref22">22</reflink>]</p> <p>It is also notable that, according to Potter, "giving uptake rightly" does not require that the one giving uptake agree with the person's claims. Giving uptake rightly in the sense of taking another's words and emotions "in the spirit" that they intended is, Potter insists, consistent with disagreement, although she acknowledges that "the more powerful must be on guard against the tendency to be dismissive of those claims".[<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref23">23</reflink>] While Potter's conceptualization of "giving uptake rightly" is helpful, turning to recent work around epistemic injustice offers additional dimensions of what uptake might mean in the context of systemic oppression.</p> <hd id="AN0176467225-3">Uptake as Credibility and Intelligibility</hd> <p>If, as Jose Medina contends, "inequality is the enemy of knowledge",[<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref24">24</reflink>] then the connection between uptake and epistemic injustice deserves attention. In her widely cited book, <emph>Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing</emph>,[<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref25">25</reflink>] Miranda Fricker addresses a distinctively epistemic type of injustice in which someone is wronged in their capacity as a knower. Fricker identifies two types of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Testimonial injustice occurs when "prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker's word"[<reflink idref="bib26" id="ref26">26</reflink>] or when an individual's expression of knowledge is granted less credibility due to factors such as race, gender, or other markers of marginalized social identity, what today is often referred to as implicit bias. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when the collective hermeneutical resources are shaped by the experiences of dominantly situated knowers so that a lacuna or gap in the conceptual or linguistic resources, according to Fricker, makes it difficult for the marginalized to understand their experiences. Both types of epistemic injustice, and the ways in which these concepts have been developed by others, have implications for the meaning of uptake.</p> <p>One of the cases that Miranda Fricker employs to illustrate testimonial injustice involves Tom Robinson's trial from <emph>To Kill a Mockingbird</emph>.[<reflink idref="bib27" id="ref27">27</reflink>] On Fricker's account, Robinson, a Black man on trial for rape of a white woman, experiences testimonial injustice because the jury does not give his claims uptake, in the sense of credibility, due to the color of his skin and position in society. Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr.[<reflink idref="bib28" id="ref28">28</reflink>] argues that the point is not only that Robinson is dismissed because of identity prejudice. Rather, he is treated as a truncated subject whose credibility is selectively affirmed or denied depending on whether it conforms to the dominantly situated knower's framework. Anything the target might try to express that is <emph>beyond dominant epistemic frameworks is unrecognized and not given uptake</emph>. When the marginalized knower's words challenge dominant frameworks of intelligibility, the dominantly situated knower either dismisses what is said or reshapes and misinterprets what is said in ways that fit the dominant framework. Pohlhaus alludes to the way that systemic ignorance impedes uptake and uptake failure reinforces systemic ignorance. Consequently, the harms of uptake failure regarding testimonial injustice begin to come into sharper focus.</p> <p>One of the harms of uptake failure is "testimonial smothering". Expanding upon Miranda Fricker's account of testimonial injustice, Kristie Dotson[<reflink idref="bib29" id="ref29">29</reflink>] introduces the concept of testimonial smothering which occurs when a speaker limits her testimony in anticipation that speaking will have certain risks because her audience is unwilling to or unable to appropriately interpret her testimony. Dotson refers to such silencing as a form of epistemic violence or a "refusal, intentional or unintentional, of a hearer to communicatively reciprocate a linguistic exchange owing to pernicious ignorance".[<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref30">30</reflink>] Building on Jennifer Hornsby's research, Dotson emphasizes that reciprocity is a necessary condition for a successful linguistic exchange. Resonant with Potter's analysis, Dotson maintains that reciprocity requires "that an audience understand a speaker's words and understand what the speaker is doing with the words".[<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref31">31</reflink>] When an audience fails to understand or is anticipated to fail to understand what the speaker is doing with words particularly due to pernicious ignorance or a reliable ignorance, the speaker may reasonably decide to "truncate...one's own testimony"[<reflink idref="bib32" id="ref32">32</reflink>] in various ways.</p> <p>Testimonial smothering, according to Dotson, is one such truncation of testimony and is a function of the unsafe and risky consequences of speaking. As an example of when testimony may be silenced because it is unsafe and risky, Dotson draws attention to when women of color remain silent about domestic violence to avoid contributing to the stereotype of the "violent Black male". Dotson, however, provides us with additional insights that are relevant to uptake. Testimonial smothering is a reasonable response to an audience who demonstrates testimonial incompetence with respect to the content of the testimony and when such testimonial incompetence is related to pernicious ignorance. Accurate intelligibility and testimonial competence, I argue, are also necessary for uptake.</p> <p>Accurate intelligibility refers to the audience's ability not only to understand the speaker's testimony but also "her/his ability to detect a failure to understand".[<reflink idref="bib33" id="ref33">33</reflink>] Dotson provides the example of a layperson listening to a lecture on nuclear physics. The person may understand something but recognizes that because of an admitted lack of expertise, they can detect and acknowledge when they fail to understand. This distinction is significant because being able to recognize when one does not know is necessary for reciprocal communication without which uptake fails and/or is deficient. This deepens the connection between uptake and disagreement that Potter acknowledges can be murky. If uptake calls for some type of epistemic humility, self-assured disagreement can impede uptake.</p> <p>Testimonial competence refers to the <emph>speaker's assessment</emph> of her audience. The speaker must be able to expect that the audience will find her testimony accurately intelligible. Testimonial incompetence is when the audience fails "to demonstrate to the speaker that they will find the proffered testimony accurately intelligible".[<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref34">34</reflink>] If the speaker anticipates that what she will say will not be intelligible, she may smother her testimony.</p> <p>Dotson offers the encounter that Cassandra Byers Harvin describes in her article "Conversations I Can't Have".[<reflink idref="bib35" id="ref35">35</reflink>] While doing research in a library, Harvin meets a white woman who asks what she is working on. Harvin replies, "My dissertation on raising Black sons in this society". Rather than asking with genuine interest if Harvin could explain more, the white woman inquires "without taking time to blink ... How is that any different from raising white sons?" Harvin writes, "her tone making clear that she just knows...I am making something out of nothing" which leads Harvin to anticipate that whatever reply she offers would not be intelligible to the white woman. Moreover, according to Harvin, this example of testimonial incompetence is laced with pernicious ignorance because whatever Harvin would have replied would be interpreted only from the white woman's perspective. As Potter acknowledges, the space between disagreement and uptake failure can be muddled and obscured. Harvin decides to withdraw from the conversation.</p> <p>The upshot of Dotson's account for my analysis of uptake under conditions of systemic oppression is that uptake requires accurate intelligibility as well as testimonial competence. Testimonial incompetence laced with pernicious ignorance is antithetical to uptake. What comes into clearer view is that uptake must consider dominant frameworks of intelligibility and how they are maintained. In addition, uptake is impeded by pernicious systemic ignorance. This is an apt segue to address Fricker's second type of epistemic injustice.</p> <p>Hermeneutical injustice occurs because "the powerful have an unfair advantage in structuring collective social understandings"[<reflink idref="bib36" id="ref36">36</reflink>] and this results in a lacuna in the conceptual or linguistic resources of a society. Fricker underscores that hermeneutical injustice makes it difficult for the marginalized to articulate wrongful social experience. In other words, it is "the injustice of having some significant area of one's social experiences obscured from collective understanding owing to a structural identity prejudice in the collective hermeneutical resource".[<reflink idref="bib37" id="ref37">37</reflink>] Fricker offers that before the term sexual harassment entered our public language, it was challenging for women to name their experience of unwanted sexualized attention because their experience was rendered unintelligible due to gaps in the shared epistemic resources. However, others have found flaws in Fricker's understanding of hermeneutical injustice.</p> <p>Pohlhaus.[<reflink idref="bib38" id="ref38">38</reflink>] for instance, maintains that marginally situated knowers often have hermeneutical resources that make sense of their experiences with systemic injustice. She introduces the concept of willful hermeneutical ignorance which is when hermeneutical resources to explain marginalized experience are available but dominantly situated knowers <emph>refuse</emph> to give such concepts uptake and apply them in the way they are intended. Epistemic resources are tools for understanding one's own experience, others' experiences, and ground bodies of knowledge, often contributing to new ways to interpret the world. The resources that marginalized knowers develop to explain their experiences are necessary to resist injustice.</p> <p>Returning to Fricker's case, the jury's lack of uptake of Robinson's claims goes deeper than just identity prejudice. Robinson is hermeneutically marginalized. It is not that the epistemic resources to understand what Robinson is saying are unavailable to the jury. Rather, the jury <emph>chooses</emph> to utilize distorted resources to interpret his claims. As Pohlhaus explicates, the jury fails to enter into a cooperative interdependent relation with knowers that are outside of their dominant framework of intelligibility. According to Pohlhaus, "The individual jurors' past and continuing failure to enter into cooperative epistemic interdependence with marginally situated knowers results in a current structural problem with regard to the transfer of knowledge".[<reflink idref="bib39" id="ref39">39</reflink>]</p> <p>The focus at this juncture is on uptake failure that targets <emph>the hermeneutical resources</emph> that marginally situated knowers develop. Robin Dembroff,[<reflink idref="bib40" id="ref40">40</reflink>] for instance, notes that without giving uptake to the concept of genderqueer, "a conceptual lacuna is sustained around the existence of nonbinary persons".[<reflink idref="bib41" id="ref41">41</reflink>] Similarly, a repeated misgendering of nonbinary persons is also a failure of uptake that is often a product of willful hermeneutical ignorance. This type of willful hermeneutical ignorance points to the ways in which dominantly situated knowers choose to employ prejudiced and distorted hermeneutical resources when they could have utilized resources that could more accurately explain marginalized experience. These insights emphasize that uptake requires considering the "the socio-epistemic circumstances" in which uptake is embedded.[<reflink idref="bib42" id="ref42">42</reflink>] The next section numerates some unjust conditions of engagement that impede uptake and harm marginalized knowers.</p> <hd id="AN0176467225-4">Unjust Conditions of Engagement, Harm, and Uptake Failure</hd> <p>Nora Berenstain[<reflink idref="bib43" id="ref43">43</reflink>] introduces the term epistemic exploitation to address the harmful effects that result when marginally situated knowers are called upon and expected "to produce an education or explanation about the nature of the oppression they face".[<reflink idref="bib44" id="ref44">44</reflink>] Berenstain argues that epistemic exploitation is accompanied by three specific harms: (a) enduring unpaid and unacknowledged intellectual and emotional labor, and their associated opportunity costs (b) the double-bind created by demands to educate, and (c) the unwarranted default skeptical responses that marginalized knowers must bear. When the unacknowledged labor of marginally situated knowers is consistently met with skepticism regarding the validity of their claims, when their claims are never given uptake, a double bind is experienced in which one either chooses to allow false claims about marginalized knowers go unchallenged or to provide epistemic labor that is not only unremunerated but is also denied uptake. Both choices are undesirable.</p> <p>This double bind becomes even more treacherous because, as Berenstain points out, epistemic exploitation and default skepticism often masquerade as normalized epistemic practices such as, 'just asking a question,' or 'making a well-intentioned effort to learn'.[<reflink idref="bib45" id="ref45">45</reflink>] Persistent calls for evidence, evidence that is never afforded credibility, for instance, makes it more difficult to pinpoint what such questioning does. Berenstain elaborates,The dominantly situated treat them [the marginalized] as fodder for skeptical responses and harvest them for content that can be developed into straw man arguments and rejected out of hand. This practice gives the appearance of a balanced, reasoned debate from which the privileged position of active ignorance emerges as the rational victor. The dominantly situated feign engagement with the marginalized but refuse to listen to them.[<reflink idref="bib46" id="ref46">46</reflink>]</p> <p>Such regressive cycles go nowhere yet harm marginally situated knowers in various ways, among which is the risk of creating self-doubt similar to that which is associated with gaslighting. Subsequently, no matter what marginally situated knower do, dominantly situated knowers set the terms of the discussion and their needs and comfort are centered.</p> <p>A good illustration of such default skepticism can be found in Sara Ahmed's[<reflink idref="bib47" id="ref47">47</reflink>] defense of canceling or deplatforming trans-exclusionary feminists. Ahmed explains that refusing to engage or withdrawing from conversation is a consequence of a trans-exclusionary logic grounded in a safeguarding "rebuttal system". Such a logic of rebuttal continuously invalidates trans existence by insisting that trans women are not women. Cancelling or withdrawing support, in this case, should be understood as a demand for legibility. This rebuttal system involves a demand for "evidence that is directed against evidence that has already been presented".[<reflink idref="bib48" id="ref48">48</reflink>] In other words, the evidence proffered is not afforded uptake. Such ad infinitum requests for evidence become impossible to satisfy.</p> <p>Isn't rebuttal just a characteristic of legitimate arguments? Ahmed, however, exposes a harmful form of rebuttal that involves questioning <emph>evidence of one's own existence</emph>. She underscores,When an existence is understood as needing evidence, then a rebuttal is directed not only against evidence but against an existence. An existence can be nullified by the requirement that an existence be evidenced. The very requirement to testify to your existence can end up being the very point of your existence.[<reflink idref="bib49" id="ref49">49</reflink>]</p> <p>Returning to some of the concerns briefly intimated in the classroom case described in the introduction, one might retort: But why are the beliefs of trans-exclusionary feminist not protected positions in dialogue? Ahmed position is sharply perceptive. Trans-exclusionary statements are not just another viewpoint at "a happy diversity table" because when you have dialogue or debate with those who wish to eliminate you from the conversation, for instance by not being willing to think your existence is possible, "then dialogue and debate becomes a mechanism of power".[<reflink idref="bib50" id="ref50">50</reflink>] When the legibility and legitimacy of one's being is constantly attacked (Ahmed refers to this as a "hammering away" of one's being, personhood, and subjectivity), then a refusal to dialogue is a tactic for survival and a form of resistance.</p> <p>Pohlhaus[<reflink idref="bib51" id="ref51">51</reflink>] similarly defends disengaging and encouraging others to disengage as a form of collective epistemic resistance under conditions of epistemic gaslighting. Pohlhaus builds upon Kate Abramson's[<reflink idref="bib52" id="ref52">52</reflink>] definition of gaslighting asA form of emotional manipulation in which the gaslighter tries (consciously or not) to induce in someone the sense that her reactions, perceptions, memories, and/or beliefs are not just mistaken, but utterly without grounds—paradigmatically, so unfounded as to qualify as crazy.[<reflink idref="bib53" id="ref53">53</reflink>]</p> <p>Gaslighting, then, is not only about unwarranted credibility deficit, but also about persuading the victim to lose <emph>all confidence in her epistemic agency</emph>. It does not just undermine epistemic agency, but it drives the victim to undermine <emph>her own epistemic authority</emph> so that she will conform with the gaslighter's views. Abramson argues that gaslighting paradigmatically arises when a woman challenges gender norms and when the one who gaslights is unable "to tolerate even the possibility of challenge".[<reflink idref="bib54" id="ref54">54</reflink>] The gaslighter not only aims to destroy the possibility of disagreement but does so in a way that ensures that the source of possible disagreement ("the independent, separate, deliberative perspective from which disagreement might arise"[<reflink idref="bib55" id="ref55">55</reflink>]), must be so undermined that "she has nowhere left to stand from which to disagree, no standpoint from which her words might constitute genuine disagreement".[<reflink idref="bib56" id="ref56">56</reflink>]</p> <p>Pohlhaus shifts the notion of gaslighting away from a focus on psychological breakdown and toward "a sort of epistemic breakdown: to put out of circulation a particular way of understanding the world".[<reflink idref="bib57" id="ref57">57</reflink>] Acknowledging that structural gaslighting pressures marginally situated knowers to ignore what they know, and recognizing when that presses marginalized knowers to view the world from the experiences of those who are dominantly positioned, intimates a type of uptake failure that functions to shortchange epistemic agency and that possibly limits agency in other ways as well.</p> <hd id="AN0176467225-5">Uptake Denial: Critical Agency Shortchanged58 and Defanged</hd> <p>(Resistance is) the heart and soul, the epistemic centerpiece, of democratic culture.[<reflink idref="bib59" id="ref58">59</reflink>]</p> <p>The scholarship around epistemic injustice tends to be oriented towards finding remedies for those who perpetrate injustices instead of focusing on how those who historically have been harmed by them survive and resist. Philosophers, Pohlhaus[<reflink idref="bib60" id="ref59">60</reflink>] and Medina[<reflink idref="bib61" id="ref60">61</reflink>] among them, have recently unequivocally and boldly attended to the agency of marginalized knowers. This shift builds upon and expands Dotson's definition of epistemic oppression that refers "to persistent epistemic exclusion that hinders one's contribution to knowledge production. Epistemic exclusion ... will be understood as unwarranted infringement on the epistemic agency of knowers".[<reflink idref="bib62" id="ref61">62</reflink>] Dotson elucidates that epistemic agency involves "the ability to utilize persuasively shared epistemic resources within a given epistemic community in order to participate in knowledge production and, if required, the revision of those same resources".[<reflink idref="bib63" id="ref62">63</reflink>]</p> <p>This scholarship has profound insights for understanding uptake under conditions of dominance and oppression and informs the type of pedagogical uptake I advance. Much can be gleaned about the meaning of uptake by focusing on the agential harms of uptake denial and by addressing how epistemic inclusions may be just as pernicious as epistemic exclusions, as alluded to in preceding sections. Medina argues that "...agential epistemic injustice is perpetrated against marginalized groups not only when their group epistemic agency is excluded, but also when it is included but receives <emph>defective uptake that neutralizes their capacity to resist epistemic oppression</emph>".[<reflink idref="bib64" id="ref63">64</reflink>]</p> <p>In "Epistemic Agency Under Oppression", Pohlhaus[<reflink idref="bib65" id="ref64">65</reflink>] begins by expanding Dotson's systems approach to epistemic oppression. Dotson importantly underscores that epistemic systems can be resilient, possessing practices such as epistemic exploitation, that sustain the system and shield it from challenge. Inclusion, therefore, is not only insufficient as the remedy for epistemic exclusions, but also dangerous. As Pohlhaus puts it,...inclusion within normatively governed systems may coercively direct the epistemic agency of marginalized knowers in ways that asymmetrically serve the epistemic interests of dominantly situated knowers while undermining their own.[<reflink idref="bib66" id="ref65">66</reflink>]</p> <p>The realization of justice, thus, requires the creation of new and different epistemic systems.</p> <p>Attempting to remedy injustice by making injustices evident to those who are not harmed by them and who benefit from them, according to Pohlhaus, "fixes attention on (and in service of) those privileged by systems of oppression by assuming the experienced world of those who are already privileged as a starting point".[<reflink idref="bib67" id="ref66">67</reflink>] The focus on raising the awareness of dominantly situated knowers "ignores the possibility that there are systems in place that perpetuate the ability to ignore".[<reflink idref="bib68" id="ref67">68</reflink>] As an illustration, she discusses how the #metoo movement, originally grounded in Black women's agency, was reappropriated by white women and their needs. Even when awareness was raised, this did not end epistemic oppression because raising awareness may put the onus on marginalized knowers to educate, and to endure default skepticism when they attempt to educate. Inclusion often rests on "providing epistemic labor (and) does not allow for the epistemic subjectivity of marginalized knowers explicitly to shape the direction of their labor".[<reflink idref="bib69" id="ref68">69</reflink>] Pohlhaus here references the work of Emmalon Davis,[<reflink idref="bib70" id="ref69">70</reflink>] Saba Fatima,[<reflink idref="bib71" id="ref70">71</reflink>] Nora Berenstain,[<reflink idref="bib72" id="ref71">72</reflink>] and Jeanine Weeks Schroer[<reflink idref="bib73" id="ref72">73</reflink>] as corroborating the pattern of harms to the agency of marginalized knowers.</p> <p>Pohlhaus concludes by recommending horizontal practices of resistance, a concept she borrow from Maria Lugones,[<reflink idref="bib74" id="ref73">74</reflink>] that resists fixing the gaze on the oppressor and instead involves marginalized knowers connecting with each other in ways that echo, strengthen, and support their epistemic agency. Jose Medina extends this argument in ways that offer additional insights into the pernicious effects of agential epistemic injustice.</p> <p>Medina defines agential epistemic injustice as "the discriminatory mistreatment of the epistemic agency of members of marginalized groups".[<reflink idref="bib75" id="ref74">75</reflink>] Notably, Medina underscores how such mistreatment ensues when "the exercise of the epistemic agency of members of marginalized groups is unfairly constrained, manipulated, or subverted".[<reflink idref="bib76" id="ref75">76</reflink>] In accord with Pohlhaus, Medina stresses that epistemic agency can still be mistreated when individuals are included. Epistemic injustice, then, is not only about unjust credibility or only about the exclusion of epistemic agency. It also encompasses cases where marginalized group members are included but they receive "defective uptake that <emph>neutralizes their capacity to resist epistemic oppression".</emph>[<reflink idref="bib77" id="ref76">77</reflink>] Medina addresses two types of harms resulting from defective uptake: epistemic disempowerment and defanging of the critical aspects of group epistemic agency.</p> <p>Epistemic disempowerment addresses a failure of proper recognition of group epistemic agency that can be perpetrated not only by individuals with bad intentions, but <emph>also</emph> by structures in which such disempowerment is deeply embedded in the very conditions of participation. Nevertheless, Medina is adamant that even in extreme cases of disempowerment, the marginalized find ways to resist. In support of horizontal resistance described above, Medina argues that epistemic self-empowerment is a form of epistemic activism. Significantly, epistemic disempowerment of marginalized groups is relationally linked to the epistemic empowerment of dominant groups. In other words, patterns of defective uptake as evidenced in epistemic exploitation benefit dominantly situated knowers in various ways, including protecting their innocence.</p> <p>Defanging of critical dimensions of agency is manifest when epistemic resources developed by marginalized groups gain defective uptake in the sense that the resources may be utilized but become detached either from the marginalized knowers who produced them (appropriation) and/or the resources are utilized in ways that benefit the powerful (as in the #metoo movement). The important point is the emphasis on how the critical force of resistance is defanged. Medina explains,When epistemic resources developed by marginalized groups are put at the service of dominantly situated groups, they become redirected (or misdirected, as Davis puts it) in a way that deflates or subverts the critical force and potential for epistemic resistance that those resources have for the originating communities.[<reflink idref="bib78" id="ref77">78</reflink>]</p> <p>Defective uptake, and not only uptake failure, risks diminishing the epistemic agency of marginally situated knowers. Agential epistemic resistance is a form of epistemic agency that supports the ability of epistemic resources that marginalized knowers develop to explain their experiences with injustice to undermine and transform oppressive systems. How might these weighty insights inform what pedagogical uptake means under conditions of systemic oppression?</p> <hd id="AN0176467225-6">Pedagogical Uptake and Marginally Situated Students' Critical Agency</hd> <p>A full account of what pedagogical uptake means and how it would be applied to social justice education must await another essay. Here, I begin to gather some ideas from the scholarship referenced above that might serve as signposts towards that aim and will motivate others to engage in this project.</p> <p>Uptake under conditions of systemic injustice begins with seriously considering and listening to what marginalized knowers say. Potter emphasizes that uptake in the context of systemic oppression must consist of educators appreciating and responding to the spirit of what a student is trying to say and the students' reasons for saying it. Moreover, the educator must respond appropriately, both emotionally and intellectually, always attending to social and political privilege. But this essay has attempted to go beyond this established view, arguing for a more demanding form of receptibility that accounts for what marginalized knowers experience and how they survive and resist.</p> <p>The scholarship around epistemic injustice expounds and enlarges what is required for pedagogical uptake. Fricker's work draws attention to the ways that identity prejudice can impede pedagogical uptake by denying credibility. Yet philosophers have expanded what Fricker offers. Pohlhaus explains how accurate intelligibility and testimonial competence are necessary to avoid uptake failure. Uptake of what a marginalized student is saying, thus, entails more than just acknowledging their words. It requires that educators possess the ability both to detect when they fail to understand their students as well as to work towards demonstrating to students that they can be trusted to find their students' testimony accurately intelligible. When marginalized students use hermeneutical resources to explain their experiences, for example, educators should not refuse to give such concepts uptake and, instead, apply them as they are intended. In addition, educators must be aware of patterns of failed uptake and default skepticism and interrupt such patterns when they manifest in their classrooms. Pohlhaus and Medina stress that epistemic inclusions can be just as pernicious as epistemic exclusions.</p> <p>Finally, pedagogical uptake entails recognizing agential epistemic injustice, countering defective uptake that neutralizes marginalized students' capacity to resist epistemic oppression. Pedagogical uptake under conditions of systemic oppression must ensure that epistemic disempowerment and defanging of the critical aspect of agency does not ensue. The uptake advanced here is focused on engaging dissonant voices in the classroom so that new frameworks of intelligibility become possible.</p> <p>I understand that these ideas raise many questions. I have been focused on what pedagogical uptake requires for marginalized knowers. Understanding pedagogical uptake, I submit, starts with a focus on marginalized knowers and what preserves and supports their critical agency. Then the question of the type of uptake is or isn't appropriate for dominantly situated knowers can be discussed. As Medina emphasizes, epistemic disempowerment of marginalized groups is relationally linked to the epistemic empowerment of dominant groups.</p> <p>It is still not at all clear what pedagogical uptake requires when we consider intersectionality. More needs to be addressed about the line between uptake and agreement/disagreement, and the vigilance required to avoid blurring that line. How might "echoing" that both Medina[<reflink idref="bib79" id="ref78">79</reflink>] and Pohlhaus[<reflink idref="bib80" id="ref79">80</reflink>] describe but was not specifically addressed here inform pedagogical uptake? Concerning dominantly situated knowers, what does pedagogical uptake mean and how is it different from the type of uptake advanced in this essay? Can pedagogical uptake avoid comforting students who need discomfort to create tension necessary to learn? Do those that harbor hateful, racist, or misogynistic voices warrant uptake and in pursuing such uptake do we run the risk not only of legitimizing those ideas but contributing to the violence that marginalized students bear?</p> <p>This is an invitation and a solicitation to raise and further engage with questions that may arise from this brief outline of pedagogical uptake in the context of systemic oppression. What issues require further consideration? How might you implement this type of uptake in your classroom? In other words, I welcome your uptake.</p> <p>The corresponding author states that there is no conflict of interest.</p> <hd id="AN0176467225-7">Publisher's Note</hd> <p>Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.</p> <ref id="AN0176467225-8"> <title> Footnotes </title> <blist> <bibl id="bib1" idref="ref1" type="bt">1</bibl> <bibtext> Vincent Lloyd. "A Black Professor Trapped in Anti-racist Hell".<emph>Compact Magazine</emph> (February 10, 2023).https://compactmag.com/article/a-black-professor-trapped-in-anti-racist-hell.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib2" idref="ref2" type="bt">2</bibl> <bibtext> Ibid.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib3" idref="ref3" type="bt">3</bibl> <bibtext> Ibid.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib4" idref="ref4" type="bt">4</bibl> <bibtext> Ibid.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib5" idref="ref5" type="bt">5</bibl> <bibtext> Ibid.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib6" idref="ref6" type="bt">6</bibl> <bibtext> Ibid.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib7" idref="ref7" type="bt">7</bibl> <bibtext> Mitchell Atencio. "Vincent Lloyd on Salvation from Anti-racist Hell".<emph>Sojourners</emph> (February 23, 2023).https://sojo.net/articles/vincent-lloyd-salvation-anti-racist-hell.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib8" idref="ref8" type="bt">8</bibl> <bibtext> Ibid.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib9" idref="ref9" type="bt">9</bibl> <bibtext> J. L. Austin.<emph>How to Do Things with Words.</emph> (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Kristie Dotson. "A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic Oppression".<emph>Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies</emph> 33/1 (2012): 24–47.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Nancy Potter. "Giving Uptake".<emph>Social Theory and Practice</emph> 26/3 (2000) 479–508; Nancy Potter.<emph>The Virtue of Defiance and Psychiatric Engagement</emph> (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Nancy Potter. "Giving Uptake", 481.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Nancy Potter.<emph>How Can I Be Trusted?: A Virtue Theory of Trustworthiness</emph> (Lanham: Rowman &amp; Littlefield, 2002): 150.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Marilyn Frye, <emph>The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory.</emph> (Trumansburg, New York: The Crossing Press, 1983).</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Claire Lockard. "The Charitability Gap: Misuses of Interpretive Charity in Academic Philosophy".<emph>Hypatia</emph> (forthcoming).</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Maria Lugones.<emph>Pilgrimages/peregrinajes: Theorizing coalition against multiple oppressions</emph>. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman &amp; Littlefield, 2003).</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Claire Lockard. "The Charitability Gap".</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ibid.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ibid.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr. "Wrongful Requests and Strategic Refusals to Understand". In Heidi Grasswick, ed., <emph>Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science: Power in Knowledge</emph> (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011): 223–240.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ibid., 223.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Nancy Potter. "Giving Uptake", 483.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ibid., 507.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Jose Medina.<emph>The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations</emph> (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 27.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Miranda Fricker.<emph>Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing</emph> (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ibid., 1.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Harper Lee.<emph>To Kill a Mockingbird</emph>. (Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott, 1960).</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Pohlhaus, Gaile Jr. "Discerning the Primary Epistemic Harm in Cases of Testimonial Injustice".<emph>Social Epistemology</emph> 28/2 (2014): 99–114.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Kristie Dotson, "Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing".</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ibid., 238.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ibid., 237.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ibid., 244.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ibid., 245.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ibid.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Cassandra Byers Harvin, "Conversations I Can't Have<emph>", On The Issues</emph> 5:2 (April 1996): 15.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Miranda Fricker.<emph>Epistemic Injustice</emph>, 147.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Miranda Fricker.<emph>Epistemic Injustice</emph>, 155.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Gaile Pohlhaus Jr. "Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a Theory of 'Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance'".<emph>Hypatia</emph> 27/4 (2012): 715–735.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ibid., 725.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Robin Dembroff. "Beyond Binary: Genderqueer as a Critical Gender Kind".<emph>Philosophers' Imprint</emph> 20/9 (2020): 2, 1–23.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ibid., 2.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Kristie Dotson, "Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing", 251.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Nora Berenstain. "Epistemic Exploitation".<emph>Ergo</emph> 3/22 (2016): 569–590.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ibid., 570.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ibid., 571.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ibid., 587.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Sara Ahmed. "An Affinity of Hammers".<emph>TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly</emph> 3/1–2 (2016): 22–34.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ibid., 29.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ibid.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ibid., 27.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Gaile Pohlhaus Jr. "Gaslighting and Echoing, or Why Collective Epistemic Resistance is not a 'Witch Hunt'".<emph>Hypatia</emph> 35/4 (2020): 674–686.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Kate Abramson. "Turning Up the Lights on Gaslighting".<emph>Philosophical Perspectives</emph> 28/1 (2014): 1–30.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ibid., 2.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ibid., 9.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ibid., 10.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ibid.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Gaile Pohlhaus Jr. "Gaslighting and Echoing", 677.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> I borrow this term from Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr. "Wrongful Requests": 227.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> José Medina. The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations. (Oxford University Press, 2013): 4.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Gaile Pohlhaus Jr. "Epistemic Agency Under Oppression".<emph>Philosophical Papers</emph> 49/2 (2020): 233–251.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> José Medina. "Group Agential Epistemic Injustice: Epistemic Disempowerment and Critical Defanging of Group Epistemic Agency.<emph>Philosophical Issues</emph> 32 (2022); 320–334.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Kristie Dotson. "Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression". Social Epistemology 28/2 (2014): 115–138, 115.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Kristie Dotson. "A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic Oppression". Frontiers: A Journal of Women's Studies 33/1 (2012): 24–47, 24.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> José Medina. "Group Agential Epistemic Injustice", 320 (emphasis added).</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Gaile Pohlhaus Jr. "Epistemic Agency Under Oppression".<emph>Philosophical Papers</emph> 49/2 (2020): 233–251.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ibid., 241.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ibid., 245.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ibid., 248.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ibid., 243.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Emmalon Davis. "Typecasts, Tokens, and Brands: Credibility Excess as Epistemic Vice".<emph>Hypatia </emph>31/3 (2006): 485–501.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Saba Fatima. "On the Edge of Knowing: Microaggression and Epistemic Uncertainty as a Woman of Color". In K. Cole and H. Hassel (eds), <emph>Surviving Sexism in Academia: Strategies for Feminist Leadership</emph> (New York: Routledge, 2007): 147–154.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Nora Berenstain. "Epistemic Exploitation".</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Jeanine Weekes Schroer. "Giving Them Something They Can Feel: On the Strategy of Scientizing the Phenomenology of Race and Racism".<emph>Knowledge Cultures</emph> 3/1 (2015): 91–110.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> María Lugones.<emph>Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes</emph>.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> José Medina. "Group Agential Epistemic Injustice", 322.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ibid.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ibid. 320 (emphasis added).</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ibid. 326.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> José Medina.<emph>The Epistemology of Protest: Silencing, Epistemic Activism, and the Communicative Life of Resistance</emph> (Oxford University Press, 2023).</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Gaile Pohlhaus Jr. "Gaslighting and Echoing".</bibtext> </blist> </ref> <aug> <p>By Barbara Applebaum</p> <p>Reported by Author</p> </aug> <nolink nlid="nl1" bibid="bib10" firstref="ref10"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl2" bibid="bib11" firstref="ref11"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl3" bibid="bib12" firstref="ref12"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl4" bibid="bib13" firstref="ref13"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl5" bibid="bib14" firstref="ref14"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl6" bibid="bib15" firstref="ref15"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl7" bibid="bib16" firstref="ref16"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl8" bibid="bib17" firstref="ref17"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl9" bibid="bib18" firstref="ref18"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl10" bibid="bib19" firstref="ref19"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl11" bibid="bib20" firstref="ref20"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl12" bibid="bib21" firstref="ref21"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl13" bibid="bib22" firstref="ref22"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl14" bibid="bib23" firstref="ref23"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl15" bibid="bib24" firstref="ref24"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl16" bibid="bib25" firstref="ref25"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl17" bibid="bib26" firstref="ref26"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl18" bibid="bib27" firstref="ref27"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl19" bibid="bib28" firstref="ref28"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl20" bibid="bib29" firstref="ref29"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl21" bibid="bib30" firstref="ref30"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl22" bibid="bib31" firstref="ref31"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl23" bibid="bib32" firstref="ref32"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl24" bibid="bib33" firstref="ref33"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl25" bibid="bib34" firstref="ref34"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl26" bibid="bib35" firstref="ref35"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl27" bibid="bib36" firstref="ref36"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl28" bibid="bib37" firstref="ref37"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl29" bibid="bib38" firstref="ref38"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl30" bibid="bib39" firstref="ref39"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl31" bibid="bib40" firstref="ref40"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl32" bibid="bib41" firstref="ref41"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl33" bibid="bib42" firstref="ref42"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl34" bibid="bib43" firstref="ref43"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl35" bibid="bib44" firstref="ref44"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl36" bibid="bib45" firstref="ref45"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl37" bibid="bib46" firstref="ref46"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl38" bibid="bib47" firstref="ref47"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl39" bibid="bib48" firstref="ref48"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl40" bibid="bib49" firstref="ref49"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl41" bibid="bib50" firstref="ref50"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl42" bibid="bib51" firstref="ref51"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl43" bibid="bib52" firstref="ref52"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl44" bibid="bib53" firstref="ref53"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl45" bibid="bib54" firstref="ref54"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl46" bibid="bib55" firstref="ref55"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl47" bibid="bib56" firstref="ref56"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl48" bibid="bib57" firstref="ref57"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl49" bibid="bib59" firstref="ref58"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl50" bibid="bib60" firstref="ref59"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl51" bibid="bib61" firstref="ref60"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl52" bibid="bib62" firstref="ref61"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl53" bibid="bib63" firstref="ref62"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl54" bibid="bib64" firstref="ref63"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl55" bibid="bib65" firstref="ref64"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl56" bibid="bib66" firstref="ref65"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl57" bibid="bib67" firstref="ref66"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl58" bibid="bib68" firstref="ref67"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl59" bibid="bib69" firstref="ref68"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl60" bibid="bib70" firstref="ref69"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl61" bibid="bib71" firstref="ref70"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl62" bibid="bib72" firstref="ref71"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl63" bibid="bib73" firstref="ref72"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl64" bibid="bib74" firstref="ref73"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl65" bibid="bib75" firstref="ref74"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl66" bibid="bib76" firstref="ref75"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl67" bibid="bib77" firstref="ref76"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl68" bibid="bib78" firstref="ref77"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl69" bibid="bib79" firstref="ref78"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl70" bibid="bib80" firstref="ref79"></nolink> |
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| Items | – Name: Title Label: Title Group: Ti Data: Pedagogical Uptake: Credibility, Intelligibility, and Agency – Name: Language Label: Language Group: Lang Data: English – Name: Author Label: Authors Group: Au Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Barbara+Applebaum%22">Barbara Applebaum</searchLink> (ORCID <externalLink term="http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5117-7397">0000-0002-5117-7397</externalLink>) – Name: TitleSource Label: Source Group: Src Data: <searchLink fieldCode="SO" term="%22Studies+in+Philosophy+and+Education%22"><i>Studies in Philosophy and Education</i></searchLink>. 2024 43(2):195-210. – Name: Avail Label: Availability Group: Avail Data: Springer. Available from: Springer Nature. One New York Plaza, Suite 4600, New York, NY 10004. Tel: 800-777-4643; Tel: 212-460-1500; Fax: 212-460-1700; e-mail: customerservice@springernature.com; Web site: https://link.springer.com/ – Name: PeerReviewed Label: Peer Reviewed Group: SrcInfo Data: Y – Name: Pages Label: Page Count Group: Src Data: 16 – Name: DatePubCY Label: Publication Date Group: Date Data: 2024 – Name: TypeDocument Label: Document Type Group: TypDoc Data: Journal Articles<br />Reports - Descriptive – Name: Subject Label: Descriptors Group: Su Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Credibility%22">Credibility</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Intelligibility%22">Intelligibility</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Educational+Practices%22">Educational Practices</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Social+Justice%22">Social Justice</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Educational+Philosophy%22">Educational Philosophy</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Mental+Health%22">Mental Health</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Power+Structure%22">Power Structure</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Epistemology%22">Epistemology</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Psychology%22">Psychology</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Social+Theories%22">Social Theories</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Resistance+%28Psychology%29%22">Resistance (Psychology)</searchLink> – Name: DOI Label: DOI Group: ID Data: 10.1007/s11217-023-09906-3 – Name: ISSN Label: ISSN Group: ISSN Data: 0039-3746<br />1573-191X – Name: Abstract Label: Abstract Group: Ab Data: This essay begins with the story of Vincent Lloyd who recounts a disturbing experience he had while teaching a course to a group of students of color. What does pedagogical uptake under conditions of systemic oppression require of educators? In the first section, I explore philosopher Nancy Potter's (Nancy Potter. "Giving Uptake". "Social Theory and Practice" 26/3 (2000) 479-508; Nancy Potter. "The Virtue of Defiance and Psychiatric Engagement" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016)) work on uptake, whose focus on the mental health field is important because she acknowledges power imbalances. Nevertheless, her understanding of uptake may be insufficient for considering such classroom cases that introduced this essay. The second section shifts the focus of uptake from a psychological approach to a more epistemic understanding of uptake that underscores credibility and intelligibility. Uptake as credibility and intelligibility reveals the everyday patterns of uptake failure that marginalized knowers experience in the socio-epistemic world, described in section three. A recent turn in the scholarship of epistemic injustice towards epistemic agency and resistance is taken up in the subsequent section and applied to the conceptualization of uptake. In the concluding section, I begin to explore how these insights contribute to a notion of pedagogical uptake under conditions of systemic oppression. – Name: AbstractInfo Label: Abstractor Group: Ab Data: As Provided – Name: DateEntry Label: Entry Date Group: Date Data: 2024 – Name: AN Label: Accession Number Group: ID Data: EJ1419524 |
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| RecordInfo | BibRecord: BibEntity: Identifiers: – Type: doi Value: 10.1007/s11217-023-09906-3 Languages: – Text: English PhysicalDescription: Pagination: PageCount: 16 StartPage: 195 Subjects: – SubjectFull: Credibility Type: general – SubjectFull: Intelligibility Type: general – SubjectFull: Educational Practices Type: general – SubjectFull: Social Justice Type: general – SubjectFull: Educational Philosophy Type: general – SubjectFull: Mental Health Type: general – SubjectFull: Power Structure Type: general – SubjectFull: Epistemology Type: general – SubjectFull: Psychology Type: general – SubjectFull: Social Theories Type: general – SubjectFull: Resistance (Psychology) Type: general Titles: – TitleFull: Pedagogical Uptake: Credibility, Intelligibility, and Agency Type: main BibRelationships: HasContributorRelationships: – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Barbara Applebaum IsPartOfRelationships: – BibEntity: Dates: – D: 01 M: 01 Type: published Y: 2024 Identifiers: – Type: issn-print Value: 0039-3746 – Type: issn-electronic Value: 1573-191X Numbering: – Type: volume Value: 43 – Type: issue Value: 2 Titles: – TitleFull: Studies in Philosophy and Education Type: main |
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