Recovering from Domination: Pettit's Republicanism and the Case for Rehabilitative Education
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| Title: | Recovering from Domination: Pettit's Republicanism and the Case for Rehabilitative Education |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Authors: | Tugba Sevinç (ORCID |
| Source: | Studies in Philosophy and Education. 2025 44(1):1-20. |
| Availability: | Springer. Available from: Springer Nature. One New York Plaza, Suite 4600, New York, NY 10004. Tel: 800-777-4643; Tel: 212-460-1500; Fax: 212-460-1700; e-mail: customerservice@springernature.com; Web site: https://link.springer.com/ |
| Peer Reviewed: | Y |
| Page Count: | 20 |
| Publication Date: | 2025 |
| Document Type: | Journal Articles Reports - Research |
| Descriptors: | Role of Education, Citizenship Education, Democracy, Freedom, Political Attitudes, Politics of Education, Rehabilitation, Psychological Patterns, Moral Issues, Individual Development |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11217-024-09963-2 |
| ISSN: | 0039-3746 1573-191X |
| Abstract: | This article critically engages with Philip Pettit's civic republican theory, particularly his account of what it takes to realize non-domination in society. Despite providing a comprehensive analysis of the institutional prerequisites for realizing non-domination, Pettit surprisingly overlooks the critical role of education in achieving this goal. Pettit's neglect of republican education has been widely criticized, and a growing body of literature seeks to develop a civic education theory suitable for civic republican purposes. While there is considerable disagreement in the literature regarding the content and methods of republican education, almost all consider its scope restricted to the pupil's education. Pettit's insufficient understanding of domination's ill effects constrains our ability to envision a comprehensive educational response. In contrast, the republican tradition provides more substantial reasons for condemning domination and a richer account of the harms of domination, including a detailed account of the pervasive moral, developmental, and psychological harms. By drawing on women republicans of the 18th century (Mary Wollstonecraft, Sophie de Grouchy) and contemporary feminists (I. M. Young, and others), the article aims to establish the case for rehabilitative education, utilizing Tostan (an African-based NGO) as a model for its pedagogy and implementation. Such reconstruction requires challenging core tenets of Pettit's theory, such as his dismissal of positive liberty, the limited role he assigns to civil society organizations, and how he envisions the politics of republicanism. Hence, by revisiting and taking issue with Pettit's republicanism, the article advocates for rehabilitative education programs to overcome domination and envisions a more engaged and grassroots political framework for the politics of republicanism. |
| Abstractor: | As Provided |
| Entry Date: | 2025 |
| Accession Number: | EJ1460896 |
| Database: | ERIC |
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| FullText | Links: – Type: pdflink Url: https://content.ebscohost.com/cds/retrieve?content=AQICAHj0k_4E0hTGH8RJwT4gCJyBsGNe_WN95AvKlDbXJGqwxwGdoawUsfWGfkSPfYFlfLAbAAAA4zCB4AYJKoZIhvcNAQcGoIHSMIHPAgEAMIHJBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHgYJYIZIAWUDBAEuMBEEDP41Mdcx9Pb0uNG0mQIBEICBmxH8hIwqY58lePP3wIy-VjxSyvJIkIwYowOLzc2WxrXBerN0zggHbSF907p3_UH2nYSZc4K-fiekDImM1ZrNPNXTCqDXQjTCU9QbaKwHiyBY8-TWE-OD040MLC2QCcS9lw7A36quAPkvD-tEHhkzskb7hRGMextDCDzof4bGcSEKEzPZj31Quk9qJ_OxplCY9u9Mmo-URrW3la_3 Text: Availability: 1 Value: <anid>AN0183080046;sps01feb.25;2025Feb19.04:44;v2.2.500</anid> <title id="AN0183080046-1">Recovering from Domination: Pettit's Republicanism and the Case for Rehabilitative Education </title> <p>This article critically engages with Philip Pettit's civic republican theory, particularly his account of what it takes to realize non-domination in society. Despite providing a comprehensive analysis of the institutional prerequisites for realizing non-domination, Pettit surprisingly overlooks the critical role of education in achieving this goal. Pettit's neglect of republican education has been widely criticized, and a growing body of literature seeks to develop a civic education theory suitable for civic republican purposes. While there is considerable disagreement in the literature regarding the content and methods of republican education, almost all consider its scope restricted to the pupil's education. Pettit's insufficient understanding of domination's ill effects constrains our ability to envision a comprehensive educational response. In contrast, the republican tradition provides more substantial reasons for condemning domination and a richer account of the harms of domination, including a detailed account of the pervasive moral, developmental, and psychological harms. By drawing on women republicans of the 18th century (Mary Wollstonecraft, Sophie de Grouchy) and contemporary feminists (I. M. Young, and others), the article aims to establish the case for rehabilitative education, utilizing Tostan (an African-based NGO) as a model for its pedagogy and implementation. Such reconstruction requires challenging core tenets of Pettit's theory, such as his dismissal of positive liberty, the limited role he assigns to civil society organizations, and how he envisions the politics of republicanism. Hence, by revisiting and taking issue with Pettit's republicanism, the article advocates for rehabilitative education programs to overcome domination and envisions a more engaged and grassroots political framework for the politics of republicanism.</p> <p>Keywords: Domination; Civic republicanism; Philip pettit; Mary wollstonecraft; Tostan; Rehabilitative education; Civil society organizations</p> <p>Copyright comment Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.</p> <hd id="AN0183080046-2">Introduction</hd> <p>One of the most significant contributions to contemporary political philosophy is undoubtedly Philip Pettit's procedural interpretation of republican theory, characterized by its distinctive conception of political liberty (as non-domination) and the institutional requirements for its realization.[<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref1">1</reflink>] For Pettit, the greatest evil that our political institutions must fight against is not "interference" as in the liberal tradition, but "domination," being subjected to the arbitrary (uncontrolled) power of others. Hence, the real threat to liberty lies not in overt interference but in the mere existence of a master who has the potential to intervene at will. Pettit claims that liberty as non-domination is better suited to understand and address contemporary forms of domination, such as the situation of women, ethnic and religious minorities, workers, LGBT + people, people of color, and many others. All still mark areas of social (if not legal) status hierarchies and the possible venues for arbitrary interference. While Pettit's theory is appealing in its promises, I contend that it suffers from two significant shortcomings, which profoundly limit the theory's ability to identify and fight against domination. While thoroughly describing the political institutions required to eliminate domination, largely formulated as legal restrictions and preventions that stop people from interfering with others on arbitrary grounds, Pettit, firstly does not seriously consider republican education as a tool to achieve non-domination, and, secondly, unconvincingly limits the role of other civil society actors, such as civil society organizations in the realization of the ideal of non-domination. These points are particularly noteworthy considering the emphasis on civic virtue (and the need for civic education that fosters it) in the republican tradition and the need for social transformation in feminist theory. To identify and address these shortcomings, this article offers a critical engagement with Philip Pettit's theory of domination, seeking to reconceptualize its consequences for individuals and to identify the prerequisites for its complete elimination. This discussion challenges the widely held assumption in civic republican theory that republican liberty as nondomination is a negative concept distinct from positive liberty. Despite this being conceptually the case, I argue that non-domination cannot be detached from positive liberty in practice and realized independently.[<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref2">2</reflink>] With Wollstonecraft, Sophie de Grouchy, I. M. Young, and others, I develop a fuller account of the harms of domination and contend that Pettit's oversight of the profound impacts of domination on individuals leads him to underestimate the pivotal role positive liberty plays in inspiring people to embrace and pursue non-domination as a political ideal. Overall, I will argue that overcoming domination necessitates transforming oppressive cultures and traditions, which demands a well-thought-out republican education theory with a distinct rehabilitative education program directed at dominated people. Since civil society organizations are particularly well-suited for rehabilitative education as they can directly engage with individuals and challenge oppressive structures from below, rehabilitative education programs demand more engaged republican politics. The article will be structured as follows.</p> <p>The first section problematizes Pettit's central claim in <emph>Republicanism</emph>, that is, non-domination is a personal good that everyone wants and values, showing that some people might not want and value non-domination for reasons substantively significant for Pettit's theory. The second section reveals the underlying substantial conception of the person that informs classical republicans' critique of domination. This conception prioritizes values such as self-realization, personal autonomy, virtue, and dignity. Notably, Pettit does not endorse the substantial ideal of the person classical republicans held, nor does he make explicit another normative foundation to account for the value of non-domination over non-interference. As a result, he fails to account for why some―especially the dominated people―fail to value non-domination and see it as a good to pursue. Investigating this last point is essential to substantiate my argument that Pettit's assessment of the harms of domination, as well as his proposed remedies, is insufficient. The third section develops a more comprehensive account of the ill effects of domination, emphasizing the profound psychological harms and the resulting impoverishments in central human capacities. The upshot of this extensive discussion will be that domination <emph>erodes</emph> people's desire for independence and freedom, which constitutes an obstacle (to varying degrees) to institutionalizing and securing non-domination. The third section concludes the necessity of rehabilitative education targeted at adults, utilizing Tostan ―an Africa-based women's and human rights NGO known for its role in ending female genital cutting― to demonstrate a potential model for such a rehabilitative education program. The fourth section establishes the necessity of a republican education theory for fostering the civility required in Pettit's theory, whereas the fifth section argues the necessity of a distinct rehabilitative education framework, particularly in contexts where the lingering effects of domination are pronounced or where societal norms and traditions continue to perpetuate domination. The last section criticizes Pettit for reducing the role of civil society organizations to democratic contestation alone and, as a result, sacrificing one of the essential tools for social transformation and rehabilitative education. Challenging Pettit's state-centered approach, the article concludes by underscoring the necessity of a grassroots-oriented framework for republican politics.</p> <hd id="AN0183080046-3">The Case of a Cunning Woman</hd> <p>In <emph>Republicanism</emph>, Pettit claims that freedom as non-domination is a "personal good that practically everyone has reason to <emph>want</emph>, and more generally, to <emph>value</emph>" (Pettit [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref3">24</reflink>], 80–81, my emphasis). It is this claim that I will problematize, arguing that some people might not <emph>want</emph> and <emph>value</emph> non-domination for reasons substantively significant for Pettit's theory. Pettit's argument for non-domination is straightforward and fundamentally builds on the established value of non-interference for persons. Almost everyone assumes that non-interference is good: People <emph>desire</emph> it for themselves and admit it is <emph>desirable</emph> for everyone else. And, like non-interference, non-domination is an <emph>instrumental</emph> good, "a good that generates other benefits for the individual who enjoys it" (Pettit [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref4">24</reflink>], p. 82).</p> <p>His purpose with this argument is to convince us that as instrumental good, non-domination serves people better than non-interference; hence, it is a better ideal. Pettit underscores that the major instrumental benefit of non-interference is "the enjoyment of choice that is not affected by intentional blocking and inhibition by others" ([<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref5">24</reflink>], 84). He admits that the republican conception might fall short of providing the same amount―since it does not condemn all interference as evil, but only arbitrary interference. Yet, Pettit argues that the republican conception of liberty "compensates and more than compensates" this lack by providing <emph>three additional benefits</emph> that emerge as an outcome of the removal of domination―relief from uncertainty, relief from the need for strategic deference and anticipation, and the subjective and intersubjective benefits associated with the public recognition of equal status. In other words, even though the area of unobstructed choice might be greater under non-interference, people would still <emph>prefer</emph> non-domination for the attractiveness (or importance) of the additional benefits it affords. To quote Pettit: "Given that freedom as non-domination is bound up in this way with the effects discussed, how could <emph>anyone</emph> fail to <emph>want</emph> it for themselves, or fail to <emph>recognize it as a value</emph>?" (Pettit [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref6">24</reflink>], p. 90, my emphasis).[<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref7">3</reflink>]</p> <p>To illustrate my problem with Pettit's argument, imagine a different version of Pettit's story from Henrik Ibsen's play <emph>A Doll's House</emph> (Pettit [<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref8">30</reflink>]). Let this time be the female protagonist, a cunning woman who knows how to realize her wishes without drawing her husband's rage. If she gets what she wants, she might not complain about the ways she enjoys non-interference and even not consider her ways "demeaning". Quite the contrary, in a patriarchal culture where such techniques are conceived of as feminine art and smartness (as Rousseau ([<reflink idref="bib33" id="ref9">33</reflink>]) describes them positively), women are socially encouraged to learn such pleasing attitudes and strategic techniques in their dealings with men. We might even think of her getting satisfaction from her cunning ways and considering these as accomplishments. What is missing in Pettit's account is a consideration for the fact that the female protagonist in the story (and the dominated people in general) might not value non-domination and exchange a larger area of unobstructed choice for a lesser but non-dominated choice due to their social conditioning within dominating social structures. Thus, I claim that people will value and prefer non-domination only in so far as they are already committed to a particular ideal (or moral view) that allows them to see themselves and judge their actions as well as their situation under domination as 'bad,' 'demeaning,' 'improper' for human beings, or 'incompatible' with human dignity. However, it is precisely this (or similar) ideal of the person and people's capacity to become such persons is undermined by domination. I claim that Pettit has never given sufficient attention to why some people fail to value non-domination or content with their status of domination. Nor is he concerned with offering strategies that remedy such ill effects of domination. However, as will be seen later, this is a burning issue for many in the republican tradition.</p> <p>At one point, Pettit gets closer to the problem I am raising here and acknowledges that people differ in their preferences or what they consider most important: having a choice or having an <emph>undominated</emph> choice. Yet, he neither explains nor inquires why some people are more <emph>sensitive</emph> to the quality of choice and not merely its quantity, taking the difference in preferences as given. I quote Pettit at length:Those who are attached to the ideal of non-interference value the fact of having a choice ―the fact of non-interference―whether the choice is dominated or not; those who embrace the ideal of non-domination value the fact of having undominated choice, but not necessarily the fact of having choice as such. They [those who embrace the ideal of non-domination] do not mind the lack of choice that results from non-arbitrary interference, and they may <emph>despise</emph> the sort of choice that you enjoy by grace of your own cunning or charms or ingratiation, seeing it as a <emph>demeaning</emph> and <emph>despicable</emph> bequest. The first group focus on the quantity of choice available, no matter what kind of choice is involved; the second are interested only in the choice of the right, undominated quality. (Pettit [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref10">24</reflink>], p. 25, my emphasis)</p> <p>However, in such basic choices, as argued by Charles Taylor, we are not "simple weigher of alternatives" (hence, the choice is not merely about counting the benefits and costs of alternative ideals and preferring one over the other), but instead, we are "strong evaluators:" Our choice presumes the kind of life we consider valuable and the person we aspire to be (Taylor [<reflink idref="bib39" id="ref11">39</reflink>], 15–44). Most importantly, the choice is based on a moral outlook by which we identify situations as harmful or beneficial. That is, the choice of non-domination over non-interference presumes an understanding of what it is to be properly human, hence a normative view by which we evaluate certain character traits as appropriate or inappropriate and specific situations as harmful, unacceptable, or despicable. With a closer analysis of the harms of domination, in the next section, I will underscore the existence of a substantial moral ideal of the person presumed in classical republicans' critique of domination. Nevertheless, Pettit does not endorse the republican ideal explicitly, nor does he make explicit another normative foundation to ground his arguments.[<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref12">4</reflink>]</p> <hd id="AN0183080046-4">The Republican Ideal of the Person</hd> <p>Unlike Pettit, classical republicans endorse a substantial conception of the person to which self-mastery (personal autonomy) and other perfectionist themes such as self-realization and virtue are central. They condemn domination and conceptualize its effects as <emph>evil</emph> based on this substantial account of the person (in addition to other reasons below). The republican ideal of the person (or the good life more broadly) helps explain not only why some people value undominated choice but also why republicans are more concerned with education and promoting civic virtues compared to other traditions. In this and the following sections, I will flesh out the consequences of omitting the republican ideal of the person―and the associated positive liberty themes―for Pettit's theory.</p> <p>Pettit explains that for republicans, arbitrary interference is worse than non-arbitrary interference because persons subjected to arbitrary interference suffer from additional evils such as living in a state of uncertainty, struggling with anxiety and wretchedness in addition to actual coercion (Pettit [<reflink idref="bib28" id="ref13">28</reflink>], 344). Republicans acknowledge the possibility of enjoying non-interference through wit, cunning, and strategic flattery (Pettit [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref14">24</reflink>], p. 86). Yet, for them, such freedom is not <emph>worthwhile</emph>. But Pettit does not say what exactly <emph>decreases</emph> the value of having an unobstructed choice when it is enjoyed through cunning and strategic deference for classical republicans. At this point, Quentin Skinner provides a much more explicit discussion.</p> <p>Skinner underscores what worries seventeenth-century British republicans like Sidney, Milton, and Harrington about dependence is that slavery or dependence prevents counselors and officers in the government from speaking and acting for the common good of the republic. When counselors are subjected to the capricious will of the king and fear for their lives and property, instead of speaking honestly, they try to please the king and safeguard their position and lives. Secondly, republicans worry that it is not wise and honorable men but flatterers and liars who accept such despicable conditions of service. Their argument about the ill effects of dependence, in the political context, focuses on the ill consequences of dependence on the general well-being of the republic. Hence, in their view, dependence is evil because corrupting the counselors ultimately harms the republic's common good (Skinner [<reflink idref="bib37" id="ref15">37</reflink>], 89–92).</p> <p>In addition to this, however, one detects another line of argument that adopts a moral perspective, claiming that virtuous and noble human action is impossible under conditions of servitude. As Skinner demonstrates through an extensive quotation from classical republican texts, republicans make a moral distinction between the figure of the slavish counselors as "persons of obnoxious character" and the figure of the country gentleman defined by his virtue and upright standing (Skinner [<reflink idref="bib37" id="ref16">37</reflink>], 94–96). By being subjected to dependence, republicans say, a person loses moral dignity and her ability to develop a noble, virtuous character. Similarly, Wollstonecraft depicts women as corrupted, degraded, incapable of virtue, "a fanciful kind of half being," and lacking dignity (Wollstonecraft [<reflink idref="bib43" id="ref17">43</reflink>], 52, 68–73). Sophie de Grouchy depicts the king's subjects as morally, emotionally, and psychologically immature, hence acting childlike (Berges [<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref18">3</reflink>]). Thus, for republicans, dependence is evil since it <emph>corrupts</emph> people and prevents them from being/becoming and acting <emph>properly</emph> (and fully) human. And what is involved in "being/becoming and acting properly human" constitutes classical republicans' critique of domination. Thus, republicans condemn domination because it prevents the realization of the moral ideal of the person they uphold (in addition to the political reason above). Pettit borrows their conclusion and condemns domination without acknowledging the background moral framework that enables republicans to call domination evil in the first place.</p> <p>In later works, Pettit explicitly limits his project to what he calls "political freedom," hence, the harms of domination theme with its emphasis on distorted character, strategic attitude, and the psychological and mental barriers they pose, such as self-denial, lose significance (Pettit [<reflink idref="bib26" id="ref19">26</reflink>], 47–49). I read Pettit's revisions as an attempt to distance his theory further from the positive themes presumed in classical republicans' critique of domination. Yet, as seen below, these omissions have important implications for his theory due to the complex relationship between the ideal of non-domination and personal autonomy. I argue that given the profound and pervasive ways self-denial and other psychological and behavioral effects of domination inflict on the dominated people, without rehabilitative education, hence promoting personal autonomy and the capacities essential to exercise it, realizing the ideal of non-domination might be seriously jeopardized.</p> <hd id="AN0183080046-5">A Feminist Account of the Harms of Domination</hd> <p>The limits of Pettit's analysis of the harms of domination, and consequently the shortcomings of his strategy proposals, will be best seen in comparison to Wollstonecraft's republicanism as she employs the republican ideas to illustrate the plight of women as one of double slavery. As Lena Halldenius rightly puts it, Wollstonecraft's challenge to republicanism voices 'the lived experience of being subordinated' (2017, 98). In <emph>A Vindication of the Rights of Women</emph>, Wollstonecraft writes that women are slaves to men, yet they do not <emph>view</emph> their situation as one of slavery. According to Wollstonecraft, there are two reasons for this. First, women have certain advantages associated with their inferior status, such as being treated like "queens," paid homage, and provided with the necessities of life and luxuries by men. That is partly why, for Wollstonecraft, they submit to oppression just like men who submit to political dependence and are "degraded by the same propensity to enjoy the present moment" (Wollstonecraft [<reflink idref="bib43" id="ref20">43</reflink>], 67). Second, and most importantly for my purposes, Wollstonecraft thinks that women's long-lasting dependence hinders their capacities for reasoning, critical evaluation, and contemplation that are necessary to 'value' and 'desire' freedom in the first place. Thus, because of their social conditioning (or "education"), women "<emph>despise</emph> the freedom which they have not sufficient virtue to struggle to attain" (Wollstonecraft [<reflink idref="bib43" id="ref21">43</reflink>], 68, my emphasis). As a result of their dependence, not only are they unable to fight against slavery, but they are also content with their dependence and do not value freedom (Berges [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref22">2</reflink>], p. 87). In this context, Wollstonecraft depicts women as in love with their chains, characterizing the pervasive effects of domination on their judgments (Wollstonecraft [<reflink idref="bib43" id="ref23">43</reflink>], 105). Wollstonecraft makes two distinct points: first, women lack capacities for attaining freedom since the necessary capacities are either curbed or left uncultivated by their social education within dominating social structures; second, they do not desire freedom or consider it a valuable objective to pursue. Most importantly, for Wollstonecraft, women do not want freedom―not because they strategically adjust themselves to their situation (as in Elster's fox-grape story), but instead because they are <emph>incapable</emph> of forming this desire at all due to their social conditioning (Berges [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref24">2</reflink>], 103–105). This point is crucial for my argument since one of the effects of long-lasting domination is that it <emph>erodes</emph> in people (or prevents the formation of) the desire for independence (or dislike for having masters). Thus, Wollstonecraft argues that <emph>dependence</emph> becomes second nature to women because of their upbringing and education. As will be seen shortly, this will have important implications for the politics required to eliminate domination.</p> <p>Sophie de Grouchy, another prominent republican of the 18th century, also stresses the moral and psychological costs of domination, in addition to what she calls the economic costs of providing a luxurious life to a monarch. In agreement with the other republicans of her century, Grouchy stresses that domination makes people permanently anxious about arbitrary interference and puts them in a position of continual guarding against the possibility of such a threat. Berges stresses that this fear of tyrannical intervention could only be bearable "through a general psychological repression of the truth" (Berges [<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref25">4</reflink>]). Like what Wollstonecraft says of women and how their reality is distorted, namely, women love their chains and entertain themselves with vain activities; Grouchy states that having a king, no matter benevolent, and being subjected to his arbitrary power, the French people can never grow up to think and act for themselves, never grow mature enough to grasp the severity of their situation. Instead, they act like children―they are easily entertained and distracted― and remain forever as such. Grouchy stresses that domination hinders people's moral and psychological development; as a result, they direct their respect and put their loyalty to improper objects. They fail to love their <emph>liberty</emph> and desire it as expected from mature adults but childishly love and attach to their oppressors (Berges [<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref26">3</reflink>]). For Grouchy, mature sentiments extend to principles (the laws) and humanity in general rather than attaching to the particulars or those close to us (Berges [<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref27">3</reflink>]). Grouchy stresses that people cannot fully develop and exercise their moral, emotional, and rational faculties if subjected to arbitrary power. Hence, for her, the cost of domination is eternal childhood and failing to realize one's full human potential. Civic education is needed to grow up, namely, to complete one's moral development as a human being. However, such education is not limited to embracing civic values; it must include cultivating proper psychological habits (Berges [<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref28">3</reflink>]). In Grouchy's view, too, we see that political independence is linked to human development (rational, moral, and emotional) and one's capacity to be autonomous.</p> <p>Contemporary theorists support republicans' analysis of the profound psychological harms of domination and stress the ways it disturbs the desires and aspirations of the dominated. Bartky ([<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref29">1</reflink>]), for instance, stresses how women are subjected to stereotyping, cultural domination, and sexual objectification. She points out that women internalize the beliefs, ideas, values, and judgments of their oppressors, seeing themselves through the oppressors' lens. Internalization of inferiority leads the victim of oppression not to believe in themselves, their power, or their capacities. Bartky underscores that even when economic and political oppression are removed through legal and institutional means, "a depreciated alter ego still blocks the way." Bartky famously calls this situation <emph>false consciousness</emph> (Bartky [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref30">1</reflink>], p. 23). Likewise, Frank Lovett stresses that permanent domination undermines a subject's self-respect and sense of worth, leading subjects to believe in their lack of worth and ultimately to reconcile with their dominated status (Lovett [<reflink idref="bib17" id="ref31">17</reflink>], p. 132). Lovett holds that domination leads people to arrange themselves to their unpleasant circumstances and to come to terms with their domination, either believing they deserve it or that it is good for them. So, as a result of domination, not only do they develop a pleasing attitude to cope with uncertainty, but also, in time, they adopt the preferences of the powerful as their own (self-denial in Pettit's account). Lovett underscores that in its most tragic version, Stockholm syndrome, the dominant person starts seeing their oppressor as furthering their good. For Sen ([<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref32">34</reflink>]), lifelong deprivation and oppression will eliminate dissatisfaction or dislike in people since people become used to their deprivation and indeed feel content with their poverty or dominated status, which in turn curbs their motivation (and ability) to improve the quality of their life. It is in this context that Nussbaum argues oppressed women had to go through a two-stage process of awareness to achieve non-domination: first, to identify their situation as "bad," and second, to see themselves as "citizens who had a right to a better situation" (Nussbaum [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref33">21</reflink>], p. 140). For Nussbaum, too, domination seriously curbs people's ability to identify their situation as one of domination and consequently leads to the inability to transform their situation for the better. Wollstonecraft, too, stresses that in their present state of oppression, women are powerless, lacking the necessary mental tools, awareness, and capacities to fight against their oppression. Thus, for her, not only do women lack social, political, and economic rights and equal opportunities with men, but also mental power, awareness, and self-understanding. As will be seen below, her extensive analysis of the ill effects of long-lasting domination informs her analysis of what it requires to achieve freedom: rational education― that supports the exercise of understanding instead of their sensibilities (Wollstonecraft [<reflink idref="bib43" id="ref34">43</reflink>], 79) and the social revolution in female manners―by allowing women to take an active part in all areas of social life (Wollstonecraft [<reflink idref="bib43" id="ref35">43</reflink>], 60; Coffee [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref36">5</reflink>]).</p> <p>Wollstonecraft frequently equates slavery with "dependence of the mind" and not only with social and political dependence (Wollstonecraft [<reflink idref="bib43" id="ref37">43</reflink>], 67). Thus, her understanding of freedom as independence is a hybrid of positive and negative conceptions where these two mutually reinforce (or hinder) each other (Coffee [<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref38">6</reflink>], p. 912). In her view, freedom refers first to the ability to act without seeking anyone's permission (corresponding to what Pettit calls non-domination or non-mastery) and second to the capacity to reason and think for oneself (like Kant's notion of autonomy, we should not blindly follow others―opinions, emotions, prejudices, or customs, but rely on our reason). Most importantly, for my purposes, these two (civic independence and independence of the mind) are intertwined so that if we are dependent in one sense, this also hinders our ability to be independent in the other sense (Coffee [<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref39">6</reflink>]). How are we to understand this connection?</p> <p>Iris M. Young offers a detailed account of how civic independence and independence of the mind are tied together. She points out that "institutional constraints on self-development" (oppression) usually include or entail "the institutional constraints on self-determination" (domination). Young argues that in all its forms (be it exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence), oppression hinders people's ability to develop and exercise crucial capacities against domination and express their feelings, needs, desires, and experiences, which in turn makes them dependent on others, powerless, and easily ignored in decision-making (Young [<reflink idref="bib44" id="ref40">44</reflink>], 48–63). Young holds that to the extent that people fail to develop specific capacities due to subjection to oppression (such as expression of one's experience, capacities for reasoning, or decision-making and criticism), they become easy victims of domination and are made to follow the rules set by others (Young [<reflink idref="bib44" id="ref41">44</reflink>], p. 38). Consequently, because these two practices are interwoven (oppression furthers domination, and domination furthers oppression), it is impossible to eliminate domination without struggling simultaneously against oppression (rehabilitating people's capacities of expression, criticism, decision-making, and reasoning). For this, Young underscores the importance of "consciousness-raising" and "social therapy" on the one hand and active participation of the oppressed in decision-making procedures, hence democratic self-determination, on the other (Young [<reflink idref="bib44" id="ref42">44</reflink>], 81; Young [<reflink idref="bib45" id="ref43">45</reflink>], 33). As will be more apparent through the end, Young's portrayal of the connection between civic independence and independence of the mind is crucial for my argument since she acknowledges both the need for a participatory understanding of liberty and the necessity of rehabilitating the effects of oppression on one's central capacities in fighting against domination.</p> <p>What kind of education program can serve as "social therapy," mitigating the detrimental effects of domination on individual capacities and fostering societal transformation? At this point, discussing Tostan, an African-based women's rights and human rights NGO,[<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref44">5</reflink>] which is known for its role in ending the practice of female genital cutting (FGC), will help illustrate the form such a rehabilitative education program could assume. Most importantly, the methods used by Tostan demonstrate how a participatory and deliberative environment contributes to personal and community empowerment at once, leading to overcoming oppressive social practices through rehabilitating people's critical capacities of reasoning and expression and their self-image as "voices that count." In the spirit of Paulo Freire's <emph>Pedagogy of the Oppressed</emph> ([<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref45">12</reflink>]), Tostan initiates a community empowerment program aimed at rural Senegalese women (later extended to Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, The Gambia, and more recently Nigeria) to increase literacy, awareness of human rights, and women's and children's well-being. Its focus is broad; it aims at empowerment in diverse areas such as health, education, political participation, economic sufficiency, and environmental issues. According to Easton et al. ([<reflink idref="bib11" id="ref46">11</reflink>]), several things jointly contributed to Tostan's success in raising awareness of the harms of female genital cutting and, consequently, its abolition. To highlight a few, I should stress its participatory curriculum (making the learners active in the learning process), its education model and practical (problem-solving) orientation, its policy to hire local trainers, and most importantly, the environment it creates where women can spell out and share their lived experiences related to FGC while gaining awareness of their women and human rights (Monkman et al. [<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref47">19</reflink>]). Most importantly, instead of indoctrinating the participants about the wrongs and health risks associated with FGC, through consciousness-raising and community-building practices, Tostan provides people space, the conceptual tools, and a discursive environment where women, practitioners of the custom, men, and religious/community leaders across villages meet and discuss the practice, condemn it, and decide on its abolishment collectively. Tostan recognizes the interconnectedness of community and individual empowerment and the role of such a joint approach in transforming oppressive social practices. Easton et al. underscore that, like all social practices, FGC has a social-cultural function; it determines the marriageability of girls across villages. Thus, if the practice is to be abandoned, it must be abandoned collectively in all the villages of the inter-marrying community. Otherwise, it brings severe outcomes for those who reject the practice individually (Easton et al. [<reflink idref="bib11" id="ref48">11</reflink>], p. 453). That explains why many people continue practicing the custom despite not supporting it. Tostan proves that with respectful and carefully thought methods, civil society organizations can directly relate to oppressed individuals by creating a participatory and deliberative environment to achieve empowerment and social transformation. Similar to what Young calls "social therapy," in the Tostan case, both the oppressed and oppressors interacted, discussed, and listened to each other's side, changed their minds gradually and interactively, and, as a result, decided to abandon an oppressive social practice collectively. I contend that Tostan implements a rehabilitative education program that empowers without dominating; in that respect, it suits well to republican purposes.[<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref49">6</reflink>] I will revisit Tostan in the conclusion to explore its implications for a more grassroots-oriented framework for republican politics. In the following, I will critically analyze Pettit's proposed strategies for eliminating domination, contending that they fall short of eradicating domination without a robust republican education theory.</p> <hd id="AN0183080046-6">Overcoming Domination: The Case for Civic Education</hd> <p>This section (also the next section) will demonstrate that Pettit's proposed strategies below fall short of realizing non-domination. Then, it explores theoretical attempts to develop a republican educational framework capable of addressing the shortcomings of Pettit's proposal. By framing the core ideas of these republican civic education theory proposals, I lay the groundwork for arguing that formal civic education will be insufficient, and that a rehabilitative education is still needed to empower those subjected to domination. In the end, revisiting Tostan, I will contend that civil society organizations are best positioned to implement such rehabilitative education programs.</p> <p>Pettit states that non-domination is realized, and the vulnerability of the dependent person is eliminated either through curbing others' capacities to interfere with the person on arbitrary grounds (through institutional protections) or eliminating the person's dependency on the powerful (through resourcing) (Pettit [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref50">24</reflink>], 67–69; [<reflink idref="bib26" id="ref51">26</reflink>], 69–74). Thus, in Pettit's view, no change must occur in the dominated person (in their self-awareness or self-understanding) to be free in the republican sense. In analogy with antibodies and the immunity one develops against diseases, Pettit thinks that when civic institutions are in place and prevent arbitrary intervention, the person is considered to be free (Pettit [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref52">24</reflink>], p. 107; [<reflink idref="bib26" id="ref53">26</reflink>], 124). This, however, might lead to the following situation: when constitutional protections are currently in place, and others are disabled from interfering with me arbitrarily, regardless of whether I still have the same psychological condition or slavish disposition, suffer from the same psychological limitations, and choose, desire, and live the same way I did before, I am now considered free in the republican sense. Indeed, there is a distinction between (i) the conceptual claim about what it means to say someone is free in the republican sense and (ii) the empirical conjecture about the conditions under which people are likely to enjoy freedom from domination. Hence, even though I do not enjoy non-domination because I still suffer from the hangover effects of domination as described above, I can still be considered free in the republican sense. Despite being unproblematic conceptually, I argue that people's inability to enjoy non-domination due to the hangover effects matters for republican theory and poses the following difficulties for Pettit.</p> <p>Pettit's theory―and the republican theory in general―extensively relies on the existence of virtuous citizens who are required to check the government and contest its decisions to eliminate the danger of public <emph>imperium</emph> (Pettit [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref54">24</reflink>], 183–185; [<reflink idref="bib26" id="ref55">26</reflink>], 225–229).[<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref56">7</reflink>] Pettit endorses the idea that citizens should continuously invigilate and control those in power and be ready to contest the government's decisions and practices if they think that such practices do not track their avowable or readily avowable common interests (Pettit [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref57">24</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref58">25</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib27" id="ref59">27</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib29" id="ref60">29</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref61">31</reflink>]). So, citizens must be <emph>domination-averse</emph> or sufficiently <emph>alert</emph> to domination to react to situations that constitute domination. Historically, republicans are aware of this problem; to institute the laws that secure liberty as non-domination, we need citizens who value independence and work to shape their institutions accordingly (Skinner [<reflink idref="bib35" id="ref62">35</reflink>]). Also, once the laws that secure non-domination are instituted, we still need virtuous citizens to keep these laws in place and be continuously vigilant against the danger of corruption (the problem of stability). As will be seen below, Pettit relies on widespread civility and argues that in addition to institutional measures (legal protection and resourcing), citizens would contribute to realizing non-domination by displaying certain attitudes (alertness and compliance). However, Pettit fails to provide a convincing account of how these attitudes (or dispositions) will be cultivated in citizens, especially without a well-thought-out theory of republican education.</p> <p>We could say, in support of Pettit, that it is not the quantity but the quality of public responsiveness that is more crucial. Pettit endorses "group-centered civility," that is, civil groups must voice their group point of view in public discussions and give feedback to the government when its decisions and policies dominate (Pettit [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref63">24</reflink>], p. 195, 247–248). Also, Pettit introduces the idea of <emph>specialization</emph> in civic vigilance and states that a citizen is not expected to be equally responsive to all instances of domination at once, but rather, for each case of domination, it will be sufficient that some activists exercise civic vigilance and check government activity (Pettit [<reflink idref="bib26" id="ref64">26</reflink>], 226). This might be sufficient when the government is willing to hear citizens' contestations and correct its policies accordingly. In real-world cases, however, this is often not the case, and the success of civil activism depends on the amount of support activists receive from the electorate, which is, in turn, determined by the extent of civility and alertness to domination in society. Hence, civil activists risk being marginalized when the state is reluctant and widespread civil responsiveness is low. Thus, even though not everyone needs to be active, and not everyone active needs to be active against every form of domination, there should exist enough citizens who are responsive, sensitive, and ready to support activists, which is crucial for civil groups' ability to check and control government policy. Therefore, neither group-centered civility nor specialization rules out the need for widespread civic alertness in society.</p> <p>Besides group-centered civility, Pettit defines civility also as citizens' willingness to uphold laws and norms that prevent domination. Hence, virtuous citizens are the ones who "desist arbitrary interference with others" as a result of "spontaneous, culturally reinforced civility" (Pettit [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref65">24</reflink>], p. 246). Pettit thinks that most of this second form of civility is generated; hence, the citizens' compliance with the laws will be secured when the laws are legitimate and the political procedures are fair. This is because, Pettit states, obedience results not from fear of sanctions but from people's trust in the fairness of the rules and procedures (Pettit [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref66">24</reflink>], 246–247). Citizens' compliance is reinforced by "the intangible hand" of social approval and disapproval. Since "people care about the regard of others," Pettit argues, the intangible hand can secure, better than any legal intervention can do, the behaviors supportive of non-domination and discourage behaviors that undermine it (Pettit [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref67">24</reflink>], p. 254). Most importantly, for our purposes, Pettit emphasizes the importance of the <emph>ideological requirement</emph>, namely, that the state must guarantee that citizens embrace the political ideal and perceive non-domination as a paramount value worthy of pursuit. (Pettit [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref68">24</reflink>], p. 252). Yet, without a theory of education, it is unclear how the state can <emph>fully</emph> realize the ideological requirement. Viewed together, there is a division of labor in Pettit's account of civility: group-centered civility identifies and challenges domination whenever it occurs (civility as alertness), whereas good citizens, by inclination, desist arbitrary interference with others (civility as compliance). This account still leaves many key questions unanswered: Are there other means to reinforce norms supportive of non-domination? How should we address hierarchical social norms that perpetuate relationships of domination? Furthermore, where and when do citizens develop the skills and competencies necessary for public vigilance—in schools, through civic engagement, or others?</p> <p>Unlike in the republican tradition, where civic education is a means for cultivating civic virtue, Pettit refers to education only in passing and briefly acknowledges its importance in creating the civility required (Pettit [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref69">24</reflink>], p. 253; [<reflink idref="bib26" id="ref70">26</reflink>], 111).[<reflink idref="bib8" id="ref71">8</reflink>] Moreover, Pettit is skeptical about cultivating civility through the education system since he thinks that "those measures easily deteriorate into the sort of propaganda that bores or alienates." (Pettit [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref72">24</reflink>], p. 253) Despite being right about the danger of propaganda and indoctrination, Pettit hastily gives up on education and overlooks the possibility of a republican theory of education that helps realize as well as stabilize the ideal of non-domination. As Costa highlights, Pettit must inevitably address the type of moral and political education necessary to foster civility (Costa [<reflink idref="bib8" id="ref73">8</reflink>], p. 405). An expanding body of literature attempts to close this gap and aims to develop a civic education theory aligned with civic republican purposes. To note at the outset, most scholars conceive republican education as civic education, hence exclusively focusing on cultivating the necessary skills, competencies, and civic virtues in kids. The discussion in the previous section implies that realizing non-domination requires a more radical and comprehensive stance on education that appreciates the link between personal autonomy and political freedom, which aims to cultivate the capacities required by both. In pupils' education, for instance, this might involve, among other things, supporting the desire for independence in kids and cultivating the critical capacities required for it. The common worry against such proposals is that promoting personal autonomy and individuality in schools is dominating and might be against parents' comprehensive (religious) views. That is why, for Neufeld, comprehensive conceptions of non-domination and the associated idea of ethical autonomy should be avoided (Neufeld [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref74">20</reflink>], p. 147). Instead, civic education must only cultivate the skills and knowledge for realizing non-domination in the political contexts, limited to public institutions and the workplace (Neufeld [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref75">20</reflink>], p. 141). A true political conception of non-domination must not attempt to eliminate hierarchical relations, but what it can do at most is to teach kids their rights, fundamentally their right to exit from such relations (Neufeld [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref76">20</reflink>], p. 146). However, for those who acknowledge the many ways domination is exercised and perpetuated, eliminating domination involves transforming oppressive cultural norms and hierarchies. Costa argues this point and claims that if republicanism were to address contemporary cases of domination successfully, it must recognize that the law would be ineffective in eliminating all forms of domination (Costa [<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref77">9</reflink>], p. 163). Costa stresses the relationship between prejudice and domination (how prejudice perpetuates domination, bias against certain groups, and partial treatment), arguing that without addressing existing prejudices against certain groups, one cannot effectively eliminate domination. For Costa, this demands more than merely teaching historical instances of domination in schools, such as slavery or women's political subjugation. Civic education must also focus on existing prejudices and cases of discrimination to initiate active engagement, social criticism, and reform (Costa [<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref78">9</reflink>], p. 169). Conversely, Hansen argues that raising awareness on such issues potentially undermines the liberal commitment to diversity and tolerance, in addition to overstepping parents' liberty to decide about their children's moral and religious education (Hansen [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref79">13</reflink>], p. 11). The crux of the debate lies in determining the extent to which republican theory could and should adhere to liberal neutrality. As seen below, Pettit's position is congruent with liberal neutrality, which I argue is insufficient for eliminating domination.</p> <p>The recent debates surrounding civic republican education extend beyond its aims and boundaries to encompass the very methods by which it should be taught. Peterson distinguishes two forms of civic republican education: "teaching civic principles" and "teaching civic virtues". For Peterson, like liberal views of civic education, Pettit suggests an instrumental republican account of civility, which includes embracing norms and principles that inform the actions of citizens in social and political life. However, Peterson argues that teaching principles will not help cultivate the required dispositions in kids since principles might remain external to kids and not become part of their experience; such education cannot shape their attitudes and thinking from within. Like in Aristotle's theory of virtue acquisition, where virtues are acquired through practice, Peterson argues that kids should learn civic principles and political values of their community through active civic engagement (volunteering and participating in altruistic civil activities). Also, for Peterson, only fostering cognitive skills and competencies in kids without cultivating the affective foundations will be ineffective (Peterson [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref80">23</reflink>], p. 133). For instance, debate and critical discussion practices in civic education curriculums might not guarantee kids' engagement with the issues discussed unless they are taught in a certain way that supports republican purposes. Thus, the issue is not acquiring the skills necessary for debating alone but also understanding the purpose of the debate in the republic; these are finding common ground, critically affirming the political values of the community, and reaching a consensus, all of which constitute the heart of deliberative democracy. Thus, Peterson advocates for an experience-based pedagogy (or learning by doing) where students actively engage with the problems in their communities. Likewise, Snir and Eylon ([<reflink idref="bib38" id="ref81">38</reflink>]) hold that liberal and neo-republican theories of civic education are prone to the same flaw: they view students fundamentally as future citizens while overlooking the oppressive practices occurring in schools and how these practices shape students. This creates a disconnect between the political values and principles taught—which honor autonomy, independence, and civility—and students' actual experiences―passivity, receptivity, obedience, and respect for hierarchies in the classroom. Bringing together the insights of Freire's critical pedagogy and Pettit's theory of domination, they suggest that the school must become like a "small-scale republic" and must give the kids the opportunity to practice "democratic control, civic contestation, and trust" suitable for their age and cognitive capacities. For them, developing such a civic education theory in line with non-domination will be doubly rewarding: Not only will it effectively teach the pupils the skills and political habits required for promoting non-domination, but also, by designing the school in the image of a free republic, it avoids the criticism that school is the site of "domination, surveillance and lack of freedom" (2016, 762) I think, such approach to education will also relax worries regarding public education degenerating into propaganda and indoctrination since students will not be informed about the civic principles but rather will actively engage with practices of democratic deliberation, contestation, participation, etc., that support realizing non-domination. As seen in the Tostan case, such active engagement is also crucial in rehabilitative education since it is important for oppressed people to develop and exercise their capacities of critical reflection and expression, which, in turn, enables them to identify and transform oppressive practices.</p> <p>Despite civic education being effective for raising future citizens and endowing them with the required virtues, skills, and habits, in cases where the hangover effects of domination are widespread and still intense in society, complementary rehabilitative education programs will still be needed. Hence, the amount of civility in society will also depend on rehabilitating the adverse psychological effects of domination and restoring the ideal of independence and capacities in adult people historically subjected to domination. The next section will establish that rehabilitation is indispensable to achieving and securing non-domination.</p> <hd id="AN0183080046-7">Overcoming Domination: The Case for Rehabilitative Education</hd> <p>It could be argued that Pettit does not need to worry about rehabilitative education––as much as he needs to worry about public education––since Pettit describes the necessary conditions required to say that the ideal of non-domination is realized in society and the political institutions required to secure non-domination once it is realized. Thus, Pettit could say that when people suffer hangover effects such that they can't sufficiently invigilate to avoid public <emph>imperium</emph>, this inability constitutes the absence of one of the social features necessary for realizing non-domination. Thus, rehabilitation is a need for societies that have not realized the ideal of non-domination yet but are aspiring to reach the ideal and not the ones that have already realized it. On this view, societies that realized non-domination also must have already achieved sufficient civility. I argue that even if this is the case, rehabilitation might still be required as a complementary strategy, especially in situations where the ideal of non-domination has been recently achieved and where the possibility of backsliding is a realistic worry. In such societies, the social and cultural patterns of domination and its hangover effects on people will likely be strong enough to undermine the ideal of non-domination even after it is successfully realized. The problem with Pettit's view, I argue, is the lack of consideration for the diversity of cases where societies suffered from domination for different lengths and at various degrees or achieved the ideal of non-domination only recently or for a long time. As a result, what is required to stabilize the ideal of non-domination and the institutions that guard it would be different in each society. There might be a need for complementary rehabilitative education programs, especially in cases where the history of domination is long, its effects are pervasive, or the ideal is achieved only recently. And whether there is a need for it can only be decided according to the empirical conditions of each society.</p> <p>It could be argued in support of Pettit that we do not need to interfere with people's choices and mindsets to promote non-domination via rehabilitative programs since the institutional arrangements endorsed by Pettit would be effective in rehabilitating the profound harms of domination over time. Like Rawls' account of stability, one could say that the ideal of non-domination and the institutions and legal practices that promote and realize it would, in time, cultivate in citizens a corresponding desire for non-domination and the capacity to enjoy it (Rawls [<reflink idref="bib32" id="ref82">32</reflink>], p. 456). Living under such institutions, we might expect people would eventually recover from anxieties and character traits like self-censorship or self-denial. As Lovett argues, living in a domination-free social environment might naturally cause changes in people's mindsets, and we might expect that when people's choice set is improved, people who formerly consented to domination (or have an adaptive preference for it) might gradually choose non-domination for themselves as well (Lovett [<reflink idref="bib17" id="ref83">17</reflink>], p. 150). I am sympathetic to these arguments and agree that, in time, institutions (and a domination-free environment) positively impact people. However, as said above, there will be differences among societies, and the number of citizens who continue to suffer from the hangover effects of domination in a non-dominating society might threaten the stability of republican society by the time institutions achieve such positive effects spontaneously. To illustrate my point, I will refer to Rawls' view of "the toleration of the intolerant." Rawls thinks that a liberal society must tolerate illiberal groups. Yet, the toleration capacity of a liberal society is an empirical matter and depends on the intolerant's capacity to threaten liberal institutions. Rawls states that if the intolerant group is numerous and powerful enough to destabilize liberal democracies, illiberal measures can be taken to protect the existence of liberal society (Rawls [<reflink idref="bib32" id="ref84">32</reflink>], 216–221). Likewise, when the number of people who suffer from domination effects is considerably high, they might threaten the stability of republican society the way illiberal groups can threaten the stability of liberal society. When this is the case, rehabilitative programs that restore people's desire and capacity for non-domination would be a way to minimize the threat against the republican society and secure its stability.</p> <p>In later works, Pettit's theory continues to diverge from the direction proposed in this article. After <emph>Republicanism</emph>, Pettit's strategy proposals underwent certain revisions, and Pettit recognizably further emphasizes the connection between non-domination and material inequality―or dependency and material deprivation (Pettit [<reflink idref="bib26" id="ref85">26</reflink>], 70, 126). Unlike material inequalities, which Pettit acknowledges more as a problem in front of realizing non-domination, in <emph>People's Terms</emph>, the harms of domination and the psychological and mental barriers they pose to realizing non-domination in society lose predominance. Pettit rather characterizes the good of non-domination more through the republican free person image (Pettit [<reflink idref="bib26" id="ref86">26</reflink>], 84). I argue that this omission deprives republicanism of the conceptual tools for adequately theorizing domination and prevents it from developing effective strategies to fight against it. As Krause rightly points out, without paying attention to the deeper levels of domination, liberty as non-domination does not seem to offer much in practice to answer the complaints of the dominated people in societies where institutions have already realized structural equality (Krause [<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref87">15</reflink>], 193).[<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref88">9</reflink>] Thus, republicanism needs a richer understanding of domination and complementary rehabilitative education programs to make non-domination a reality in practice.</p> <p>Radical republicanism takes the Marxist critique and feminist theory on the effects of domination much more seriously and, as a result, is more demanding when describing the political action necessary for realizing non-domination. For instance, Michael Thompson argues that Pettit's agent-centered account of domination is limited, and not only agents but social structures can exercise domination. For Thompson, domination occurs not only when a person is subjected to arbitrary interference from another person ―and, as a result, the other extracts certain benefits from the person, such as labor, resources, care, or emotional benefits―but also when the person is subjected to the social structures, laws, regulations, and cultural norms that legitimize (also normalize in the mind of the dominated) such transfer of benefits in society as rightful and lawful acts (Thompson [<reflink idref="bib40" id="ref89">40</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib41" id="ref90">41</reflink>], 282). Thus, Thompson argues that in addition to eliminating the arbitrary power of individuals over others, we are to alter social structures that allow some elites in society to extract benefits from others systematically and dominate them as a result (Thompson [<reflink idref="bib41" id="ref91">41</reflink>], p. 50). Yet, constitutive domination, for Thompson, is a "more nuanced, subtler process of living, thinking, and acting within the norms," and eliminating it requires "seeing" arrangements that are otherwise accepted as "right, correct, and as valid and normal" differently. For instance, gender roles are normalized, "routinized," and habituated in a patriarchal culture, which makes it easier for men to dominate (or extract benefits from) women. Thompson adds that constitutive power is a form of domination "because it is able to control the individual from <emph>within</emph>" (Thompson [<reflink idref="bib41" id="ref92">41</reflink>], p. 50, my italics) since "norms help shape forms of cognition which in turn help produce social realities that become <emph>a second nature</emph> for actors" (Thompson [<reflink idref="bib41" id="ref93">41</reflink>], p. 52, my italics). For Thompson, this fact poses a serious obstacle to Pettit's theory. Pettit's republican state can eliminate domination only when individuals identify and express their 'avowable interests' or make domination complaints correspondingly. It will fail to do so when individuals are <emph>unaware</emph> of their domination due to their socialization within oligarchic and hierarchic social structures. Thus, unlike Pettit, and in line with feminist thinkers discussed above, Thompson stresses the need to transform the oppressive cultural norms and practices that undergird social and political domination.[<reflink idref="bib10" id="ref94">10</reflink>] But he does not tell us how we can transform cultural norms and practices or achieve that dominated people come to see their situation as one of domination.</p> <hd id="AN0183080046-8">Conclusion: The Case for a More Engaged Republicanism</hd> <p>As discussed above, Pettit assigns a central role to civil society organizations and activist bodies in realizing non-domination; they must check government activity and contest public policies when these policies dominate (Pettit [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref95">24</reflink>], p. 195; [<reflink idref="bib26" id="ref96">26</reflink>], 226). Yet, Pettit limits the role of civil society organizations to their political function alone.[<reflink idref="bib11" id="ref97">11</reflink>] The Tostan example illustrates that, beyond their political role, civil society organizations can serve an educational function by directly assisting oppressed people in recovering from the harms of domination and overcoming oppressive practices. Unlike institutional arrangements, which tend to operate in a top-down manner, civil society organizations are particularly well-suited for this task as they can directly engage with individuals and challenge oppressive structures from below. Thompson criticizes Pettit's view that realizing non-domination is and should be primarily the state's task and points out the need for assigning a broader, more radical, and more active role to social movements (Thompson [<reflink idref="bib41" id="ref98">41</reflink>], p. 58). Yet, Thompson does not clarify what role social movements are exactly to play. Like Pettit, he seems to assign social movements only a political role, considering them primarily in their relation to the state and their ability to force the state to act in certain ways, not in their relation to the dominated individuals and their ability to transform background structures that reproduce domination. This second alternative is suggested by David Watkins, who underscores the importance of non-state activity in ending oppressive practices (Watkins [<reflink idref="bib42" id="ref99">42</reflink>], 517–518) For Watkins, the success of civil organizations such as Tostan in ending oppressive practices lies in their ability to reach dominated individuals and help them transform the background social norms that reproduce dominating practices, traditions, and structures. In contrast to the state-NGO model, where the state often resists promoting non-domination, social groups must compel or guide the state towards addressing oppressive practices— through contestation, as in Pettit, or through more active political struggles, as in Thompson, Tostan's empowerment model is an NGO-community model where the civil organization supports the laws of non-domination, performs grassroots activity, and actively works with people toward eliminating domination. The NGO-community model is crucial, especially in cases where institutional strategies are ineffective or counterproductive. Watkins underscores that Senegal issued a law against practicing some forms of female genital cutting in 1999, yet the state was unable to enforce it effectively. Moreover, state enforcement was counterproductive, and the villagers became more defensive about female genital cutting as a reaction to state interference in their cultural practice. (Watkins [<reflink idref="bib42" id="ref100">42</reflink>], 517–518) Related to this point, Easton et al. underscore that "the choice of language and approach" has also contributed to Tostan's success. Condemnations of the practice and demonization of the custom practitioners and the local people were counterproductive in the previous empowerment programs (Easton et al. 2014, 449). Tostan proves that with respectful and carefully thought methods, rehabilitative education programs can rehabilitate the negative effects of domination, achieve empowerment, and help transform oppressive practices. This implies that civil society organizations have a more active and substantial role than merely checking the state and contesting its policies.</p> <p>In this article, I have argued that given the pervasive moral, developmental, and psychological effects of domination, and the many layers domination operates, realizing non-domination compels us to reconnect the ideals of personal autonomy and non-domination and to promote these ideals jointly. Such reconceptualization establishes the necessity of a robust theory of republican education and, most importantly, a separate rehabilitative education program that complements Pettit's institutional strategies. It also demonstrates the necessity of assigning a more active and diverse role to civil society organizations in transforming oppressive cultures and mentalities. Indeed, more needs to be said about the concrete forms such rehabilitative education should take and how civil society organizations should carry out this task without producing domination. These points should be carefully spelled out. In this article, I hope to have established at least as much that given how demanding the ideal of non-domination is and how consequential the harms of domination are, republican theory needs to reconceptualize non-domination in its relation to personal autonomy and rearticulate a comprehensive theory of republican education and corresponding politics for republicanism.</p> <hd id="AN0183080046-9">Acknowledgements</hd> <p>I extend my gratitude to Sandrine Bergès, Saniye Vatansever, İmge Oranlı, and Lucas Thorpe for their reading and commenting on the earlier drafts of this article. I also thank Bill Wringe for encouraging me to write an article on this topic at the SWIP-TR conference at Bilkent University. I am indebted to two anonymous reviewers and the journal editor for their invaluable constructive criticisms, comments, and suggestions.</p> <hd id="AN0183080046-10">Declarations</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0183080046-11">Conflict of interest</hd> <p>No conflict of interest to disclose.</p> <hd id="AN0183080046-12">Publisher's Note</hd> <p>Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.</p> <ref id="AN0183080046-13"> <title> References </title> <blist> <bibl id="bib1" idref="ref1" type="bt">1</bibl> <bibtext> Bartky Sandra. Feminity and domination: Studies in the phenomenology of oppression (thinking gender). 1990: New York; Routledge</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib2" idref="ref2" type="bt">2</bibl> <bibtext> Berges Sandrine. 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Reconstructing republican freedom: A critique of the neo-republican concept of freedom as non-domination. Philosophy and Social Criticism. 2013; 39; 3: 277-298. 10.1177/0191453712473081</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Thompson Michael J. The two faces of domination in republican political theory. European Journal of Political Theory. 2018; 17; 1: 44-64. 10.1177/1474885115580352</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Watkins David. Institutionalizing freedom as non-domination: Democracy and the role of the state. Political Science Faculty Publications. 2015; 50: 508-534</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Wollstonecraft, Mary. 2004. A vindication of the rights of women. London: Penguin Books.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Young Iris Marion. Justice and the politics of difference. 1990: New Jersey; Princeton University Press</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Young Iris Marion. Inclusion and democracy. 2000: New York; Oxford University Press</bibtext> </blist> </ref> <ref id="AN0183080046-14"> <title> Footnotes </title> <blist> <bibtext> Pettit's theory offers a contemporary interpretation of civic republicanism, distinct from Hannah Arendt's civic humanism which endorses a perfectionist view of human flourishing through active political participation. Characterized by an instrumental conception of citizenship, and its emphasis on institutional design for realizing non-domination, Pettit's theory is also classified as instrumental and/or procedural republicanism.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> While strong themes of positive liberty exist in some strands of the republican tradition (in Rousseau, Wollstonecraft, and Arendt), Pettit chooses to construe republican liberty negatively, believing this will bring greater inclusion and broader appeal (Pettit [24], 90–96). Following Isaiah Berlin's Cold War discourse, which equated positive liberty with totalitarian rule, and consequently discredits it, Pettit's interpretation makes vital omissions of positive themes from republican theory that curb the theory's ability to diagnose and remedy domination adequately.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Pettit admits that some people might fail to value non-domination due to their comprehensive views that require self-abasement, however he overlooks the fact that such self-abasement might be the product of their domination.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> I should stress that while classical republicans appealed to a substantial conception of the person to account why domination is evil (among other reasons), it is by no means the only normative strategy available for Pettit. Recently, Victoria Costa (2022) and Layman ([16]) pointed out a similar problem in Pettit's theory of domination, namely the absence of a normative basis, and underscored a resulting "specification problem". My criticism in this section parallels theirs: I, too, argue that Pettit's conception of non-domination requires a normative basis to say that non-domination is good, or domination is evil. Yet, although the normative framework of basic liberties and rights can explain why domination is evil, it nevertheless will fail to capture the extent to which it is evil. This last point is crucial for correctly identifying what needs to be done to eliminate domination.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> For more information about Tostan, see https://tostan.org/.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> It can be argued that Tostan and my proposal concerning it, apply Western, republican, feminist-informed theory to a completely different cultural context, violating respect for other cultures and diversity. While acknowledging the colonial and imperialist past of Western societies, we must reject the problematic assumption prevalent in some multiculturalist discourses that all cultures possess inherent and equal value. Cultures are not absolute and should and could be transformed by the actions and decisions of its members. In the Tostan case, as well as in my proposal, individual empowerment and transformation go parallel with social transformation, respecting the community's right to lead cultural transformation. Besides, such republican rehabilitative education will be functional in all contexts, including the Western ones.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Skinner ([36]) explains that the classical republican tradition emphasizes fostering civic virtue to cultivate politically engaged citizens, and civic education is of utmost importance in fostering this civic spirit.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> For an extensive discussion on civic education in the republican tradition, see Iseult Honohan's <emph>Civic Republicanism</emph> ([14]).</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Lars J. K. Moen makes a similar point and argues that Pettit's institutional protection and resourcing strategies are like what Rawls already guarantees in his <emph>Political Liberalism</emph>. Moen stresses that if neo-republicanism aims to be a fruitful alternative to contemporary theories of liberalism, it cannot be neutral between the conceptions of the good citizens hold (Moen [18]).</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Likewise, Allan Coffee argues that Pettit's contestatory democracy will be insufficient to realize non-domination due to two distinct spheres where domination is operative (Coffee [7]). Coffee stresses that people think and act within a background system of cultural beliefs, ideas, and norms. In addition to agents, these presumptions, ideas, cultural norms, and unquestioned beliefs dominate women as well as other vulnerable groups. Thus, as we have seen both in Wollstonecraft and Young, the required transformation in the background culture, practices, and traditions will only be achieved through a participatory conceptualization of liberty.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> What might worry Pettit could be the possibility of these civil organizations becoming a source of domination in society. To illustrate, trade unions or workers' associations usually have arbitrary power over non-members and immigrant workers despite their general commitment to empowering workers against employees. Yet, assigning a rehabilitative role to civil society organizations does not necessarily imply that these civil associations will be free from any state or public control mechanisms. Such check mechanisms should be carefully thought out.</bibtext> </blist> </ref> <aug> <p>By Tuğba Sevinç</p> <p>Reported by Author</p> </aug> <nolink nlid="nl1" bibid="bib24" firstref="ref3"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl2" bibid="bib30" firstref="ref8"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl3" bibid="bib33" firstref="ref9"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl4" bibid="bib39" firstref="ref11"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl5" bibid="bib28" firstref="ref13"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl6" bibid="bib37" firstref="ref15"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl7" bibid="bib43" firstref="ref17"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl8" bibid="bib26" firstref="ref19"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl9" bibid="bib17" firstref="ref31"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl10" bibid="bib34" firstref="ref32"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl11" bibid="bib21" firstref="ref33"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl12" bibid="bib44" firstref="ref40"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl13" bibid="bib45" firstref="ref43"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl14" bibid="bib12" firstref="ref45"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl15" bibid="bib11" firstref="ref46"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl16" bibid="bib19" firstref="ref47"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl17" bibid="bib25" firstref="ref58"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl18" bibid="bib27" firstref="ref59"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl19" bibid="bib29" firstref="ref60"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl20" bibid="bib31" firstref="ref61"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl21" bibid="bib35" firstref="ref62"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl22" bibid="bib20" firstref="ref74"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl23" bibid="bib13" firstref="ref79"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl24" bibid="bib23" firstref="ref80"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl25" bibid="bib38" firstref="ref81"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl26" bibid="bib32" firstref="ref82"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl27" bibid="bib15" firstref="ref87"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl28" bibid="bib40" firstref="ref89"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl29" bibid="bib41" firstref="ref90"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl30" bibid="bib10" firstref="ref94"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl31" bibid="bib42" firstref="ref99"></nolink> |
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| Items | – Name: Title Label: Title Group: Ti Data: Recovering from Domination: Pettit's Republicanism and the Case for Rehabilitative Education – Name: Language Label: Language Group: Lang Data: English – Name: Author Label: Authors Group: Au Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Tugba+Sevinç%22">Tugba Sevinç</searchLink> (ORCID <externalLink term="http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5615-9908">0000-0001-5615-9908</externalLink>) – Name: TitleSource Label: Source Group: Src Data: <searchLink fieldCode="SO" term="%22Studies+in+Philosophy+and+Education%22"><i>Studies in Philosophy and Education</i></searchLink>. 2025 44(1):1-20. – Name: Avail Label: Availability Group: Avail Data: Springer. Available from: Springer Nature. One New York Plaza, Suite 4600, New York, NY 10004. Tel: 800-777-4643; Tel: 212-460-1500; Fax: 212-460-1700; e-mail: customerservice@springernature.com; Web site: https://link.springer.com/ – Name: PeerReviewed Label: Peer Reviewed Group: SrcInfo Data: Y – Name: Pages Label: Page Count Group: Src Data: 20 – Name: DatePubCY Label: Publication Date Group: Date Data: 2025 – Name: TypeDocument Label: Document Type Group: TypDoc Data: Journal Articles<br />Reports - Research – Name: Subject Label: Descriptors Group: Su Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Role+of+Education%22">Role of Education</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Citizenship+Education%22">Citizenship Education</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Democracy%22">Democracy</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Freedom%22">Freedom</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Political+Attitudes%22">Political Attitudes</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Politics+of+Education%22">Politics of Education</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Rehabilitation%22">Rehabilitation</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Psychological+Patterns%22">Psychological Patterns</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Moral+Issues%22">Moral Issues</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Individual+Development%22">Individual Development</searchLink> – Name: DOI Label: DOI Group: ID Data: 10.1007/s11217-024-09963-2 – Name: ISSN Label: ISSN Group: ISSN Data: 0039-3746<br />1573-191X – Name: Abstract Label: Abstract Group: Ab Data: This article critically engages with Philip Pettit's civic republican theory, particularly his account of what it takes to realize non-domination in society. Despite providing a comprehensive analysis of the institutional prerequisites for realizing non-domination, Pettit surprisingly overlooks the critical role of education in achieving this goal. Pettit's neglect of republican education has been widely criticized, and a growing body of literature seeks to develop a civic education theory suitable for civic republican purposes. While there is considerable disagreement in the literature regarding the content and methods of republican education, almost all consider its scope restricted to the pupil's education. Pettit's insufficient understanding of domination's ill effects constrains our ability to envision a comprehensive educational response. In contrast, the republican tradition provides more substantial reasons for condemning domination and a richer account of the harms of domination, including a detailed account of the pervasive moral, developmental, and psychological harms. By drawing on women republicans of the 18th century (Mary Wollstonecraft, Sophie de Grouchy) and contemporary feminists (I. M. Young, and others), the article aims to establish the case for rehabilitative education, utilizing Tostan (an African-based NGO) as a model for its pedagogy and implementation. Such reconstruction requires challenging core tenets of Pettit's theory, such as his dismissal of positive liberty, the limited role he assigns to civil society organizations, and how he envisions the politics of republicanism. Hence, by revisiting and taking issue with Pettit's republicanism, the article advocates for rehabilitative education programs to overcome domination and envisions a more engaged and grassroots political framework for the politics of republicanism. – Name: AbstractInfo Label: Abstractor Group: Ab Data: As Provided – Name: DateEntry Label: Entry Date Group: Date Data: 2025 – Name: AN Label: Accession Number Group: ID Data: EJ1460896 |
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