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Dis-Automatising (Software) Codification

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Title: Dis-Automatising (Software) Codification
Language: English
Authors: Greta Goetz (ORCID 0000-0002-6611-9536)
Source: Educational Philosophy and Theory. 2025 57(5):395-409.
Availability: Routledge. Available from: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 530 Walnut Street Suite 850, Philadelphia, PA 19106. Tel: 800-354-1420; Tel: 215-625-8900; Fax: 215-207-0050; Web site: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
Peer Reviewed: Y
Page Count: 15
Publication Date: 2025
Document Type: Journal Articles
Reports - Evaluative
Descriptors: Educational Philosophy, Critical Theory, Teaching Methods, Phenomenology, Learning Processes, Models, Cultural Literacy, Influence of Technology, Information Technology
DOI: 10.1080/00131857.2025.2451303
ISSN: 0013-1857
1469-5812
Abstract: "Applications" of knowledge symbolically and structurally "codify" thinking, often displacing the human who is relegated to passive, routine reproduction of operations and left with no space or time to understand or question the relations underlying the processes. This is both mirrored and augmented by the schematic narrowing of computational, calculative reason and nebulous or hidden code that is often read-only if human-readable at all. According to French philosopher Bernard Stiegler, this has toxic effects on learning, systemically and progressively embedding failures to think, hindering the potential for the collective and individual human adoption and adaptation of the knowledge of life. This article presents a process-based model to care for this problem through Stieglerian critical pedagogy, phenomenography, and process philosophy. The model evolved out of a course with the aim to achieve collective cultural literacy in that which "goes without saying" in the increasingly ubiquitous digital design of everyday life.
Abstractor: As Provided
Entry Date: 2025
Accession Number: EJ1469295
Database: ERIC
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  Value: <anid>AN0184762936;54l01may.25;2025Apr29.06:06;v2.2.500</anid> <title id="AN0184762936-1">Dis-automatising (software) codification </title> <p>"Applications" of knowledge symbolically and structurally "codify" thinking, often displacing the human who is relegated to passive, routine reproduction of operations and left with no space or time to understand or question the relations underlying the processes. This is both mirrored and augmented by the schematic narrowing of computational, calculative reason and nebulous or hidden code that is often read-only if human-readable at all. According to French philosopher Bernard Stiegler, this has toxic effects on learning, systemically and progressively embedding failures to think, hindering the potential for the collective and individual human adoption and adaptation of the knowledge of life. This article presents a process-based model to care for this problem through Stieglerian critical pedagogy, phenomenography, and process philosophy. The model evolved out of a course with the aim to achieve collective cultural literacy in that which "goes without saying" in the increasingly ubiquitous digital design of everyday life.</p> <p>Keywords: Phenomenography; American cultural codification; process philosophy; postdisciplinarity; co-creation; hermeneutics</p> <hd id="AN0184762936-2">The symbolic problem of knowledge and reason</hd> <p>If contemporary society is understood as belonging to a "knowledge age" (cf. Drucker, [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref1">21</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref2">22</reflink>]), an elementary question might be: what type of "knowledge" are we producing? Does the learning that acquires knowledge and the education that purports to teach it <emph>care</emph>? The following non-standard introduction seeks to tease out and historically trace the challenges and problems of care about knowledge and reason at a time when it is increasingly digitally automatised, as posed by French philosopher Bernard Stiegler ([<reflink idref="bib78" id="ref3">78</reflink>]).</p> <p>Stiegler traces the recent fast adaptation and transformation of technologies to their development through the time and efficiency techniques of the American scientific management that developed out of industrialisation. The massive increase in the production of goods required marketing techniques to sustain sales. These marketing techniques at once manipulate human desires to make the goods appealing while calculating profit. Significantly, the "<emph>non-intuitive</emph>" calculus put in the service of capitalism serves a specific faculty of automatic knowing of information and skills (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib84" id="ref4">84</reflink>], p. 96).</p> <p>Capitalist reason or "rationalisation" has replaced financial investment with speculation on human drives. This is to say rationalisation that is not reason in the full meaning of the <emph>possibilities</emph> inherent to the word, has become purely, simply, absolutely, and limitlessly computational (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib84" id="ref5">84</reflink>], p. 153) in service of the capitalist system. Reason becomes a form of consumption madness annihilating the potential of the human "being".</p> <p>Computational and calculative analytical understanding is but one kind of reasoning (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib84" id="ref6">84</reflink>], p. 154) and precludes the understanding of knowledge <emph>in all its forms</emph>. Forms of knowledge include the knowledge of how to interpret meaning, how to derive implications, the process of learning to apply knowledge, and <emph>νοῦς</emph>, or noetics, which is "all reasons for living, acting, and hoping" (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib84" id="ref7">84</reflink>], p. 211). The latter type of reasoning can be symbolic but can also be overwritten.</p> <p>Strategic advertisement and product placement short-circuits intuitive, local technological initiatives. For example, marketing makes use of the rapid adaptation and transformation of audio visual technologies characteristic of 20th century American progress, disrupting possibilities for individually-generated symbols that can be shared collectively first on a local basis. The symbols of advertising capture and channel all human drives or <emph>libido,</emph> buying them up and devaluing them by attaching a material price to what is essentially priceless through "negligent carelessness" (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib84" id="ref8">84</reflink>], p. 181).</p> <p>Symbols, including those that are the reasons for living, are the "fruits of intellectual life (concepts, ideas, theorems, <emph>knowledge</emph>)" and "of sensible life (arts, know-how, mores)" (Stiegler et al., [<reflink idref="bib85" id="ref9">85</reflink>], p. 10) (emphasis added). In the context of human culture, symbols are aspects or representations of reality that form patterns of thinking—or codified grids—through to interpret the world, detailing the reasoning according to which decisions are made and actions performed (Geertz, [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref10">31</reflink>]).</p> <p>This can be compared with database schema which is a logical representation that models and structures real-world entities. Indeed, this ability makes it possible for computed symbols to "overwrite" human ones, using processes that automatically capture what can be remembered in the form of data, and processes that computationally produce the anticipations and expectations deduced from this data through complex computational systems (Stiegler [<reflink idref="bib84" id="ref11">84</reflink>], p. 234). This also effects the development of technical production. Ever-more insidious feedback loops using dark patterns manage to persuade sales of 'small-update' innovations to technology, instead of rethinking the whole (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib78" id="ref12">78</reflink>]).</p> <p>Open-ended theoretical possibility has been schematically replaced by the speculative law of impersonal, mathematical fact. Where the symbols and code underlying contemporary society is <emph>not</emph> hidden, individuals are allowed to "read only" but not write, which is systemic <emph>entropy</emph> as feedback loops are closed to different possibilities. This should give pause for thought when it is considered just how much knowledge is being "saved" through the massive datafication of human lives which traces the increasingly ubiquitous human interactions with digital interfaces. Humans are not given the choice to read the digital traces they themselves leave nor the aggregation of digitised human knowledge used to build the digital computational system. The balance of who controls information, the system or the human—which includes social knowledge institutions, is immensely disproportionate and largely in service of or co-opted by the system of capital.</p> <p>In contemporary society, scholars and directors have merely served to re-produce existing capitalistic calculative technoscientific schemas. The data economy produces industry-driven software focused on sales and market capture (cf. Zuboff, [<reflink idref="bib96" id="ref13">96</reflink>]) that has not always met the real needs of users (Noble, [<reflink idref="bib58" id="ref14">58</reflink>]), which include scholars.</p> <p>Universities have yet to work with the public on developing audiovisual and digital media policy and fully think through the editorial functions of digital technology (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib81" id="ref15">81</reflink>], p. 214; McLuhan, [<reflink idref="bib53" id="ref16">53</reflink>]). Clerics of knowledge:</p> <p>end up internalizing the state of fact that consists in a structural lateness, and they do so through <emph>theory, which no longer plays any role other than to legitimate, after the fact – to 'rationalize' – that which makes a state of law impossible</emph> (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib84" id="ref17">84</reflink>], p. 128).</p> <p>As such, a <emph>science</emph> of government and reason forms the basis of a new type of algorithmic governmentality (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib78" id="ref18">78</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib82" id="ref19">82</reflink>]). Linguistic prescriptions make the law out of statistical averages and patterns derived from massive data sets calculated at speeds up to four million times faster than the human nervous system. Massive data sets are privileged, replacing the positive law of argument and reason itself "into calculability" (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib84" id="ref20">84</reflink>], p. 179–180), "enormity becoming normal" (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib82" id="ref21">82</reflink>], p. 51).</p> <p>The problem of scale inherent to so-called big data affects interpretation of fact and knowledge in other ways, such as how audio-visual industries support the system's reproduction or how the system obscures knowledge of its parts. As projected a century ago, the human is no longer at the centre: the system is (Taylor, [<reflink idref="bib89" id="ref22">89</reflink>], p. 7). By system is meant the complex whole of interacting, interrelated, or interdependent elements, processes, or interactions that form a whole. Awareness of systemic wholes raises the question of how to categorise or structure the variables of the system (Bateson, [<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref23">6</reflink>]), which, in Taylor's reading, is no longer an exercise made available to individuals. This raises the question of whether we care, categorically speaking, about the possibility for individuals to understand the system or continue to create symbols and thereby themselves assign the variables and values in schemas projecting the design of how the world is experienced and understood.</p> <p>An example of this is how re-presentations of the real through media programming industries affect the real present of the viewer, overriding individual judgment through the "'stream of consciousness' of global collectivity" (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib79" id="ref24">79</reflink>], p. 1). Another example is how software is baked into hardware using proprietary code that is illegal to read—and not available to <emph>individual</emph> reason through the use of logic to discover truth. This leaves individuals with material objects critical to daily existence that can execute manufacturers' commands on their personal computing devices without their knowledge (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib82" id="ref25">82</reflink>], p. 16). The lack of knowledge about a tool so central to daily life should be central to education.</p> <p>There are socio-cultural consequences to how technological mechanisms can co-opt access to experience and knowledge. Workers whose knowledge has been transferred to the machine such that it is no longer they who are individuated by grasping and putting tools into practice (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib80" id="ref26">80</reflink>], p. 37) are <emph>proletarianised.</emph> Once knowledge of how to work is lost, workers are disconnected from the collective individuation processes which define their existence as psycho-social individuals and they are effectively <emph>disindividuated</emph> (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib83" id="ref27">83</reflink>], p. 145). They become socially powerless to correct systemic failure. The cure for this is for individuals to participate in <emph>processes</emph> of <emph>collective individuation,</emph> co-contributing to knowledge of processes that is shared.</p> <p>Without pedagogical interventions (whether within or without learning institutions), the individual in technoscientific marketed governmentality is left to consume "unreasonable" standardised symbols and automatised traces of knowledge emitted through audio-visual technologies. Individuals are systematically hindered from producing new symbols, knowledge, and tools through shared reasoning.</p> <p>Stiegler identified the antidote to the mechanisations outlined above through collective interpretive pedagogical approaches that comprise methods and practices of teaching that acknowledge socio-political, psychological influences on learning, or, the individual appropriation of knowledge. Pedagogy acknowledging such influences is "critical" pedagogy where it questions accepted assumptions that reveal hidden power structures, inequities, and injustice in society. These are hidden because of how the technical dissemination of knowledge works.</p> <p>The toxic effects of (political) power and science can be traced to the ancient problem of the exteriorisation of knowledge through techniques like writing (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib78" id="ref28">78</reflink>], p. 29; Goetz, [<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref29">34</reflink>]). Technics can be used to retain memory because it is possible to store the memory constituting knowledge that has been externalised—outside the brain—in technical objects. Because of this potential, knowledge can be automatised or manipulated as it can be simply memorised and reconfigured to serve fixed and predetermined ends.</p> <p>In Stiegler's lexicon the use of technics to re-member exteriorised knowledge is called <emph>mnemotechnics</emph> or <emph>hypomnesic tertiary retention</emph>. Understanding this will help unpack the symbolic, systemic implications of what it means to "read only", if reading is possible at all. The challenge of how to "work out" the systemic capture and control of human knowledge as diagnosed by Stiegler will be illustrated further on through a description of a course that took a process-based, phenomenographical approach to disautomatising digital mnemotechnics as a cultural problem requiring human care.</p> <hd id="AN0184762936-3">Disautomatising mnemotechnics</hd> <p>The potential for mnemotechnics to retain and re-present exteriorised human memory makes it a <emph>pharmakon</emph> (<emph>φάρμακον</emph>) which is to say that it can be at once toxic or a cure (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib83" id="ref30">83</reflink>]). It is toxic where that which is remembered can be used to fabricate illusions and manipulate minds. Examples include political rhetoric (Plato, [<reflink idref="bib61" id="ref31">61</reflink>], Phaed., 275) or how Freudian marketing techniques in twentieth century America began to use knowledge of human drives to reach predetermined capitalistic ends (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib78" id="ref32">78</reflink>]).</p> <p>Mnemotechnics can be a cure where it permits possibilities for methods and practices of teaching that permit social remembering by actively involving individual members in the process of learning. Pedagogy is intrinsic to the "<emph>passage to the act</emph>" of knowledge (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib81" id="ref33">81</reflink>], p. 118). By being <emph>processual</emph> and individually experienced, it is not automatic. Teaching may follow conventions but it can also depart from them. It transfers methods like modes or relations, not just the rules (facts), of research in order to promote practice as the agency of direction to new possibilities. In this way, it liberates not just intelligence but sympathy (Dewey in Peterson, [<reflink idref="bib60" id="ref34">60</reflink>], p. 28).</p> <p>The digitised aspect of mnemotechnics in the twenty-first century requires a social understanding of and approach to learning. This is because of the "disadjustment between the [mnemo]technical system, social systems and biophysical systems, and, consequently, the question of the need for a new public power" (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib84" id="ref35">84</reflink>], p. 99). But universities have yet to become a "partner of public power in reviewing audiovisual and digital media policy, and ... prescribe new editorial functions, made possible by digital retention" (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib81" id="ref36">81</reflink>], p. 214).</p> <p>The question of how things <emph>function</emph> is being left out of education just as pedagogical process is being left out of the increasingly automatic functions of digital infrastructure. Many software "services" do not give individuals full control over the programs that their devices are running (Stallman, [<reflink idref="bib77" id="ref37">77</reflink>]) [parenthetical] though many learning institutions have adopted toxic software and learning platforms (Human Rights Watch, [<reflink idref="bib40" id="ref38">40</reflink>]). "Read-only" code that is hidden from "users" of the program locks users in to the use-patterns of specific software without their understanding the nature of the functions underlying it, such as how algorithms are used to perform a variety of tasks in digital imaging.</p> <p>Mnemotechnics generalises practices that had become "norms" through attentional modes like methods or relations. These "norms" can also be understood as knowledge codification. For example, the ability to draw a graph and its curves means nothing if the relation of the function of the curve is not explained. Curves are a way of expressing or representing the simple fundamental physical laws behind the algebraic and trigonometrical functions. But in education, these laws should be decodified. They should be "passed under review, and the applications of the simple functions to express important concrete cases of physical laws considered" (Whitehead, [<reflink idref="bib93" id="ref39">93</reflink>], p. 86). Teaching is to impart such information imaginatively, such that a "fact is no longer a bare fact: it is invested with all its possibilities. It is no longer a burden on the memory: it is energising as the poet of our dreams, and as the architect of our purposes" (Whitehead, [<reflink idref="bib93" id="ref40">93</reflink>], p. 93).</p> <p>The failure to think or imagine in the digital age is becoming systemically embedded as demonstrated by educational institutions' care-less adoption of software, ignorant of programming that confuses automatism and autonomy (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib82" id="ref41">82</reflink>], p. 94). Autonomously-generated human knowledge is today subverted by the downloading of massified, automatised knowledge. This is essentially non-knowledge as the knowledge is not human-mediated, never having been internalised, questioned, or authenticated as meaningful or true by human subjects (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib82" id="ref42">82</reflink>]).</p> <p>When this non-knowledge proves false, even knowledge experts blame the machine and its systems (Greenspan in Stiegler [<reflink idref="bib82" id="ref43">82</reflink>], pp. 1–4). This must be re-membered when the question of what or how we can access digital information is set to change (Cloudera, [<reflink idref="bib17" id="ref44">17</reflink>]; Miessler, [<reflink idref="bib54" id="ref45">54</reflink>]). For example, it is uncertain whether all sites will continue to load that have not moved "into CDN [content delivery network] hostels" (Huston, [<reflink idref="bib41" id="ref46">41</reflink>]). The unanswered precarious question of future access has perplexingly not slowed the move of libraries and cultural institutions to substitute physical artefacts of knowledge with digital ones.</p> <p>This article suggests that questions of <emph>knowledge in all its forms</emph>—like science, technology, and economics, and not just "libraries" of knowledge—need to be posed through individual and collective acts of dis-automatisation, such as by (re-)interpreting knowledge (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib83" id="ref47">83</reflink>], pp. 43–46). Knowledge, just like code itself, can be thought of "as re-source" and an <emph>activity</emph> used to join and build a <emph>type of community</emph> (Chun, [<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref48">15</reflink>], p. 323). Communities can choose how they respond to <emph>social and environmental implications</emph> of digitisation (cf. Knox, [<reflink idref="bib47" id="ref49">47</reflink>]). The current systemic imbalance of knowledge between that held by automatised digital systems and individual humans would make those statements sound utopian. But this imbalance can be inverted by arranging <emph>hermeneutic</emph> digital technology so that it serves <emph>dis-automatisation</emph>, <emph>individuation</emph>, and the rebirth of knowledge (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib82" id="ref50">82</reflink>]).</p> <p>Pedagogy can seek to form contributive milieus in which individuals make and not just consume (digital) symbols—thereby <emph>making</emph> "<emph>a difference</emph>" (cf. Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib81" id="ref51">81</reflink>], p. 52) (emphasis added) to contemporary society, valuing new values. Understanding how to do this is a form of literacy, where literacy is understood to be a form of symbolic decodification, or a form of internalising the codification of systems of knowledge and culture.</p> <hd id="AN0184762936-4">Why and how to dis-automatise and decodify symbols</hd> <p>The act of "reading" the world requires an understanding of how the world is symbolically codified. Within the context of cultural studies, literacy is the ability to dis-automatise the meaning of what "goes without saying". What "goes without saying" is reality that has been suspended and re-presented in symbolic grids (Geertz, [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref52">31</reflink>]; Said in Peterson, [<reflink idref="bib60" id="ref53">60</reflink>], p. 1), which emerges through how a social group gives itself an image "to represent and to realise itself, in the theatrical sense of the word" (Ricoeur, [<reflink idref="bib64" id="ref54">64</reflink>], p. 249).</p> <p>Any knowledge we have of reality is necessarily mediated by our own symbolic structures, whether they be mathematics, philosophy, religion, or art that form codifying "webs of significance" made by humans that in turn suspend them (Weber in Geertz, [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref55">31</reflink>], p. 5). These webs can form conventional codes to be automatically followed—like generalised practices that had become "norms" through attentional modes like methods or relations. Our lives have always been superficially codified by a grid of symbols or "webs of significance" humankind decides on spinning (cf. Geertz, [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref56">31</reflink>], p. 5).</p> <p>These can include the "catalogue of collective illusions, unconsciously distorted representations of others ... an attempt at interpretation of social situations in terms of political, moral, religious, and philosophical evaluations that imply a point of view ... based on assumptions that are accepted without discussion, beyond all question" (Ellul, [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref57">25</reflink>], p. 13). This type of conventional code is known as the commonplace.</p> <p>Thought loses rigour where it is approached on the surface, where it is not embedded by individuals through a process of disautomatisation that seizes and exteriorises knowledge so that it may continue to be passed on (Marton & Booth, [<reflink idref="bib52" id="ref58">52</reflink>]; also see Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib83" id="ref59">83</reflink>], p. 93). It is transformative only insofar as its ideas can become opinions and social efficacy is gained only insofar as thought loses its rigour (Ricoeur, [<reflink idref="bib64" id="ref60">64</reflink>], p. 250). Codification is justificatory anti-knowledge, dogmatic in character, in contrast to the possibility inherent to all knowledge to become "dis-automatised through the act of knowing, where this knowing <emph>internalises</emph> the automatisms in which this knowledge <emph>also</emph> consists" (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib83" id="ref61">83</reflink>], p. 178). This can be achieved through decodification or interpretation which makes second-hand knowledge of assumptions that embed cultural artefacts first-hand (cf. Williams, [<reflink idref="bib94" id="ref62">94</reflink>]; Ricoeur, [<reflink idref="bib64" id="ref63">64</reflink>]). Such active knowledge is capable of producing new symbols.</p> <p>Symbols began as a tool for re-membrance when a host would present a guest an object to be broken in two, to form a whole in an act of recognition at a future encounter (Gadamer, [<reflink idref="bib29" id="ref64">29</reflink>]). From the sixteenth century they became "something that stands for something else", first enabling numbers to stand for social understandings, and now enabling the physical world to be codified and mapped into a database through the use of mathematical "objects". However, this type of re-presentation of the world ultimately reduces the world (Ricoeur, [<reflink idref="bib63" id="ref65">63</reflink>], p. 95). To re-expand it what is meant by being technologically literate moves from mere symbolic recognition to the knowledge of how to co-create new assemblages:</p> <p>technology is not merely viewed as a means of enabling certain forms of literacy (i.e., "digital literacy"), but instead is considered as one component of a larger literacy assemblage where both human agency and subjectivity play a critical role in forms of mutual co-creating of texts and technology (Bhatt, [<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref66">9</reflink>], pp. 2–3).</p> <p>The changing digital landscape raises multiple questions including whether it is possible to know "the extent, content, and effects of new media" (Chun, [<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref67">15</reflink>], p. 300). It brings together cybernetics (Simon, [<reflink idref="bib72" id="ref68">72</reflink>]; Newell & Simon, [<reflink idref="bib57" id="ref69">57</reflink>]), knowledge representation (Sowa, [<reflink idref="bib75" id="ref70">75</reflink>]), and ultimately data aggregators that are funnelled into LLMs (Willison, [<reflink idref="bib95" id="ref71">95</reflink>]; Lee & Trott, [<reflink idref="bib48" id="ref72">48</reflink>]; Janus, [<reflink idref="bib43" id="ref73">43</reflink>]; Russell & Norvig, [<reflink idref="bib68" id="ref74">68</reflink>]). But for knowledge to be passed on it needs to be socially "embedded" or internalised (Marton & Booth, [<reflink idref="bib52" id="ref75">52</reflink>]; Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib83" id="ref76">83</reflink>], p. 178). This is a question of technical literacy.</p> <p>The embeddedness of technology requires process-based learning strategies capable of supporting the theory of change: at once explaining meta-level infrastructure and theory, illustrating initial steps that can be taken to recognise the relational complexity of software codification, and giving experience in how <emph>awareness</emph> of its cultural-philological perceptions can be extended to new modes of symbolic reference and experience. Here, the symbolic is not conventional or second-hand but rigorously innovative (Whitehead and Bateson in Peterson, [<reflink idref="bib60" id="ref77">60</reflink>], p. 36; Burke, [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref78">13</reflink>]; Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib83" id="ref79">83</reflink>], pp. 42–25; Whitehead, [<reflink idref="bib92" id="ref80">92</reflink>], p. 21).</p> <p>The curative purpose of memory is not just to passively retain facts, routine procedures, or fabricated illusions, but to actively decodify and relate them to higher guiding principles such as their functions and to examine their logic and meaning (Marton & Booth, [<reflink idref="bib52" id="ref81">52</reflink>]). This should be an educational "strategy" (Peterson, [<reflink idref="bib60" id="ref82">60</reflink>], p. 39) as it is critical to continuing human culture, which is more an activity of "receptiveness to beauty and human feeling" than one centred on information (cf. Whitehead, [<reflink idref="bib93" id="ref83">93</reflink>], p.13).</p> <hd id="AN0184762936-5">Theory for the process of decodifying mnemotechnics</hd> <p>Memory (by way of Stieglerian Husserlian phenomenology, Derrida, and Plato) begins as a <emph>primary retention</emph>, which is to say as all possible ideas that can be received by intellectual perception (<emph>νοῦς</emph> or <emph>nous</emph>). However, these can be "grasped" or "seized" by <emph>secondary retentions—</emph>either within an individual mind or by <emph>mnemotechnics</emph> that short-circuit individual <emph>secondary retention</emph>, rupturing individual possibility by imposing massified criteria by which retentions are seized, therefrom standardising them. This has been achieved through continued development of audio-visual and marketing techniques such as psychometric profiling (Our Data Our Selves, [<reflink idref="bib59" id="ref84">59</reflink>].) and dark patterns (e.g. Deceptive Design, [<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref85">19</reflink>].).</p> <p>The symbols of codification pass on knowledge in such a way as to support its mere re-production. The task of dis-automatising, individuating decodification is to support the re-production of knowledge through subjective interaction and remain open to the meaning and experience of other people and (technological) actants, (networked) text, perspective, or way of doing things, and range of tools (cf. Gadamer, [<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref86">30</reflink>], p. 271).</p> <p>Phenomenography is receptive to the different ways people "experience, conceptualise, perceive, and understand various aspects, and phenomena in the world around them" (Marton, [<reflink idref="bib51" id="ref87">51</reflink>]). Phenomenography seeks to overcome surface-level learning approaches, which merely reproduce parts of knowledge (not wholes) through passive acceptance of ideas and information, concentrating only on the assessment requirements.</p> <p>By taking a phenomenographical process-based approach to learning, memory is not passive but an active component in the production of knowledge. This has temporal significance and further supports possibilities for what Stiegler calls <emph>long circuits</emph> of learning which are interconnections of circuits that give access to ideas that, as objects of desire, do not (yet) exist (Stiegler, 2010, p. 43). This can be reinforced by <emph>collective individuation</emph>, where individual, psychic retention plays a role in not just technical and artificial retention but social organisations (e.g. Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib83" id="ref88">83</reflink>]). By contrast, <emph>mnemotechnics</emph> can rupture the possibility of forming individual anticipations of the future, which is to say critical protentions or possibilities of the future. This is an example of <emph>disindividuation</emph>.</p> <p>Hermeneutics is a method of decodification of conventionalised and standardised cultural, philological thought (Ellul, [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref89">25</reflink>]), able to address laws and rules discursively (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib84" id="ref90">84</reflink>], p. 223). In addition to hermeneutics, Stiegler has shown how Alexander North Whitehead's process philosophy supports processes of negentropic individuation aiming to achieve new possibility and to reconsider the practice of speculation (e.g. Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib82" id="ref91">82</reflink>], p. 55; Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib82" id="ref92">82</reflink>], p. 221) applied to big data (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib82" id="ref93">82</reflink>], p. 245).</p> <p>Whitehead's work has yet to be broadly applied to education, but educators have recognised its value, above all for the creative potential of its holistic, (inter-)relational approaches that can be used to correct education (Brumbaugh, [<reflink idref="bib11" id="ref94">11</reflink>]; Regnier, [<reflink idref="bib62" id="ref95">62</reflink>]; Taylor & Bovill, [<reflink idref="bib88" id="ref96">88</reflink>]; Knight & Lasczik, [<reflink idref="bib46" id="ref97">46</reflink>]; Roth, [<reflink idref="bib65" id="ref98">65</reflink>]). His thought has been used to develop a phenomenological approach towards twenty first century media (Hansen, [<reflink idref="bib38" id="ref99">38</reflink>]) concerned with the "environmental possibilities of networks and 'worldly sensibilities'" (Snepvangers & Ingrey-Arndell, [<reflink idref="bib74" id="ref100">74</reflink>], p. 62).</p> <p>This suggests we "no longer conceive of ourselves as separate and quasi-autonomous subjects, facing off against distinct media objects; rather we are ourselves composed as subjects through the operation of a host of multi-scalar processes" with different relations to material events (Hansen, [<reflink idref="bib38" id="ref101">38</reflink>], p. 3). These are embedded or enfolded in the "interpretative layers" of the cultural web of significance spun around the material world (cf. Geertz, [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref102">31</reflink>], p. 5), requiring the dis-automatising interpretation that forms the basis of Stieglerian digital studies (e.g. Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib83" id="ref103">83</reflink>], pp. 244–245).</p> <p>Process-philosophy involves the perceptive modes in experience stemming from the present, dissimulated and integrated, and brought into conscious coincidence through symbolic reference to the percepta of causal efficacy (Whitehead, [<reflink idref="bib92" id="ref104">92</reflink>], p. 169). By attempting to perceive the toxicity of the present, socio-politically hidden power structures, inequities, and injustice in society can begin to be revealed, especially where perceptions are exchanged.</p> <hd id="AN0184762936-6">A case example of a course (ex)posing codification to disautomatise learning</hd> <p>A course in cultural philology applied the phenomenographical learning approach strategised above, asking course participants to collectively map out the history, core networks and the communication technologies of the codifying technology of the present: the Internet. They have achieved this through goal-oriented discovery and reading strategies and strategies for artefact identification and interpretation of the points of view that stand for it.</p> <p>Through this ex-positional approach to learning and to <emph>collective individuation</emph>, students produce their own artefacts that demonstrate an understanding of the range of material. Some create software application prototypes, including one teaching users about digital privacy. Others write business proposals outlining regionally-relevant digital assistants and collaborative work models on how to help artists. Student work uses both free and the latest proprietary software. Students are asked to document the reasoning behind decisions the made, comparing it to alternatives.</p> <p>By interacting with points of view and artefacts that map out the larger context of the knowledge, design, and culture of the digital environment, learners can (ex)pose the code in which we think (Ellul in Ricoeur, [<reflink idref="bib64" id="ref105">64</reflink>], p. 251; Ellul, [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref106">25</reflink>]). This attempts to pose that which "goes without saying" in the embeddedness of literacy and its perspectives (e.g. Eames & Eames, [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref107">23</reflink>]; Eames et al., [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref108">24</reflink>]).</p> <p>Reading strategies are used to help identify talking points, which is to say, key issues or areas of interest to be expressed in short oral or written communication. If the reading is not within learners' knowledge domain (e.g. somewhat technical texts like Licklider, [<reflink idref="bib49" id="ref109">49</reflink>]), learners can conduct deep reading: skimming to guess content and supplementing this with cursory research; skimming to place text in larger (historical) context; reading for information and to build context (glossary, further contextual research); close reading with annotations (which can be shared online for asynchronous learning); synthesising reading notes (from outline to synthesis); analysis (first response, response to researched synthesis).</p> <p>Within the context of digital literacy, reading can be supplemented by considering the materiality of the Internet, aiming, after Roussilhe ([<reflink idref="bib66" id="ref110">66</reflink>]), to focus on the physical transformations <emph>via</emph> the Internet through material infrastructure, including mobile devices like mobile phones. Each of these material "nodes" has their own lifecycles and environmental footprint. Much of this infrastructure is proprietary and cannot be fully defined. This includes factors needed for a full life cycle assessment (Roussilhe, [<reflink idref="bib67" id="ref111">67</reflink>], S5).</p> <p>The purpose of this is to begin to raise questions. Awareness is a foundation for further learning (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib83" id="ref112">83</reflink>], pp. 44–45), including of causal efficacy, involving the cultural codifications of these technologies (cf. Whitehead, [<reflink idref="bib92" id="ref113">92</reflink>], p. 169). Important to resulting discussion is how different individuals make sense out of and manipulate the subject material and how they use digital technology, or avoiding it, and why.</p> <hd id="AN0184762936-7">The development of complex schemas</hd> <p>Awareness of the variation that is possible in points of respective observation or frames of reference is deliberately sought to promote an understanding of the meta-context. The meta-context involves the learner who examines things critically or considers arguments and the content to be learned by tossing it around and viewing it from different angles (Marton & Booth, [<reflink idref="bib52" id="ref114">52</reflink>], p. 37). For example, the digital technology of today can be compared with the views of early "digital visionaries", like Douglas Engelbart, Alan Kay, or Ted Nelson. This is a transdisciplinary not multidisciplinary approach, as explained in the context of Whitehead's ([<reflink idref="bib92" id="ref115">92</reflink>]) process philosophy with its the focus on values and general principles. It is this level of thought that points to "the transvaluation of becoming into future" (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib82" id="ref116">82</reflink>], p. 10).</p> <p>Learning content can be formed or molded in different ways to present different views for the learner to glimpse and form into a whole. These views should reflect ways in which learners experience the content but also those that reflect the teacher's understanding of the wider field to which the content belongs, and that the teacher wants learners to link the views to. Dimensions of variation prevent content from becoming fixed, inert, or taken for granted, and involve different types of subject matter, or problems in different contexts (Whitehead, [<reflink idref="bib92" id="ref117">92</reflink>]).</p> <p>For example, historical hacking ideals (Stallman, [<reflink idref="bib76" id="ref118">76</reflink>]) [parenthetical] can be compared with current usage of the word "hacker" (Schneier, [<reflink idref="bib70" id="ref119">70</reflink>]). People need to continually reimagine the basic assumptions of how the world works all the time, though it can remain unseen and unexamined (Whitehead, [<reflink idref="bib92" id="ref120">92</reflink>], p. 11). Stressing this here is not redundant. <emph>It is education's role to provide this variation</emph> (Stiegler et al., [<reflink idref="bib85" id="ref121">85</reflink>], p. 78). The critical work of the neganthropocene (which will enable cognitive leaps out of the Anthropocene, marking the era of harmful human impacts on the earth) involves "<emph>redesigning the digital architecture</emph> and in particular the <emph>digital architecture of the web</emph>, with the goal of creating a digital hermeneutics that gives to controversies and conflicts of interpretation their negentropic value" or system (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib82" id="ref122">82</reflink>], p. 20).</p> <p>Readiness for "and positive anticipation of the coming tasks" can be achieved by helping learners understand why something matters, or helping them meet abstractions (such as through piquing curiosity in a topic), or appreciate what the learning situation is aimed at and what it demands (Marton & Booth, [<reflink idref="bib52" id="ref123">52</reflink>], p. 182). This can also be explained in the terms of process philosophy as a type of "vector feeling", whereby feelings are "vectors," feeling what is there and transforming it into what is here (Whitehead, [<reflink idref="bib92" id="ref124">92</reflink>], p. 87). Such (organological) engagement is critical for transforming "the speed of technical vectors currently at work" (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib83" id="ref125">83</reflink>], p. 58).</p> <p>Relevance structures, which is to say individual awareness of what a situation calls for, promote secondary retention, or prehension, which "seizes" the apprehension of primary retention, which is all possible ideas that can be received by intellectual perception (<emph>νοῦς</emph> or <emph>nous</emph>). Once it is seized, it can then be externalised through mnemotechnic (hypomnesic) tertiary retention (Stiegler, [<reflink idref="bib83" id="ref126">83</reflink>], p. 95). For example, abstract critique, assisted in class, can hint at the possibility of using multiple software options. This allows a glimpse into seeing not just how achievable agency is but how many affordances are gained through changing behavioural patterns to say nothing of what it teaches of basic elements, propositions, and assumptions of software use. Teaching about types of software in general can inform previously habitual "pattern imprinting" (Atwood, [<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref127">3</reflink>]) [parenthetical], or use, of proprietary software (also see Kenlon, [<reflink idref="bib45" id="ref128">45</reflink>]) into something new, in the present.</p> <p>Cultural, codifying change can be achieved in learning through having learners phenomenographically share strategies with each other, appreciating different frames of reference, and extending relevance structures. While change is effected within the individual learners it is also effected collectively at the level of the class, modelling within the class collective engagement with the code of understanding behind the effect of digital technologies.</p> <p>To bring learners into this de-personalised context, they participate in ongoing processes and restore the world as medium, not software systems or services (cf. Whitehead, [<reflink idref="bib92" id="ref129">92</reflink>], p. 127). "True" labelling becomes the propriety of those living in the world, not that of self-governed automatisation.</p> <p>Meta-level focal awareness thus brings awareness of current and possible place(s) of the human activity, thought, and life forming the map of digital literacy. Focal awareness is needed here to reveal the implications of taking a systems-level view to the control of decision making or to the future of knowledge (and memory), which are threatened by automatisation. Learners can create mind maps reviewing what has been covered thus far. In this context, to try to re-present a course consideration (but at a higher level), the following paragraph can be given as a reflection prompt to be supported by research of expert testimony (e.g. Bender et al., [<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref130">7</reflink>]):</p> <p>Pre-defined reality, such as where reality is pre-determined by an artificial system, creates psychic pain (Tausk in Halpern, [<reflink idref="bib37" id="ref131">37</reflink>]). As Donna Haraway put it (in Gray, [<reflink idref="bib36" id="ref132">36</reflink>], p. xix), "Lives are at stake in curious quasi-objects like databases" ... the computer trace ... leaves much room for interpretation.</p> <p>Through this iterative, cumulative approach, learners' mental models expand far beyond the scope of Shannon's communication system (information source; transmitter; noise source; receiver; destination) (Shannon, [<reflink idref="bib71" id="ref133">71</reflink>]) and its variations (data centres; telecom networks; user equipment) (Fourboul & Roussilhe, [<reflink idref="bib28" id="ref134">28</reflink>]) to develop a polysemically thick (cf. Geertz, 1973) relational approach. This can anticipate the multidirectional assemblage of how human agency, subjectivity, and collectivities are mutually affected by technology and time, or, historical context and promote relational literacy.</p> <p>By exploring options and different types of problems in different contexts, learners have an opportunity to consider relational effects (e.g. Sandborn, [<reflink idref="bib69" id="ref135">69</reflink>]) or what it means to depend on quantitative language and reason when this turns the things it looks at into systems (e.g. Carr, [<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref136">14</reflink>]; Brown, [<reflink idref="bib10" id="ref137">10</reflink>]; Doctorow, [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref138">20</reflink>]; Johnson, [<reflink idref="bib44" id="ref139">44</reflink>]; Moriarity, [<reflink idref="bib55" id="ref140">55</reflink>]; Crawford & Joler, [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref141">16</reflink>]; Bartolo & Thomas, [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref142">5</reflink>]).</p> <p>To show that this matters to learners personally, learning participants can be asked whether aspects of the systems they are in help promote their better selves or not. An exploration of dark patterns could be an ice-breaker here (Deceptive Design, [<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref143">19</reflink>]; Dark Pattern Games, [<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref144">18</reflink>].)[parenthetical]. Showing examples of how signifying functions of language structure decision-making and thus also outcomes demonstrates the higher-level concept of how the signifying function of language is a meta-precondition of social life (Adams, [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref145">1</reflink>], p. 136). Learners need to care about the system and need to learn to decode what "it" is saying.</p> <p>Meta-context participation where individuals seek common ground is a way to reveal patterns and conclusions and augment shared intelligence (Engelbart, [<reflink idref="bib26" id="ref146">26</reflink>]). Learning participants are encouraged to see the full "life-cycle" or extent of the systems they interact with so as to uncover the moral of the story and pose conceptions, not merely think within them. The model is explicitly holistic and while it can be argued that errors in learning are likely if the learning is too generalist, the systemic ordering of the world through digital interfacing requires transdisciplinary perception, with the understanding that everyone seeking to understand it, save the rare polymath, is a non-expert. Additionally, people need to continually assess whether progress is really under way (cf. Whitehead, [<reflink idref="bib92" id="ref147">92</reflink>], p. 11).</p> <p>The phenomenographical approach it gives actual <emph>experience</emph> in reordering, proving that the ideas that structure our lives are not just "out there" or proprietary but can be understood and interacted with in the new context afforded by the collaborative space offered by a class. Learners experience "getting things done" (Allen, [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref148">2</reflink>]).</p> <hd id="AN0184762936-8">The production of artefacts which convey understanding</hd> <p>It can be difficult to describe artefacts embedded in the code of signification of contemporary society particularly where they are digital. To this end, the museum curation descriptions of the Victoria and Albert Museum's Rapid Response Collecting collection ([<reflink idref="bib90" id="ref149">90</reflink>]) and the Smithsonian Museum's My Computing Device exhibit ([<reflink idref="bib73" id="ref150">73</reflink>].) can be used for illustrative and explanatory purposes, as scaffolding (Vygotsky, [<reflink idref="bib91" id="ref151">91</reflink>], p. 86).</p> <p>By considering artefacts, learners can consider the social environments they emerge from; the parameters of the task they are solving; what their form, content, type, and interfaces are; their company-background, audience, manufacture, and distribution; what kind of communications system they need for continued operability; which procedures and tools are used in given situations (cf. Burger, [<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref152">12</reflink>] in Goetz, [<reflink idref="bib32" id="ref153">32</reflink>]); their effects; what they make possible; what they obscure. This can be elaborated again later through assignments in <emph>assaying</emph>.</p> <hd id="AN0184762936-9">Identifying and decoding commonplaces</hd> <p>By interacting with the different talking points and points of view of other learner-participants, learners are positioned to "discover" (as rhetorical <emph>τόποι</emph> or <emph>topoi</emph>) "traces of the challenges, the threats, the secret operation of death already at work" (Ellul, [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref154">25</reflink>], p. 12) that obscure understanding and automatises thought through codification.</p> <p>In classical education, commonplaces were used as the <emph>places</emph> (<emph>τόποι</emph> or <emph>topoi</emph>) to find things to use in rhetorical exposition. They were the conventions for the departure of or scaffolding for (cf. Vygotsky, [<reflink idref="bib91" id="ref155">91</reflink>], p. 86) student work. But here, commonplaces are used as the subject for the riposte of suspicion (Ricoeur, [<reflink idref="bib64" id="ref156">64</reflink>], p. 248), after work by Jacques Ellul ([<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref157">25</reflink>]). Examples of commonplaces Ellul identified that are relevant to this chapter include: <emph>The machine is neutral</emph>, <emph>It is fashionable to criticise technology</emph>, and <emph>The end justifies the means</emph>. Ellul defines commonplaces as:</p> <p> <emph>an attempt at interpretation of social situations in terms of political, moral, religious, and philosophical evaluations</emph> that imply a point of view. They are collective beliefs based on assumptions that are accepted <emph>without discussion, beyond all question</emph>. The commonplace is really common because it does not tolerate any fundamental discussion. [They are] rarely quoted, but ... constantly present (Ellul, [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref158">25</reflink>], p. 13) (emphasis added).</p> <p>Learners, especially when encouraged to imitate Ellul, are capable of identifying commonplaces that explain the current technoscientific-economic infrastructure (e.g. <emph>I have nothing to hide</emph>) and also those identifying cultural currents actively critical of the status quo (e.g. <emph>Cyberpunk dystopia as road map</emph>—after Charlie Stross, [<reflink idref="bib86" id="ref159">86</reflink>]) [parenthetical].</p> <p>Once articulated, the commonplaces and their artefacts can be "reenacted" with student groups representing different interest groups (service providers, end users, protocol designers). Points of view (or perceptions) can be added to mind maps or to stand-alone or interlinked wiki pages (see Goetz, [<reflink idref="bib33" id="ref160">33</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib35" id="ref161">35</reflink>]). This helps get at the interdisciplinary nature of the literacy embedded in "various types of human activity, in social life, thought, and history" (Barton in Bhatt, [<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref162">9</reflink>], p. 2).</p> <p>As such it can tease out the politics <emph>inscribed</emph> into heart of science (of the living) in negotiation with the organisation of non-living and living organisations (e.g. Stiegler et al., [<reflink idref="bib85" id="ref163">85</reflink>], p. 78). It can tease out how (techno)science became projected as a state goal and substitute for conventional politics, filling a latent social need for a concept akin to development, "retrospectively applied to the history of social change in Europe during the previous three hundred odd years" (Nandy, [<reflink idref="bib56" id="ref164">56</reflink>]). Participants discuss, interpret, and annotate the curated materials, wiki pages, shared mental maps.</p> <p>By using a range of focal points learners can assay, muse, and ponder current codification through the investigation and comparison of their internal coherence, background motivations, and force of arguments.</p> <p>Commonplaces identified in class can be rearranged to change focal awareness to support further discussion. Additional research, now with the purpose of assaying the commonplaces, can be performed to further explore their historical development; how their material components are made and their distribution; type (not just form or content but also memory as well as background motivations, etc.); audience, use, and effects... Examples could include: tracing relational literacy of human activity, thought, and life; considering protocol alternatives like Gemini and Gopher; comparing current practice with permacomputing, post-collapse, local, grid, or low-bloat computing (Barber, [<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref165">4</reflink>]; Hinsen, [<reflink idref="bib39" id="ref166">39</reflink>]; Bernard, [<reflink idref="bib8" id="ref167">8</reflink>]; Jang & Johnson, [<reflink idref="bib42" id="ref168">42</reflink>]; Foster et al., [<reflink idref="bib27" id="ref169">27</reflink>]; Mansoux et al., [<reflink idref="bib50" id="ref170">50</reflink>]; suckless.org, [<reflink idref="bib87" id="ref171">87</reflink>]).</p> <hd id="AN0184762936-10">Conclusion</hd> <p>This article considers and responds to the Stieglerian view of the technology that "saves" the human memory of the knowledge of contemporary society as a <emph>pharmakon</emph>, or poison or cure. The toxic effects of this so-called <emph>mnemotechnics</emph> can be overwhelming: more than "merely" a threat to the environment, the systemic and massive speed and scale of proprietary datafication is potentially a threat to the symbolic agency of the human being, overwriting not just individual knowledge of the world but the ability for the individual to assemble the world, even collectively. This is only possible as it mirrors and augments the social and scientific codified re-presentation of the real world that has developed through Western rational thought. This was rapidly transformed and adapted in American culture in the twentieth century. Codification, where hidden, passive, or not available for reconsideration, threatens the ability of individual human beings to symbolically, meaningfully contribute to the question of how to live.</p> <p>Toxic organising patterns behind the technology can be cured through vigorous, critical interaction, relational thinking, interpretation, organising, and individual exploration of causes/effects. The article briefly suggests and outlines process-based phenomenographic and hermeneutic learning design to articulate the relationality of knowledge, depending on a world external to the individual, involving the continual inter-relationship between thought, interpretation, experience, and a phenomenon. This forms the web of meaning or codification that is the common grid (or commonplaces) underlying our thoughts, experience, education, culture, history, and social ideals and values and making it possible for active participation in society.</p> <p>The article ends with a case study of a course on how to decode this web of contemporary human experience. (Software) codification is disautomatised as learning participants, both individually and collectively participate in their creative organisation for active forms of interpretation and use. Learning is not the passive incorporation of dead ideas and commonplaces (merely to be received) but the active construction of (temporal) possibility. Examples supported by resources are given of how students identify the digital symbolic codifications and infrastructure that inform judgment, inquiry, and the basis of everyday life and practice and co-create new and meaningful artefacts.</p> <hd id="AN0184762936-11">Disclosure statement</hd> <p>No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).</p> <ref id="AN0184762936-12"> <title> References </title> <blist> <bibl id="bib1" idref="ref145" type="bt">1</bibl> <bibtext> Adams, S. (2015). On Ricœur's shift from a hermeneutics of culture to a cultural hermeneutics. Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies, 6 (2), 130 – 153. https://doi.org/10.5195/errs.2015.312</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib2" idref="ref148" type="bt">2</bibl> <bibtext> Allen, D. (2001). Getting things done. Penguin Books.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib3" idref="ref127" type="bt">3</bibl> <bibtext> Atwood, J. (2007). The software imprinting dilemma. 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  Group: Au
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Greta+Goetz%22">Greta Goetz</searchLink> (ORCID <externalLink term="https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6611-9536">0000-0002-6611-9536</externalLink>)
– Name: TitleSource
  Label: Source
  Group: Src
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="SO" term="%22Educational+Philosophy+and+Theory%22"><i>Educational Philosophy and Theory</i></searchLink>. 2025 57(5):395-409.
– Name: Avail
  Label: Availability
  Group: Avail
  Data: Routledge. Available from: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 530 Walnut Street Suite 850, Philadelphia, PA 19106. Tel: 800-354-1420; Tel: 215-625-8900; Fax: 215-207-0050; Web site: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
– Name: PeerReviewed
  Label: Peer Reviewed
  Group: SrcInfo
  Data: Y
– Name: Pages
  Label: Page Count
  Group: Src
  Data: 15
– Name: DatePubCY
  Label: Publication Date
  Group: Date
  Data: 2025
– Name: TypeDocument
  Label: Document Type
  Group: TypDoc
  Data: Journal Articles<br />Reports - Evaluative
– Name: Subject
  Label: Descriptors
  Group: Su
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Educational+Philosophy%22">Educational Philosophy</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Critical+Theory%22">Critical Theory</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Teaching+Methods%22">Teaching Methods</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Phenomenology%22">Phenomenology</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Learning+Processes%22">Learning Processes</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Models%22">Models</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Cultural+Literacy%22">Cultural Literacy</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Influence+of+Technology%22">Influence of Technology</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Information+Technology%22">Information Technology</searchLink>
– Name: DOI
  Label: DOI
  Group: ID
  Data: 10.1080/00131857.2025.2451303
– Name: ISSN
  Label: ISSN
  Group: ISSN
  Data: 0013-1857<br />1469-5812
– Name: Abstract
  Label: Abstract
  Group: Ab
  Data: "Applications" of knowledge symbolically and structurally "codify" thinking, often displacing the human who is relegated to passive, routine reproduction of operations and left with no space or time to understand or question the relations underlying the processes. This is both mirrored and augmented by the schematic narrowing of computational, calculative reason and nebulous or hidden code that is often read-only if human-readable at all. According to French philosopher Bernard Stiegler, this has toxic effects on learning, systemically and progressively embedding failures to think, hindering the potential for the collective and individual human adoption and adaptation of the knowledge of life. This article presents a process-based model to care for this problem through Stieglerian critical pedagogy, phenomenography, and process philosophy. The model evolved out of a course with the aim to achieve collective cultural literacy in that which "goes without saying" in the increasingly ubiquitous digital design of everyday life.
– Name: AbstractInfo
  Label: Abstractor
  Group: Ab
  Data: As Provided
– Name: DateEntry
  Label: Entry Date
  Group: Date
  Data: 2025
– Name: AN
  Label: Accession Number
  Group: ID
  Data: EJ1469295
PLink https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=eric&AN=EJ1469295
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        Value: 10.1080/00131857.2025.2451303
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      – Text: English
    PhysicalDescription:
      Pagination:
        PageCount: 15
        StartPage: 395
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Educational Philosophy
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Critical Theory
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Teaching Methods
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Phenomenology
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      – SubjectFull: Learning Processes
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      – SubjectFull: Models
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      – SubjectFull: Cultural Literacy
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      – SubjectFull: Influence of Technology
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      – SubjectFull: Information Technology
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      – TitleFull: Dis-Automatising (Software) Codification
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            – D: 01
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              Type: published
              Y: 2025
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              Value: 57
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            – TitleFull: Educational Philosophy and Theory
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