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An Educated Society Is an Ideas-Informed Society: A Proposed Theoretical Framework for Effective Ideas Engagement

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Title: An Educated Society Is an Ideas-Informed Society: A Proposed Theoretical Framework for Effective Ideas Engagement
Language: English
Authors: Chris Brown, Ruth Luzmore
Source: British Educational Research Journal. 2025 51(2):969-989.
Availability: Wiley. Available from: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030. Tel: 800-835-6770; e-mail: cs-journals@wiley.com; Web site: https://www.wiley.com/en-us
Peer Reviewed: Y
Page Count: 21
Publication Date: 2025
Document Type: Journal Articles
Reports - Evaluative
Descriptors: Citizenship Education, Democracy, Current Events, Individual Development, Thinking Skills, Social Networks, Access to Information, Educational Attainment, Public Opinion, Popular Education, Critical Thinking, Models, Educational Research
DOI: 10.1002/berj.4110
ISSN: 0141-1926
1469-3518
Abstract: The term 'ideas-informed society' describes democracies in which citizens believe in the value of staying well-informed and up-to-date with current affairs. They also put these beliefs into action: critically engaging with new ideas and perspectives, delving into scientific discoveries or emerging technologies and exploring aspects of history and culture. Likewise, they stay abreast of political, economic and health-related events, new products, new forms of media and so on. While ideas engagement can, in theory, lead to citizens becoming better informed, better able to engage in effective decision-making and better able to understand the world around them, these benefits do not reach everybody. Likewise, in the ideas ecosystem generally, we can often see 'dark' ideas winning through: resulting in less optimal outcomes for both citizens and nations. While interest in the notion of the ideas-informed society is burgeoning, we argue that, if future research is to be effectively positioned to support meaningful ideas engagement, what is now required is a theoretical frame to guide this research moving forward. We use this paper to argue for such a framework based on three principal elements: (1) whether individuals possess a prospective mindset, enabling them to value ideas engagement, as well as become more likely to commit to behaviours concomitant with ideas that have optimal and wide-reaching outcomes; (2) the features of individuals' social networks, and how these impact on citizens' access to ideas and the nature of their ideas engagement; and (3) individuals' levels of education and the extent to which the education people receive allows them to engage with ideas critically. As well as setting out the case for our proposed framework, we conclude by proposing future research to enable us to further specify and verify this framework as well as develop instruments to test it nationally and internationally.
Abstractor: As Provided
Entry Date: 2025
Accession Number: EJ1466182
Database: ERIC
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  Value: <anid>AN0184273895;bed01apr.25;2025Apr08.06:09;v2.2.500</anid> <title id="AN0184273895-1">An educated society is an ideas‐informed society: A proposed theoretical framework for effective ideas engagement </title> <p>The term 'ideas‐informed society' describes democracies in which citizens believe in the value of staying well‐informed and up‐to‐date with current affairs. They also put these beliefs into action: critically engaging with new ideas and perspectives, delving into scientific discoveries or emerging technologies and exploring aspects of history and culture. Likewise, they stay abreast of political, economic and health‐related events, new products, new forms of media and so on. While ideas engagement can, in theory, lead to citizens becoming better informed, better able to engage in effective decision‐making and better able to understand the world around them, these benefits do not reach everybody. Likewise, in the ideas ecosystem generally, we can often see 'dark' ideas winning through: resulting in less optimal outcomes for both citizens and nations. While interest in the notion of the ideas‐informed society is burgeoning, we argue that, if future research is to be effectively positioned to support meaningful ideas engagement, what is now required is a theoretical frame to guide this research moving forward. We use this paper to argue for such a framework based on three principal elements: (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref1">1</reflink>) whether individuals possess a prospective mindset, enabling them to value ideas engagement, as well as become more likely to commit to behaviours concomitant with ideas that have optimal and wide‐reaching outcomes; (<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref2">2</reflink>) the features of individuals' social networks, and how these impact on citizens' access to ideas and the nature of their ideas engagement; and (<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref3">3</reflink>) individuals' levels of education and the extent to which the education people receive allows them to engage with ideas critically. As well as setting out the case for our proposed framework, we conclude by proposing future research to enable us to further specify and verify this framework as well as develop instruments to test it nationally and internationally.</p> <p>Keywords: ideas; ideas engagement; ideas‐informed society; theoretical framework</p> <hd id="AN0184273895-2">Key insights</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0184273895-3">What is the main issue that the paper addresses?</hd> <p>We present a theoretical framework to support research and policy interventions into effective ideas engagement: situations in which citizens engage critically and collaboratively with new ideas, so improving lives and communities. The framework is especially important for disadvantaged communities, where ideas engagement can be lacking, and for tackling engagement with 'dark' ideas.</p> <hd id="AN0184273895-4">What are the main insights that the paper provides?</hd> <p>The paper proposes a framework based on three elements that influence ideas engagement: whether individuals possess a prospective mindset, the nature of their social networks and the level of education held by individuals. It concludes by suggesting future research to refine and verify the framework and enable national and international testing.</p> <hd id="AN0184273895-5">THE IDEAS‐INFORMED SOCIETY</hd> <p>The term 'ideas‐informed society' describes situations where citizens in free and democratic communities, nations or groups of democratic nations believe in the value of staying well‐informed and up‐to‐date with current affairs (Brown, Groß Ophoff, et al., [<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref4">18</reflink>]; Brown, Luzmore & Groß Ophoff, [<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref5">22</reflink>]; de Botton, [<reflink idref="bib38" id="ref6">38</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib39" id="ref7">39</reflink>]; Freire, [<reflink idref="bib52" id="ref8">52</reflink>]; Pinker, [<reflink idref="bib98" id="ref9">98</reflink>]; Pinker et al., [<reflink idref="bib99" id="ref10">99</reflink>]; Saviano, [<reflink idref="bib105" id="ref11">105</reflink>]; Sen, [<reflink idref="bib107" id="ref12">107</reflink>]). Members of an ideas‐informed society also put these beliefs into action: actively seeking out new ideas and perspectives, delving into scientific discoveries or emerging technologies and exploring aspects of history and culture—including the arts and literature. Similarly, they stay abreast of political, economic and health‐related events, new products, services and forms of media, while also maintaining an overview of the news (Brown & Handscomb, [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref13">20</reflink>]; Hochschild, [<reflink idref="bib71" id="ref14">71</reflink>]; Pinker, [<reflink idref="bib98" id="ref15">98</reflink>]; Pinker et al., [<reflink idref="bib99" id="ref16">99</reflink>]). In theory, citizens behaving in this way should accrue numerous direct and indirect benefits, some of which will be concrete and immediate. This happens, for instance, when an individual's engagement with ideas usefully informs their decisions and actions: in other words, when citizens become more knowledgeable, they are better positioned to engage in more optimal decision‐making[<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref17">1</reflink>] or pursue more beneficial courses of action (e.g., see Andrino et al., [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref18">2</reflink>]; Franco et al., [<reflink idref="bib51" id="ref19">51</reflink>]; Global Agenda Council on Informed Societies, [<reflink idref="bib56" id="ref20">56</reflink>]; Hochschild, [<reflink idref="bib71" id="ref21">71</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib72" id="ref22">72</reflink>]; Pinker, [<reflink idref="bib98" id="ref23">98</reflink>]). Other benefits may materialise over the longer term, such as those which result from accumulating an understanding of the world in a more general sense. For instance, prolonged ideas engagement that serves to build one's cultural capital can provide a means to achieve social mobility as well as self‐actualisation (Castling & Johnston, [<reflink idref="bib28" id="ref24">28</reflink>]; DiMaggio, [<reflink idref="bib43" id="ref25">43</reflink>]; Franco et al., [<reflink idref="bib51" id="ref26">51</reflink>]; Hochschild, [<reflink idref="bib72" id="ref27">72</reflink>]; Pinker, [<reflink idref="bib97" id="ref28">97</reflink>]). The ideas‐informed society in its most positive form thus represents the benefits of formal, informal and community learning over the life course (and as such, the concept has potentially important value for those working in the field of education). In addition, however, ongoing ideas engagement within a populous can also help ensure that a core stock of human knowledge is passed down through the generations, which can enable societies to both remain coherent as well as cumulatively progress (Pinker, [<reflink idref="bib97" id="ref29">97</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib98" id="ref30">98</reflink>]; Pinker et al., [<reflink idref="bib99" id="ref31">99</reflink>]). Furthermore, it is likely that, in a world where artificial intelligence (AI) is all‐pervasive, the ability to meaningfully engage with and valorise ideas (i.e., to say which are good or bad) will serve to both provide sources of employment, while also distinguishing between the realms of human thought and AI (Brown & Luzmore, [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref32">21</reflink>]). Engaging with ideas thus represents a fundamental aspect of being human in a modern society; while the notion of an ideas‐informed society itself represents an educated society somewhat in the mould of Plato's <emph>Republic</emph> or Thomas More's <emph>Utopia</emph> (More, [<reflink idref="bib90" id="ref33">90</reflink>]; Plato, [<reflink idref="bib100" id="ref34">100</reflink>]) (albeit one unshackled from the problematic assumptions of gender, race and class relations that were previously assumed normal at the time of these authors) (Baumfield, [<reflink idref="bib11" id="ref35">11</reflink>]).</p> <p>Of course, there is no guarantee that in a society informed by ideas, the types of benefits outlined above will regularly materialise, nor will they always result in behaviours that are commensurate with understanding (European Commission, [<reflink idref="bib49" id="ref36">49</reflink>]; Goldstein & Harding, [<reflink idref="bib58" id="ref37">58</reflink>]; Hannon & Mackay, [<reflink idref="bib70" id="ref38">70</reflink>]). One only has to consider the issue of global heating to see the high level of disconnect that exists between having knowledge of an issue and not taking meaningful action in relation to it: not only at the level of the individual but also at the level of national and international government (with inaction resulting from factors such as competing priorities, politics or ideologies ultimately triumphing against the strong Kantian moral imperative felt by huge swathes of citizens suggesting that we 'ought' to do something about increasing global temperatures). Nonetheless, as an intuitive rule of thumb, it is reasonable to suggest that the more ideas‐engaged citizens are, the greater the chance—over the medium to long term—that at least some behaviours will tend towards that which results in beneficial outcomes: this reasoning accounting for recent calls by health campaigners for hard‐hitting TV campaigns to raise awareness that drinking alcohol and being overweight are both major causes of avoidable cancers (Campbell, [<reflink idref="bib26" id="ref39">26</reflink>]). The actualisation of the ideas‐informed society can also be usefully reinforced by (as well as reinforce) governmental efforts to promote individual behavioural change. For instance, those by the 'Nudge Unit', which was established by the UK Cabinet Office in 2010 to incorporate behavioural science within public policy as a way of influencing personal decision‐making. Nonetheless, there exist a number of pressing social imperatives for furthering research into the area of the ideas‐informed society, so as to more readily foster ideas engagement by citizens and usher in situations which enable the concept of the ideas‐informed society to transition from the realm of the ideal into reality. Two of these imperatives are the need to ensure those who might benefit most from doing so actually engage with ideas, and the growing influence of 'dark' ideas within Western societies. We briefly explore these imperatives before outlining the purpose of this paper.</p> <hd id="AN0184273895-6">THE BENEFIT OF IDEAS ENGAGEMENT FOR DEPRIVED COMMUNITIES</hd> <p>Our first imperative is that ideas engagement, while having the potential to be beneficial to everyone, could be especially beneficial to those living in the most socially and economically deprived communities. At the same time, it is these very same communities that are less likely to engage with new ideas. This can be illustrated by the results of analysis from a representative survey of some 1000 voting‐age citizens in England (Brown, Groß Ophoff, et al., [<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref40">18</reflink>]), where it was found that, in response to the question: 'How important is it to you to keep up to date with news, current affairs and new developments (such as political, economic and scientific developments)?', 13% of respondents indicated that this was 'unimportant' to them, with 16% neutral ('neither important nor unimportant'). This suggests that, overall, almost a third of those surveyed (and by extension, a third of the adult English population) failed to perceive the need to be ideas engaged. To better understand this group (dubbed 'ideas negative'), descriptive and structural equation modelling of this survey data was undertaken (Brown, Groß Ophoff, et al., [<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref41">18</reflink>]): with this analysis suggesting that 'ideas‐negative' respondents are more likely to be from a low‐education background. Specifically, 64.8% of 'ideas‐negative' respondents did not engage in post‐16 education (with 12.1% not possessing any formal qualifications). This compares to just 15.8% of this group who were degree educated. In contrast, those who were 'ideas positive' were more likely to hold degrees (26.9%) and only 6% had no formal qualifications at all. Analysis also showed that 28.5% of ideas negatives worked in routine or semi‐routine roles (e.g., bar staff, receptionist, bus driver); while 16.8% of ideas negatives indicated that they had either never worked or were long‐term unemployed.</p> <p>Further, 41.3% of ideas negatives indicated that all or most of their friends lived in the same neighbourhood as they did, and that 38.1% held the same job (compared to 22.9% and 14.2% of ideas‐positive respondents). Based on this, a variable called social cohesion was created to describe the extent to which respondents and their social contacts lived in the same area, as well as holding similar job roles. Structural equation modelling suggested an effect size of 0.35 between the variable 'highest level of qualification' and social cohesion. In other words, those with lower levels of qualifications—those most likely to be ideas negative—are more likely to agree that their friends not only live in the same neighbourhood as themselves, but are also likely to be employed in similar occupations. These findings thus suggest that those with lower levels of education (and so most prone to ideas refusal) are more likely to live in relatively close‐knit communities with others like themselves. This matters because, within these socially cohesive communities, there is much less likely to be a discussion of the news, current affairs and new developments with friends, family and work colleagues in comparison to ideas‐positive respondents. These findings can be seen in detail in the differences in mean scores between ideas‐negative and ideas‐positive respondents, as set out in Table 1.</p> <p>1 TABLE Mean scores from ideas‐negative and ideas‐positive respondents with regard to the frequency of ideas discussion (from Brown, Luzmore & Groß Ophoff, 2022b).</p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead valign="bottom"><tr><th align="left">Ideas‐negative respondents, discussing ideas with</th><th align="left">Frequency</th><th align="left">Ideas‐positive respondents, discussing ideas with</th><th align="left">Frequency</th></tr></thead><tbody valign="top"><tr><td align="left">Friends</td><td align="char" char=".">2.0 (SD = 1.6)</td><td align="left">Friends</td><td align="char" char=".">3.1 (SD = 1.5)</td></tr><tr><td align="left">Family</td><td align="char" char=".">2.6 (SD = 1.7)</td><td align="left">Family</td><td align="char" char=".">3.6 (SD = 1.5)</td></tr><tr><td align="left">Colleagues</td><td align="char" char=".">1.8 (SD = 1.8)</td><td align="left">Colleagues</td><td align="char" char=".">2.9 (SD = 1.8)</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <p>1 <emph>Note</emph>: The survey used a five‐point scale, where 1 corresponds to 'once or twice a year' and 5 is 'once a day or more'.</p> <p>2 Abbreviation: SD, standard deviation.</p> <p>At the same time, these communities of ideas‐negative respondents stand to gain from becoming ideas engaged, and so in a better position to make good decisions. For instance, we know by their very nature (i.e., lower levels of education/higher levels of manual occupation) that such communities are likely to have higher levels of economic deprivation and so face very specific problems (Brown, [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref42">16</reflink>]). For instance, The Centre for Social Justice ([<reflink idref="bib29" id="ref43">29</reflink>]) suggests that, post‐COVID‐19, 40% of individuals living in the United Kingdom's most deprived communities now report having a mental health condition, compared to just 13% of the general population (with mental ill‐health in young people increasing from one in nine to one in six); that in such communities, severe school absence has increased by 134% (with some 140,000 children now missing more school than they attend); and that there has been a 63% increase in deaths of people on methadone than pre‐COVID‐19, with nearly 5000 people dying from drug poisoning during 2022. Other analysis shows that those in more deprived areas are far less likely to engage in cultural capital‐building activities, despite the social‐levelling function that cultural capital provides (DiMaggio, [<reflink idref="bib43" id="ref44">43</reflink>]). Thus, while by itself unlikely to be a cure‐all for the systemic injustices which lead to social and economic deprivation, better ideas engagement could see individuals within the United Kingdom's most blighted communities better armed with the types of knowledge required to have the agency to tackle these and other such issues.</p> <hd id="AN0184273895-7">IDEAS ENGAGEMENT AND DARK IDEAS</hd> <p>A second imperative for pursuing research that might support better ideas engagement is the increasing threat to societies worldwide of what might be termed citizens' engagement with 'dark' ideas (Collier, [<reflink idref="bib32" id="ref45">32</reflink>]; EEAS, [<reflink idref="bib46" id="ref46">46</reflink>]; European Commission, [<reflink idref="bib48" id="ref47">48</reflink>]; King, [<reflink idref="bib75" id="ref48">75</reflink>]). Such ideas, for us, represent the opposite of optimal decision‐making as set out in note 1 (and so, in extremis, their perpetuation can result in undesirable situations, such as the rise of fascism seen in 1930s Europe). In part, this engagement with dark ideas has been driven by the rapid growth in reactionary populism that has gripped many countries worldwide: with recent polls suggesting that nearly a third of voters in Europe now support far‐right or far‐left parties (Rooduijn et al., [<reflink idref="bib103" id="ref49">103</reflink>]). Populists are well versed in politics‐as‐rhetoric: pitching the 'ordinary person' against so‐called 'elites', while seeking to subvert democratic norms through attempts to undermine the judiciary, the media or 'experts'; while decrying or restricting minority rights and taking extreme views on issues such as gender, national identity and immigration. This has been described elsewhere as the waging of the so‐called culture wars against the 'woke'. Populism relies heavily on 'post truth'—a situation in which people readily accept arguments based on their emotions, beliefs and need for hope, rather than on the basis of facts—as well as the production of 'alternative facts'—a phrase first coined by Kellyanne Conway, advisor to former US President Donald Trump, to account for the untruths of the then Whitehouse Press Secretary Sean Spicer (Swaine, [<reflink idref="bib109" id="ref50">109</reflink>]). This ability to impart a perspective far removed from what is objectively true has also facilitated the correlations we now see between extreme far‐right and far‐left populism with forms of science denial, especially regarding global heating. For instance, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, during the middle of one of the most severe heatwaves ever experienced in eastern Australia, famously addressed Australia's House of Representatives while holding a lump of coal, stating: 'This is coal. Don't be afraid, don't be scared, it won't hurt you' (Hamilton, [<reflink idref="bib69" id="ref51">69</reflink>]). Another form of science denial could be seen in the pushback by a number of Conservative MPs to the lockdowns utilised by the UK government (in common with many governments worldwide), as a response to COVID‐19 (Craig, [<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref52">34</reflink>]). This includes the response of former Chief Whip Mark Harper, who suggested quite earnestly that 'lockdowns cost lives' and are potentially 'worse than the disease' (Craig, [<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref53">34</reflink>]).</p> <p>Connections can also be made to the findings from an international study of 36,000 people across 30 countries, which suggests that 42% of people aged 18 to 35 are supportive of a regressive situation of military rule and that a third (35%) of young people felt that an undemocratic 'strong leader' who did not hold elections or consult parliament was 'a good way to run a country' (Open Society, [<reflink idref="bib94" id="ref54">94</reflink>]). Yet when we look at the concerns of these respondents and the issues they want tackled (which are very much centred around climate change and inequality and little to do with migration), it is clear that neither populists nor military leaders would be likely to deliver these desired ends. Rushing to embrace populism without truly understanding the consequences is therefore likely to be disastrous for citizens truly desiring a more equitable and just society.</p> <p>Outside of the populist agenda, others are also turning to rather more extreme forms of science denial, with recent expressed beliefs including: (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref55">1</reflink>) a growing credence that the world is flat (Brazil, [<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref56">14</reflink>]); (<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref57">2</reflink>) that COVID‐19 vaccines were attempts by global governments (and/or Bill Gates) to introduce 5G microchips into their populations (EEAS, [<reflink idref="bib46" id="ref58">46</reflink>]) (something apparently believed by 20% of the 1500 American adults surveyed by YouGov in July 2021) (see YouGov, [<reflink idref="bib114" id="ref59">114</reflink>]); (<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref60">3</reflink>) a belief that governments, worldwide, are hiding from the public proof of alien life, ultimately compelling the US government to convene a Congressional Hearing to establish the veracity (or not) of claims by former US intelligence officer David Grusch that the US government is harbouring 'intact and partially intact' non‐human UFO pilots, as well as running a 'multi‐decade' programme to reverse‐engineer crashed UFOs (Gabbatt, [<reflink idref="bib53" id="ref61">53</reflink>]). Such notions are also increasingly finding their way into the curriculum of the increasing number of illegal schools emerging across England (i.e., institutions providing full‐time education, but which are not registered with the Department for Education, so functioning under the radar of both local authorities and the schools regulator Ofsted). In recent articles, for example, <emph>Times</emph> reporter Tom Ball has presented the findings of his undercover reporting into two such schools: Hope Sussex, near the town of Battle and Universallzidz in Manchester (Ball, [<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref62">7</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib8" id="ref63">8</reflink>]). In each, Ball found curricula taught through the prism of conspiracy as well as infused with plain and simple nonsense. For instance, across the two, pupils are instructed that COVID‐19 was a PLANdemic coordinated via the World Hoax Organisation, that aircraft vapour trails are designed to cause dementia, that governments knew about events such as 9/11 in advance, that dinosaurs never existed and that, because our bodies are made of energy, crystals can provide a cure for serious illness. Although the number of pupils likely to be attending such schools is relatively small (estimates by England's Department for Education suggesting that 126,100 children were home schooled at any point during 2022–23; Department for Education, [<reflink idref="bib40" id="ref64">40</reflink>]), this still represents an unacceptably large number of people who might ultimately come to accept such ideas as fact, doing both themselves and others untold damage as a result.[<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref65">2</reflink>]</p> <hd id="AN0184273895-8">THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER</hd> <p>Thus, while ideas engagement can, in theory, lead to citizens becoming better informed, better able to engage in effective decision‐making and better able to understand the world around them, these benefits do not reach everybody (and potentially, are less likely to reach communities that could benefit most from ideas engagement). Likewise in the ideas ecosystem more generally, in the absence of citizens being able to act as critical consumers of ideas, we can often see 'dark' ideas winning through, resulting in less optimal outcomes for both citizens and nations. While interest in the notion of the ideas‐informed society is burgeoning (e.g., see European Commission, [<reflink idref="bib48" id="ref66">48</reflink>]; Franco et al., [<reflink idref="bib51" id="ref67">51</reflink>]; Global Agenda Council on Informed Societies, [<reflink idref="bib56" id="ref68">56</reflink>]; Goldstein, [<reflink idref="bib57" id="ref69">57</reflink>]; UNESCO, [<reflink idref="bib111" id="ref70">111</reflink>]), we argue that if future research is to be effectively positioned to support ideas engagement and the emergence of ideas‐informed societies, what is now required is a theoretical framework to guide this research moving forward.</p> <p>Of course, this is not to ignore the long‐standing theories concerned with how, within the public sphere, ideas might 'win through' or become dominant (although the new epistemic relativism, introduced by web 2.0, has somewhat eroded the basis of such theories). These include, to name but a few, Gramsci's notions of 'hegemony' and 'good sense' (Gramsci, [<reflink idref="bib59" id="ref71">59</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib60" id="ref72">60</reflink>]) and Habermas's theory of communicative action, his notion of the public sphere (Habermas, [<reflink idref="bib65" id="ref73">65</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib66" id="ref74">66</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib67" id="ref75">67</reflink>]), as well as concepts such as civic participation (Putnam, [<reflink idref="bib101" id="ref76">101</reflink>]; Verba et al., [<reflink idref="bib112" id="ref77">112</reflink>]). These concepts clearly bear on the notions of both ideas engagement and the ideas‐informed society. For instance, Gramsci's notion of hegemony (which highlights how certain ideas come to dominate and shape societal beliefs and norms) illustrates how both optimal and 'dark' ideas can achieve prominence and influence within an ideas ecosystem (often now via widespread digital sharing and algorithmic amplification). This hegemonic process may lead to a reinforcement of dominant narratives, which can discourage critical engagement or alternative viewpoints, unless countered by what Gramsci termed 'good sense'—the critical, rational insight that challenges commonly accepted beliefs. In this way, an ideas‐informed society requires mechanisms that promote critical thinking and resist passive acceptance of dominant ideas, especially on platforms that facilitate echo chambers. Additionally, Habermas's concept of the public sphere—a space for inclusive, rational discourse—provides a contrasting ideal to the fragmented and sometimes polarised discourse commonly found on social media. The public‐sphere model thus underscores the importance of fostering genuine engagement with diverse perspectives, yet social media often operates on a logic of visibility and engagement over deliberative quality, thus complicating the realisation of Habermas's vision.</p> <p>The work presented here, however, is needed precisely because it moves beyond such concepts to consider what serves to motivate individuals to actually engage (or not) with new ideas in the first place. For instance, whether and how one decides to consider new perspectives, irrespective of whether these perspectives are dominant or are still being formed and shaped by discursive acts. Likewise, the concept of an 'ideas‐informed society' emphasises a proactive‐motivated commitment to continuous, critical engagement with a broad array of ideas, including scientific, cultural and technological innovations (Franco et al., [<reflink idref="bib51" id="ref78">51</reflink>]; Pinker, [<reflink idref="bib98" id="ref79">98</reflink>]). Unlike frameworks of civic participation that primarily focus on political and community involvement, the 'ideas‐informed society' is (as will be illustrated below) concerned with the mechanisms that foster dispositions towards ongoing engagement, learning and critical analysis (Hochschild, [<reflink idref="bib72" id="ref80">72</reflink>]; Verba et al., [<reflink idref="bib112" id="ref81">112</reflink>]). This broader orientation encourages citizens to engage in reflective, informed decision‐making across multiple domains of life, from personal health to environmental action, as a precursor to action (DiMaggio, [<reflink idref="bib43" id="ref82">43</reflink>]; Hochschild, [<reflink idref="bib71" id="ref83">71</reflink>]). Furthermore, while traditional civic participation frameworks prioritise action within established civic structures, an 'ideas‐informed society' encourages a mindset that adapts to new media landscapes, such as digital and social media, fostering skills in digital literacy and critical consumption of information (D'Ancona, [<reflink idref="bib37" id="ref84">37</reflink>]; Goldstein & Harding, [<reflink idref="bib58" id="ref85">58</reflink>]). This proactive, ideas‐centric engagement supports resilience against 'dark' ideas or misinformation, equipping citizens not only to participate but to shape society through informed and reasoned perspectives (Lewandowsky, [<reflink idref="bib80" id="ref86">80</reflink>]). In this way, the 'ideas‐informed society' refines and expands upon civic participation by first fostering a holistic, lifelong commitment to being informed, critical and adaptive citizens in a complex, rapidly evolving world.</p> <p>Given the failure of the aforementioned frameworks to successfully provide bulwark to deal with the fracturing of consensus present in more modern times (Bauman, [<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref87">9</reflink>]), the anomie of uncertainty that is exemplified by the ongoing change, the seemingly never‐ending crises and the almost infinite perspectives that modern media and social media offer (D'Ancona, [<reflink idref="bib37" id="ref88">37</reflink>]; Durkheim, [<reflink idref="bib45" id="ref89">45</reflink>]), we argue that efforts to investigate and attend to effective ideas engagement and ideas‐informed society are more vital than ever. As such, we argue the need for a guiding framework that can provide explanatory power to support: (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref90">1</reflink>) exploratory studies seeking to understand why ideas engagement is or isn't present in specific situations; (<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref91">2</reflink>) interventions and programmes hoping to facilitate ideas engagement/the actualisation of ideas‐informed societies; as well as (<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref92">3</reflink>) approaches designed to repel the incursion of dark ideas into ideas ecosystems. To develop such a framework with this paper, we address the question: 'what are the fundamental factors influencing whether people see value in engaging with ideas?'. In doing so, we draw on previous empirical studies in this general area.</p> <hd id="AN0184273895-9">WHAT ARE THE FUNDAMENTAL FACTORS INFLUENCING WHETHER PEOPLE SEE VALUE IN ENGAGING WITH IDEAS?</hd> <p>Based on a bottom‐up approach—a review of research to date, which includes a systematic literature review into factors affecting ideas engagement (Brown, Luzmore, & Groß Ophoff, [<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref93">22</reflink>])—we argue that three concepts have emerged as providing most promise for the basis of our proposed framework. These are: (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref94">1</reflink>) whether individuals possess a prospective mindset, enabling them to see value in engaging with ideas, as well as become more likely to commit to behaviours concomitant with ideas that have optimal and wide‐reaching outcomes; (<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref95">2</reflink>) the features of individuals' social networks, in terms of how these impact on access to ideas and the nature of ideas engagement; and (<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref96">3</reflink>) individuals' levels of education and the extent to which the education people receive enables them to engage with ideas critically. With this paper we thus set out the case for a framework grounded in these three aspects of prospection, social networks and education. We conclude by proposing future research that would enable us to further specify and verify this framework, as well as develop instruments to test it nationally and internationally.</p> <hd id="AN0184273895-10">PROSPECTION</hd> <p>The first component of our proposed framework is whether individuals possess a prospective mindset. Humans make predictions about the near and distant future based on our experiences and learning to date (Allen, [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref97">1</reflink>]). One form of prediction—pragmatic prospection—involves individuals considering future choices and actions that could be made in pursuit of pragmatic (i.e., outcome‐focused) concerns, as well as the myriad ways these choices and actions might unfold (Baumeister & Lim, 2022). Thus, as Baumeister et al. ([<reflink idref="bib10" id="ref98">10</reflink>], p. 4) argue: 'pragmatic prospection [involves] thinking about the future in ways that will assist the process of producing desired future outcomes and avoiding undesired ones'. From our own work (Brown & Groß Ophoff, [<reflink idref="bib17" id="ref99">17</reflink>]), which utilised a 4‐week‐long experimental approach involving a sample of 515 UK adults, 246 of whom received a twice‐weekly intervention to stimulate prospective thinking, we have shown that promoting prospection can lead to a statistically significant uplift in respondents ascribing importance to staying up‐to‐date with new ideas. Specifically, our prospection‐stimulating intervention led to a post‐treatment increase of 8.9% in respondents agreeing that ideas engagement was important. This compares to the 269 individuals who received an equivalent treatment to stimulate curiosity, which had no statistically significant impact (and in fact a 1.1% decrease) on the value they afforded to engaging with ideas. Thus, our findings reinforce the notion that once stimulated to think about future goals, people are also likely to think more about the concomitant need to plan (Baumeister & Lim, 2022; Baumeister et al., [<reflink idref="bib10" id="ref100">10</reflink>]). In turn, a focus on planning leads people to realise that their plans require a sound basis if they are to succeed (Oettingen & Reininger, [<reflink idref="bib96" id="ref101">96</reflink>]). Hence, individuals attribute increased importance to being ideas informed.</p> <p>But as well as leading people to see value in ideas engagement, prospection can lead to people being more able to see value in and act in accordance with ideas that may require a long‐term commitment to deliver results, especially in comparison to those that might deliver short‐term gain. Thus, for the purposes of the ideas‐informed society, the ability to engage in prospection is important because it can support individuals to engage in potentially more optimal decision‐making and to undertake more prudent action, through a process of projecting themselves forward in time to pre‐experience an event, then adjusting their behaviour accordingly (Atance & O'Neill, [<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref102">3</reflink>]). For example, in studies in which episodic and semantic future thinking are simulated (where episodic prospection relates to personal future experiences and semantic prospection to non‐personal future occurrences), individuals who consider the long‐term rewards that might be achieved—particularly in relation to an unfavourable comparison—are more likely to mitigate the temptation of more immediate but less valuable rewards (Peters & Büchel, [<reflink idref="bib96" id="ref103">96</reflink>]). This can help with personal goals such as weight loss or addressing unhealthy habits, such as smoking. Likewise, a recent systematic review (Pawlak & Moustafa, [<reflink idref="bib95" id="ref104">95</reflink>]) notes multiple studies indicating that future‐orientated thinking is also correlated with higher academic outcomes due to the behavioural changes it engenders (e.g., putting in additional effort to achieve a target grade). On the other hand, when prospection is absent, individuals can be more prone to making choices that lead to more certain immediate rewards, rather than exercising patience for delayed gain (even if these later gains might be greater). This phenomenon is referred to as temporal discounting (Luhmann et al., [<reflink idref="bib83" id="ref105">83</reflink>])—an occurrence that can also spread through social groups (Bixter & Luhmann, [<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref106">12</reflink>]), something we return to below.</p> <p>Finally, prospection has been shown to facilitate individuals to engage in ideas which have a pro‐social and collective focus. For instance, recent findings from a longitudinal study of UK citizens who, during the early stages of the COVID‐19 pandemic, reported higher scores of 'future consciousness' showed that they also reported 'higher compassion for others, stronger sense of neighbourliness, and greater engagement in different forms of collective action as well as being those who reported greatest concern about societal issues' (Lalot et al., [<reflink idref="bib79" id="ref107">79</reflink>], p. 1). Individuals also tend to be more willing to help others in specific situations after projecting their future selves into those situations (Gaesser et al., [<reflink idref="bib54" id="ref108">54</reflink>]), and will even go as far as actualising that willingness (e.g., by donating money; Gaesser et al., [<reflink idref="bib55" id="ref109">55</reflink>]). Such prospection, at its optimal extreme, can also lead to 'cathedral thinking' (Krznaric, [<reflink idref="bib78" id="ref110">78</reflink>]) (i.e., situations in which we plan and take action for a future beyond the one that we will inhabit ourselves).</p> <p>Developing a prospective mindset is thus key to meaningful ideas engagement across the piece, and we argue that a critical mass of individuals who engage in prospection will be required to actualise an ideas‐informed society. Yet, to be effective in helping actually improve decision‐making, such a mindset requires a number of supporting factors to be present. To begin with, individuals are much more likely to act in service of their future self if they see clear connections between their future and current selves (Lewis Jr & Oyserman, [<reflink idref="bib81" id="ref111">81</reflink>]). Allied to this is that to engage in prospection effectively, there must be an understanding by individuals that the future is not 'set in stone' (i.e., that change is possible and that individuals have a certain degree of agency to achieve desired future states). Visualising an optimal future version of oneself (which comes from individual but also social comparisons) and contrasting that with a feared future version of the self can also provide motivation towards our 'possible self' (Markus & Nurius, [<reflink idref="bib86" id="ref112">86</reflink>]). At the same time, individuals also need to be cognisant of the realistic window of possibilities that exist for the future, the steps required to actualise these possibilities and the probability of success in terms of them being able to successfully carry them out: this requires individuals to possess both rich semantic knowledge (i.e., general world knowledge accumulated throughout one's life) alongside personal experience, so as to understand both what is possible and the steps required to actualise future goals (Oettingen & Mayer, [<reflink idref="bib92" id="ref113">92</reflink>]). Thus, the more we know and have experienced, the more we are likely to be able to engage in meaningful prospection (thus a clear link exists to the education component of our theoretical framework). At the same time, to engage in prospection requires a mental effort to remove oneself from the here and now. For instance, when we are engaged with the 'busy‐ness' of everyday life, we focus on the present and the most pressing matters, meaning we fail to pay sufficient attention to the future (Lewis Jr & Oyserman, [<reflink idref="bib81" id="ref114">81</reflink>]).</p> <hd id="AN0184273895-11">SOCIAL NETWORKS</hd> <p>The second component of our framework considers the features of individuals' social networks, in terms of how these impact on one's access to ideas and the nature of how ideas are engaged with. Simply defined, social networks (whether face to face or mediated via social media) are collections of people who share specific connections or patterns of ties (Borgatti & Halgin, [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref115">13</reflink>]; Burt, [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref116">24</reflink>]; Castells, [<reflink idref="bib27" id="ref117">27</reflink>]; Christakis & Fowler, [<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref118">30</reflink>]; Granovetter, [<reflink idref="bib61" id="ref119">61</reflink>]). Because they connect individuals to one another, social networks represent a means by which resources can flow, such as various forms of social and economic capital (e.g., money, time, knowledge, trust, friendship, inspiration and social norms; Brown, [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref120">16</reflink>]; Castells, [<reflink idref="bib27" id="ref121">27</reflink>]; Coleman, [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref122">31</reflink>]; Putnam, [<reflink idref="bib101" id="ref123">101</reflink>]): including, of course, ideas as a resource. What influences the resources available to an individual via their social networks, as well as their ability to access this resource, includes the following. (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref124">1</reflink>) The size of a given network, which is represented by the number of people an individual is connected to. This is because, almost by definition, a larger network, especially if it contains a diverse range of people, is more likely to contain within it a greater range of potentially useful resources than a small network (Christakis & Fowler, [<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref125">30</reflink>]; Neal, [<reflink idref="bib91" id="ref126">91</reflink>]). (<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref127">2</reflink>) The position an individual holds within a network: with <emph>centrality</emph>—the number of people within a network that individuals are directly connected to—positively influencing one's ability to access resources (Christakis & Fowler, [<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref128">30</reflink>]; Jackson, [<reflink idref="bib74" id="ref129">74</reflink>]). As well as indicating direct access to resources, centrality matters because holding a central network position heightens the possibility that individuals within the network will act more favourably towards us (with studies showing that people tend to favour those they are more closely connected to, rather than distant 'others'; Dias, [<reflink idref="bib42" id="ref130">42</reflink>]). Finally (<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref131">3</reflink>) network density describes the extent to which one's network connections all know one another (Neal, [<reflink idref="bib91" id="ref132">91</reflink>]). In a dense network, many people are connected to each other; conversely, in a sparse network, there are fewer links between people. Dense networks are thus characterised by higher levels of familiarity, trust and community, leading to more exchanges of social capital among network members.</p> <p>At the same time, these same factors can place constraints on individual action. For instance, if all the neighbours in a given community talk to each other, then news or gossip is likely to spread quickly, leading to community members becoming guarded or careful about what they say or do and the types of ideas they adopt (Burt, [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref133">25</reflink>]; Christakis & Fowler, [<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref134">30</reflink>]; Granovetter, [<reflink idref="bib62" id="ref135">62</reflink>]). Consequently, sparse relationships, while not fostering community, can also be useful. For instance, sparser networks can provide individuals with the opportunity to receive new ideas (whereas in dense networks, existing ideas or conventional wisdom tends to be circulated repeatedly). This also means that sparse networks can promote more open‐mindedness among a group, whereas dense networks can lead to people holding onto and reinforcing existing ideas (Burt, [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref136">25</reflink>]; Granovetter, [<reflink idref="bib62" id="ref137">62</reflink>]; Neal, [<reflink idref="bib91" id="ref138">91</reflink>]). An optimal mix of dense and sparse networks can be represented by the combination of weak and strong ties that define relationships. As Figure 1 illustrates, strong ties within groups enable individuals to connect to one another within a network, with such connections also providing feedback loops (social norms) to moderate behaviour. Strong ties therefore help to bind people together in dense communities. But such ties are problematic for reaching beyond one's immediate network. This means that weaker ties between networks can help spread ideas more widely by providing bridges from one dense group to another. A combination of both strong and weak ties can thus be beneficial to community wellbeing, while also serving to foster positive attributes such as the take up of innovation, serving to mix the communication and interaction associated with familiarity and community with the introduction of new ideas (Burt, [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref139">25</reflink>]; Christakis & Fowler, [<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref140">30</reflink>]; Granovetter, [<reflink idref="bib62" id="ref141">62</reflink>]).</p> <p> <img src="https://imageserver.ebscohost.com/img/embimages/rdk/BED/01apr25/berj4110-fig-0001.jpg?ephost1=dGJyMNXb4kSepq84yOvqOLCmsE6epq5Srqa4SK6WxWXS" alt="berj4110-fig-0001.jpg" title="1 Strong and weak ties (drawing on Neal, [91]): (a) strong and bonding; (b) weak and bridging; (c) combined. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]" /> </p> <p></p> <p>While the three characteristics of size, centrality and density can be influenced by individual network members (subject to the limitations afforded by family, geography, etc.), a further factor which influences how networks form and function is that of <emph>homophily</emph>. Homophily is the idea that like attracts like; or, as it is more commonly expressed, 'birds of a feather flock together' (Turner, [<reflink idref="bib110" id="ref142">110</reflink>]). In essence, homophily dictates that individuals tend to form networks with people they see as being like themselves. Conversely, we make fewer connections with those we perceive as having little in common with us (Christakis & Fowler, [<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref143">30</reflink>]; Schelling, [<reflink idref="bib106" id="ref144">106</reflink>]). Homophily is thus likely to result in the type of 'strong and bonding' networks depicted in Figure 1 (i.e., dense networks comprising relationships which bond individuals together; Putnam, [<reflink idref="bib101" id="ref145">101</reflink>]). Consequently, strong homophily can also make bridging (i.e., the formation of connections between networks, such as that depicted in Figure 1b and c) more difficult to achieve (Woolcock, [<reflink idref="bib113" id="ref146">113</reflink>]), restricting the flow of ideas into a given community. As well as access to ideas, homophily can also influence the attitudes and behaviours of network members in relation to engaging with ideas generally. For instance, of the possible types of homophily that exist, structural equation modelling of 1000 voting‐age citizens in England (Brown et al., [<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref147">19</reflink>]) suggests that shared political perspectives appears most likely to promote general ideas engagement (i.e., the more that groups have specific political beliefs in common, the more frequently they will engage in ideas‐related discussion across the piece, reflecting a need for individuals to feel comfortable around others before discussing ideas with them). The same analysis also illustrates how level of education provides a homophilic driver to connect, while simultaneously influencing attitudes towards ideas engagement (with groups who connect due to higher levels of education more likely to discuss ideas with friends and vice versa; Brown et al., [<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref148">19</reflink>]). Homophily can also influence whether prospection has a pro‐social or collective focus, since individuals will be more likely to engage in pro‐social or collective forms of prospection in relation to those they feel most connected to. As a result, the greater the proliferation of dense networks of 'similar' individuals, the harder it becomes to facilitate ideas engagement that stretches beyond the interest of the immediate network so as to include ideas that might benefit the wider collective of networks (i.e., the population generally).</p> <p>Beyond homophily, the norms which circulate within networks also affect the attitudes and behaviours of individuals in relation to specific ideas/types of ideas. For example, studies show that the children of politically engaged parents are more likely to be politically engaged themselves, with analysis by Dostie‐Goulet ([<reflink idref="bib44" id="ref149">44</reflink>]) suggesting that, where the networks of young people took part in political discussion (and, in particular, if their parents took part in such discussion), respondents were significantly more interested in politics than those whose networks were not engaged in this way. Further, analysis undertaken by Erisen and Erisen ([<reflink idref="bib47" id="ref150">47</reflink>]) indicates that the structure of one's social network can affect the <emph>quality</emph> of people's ideas engagement. Defining 'quality' political thinking as 'the extent to which an individual can express knowledge on political issues and concepts, observe the causal connections in political issues, and differentiate among the distinct dimensions of issues and the alternative ways of approaching a potential political problem' (p. 843), Erisen and Erisen's findings indicate that those in cohesive social networks (i.e., who have strong close relationships with, for example, friends) are more likely to exhibit less 'complex thinking' and be less able to produce policy‐relevant thoughts. Conversely, a wider social network—where communication includes people from different social contexts—is likely to increase the chances of quality political thinking among network members. This therefore reflects the need for networks to comprise those with different experiences, interests and perspectives to enable novel ideas to circulate and to avoid group think. Studies also illustrate how the influence of networks reaches beyond one's direct social ties, to include a broader hyper‐dyadic spread (e.g., see Bixter & Luhmann, [<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref151">12</reflink>]). This means that social networks can take on a life of their own, with groups of people exhibiting similar behaviours without 'explicit coordination or awareness' (Christakis & Fowler, [<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref152">30</reflink>], p. 25). As a result, attitudes—such as temporal discounting decisions—have been shown to spread (albeit on a small scale) like social contagion (Bixter & Luhmann, [<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref153">12</reflink>]), consequently leading to entire groups being less likely to engage in prospection and forward thinking.</p> <p>Finally, other insights from extant work in this area suggest that social networks act in service of the ideas‐informed society when they are populated by network members who engage with credible information networks and are open to critical engagement about the ideas they encounter, with credible information networks comprising: (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref154">1</reflink>) credible information sources (e.g., those which represent accuracy, are free from or acknowledge potential bias, are built on well‐reasoned arguments and are linked to expertise); (<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref155">2</reflink>) forms of content that are accessible in style and lack barriers to engagement (e.g., behind exclusionary paywalls); and (<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref156">3</reflink>) information from a diverse range of perspectives and subject matters so as to introduce novelty into social networks. There is a link to prospection here, since a prospective mindset can perhaps stimulate individuals to seek to ensure they can access credible information (Baumeister & Lim, 2022). Conversely, social networks act against the effective operation of the ideas‐informed society when they contain: (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref157">1</reflink>) network members whose charisma or rhetoric overcompensates for substance, leading network members to believe ideas without question as well as disregard alternatives; (<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref158">2</reflink>) individuals within whom network members afford misplaced or excessive trust; and (<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref159">3</reflink>) network members attracted to homophily of thought. Information networks are likewise less helpful when they contain non‐credible information sources, promote dark ideas, mis/disinformation and obfuscation, as well as narrow access to diverse perspectives and subject matters, or serve to privilege particular biases (Christakis & Fowler, [<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref160">30</reflink>]; Kahneman, 2011). That many of our information networks are now saturated with these non‐credible information sources (Lewandowsky, [<reflink idref="bib80" id="ref161">80</reflink>]) highlights the role of educational processes in helping individuals meaningfully engage with ideas, as well as ensuring that networks are utilised effectively in the service of ideas engagement.</p> <hd id="AN0184273895-13">EDUCATION AND EFFECTIVE REASONING</hd> <p>The third and final component of our proposed framework concerns the education of individuals and the extent to which they can engage with ideas critically. For Plato ([<reflink idref="bib100" id="ref162">100</reflink>]), education represented a means to achieve individual and social justice: it enabled citizens to achieve their potential while also fostering a more equitable ('virtuous') society. Dewey ([<reflink idref="bib41" id="ref163">41</reflink>]), meanwhile, argued that education enables individuals to become more effective—since it gives them agency over their lives (with Freire [1970] positing a critical social aspect to the changes possible through educative processes). Our own view (e.g., as expressed in Brown, [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref164">16</reflink>]; Brown & Luzmore, [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref165">21</reflink>]) situates 'education' as a process which facilitates the ongoing development of the knowledge, thought processes, skills and competencies which impact on our ability to improve our own situation as well as the situations of those around us. With regard to ideas engagement in particular, effective education enables individuals to: (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref166">1</reflink>) understand their particular context and how ideas apply; (<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref167">2</reflink>) build habits of mind and the ability of reason, which allows a critical and constructive engagement with new ideas; (<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref168">3</reflink>) use diverse perspectives and sources of information (including via networks) to make connections in order to better decide which ideas are most beneficial; (<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref169">4</reflink>) apply prospection to make longer‐term cost–benefit analysis calculations in relation to the ideas individuals engage with, so as to understand how adopting such ideas may impact themselves, their community and society generally; and (<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref170">5</reflink>) develop sufficient reflexive dispositions in order to challenge themselves to change their mind or go against the grain in the face of new evidence (Brown & Luzmore, [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref171">21</reflink>]; Freire, [<reflink idref="bib52" id="ref172">52</reflink>]; Plato, [<reflink idref="bib100" id="ref173">100</reflink>]). Conversely, a lack of effective education leaves individuals less able to identify ideas which are unhelpful, lacking in evidence and reason or are not in one's best interests, as well as being less able to avoid being taken in by rhetoric. In turn, this leaves individuals less able to adequately challenge and/or reject unhelpful, non‐credible or dark ideas. Similarly, a lack of educated reasoning can lead to individuals being less able to recognise biases, such as confirmation bias (listening to information that confirms our preconceptions) and group think/conformity bias (agreeing with consensus) (Brown & Luzmore, [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref174">21</reflink>]; Kahneman, 2011).</p> <p>Discussions around two aspects of education impact both on ideas engagement and the formation of ideas‐informed societies. The first of these is the level of education held by individuals: university‐level education has traditionally been seen as an experience which promotes a pluralist outlook, with those having progressed through higher education more likely to be characterised by greater openness to new ideas (Manning & Stefanovic, [<reflink idref="bib84" id="ref175">84</reflink>]). Furthermore, it is assumed that graduates are more likely to embrace more progressive ideas: for instance, it is often noted by those with centre‐left politics that non‐graduates were more likely to vote Leave in the Brexit Referendum and for the Conservative party generally (Simon, [<reflink idref="bib108" id="ref176">108</reflink>]). But it would actually seem that openness and a progressive outlook is, in fact, less a result of the process of higher education itself, and more a consequence of those with more liberal values being disproportionately more likely to enrol at universities. A network effect is therefore at play: with analysis by Simon ([<reflink idref="bib108" id="ref177">108</reflink>]), using a sibling‐based modelling approach, illustrating that possessing higher education qualifications only has a small direct causal effect on attitudes, and one which is substantially ameliorated by pre‐adult family experiences.</p> <p>Nonetheless, level of education can still positively influence one's ability to engage with ideas critically. This is because it represents an indication of one's general level of knowledge, gleaned from compulsory education, as well as the domain‐specific knowledge that an effective higher education provides. Both general and domain‐specific knowledge furnish individuals with the material to enact critical thinking. In other words, individuals can more readily engage with new ideas critically when they hold an understanding of the general knowledge‐related context and concepts underpinning those ideas. For instance, understanding why scientific method proves the world to be a sphere provides the general background required to critically engage with those who promote flat‐earth theory. Likewise, it is easier to engage in an accurate but 'fast and frugal' diagnosis of an issue when one has advanced domain‐specific knowledge (Couchman et al., [<reflink idref="bib33" id="ref178">33</reflink>]).</p> <p>Yet, as well as providing the raw material upon which to base critical thinking, experiencing higher levels of education substantially improves one's disposition towards and ability to engage in critical thinking (e.g., Huber & Kuncel, [<reflink idref="bib73" id="ref179">73</reflink>]). Here we define critical thinking as a type of 'epistemic cognition', where dispositions, beliefs and skills are combined to drive individuals to determine not only 'what' is known but 'why' and 'how' it is known (Cramer et al., [<reflink idref="bib35" id="ref180">35</reflink>]; Greene & Yu, [<reflink idref="bib63" id="ref181">63</reflink>]). Aspects of critical thinking that are particularly pertinent to the ideas‐informed society include:</p> <p></p> <ulist> <item> <emph>Curiosity</emph>. A form of motivation which promotes learning (Markey & Loewenstein, [<reflink idref="bib85" id="ref182">85</reflink>]). Curiosity is not taught but can be simulated through a supportive environment, avoiding actions and behaviours which might supress it (Markey & Loewenstein, [<reflink idref="bib85" id="ref183">85</reflink>]).</item> <p></p> <item> <emph>Intellectual honesty</emph>. '[F]acing one's own biases, prejudices, stereotypes, egocentric or sociocentric tendencies' (Facione, [<reflink idref="bib50" id="ref184">50</reflink>] , p. 25), thus recognising our tendencies towards particular perspectives which might interfere with our ability to be impartial, objective or unprejudiced.</item> <p></p> <item> <emph>Intellectual humility</emph>. Being aware of the potential limitations in one's own knowledge, while recognising that there is the possibility or likelihood of our knowledge being both incomplete and imperfect (Cramer et al., [<reflink idref="bib35" id="ref185">35</reflink>]). In other words, intellectual humility is a 'non‐threatening awareness of intellectual fallibility' (Krumrei‐Mancuso et al., [<reflink idref="bib77" id="ref186">77</reflink>] , p. 155) and associated with pro‐social values including altruism, benevolence, universalism and lower levels of power seeking (Krumrei‐Mancuso, [<reflink idref="bib76" id="ref187">76</reflink>]).</item> <p></p> <item> <emph>Intellectual empathy</emph>. As a way of reflecting on our own experiences and viewpoints and how these relate to others (Baer, [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref188">5</reflink>]). The objective of intellectual empathy is 'not to imagine that one can simply feel what another person is feeling, but rather to enable individuals to treat the reports of others, particularly those whose social experiences are vastly different from one's own, as credible sources of information for reflectively assessing one's own system of belief' (Linker, [<reflink idref="bib82" id="ref189">82</reflink>] , p. 125).</item> <p></p> <item> <emph>The ability to embrace more sophisticated epistemic beliefs</emph>. To understand scientific knowledge as tentative, and theories as revisable (as opposed to more naïve beliefs, which typically regard scientific knowledge as certain and theories as immutable) (Grossnickle Peterson, [<reflink idref="bib64" id="ref190">64</reflink>]).</item> <p></p> <item> <emph>Information literacy</emph>. The ability to access information and make balanced judgements about any information we find and use (Ryan et al., [<reflink idref="bib104" id="ref191">104</reflink>] ; UNESCO, [<reflink idref="bib111" id="ref192">111</reflink>]).</item> <p></p> <item> <emph>Generic critical thinking skills</emph>. Verbal reasoning, argument analysis, hypothesis testing, likelihood/uncertainty and problem solving (Bago et al., [<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref193">6</reflink>] ; Halpern, [<reflink idref="bib68" id="ref194">68</reflink>]).</item> </ulist> <p>Yet, given that not everyone will participate in higher education (and given the structural and systemic barriers faced by many to participating effectively in education; Raey, [<reflink idref="bib102" id="ref195">102</reflink>]), other approaches to distilling such dispositions, both at school and across the life course, will be a necessary pre‐curser for effective ideas engagement. Likewise, such approaches are needed to prevent inequalities with regard to ideas engagement that will likely prove disadvantageous to individuals over their future lives. One example of what such an approach might comprise is provided by Baehr ([<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref196">4</reflink>]), who suggests a number of the components of critical thinking described above—such as curiosity, empathy and humility—are intellectual virtues, thus making it possible to train and nurture them. As a consequence, Baehr ([<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref197">4</reflink>]) argues that educational establishments should deploy measures to educate for these virtues, including by: (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref198">1</reflink>) providing a supportive institutional culture with a mission to promote intellectual character growth; (<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref199">2</reflink>) direct instruction on the concepts and language of intellectual virtues; (<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref200">3</reflink>) facilitating self‐reflection and self‐assessment, thus building an understanding of our own intellectual character; (<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref201">4</reflink>) making explicit connections between cuticulum materials and intellectual virtues; (<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref202">5</reflink>) providing opportunities to put intellectual virtues into practice; (<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref203">6</reflink>) integrating the intellectual virtues into summative and formative assessments; and (<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref204">7</reflink>) actively modelling intellectual virtues. Alongside these might usefully sit approaches to enable the effective interpretation and evaluation of information sources (McGeough & Rudick, [<reflink idref="bib87" id="ref205">87</reflink>]). Likewise, approaches to problematise the heuristics that people often rely on to evaluate information sources, but which are quite often wrong (e.g., see Kahneman, 2011; McGeough & Rudick, [<reflink idref="bib87" id="ref206">87</reflink>]), including those related to credibility evaluation (e.g., Metzger & Flanagin, [<reflink idref="bib88" id="ref207">88</reflink>]) and the ability to see through rhetorical flourish (D'Ancona, [<reflink idref="bib37" id="ref208">37</reflink>]). Yet clearly also key will be educational efforts directed at prospective thinking and the propagation of effective networks. For instance, dynamic programming, an education programme which helps individuals select the action which leads to the best possible long‐term reward (Miller & Venditto, [<reflink idref="bib89" id="ref209">89</reflink>]).</p> <hd id="AN0184273895-14">DISCUSSION</hd> <p>Ideas engagement can potentially lead to numerous benefits accruing to individuals and society at large. These include citizens becoming more knowledgeable, finding themselves better positioned to make beneficial decisions and achieving personal fulfilment. Likewise, a population that is generally more happy, healthy, inclusive and empathetic, and where there is more social, cultural, scientific and political engagement, as well as educational and economic productivity (e.g., see Pinker, [<reflink idref="bib98" id="ref210">98</reflink>]). Yet, as we indicate above, ideas engagement can be lacking in communities that might benefit from it most: in particular, those characterised by high levels of deprivation and disadvantage. We have also seen, in recent times, a growing circulation of and belief in 'dark' ideas, such as arguments grounded in populism and post truth, as well as those based on the denial of scientific fact. In response, we have used this paper to investigate 'what are the fundamental factors influencing whether people see value in engaging with ideas?' and to use these factors to propose a theoretical framework to guide future research into the area of ideas engagement and the ideas‐informed society to account for the presence or absence of meaningful ideas engagement, thus helping guide future studies and interventions in this area. Our frame comprises three substantive areas: (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref211">1</reflink>) whether individuals possess a prospective mindset, which can foster value in ideas engagement (as well as a commitment to the behaviours concomitant with ideas that have optimal and wide‐reaching outcomes); (<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref212">2</reflink>) the characteristics of individuals' social networks, in terms of how these impact on access to ideas and the nature of ideas engagement; and (<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref213">3</reflink>) individuals' levels of education and the extent to which the education people receive enables them to engage with ideas critically. A depiction of our theoretical frame is provided in Figure 2.</p> <p> <img src="https://imageserver.ebscohost.com/img/embimages/rdk/BED/01apr25/berj4110-fig-0002.jpg?ephost1=dGJyMNXb4kSepq84yOvqOLCmsE6epq5Srqa4SK6WxWXS" alt="berj4110-fig-0002.jpg" title="2 Depiction of the proposed theoretical frame." /> </p> <p></p> <p>Of course, our proposed framework is exactly that: a proposed initial attempt to bring guiding theoretical principals to the study of ideas engagement. Although derived from substantive work over some years (both ours and others), it is of course entirely possible that another key driver of ideas engagement has been overlooked. Further, as is apparent in the description of the framework's three elements, each can potentially comprise a number of component parts (e.g., social networks can be measured and described in terms of their size, centrality, density, level of homophily and so on). Some of these components may be more or less significant than others in fostering ideas engagement. We are also aware of the individual nature of the framework: for example, it looks at an individual's prospective mindset, their social connections and what their education to date has prepared them for. Elsewhere, we talk about notions of the ideas‐informed society as a whole. What is absent, therefore, is an understanding of the positive externalities or emergent properties that materialise when an increasingly larger group of individuals within a community become ideas engaged. As we also depict in Figure 2, each of our three components are clearly interlinked, with prospection affecting not only ideas engagement but also attitudes towards one's social networks and education (and so on and so forth for both social networks and education). Figure 2 thus provides potential clues for what these emergent properties might look like: with virtuous cycles of positive attitudes towards factors such as lifelong learning, mindsets and positive network curation typifying ideas‐informed societies as much as any perceived value in the importance of engaging with ideas.</p> <p>Given this uncertainty, our proposed next steps for this work are twofold, starting with the testing of the framework with experts in the field. This process will enable us to ascertain the validity of the model and its three constituent parts, and whether vital aspects are missing. Likewise, which component aspects within each of the areas of prospection, social networks and education—as well as helping citizens see value in ideas engagement—are likely to be most important in driving ideas engagement and how these can be accurately measured. Following this initial work, we propose to subsequently engage in survey development, the ultimate goal of which is to establish an instrument that can be used at national and international levels to not only depict ideas engagement and its drivers in various democratic jurisdictions, but also identify jurisdictions that might accurately be seen as ideas‐informed societies. Such societies could then subsequently form the basis of case study work to fully delve into the benefits of what an ideas‐informed society, in the mould of a modern‐day <emph>Utopia</emph> (More, [<reflink idref="bib90" id="ref214">90</reflink>]), can truly offer.</p> <hd id="AN0184273895-16">ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</hd> <p>This work was supported in part by UKRI research funding (grant number 10069843).</p> <hd id="AN0184273895-17">CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATEMENT</hd> <p>The authors declare no conflicts of interest.</p> <hd id="AN0184273895-18">DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</hd> <p>Data sharing is not applicable to this paper as no datasets were generated or analysed during the current study.</p> <hd id="AN0184273895-19">ETHICS STATEMENT</hd> <p>No ethical approval required: this paper does not contain any studies with human participants performed by any of the authors.</p> <ref id="AN0184273895-20"> <title> Footnotes </title> <blist> <bibl id="bib1" idref="ref1" type="bt">1</bibl> <bibtext> Here we define optimal decision‐making as that which is informed by: (1) a robust and credible evidence base in relation to current or potential new behaviours; (2) a strongly reasoned argument (or theory of change) that provides this evidence with meaning; (3) a social, moral or value‐based imperative setting out the need for change based on (1) and (2) (or, conversely, the consequences of not changing); and (4) buy‐in to this imperative from a range of credible stakeholders. This definition means that optimal decisions can be made at the level of the individual, for example, 'one should limit one's alcohol consumption to 14 units a week', or to macro‐level challenges such as limiting CO<subs>2</subs> emissions. This definition also makes clear that optimal decisions are neither fixed nor universal, but comprise an extant pragmatic coalescence of hard facts and reasoning with normative judgements on what represents human and societal flourishing within a given epoch, thus differentiating them from other forms of choice‐making, such as decisions achieved via emotionally manipulative populism (Brown, [15]).</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib2" idref="ref2" type="bt">2</bibl> <bibtext> Although likely impossible to calculate in a truly accurate way, recourse to Tim Farley's 'What's the harm' website (<ulink href="http://whatstheharm.net">http://whatstheharm.net</ulink>)—intended to 'make a point about the danger of not thinking critically'—identifies at least 368,379 people killed, 306,096 injured and over $2,815,931,000 in economic damages from people prone to engaging with dark ideas.</bibtext> </blist> </ref> <ref id="AN0184273895-21"> <title> REFERENCES </title> <blist> <bibtext> Allen, S. 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Items – Name: Title
  Label: Title
  Group: Ti
  Data: An Educated Society Is an Ideas-Informed Society: A Proposed Theoretical Framework for Effective Ideas Engagement
– Name: Language
  Label: Language
  Group: Lang
  Data: English
– Name: Author
  Label: Authors
  Group: Au
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Chris+Brown%22">Chris Brown</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Ruth+Luzmore%22">Ruth Luzmore</searchLink>
– Name: TitleSource
  Label: Source
  Group: Src
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="SO" term="%22British+Educational+Research+Journal%22"><i>British Educational Research Journal</i></searchLink>. 2025 51(2):969-989.
– Name: Avail
  Label: Availability
  Group: Avail
  Data: Wiley. Available from: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030. Tel: 800-835-6770; e-mail: cs-journals@wiley.com; Web site: https://www.wiley.com/en-us
– Name: PeerReviewed
  Label: Peer Reviewed
  Group: SrcInfo
  Data: Y
– Name: Pages
  Label: Page Count
  Group: Src
  Data: 21
– Name: DatePubCY
  Label: Publication Date
  Group: Date
  Data: 2025
– Name: TypeDocument
  Label: Document Type
  Group: TypDoc
  Data: Journal Articles<br />Reports - Evaluative
– Name: Subject
  Label: Descriptors
  Group: Su
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Citizenship+Education%22">Citizenship Education</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Democracy%22">Democracy</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Current+Events%22">Current Events</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Individual+Development%22">Individual Development</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Thinking+Skills%22">Thinking Skills</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Social+Networks%22">Social Networks</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Access+to+Information%22">Access to Information</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Educational+Attainment%22">Educational Attainment</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Public+Opinion%22">Public Opinion</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Popular+Education%22">Popular Education</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Critical+Thinking%22">Critical Thinking</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Models%22">Models</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Educational+Research%22">Educational Research</searchLink>
– Name: DOI
  Label: DOI
  Group: ID
  Data: 10.1002/berj.4110
– Name: ISSN
  Label: ISSN
  Group: ISSN
  Data: 0141-1926<br />1469-3518
– Name: Abstract
  Label: Abstract
  Group: Ab
  Data: The term 'ideas-informed society' describes democracies in which citizens believe in the value of staying well-informed and up-to-date with current affairs. They also put these beliefs into action: critically engaging with new ideas and perspectives, delving into scientific discoveries or emerging technologies and exploring aspects of history and culture. Likewise, they stay abreast of political, economic and health-related events, new products, new forms of media and so on. While ideas engagement can, in theory, lead to citizens becoming better informed, better able to engage in effective decision-making and better able to understand the world around them, these benefits do not reach everybody. Likewise, in the ideas ecosystem generally, we can often see 'dark' ideas winning through: resulting in less optimal outcomes for both citizens and nations. While interest in the notion of the ideas-informed society is burgeoning, we argue that, if future research is to be effectively positioned to support meaningful ideas engagement, what is now required is a theoretical frame to guide this research moving forward. We use this paper to argue for such a framework based on three principal elements: (1) whether individuals possess a prospective mindset, enabling them to value ideas engagement, as well as become more likely to commit to behaviours concomitant with ideas that have optimal and wide-reaching outcomes; (2) the features of individuals' social networks, and how these impact on citizens' access to ideas and the nature of their ideas engagement; and (3) individuals' levels of education and the extent to which the education people receive allows them to engage with ideas critically. As well as setting out the case for our proposed framework, we conclude by proposing future research to enable us to further specify and verify this framework as well as develop instruments to test it nationally and internationally.
– Name: AbstractInfo
  Label: Abstractor
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  Data: As Provided
– Name: DateEntry
  Label: Entry Date
  Group: Date
  Data: 2025
– Name: AN
  Label: Accession Number
  Group: ID
  Data: EJ1466182
PLink https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=eric&AN=EJ1466182
RecordInfo BibRecord:
  BibEntity:
    Identifiers:
      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1002/berj.4110
    Languages:
      – Text: English
    PhysicalDescription:
      Pagination:
        PageCount: 21
        StartPage: 969
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Citizenship Education
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Democracy
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Current Events
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Individual Development
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Thinking Skills
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Social Networks
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Access to Information
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Educational Attainment
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Public Opinion
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Popular Education
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Critical Thinking
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Models
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Educational Research
        Type: general
    Titles:
      – TitleFull: An Educated Society Is an Ideas-Informed Society: A Proposed Theoretical Framework for Effective Ideas Engagement
        Type: main
  BibRelationships:
    HasContributorRelationships:
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Chris Brown
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Ruth Luzmore
    IsPartOfRelationships:
      – BibEntity:
          Dates:
            – D: 01
              M: 04
              Type: published
              Y: 2025
          Identifiers:
            – Type: issn-print
              Value: 0141-1926
            – Type: issn-electronic
              Value: 1469-3518
          Numbering:
            – Type: volume
              Value: 51
            – Type: issue
              Value: 2
          Titles:
            – TitleFull: British Educational Research Journal
              Type: main
ResultId 1