View in EDS HTML Full Text PDF Full Text

Creative Minds in a Polarized World

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Title: Creative Minds in a Polarized World
Language: English
Authors: Paola Iannello, Alice Cancer, Leor Zmigrod, Alessandro Antonietti (ORCID 0000-0002-7212-8076), Carola Salvi (ORCID 0000-0001-9312-7649)
Source: Journal of Creative Behavior. 2025 59(3).
Availability: Wiley. Available from: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030. Tel: 800-835-6770; e-mail: cs-journals@wiley.com; Web site: https://www.wiley.com/en-us
Peer Reviewed: Y
Page Count: 4
Publication Date: 2025
Document Type: Journal Articles
Reports - Evaluative
Descriptors: Creative Thinking, Cognitive Processes, Logical Thinking, Models, Misinformation, Critical Thinking
DOI: 10.1002/jocb.1509
ISSN: 0022-0175
2162-6057
Abstract: In today's digital milieu, characterized by pervasive media exposure, the intricate interplay between individual differences and cognitive processes has garnered significant scholarly interest. A notable facet of this interrelation pertains to the nexus between cognitive flexibility and individuals' engagement with online information. Recognized as essential for creative cognition, cognitive flexibility encompasses various facets of human reasoning vital for adapting to new information and challenging entrenched perspectives. This review expands the traditional "out-of-the-box" thinking paradigm beyond creative cognition to encompass a comprehensive reasoning framework that questions entrenched viewpoints and fixed cognitive schemas. By analyzing recent scholarly discussions on fake news and polarization, we underscore the pivotal role of cognitive flexibility in guiding individuals' critical navigation of the digital information landscape, promoting nuanced and less polarized perspectives. Introducing the concept of Socio-Cognitive Polarization, we elucidate how individuals with differing ideological backgrounds can exhibit escalating cognitive divisions and absolutist tendencies. Leveraging insights from existing literature, we present methodological strategies for combating misinformation and nurturing critical thinking to counteract the detrimental impact of deceptive narratives on societal discourse. This scholarly exposition advances the understanding of the challenges associated with misinformation dissemination and offers empirically grounded approaches for enhancing critical cognition in the digital era.
Abstractor: As Provided
Entry Date: 2025
Accession Number: EJ1483135
Database: ERIC
Full text is not displayed to guests.
FullText Links:
  – Type: pdflink
    Url: https://content.ebscohost.com/cds/retrieve?content=AQICAHj0k_4E0hTGH8RJwT4gCJyBsGNe_WN95AvKlDbXJGqwxwF7j_V5CG_AxER0QNYMvrd5AAAA4zCB4AYJKoZIhvcNAQcGoIHSMIHPAgEAMIHJBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHgYJYIZIAWUDBAEuMBEEDMLxoYjA6UwrbuQonwIBEICBm3go7AVmZ_cgCMNdZYMaYWy_BdSlAZtcuVjHpwNmys1LiJfKdd0Kv-GsA7ar7l7_B3oaLtgCZkBsr9jXuicPSkdq45hsKOlmIJUrFS-h32D4j4QCqLMPDtS5eO7AA2ttZuDkCgAHDU6x8H2AXdsFwiL9eUZf94LXihF7t790E-InwZ854hZFyAExkqD4n3aD6NmDuNGv2NBjESXs
Text:
  Availability: 1
  Value: <anid>AN0187843380;3u701sep.25;2025Sep11.06:34;v2.2.500</anid> <title id="AN0187843380-1">Creative Minds in a Polarized World </title> <p>In today's digital milieu, characterized by pervasive media exposure, the intricate interplay between individual differences and cognitive processes has garnered significant scholarly interest. A notable facet of this interrelation pertains to the nexus between cognitive flexibility and individuals' engagement with online information. Recognized as essential for creative cognition, cognitive flexibility encompasses various facets of human reasoning vital for adapting to new information and challenging entrenched perspectives. This review expands the traditional "out‐of‐the‐box" thinking paradigm beyond creative cognition to encompass a comprehensive reasoning framework that questions entrenched viewpoints and fixed cognitive schemas. By analyzing recent scholarly discussions on fake news and polarization, we underscore the pivotal role of cognitive flexibility in guiding individuals' critical navigation of the digital information landscape, promoting nuanced and less polarized perspectives. Introducing the concept of Socio‐Cognitive Polarization, we elucidate how individuals with differing ideological backgrounds can exhibit escalating cognitive divisions and absolutist tendencies. Leveraging insights from existing literature, we present methodological strategies for combating misinformation and nurturing critical thinking to counteract the detrimental impact of deceptive narratives on societal discourse. This scholarly exposition advances the understanding of the challenges associated with misinformation dissemination and offers empirically grounded approaches for enhancing critical cognition in the digital era.</p> <p>Keywords: fake news; polarization; creativity; socio‐cognitive polarization</p> <p>In an era dominated by the omnipresence of the Internet, media, and technology, the interplay between individual differences and cognitive processes has become a focal point of exploration. One intriguing facet of this dynamic intersection is the relationship between cognitive flexibility and the way individuals engage with information online. Cognitive flexibility, defined as the ability to adapt and shift cognitive strategies in response to changing environments, is expressed in multiple forms of human reasoning, and it is commonly understood as quintessential for creative cognition and problem solving. A recent body of work has shown that cognitive flexibility encompasses a range of cognitive abilities and processes related to adapting to new information, critical thinking, and polarized perspectives (e.g., Cancer, Salvi, Antonietti, & Iannello, [<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref1">14</reflink>]; Salvi et al., [<reflink idref="bib66" id="ref2">66</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib65" id="ref3">65</reflink>]; Zmigrod, [<reflink idref="bib77" id="ref4">77</reflink>]; Zmigrod, Rentfrow, & Robbins, [<reflink idref="bib79" id="ref5">79</reflink>]). In this review, we aim to show how the so‐called ability to think "outside the box" applies to an overall cognitive and social reasoning style characterized by challenging rigid (and polarized) perspectives or fixed ways of thinking that go beyond pure creative cognition. We will first delve into the current literature on fake news and polarization. While unfolding the complexities of this connection, we will highlight how people's ability to critically navigate the vast landscape of digital information is primarily a matter of cognitive flexibility. Specifically, our analysis of recent studies aims to illustrate how higher levels of cognitive flexibility contribute to more adept critical thinking skills, fostering a capacity for individuals to navigate digital information with less polarized perspectives. Thus, we will provide evidence on how cognitive flexibility extends beyond pure creative cognition to a holistic reasoning style that is reflected also when reasoning on social content. Manifestations of such a cognitive‐social reasoning transfer are embodied by the concept of Socio‐Cognitive Polarization (SCP). SCP refers to the phenomenon in which individuals or groups with differing social and ideological backgrounds become increasingly divided in their cognitive processes and beliefs, and it is expressed in politically polarized views, absolutism, and xenophobia (Cancer et al., [<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref6">14</reflink>]; Salvi et al., [<reflink idref="bib66" id="ref7">66</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib65" id="ref8">65</reflink>]). In conclusion, we will provide practical suggestions on how the knowledge gained in the literature analyzed could be applied to possible training contexts. By dissecting this cognitive dimension and its relation to fake news and polarization, this review aims to contribute to a deeper comprehension of the challenges posed by misinformation, paving the way for informed strategies to foster critical thinking and mitigate the impact of deceptive narratives on societal discourse.</p> <hd id="AN0187843380-2">FAKE NEWS AND POLARIZED THINKING</hd> <p>In the contemporary landscape of information dissemination, the phenomenon of fake news has emerged as a multifaceted challenge with far‐reaching consequences which include polarized thinking. The influence of social media exposure has been shown to diminish consideration of opposing viewpoints, intensify polarized attitudes, increase the likelihood of embracing ideologically aligned news, and facilitate the formation of echo chambers (Ross Arguedas, Robertson, Fletcher, & Nielsen, [<reflink idref="bib58" id="ref9">58</reflink>]). In environments like social media, where individuals perceive a false control over their information intake, they are more inclined to embrace news that aligns with their preferences and preexisting beliefs. As a result, determining the veracity of information provided by outside sources of communication necessitates calculating the likelihood that it contains errors as well as purposeful fabrications or distortions (Zmigrod, Burnell, & Hameleers, [<reflink idref="bib78" id="ref10">78</reflink>]).</p> <p>With the advent of the Internet cognitive psychologists have begun investigating the reasoning behind new information processing which includes belief and dissemination of false information (e.g., Bago, Rand, & Pennycook, [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref11">2</reflink>]; Britt, Rouet, Blaum, & Millis, [<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref12">12</reflink>]; Diehl & Lee, [<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref13">18</reflink>]; Lazer et al., [<reflink idref="bib40" id="ref14">40</reflink>]; Pennycook & Rand, [<reflink idref="bib53" id="ref15">53</reflink>]; Salvi et al., [<reflink idref="bib66" id="ref16">66</reflink>]). Belief in fake news is, indeed, associated with traits like delusionality, dogmatism, religious fundamentalism, and diminished analytical ability (Bronstein, Pennycook, Bear, Rand, & Cannon, [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref17">13</reflink>]). Specifically, dogmatic individuals and religious fundamentalists are shown to be more susceptible to fake news due to reduced open‐mind thinking (Bronstein et al., [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref18">13</reflink>]; Pennycook & Rand, [<reflink idref="bib53" id="ref19">53</reflink>]; Saltor, Barberia, & Rodríguez‐Ferreiro, [<reflink idref="bib61" id="ref20">61</reflink>]). The conceptual link between news credibility and media trust pertains to the perceived trustworthiness of a message, its source, or the medium through which it is conveyed (e.g., Metzger & Flanagin, [<reflink idref="bib45" id="ref21">45</reflink>]). With a significant portion of disinformation circulating online, frequently amplified by mainstream hyper‐partisan motivated reasoning, rigidity often emerges as the key factor contributing to individuals' failure to discern falsehoods. In these investigations, the influence of political identity on decision making becomes evident as individuals are inclined to accept falsehoods that align with their attitudes and bolster their sense of belonging to their ideological group (Hollander, [<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref22">30</reflink>]). This inclination stems from the resistance to facts that challenge one's partisan identity. Moreover, this motivated partisanship affects both direct and peripheral route evaluation processes. However, the findings from experimental designs indicate that, although individuals tend to believe false narratives favoring their side, they also exhibit a critical assessment of truth claims irrespective of partisan allegiance when they demonstrate higher cognitive reflection abilities (Pennycook & Rand, [<reflink idref="bib53" id="ref23">53</reflink>]). The consistent consensus in this domain suggests that the exertion of cognitive effort, rather than partisan bias alone, correlates with an enhanced capacity to accurately discern political falsehoods (Bago et al., [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref24">2</reflink>]; Pennycook & Rand, [<reflink idref="bib51" id="ref25">51</reflink>]).</p> <p>These findings reveal that associating with like‐minded individuals, a situation exacerbated by social media interaction, leads groups to defensively isolate themselves, reducing the exploration of alternative perspectives. Indeed, while research finds that cognitive reflection/analytical thinking (measured by the Cognitive Reflection Test, CRT) is an important predictor of being less inclined to believe in fake news and polarization, a bulk of studies began showing that robust relationship between those factors and cognitive flexibility (Cancer et al., [<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref26">14</reflink>]; Salvi et al., [<reflink idref="bib66" id="ref27">66</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib65" id="ref28">65</reflink>]; Salvi, Cristofori, Grafman, & Beeman, [<reflink idref="bib64" id="ref29">64</reflink>]; Zmigrod, [<reflink idref="bib76" id="ref30">76</reflink>]; Zmigrod et al., [<reflink idref="bib79" id="ref31">79</reflink>]).</p> <p>Cognitive flexibility plays a pivotal role in shaping how individuals select, process, and evaluate information. Thus, it is becoming a crucial element of digital literacy, particularly in the context of virtual social content, as online environments place a strong emphasis on the selection of information. It, indeed, allows individuals to consider multiple perspectives on a matter, exploring unusual reasoning paths and considering alternative approaches. Thus, cognitive flexibility promotes reorganization, restructuring, and updating mental processes in response to outside inputs (Ionescu, [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref32">31</reflink>]; Martin & Rubin, [<reflink idref="bib44" id="ref33">44</reflink>]) posing a unique challenge to believing in fake news and taking polarized perspectives. While cognitively flexible people test new rules during learning, maintain fluid mental representations of objects, and consider multiple strategies during problem solving, cognitively rigid people, instead, rely on persistence and conditioning for learning, maintain fixed mental representations of objects, and prioritize active strategies over alternatives (see Todd Maddox & Markman, [<reflink idref="bib69" id="ref34">69</reflink>]).</p> <p>A research field that has often dealt with the study of cognitive flexibility (or its opposite cognitive inflexibility or rigidity) is political psychology, within the exploration of the role of individual differences in the formation of political ideologies. The theories formulated in the early 50s suggested that promoting "rigid" ideological doctrines could attract individuals with corresponding psychological predispositions, namely, individuals predisposed to what we might call mental rigidity. Indeed, research has linked the traits of political conservatism such as authoritarianism, nationalism, and system justification to cognitive rigidity (Zmigrod et al., [<reflink idref="bib79" id="ref35">79</reflink>]). Empirical findings across various disciplines suggest that liberals and conservatives possess differing levels of cognitive flexibility. Liberals, in particular, demonstrate a notable degree of cognitive flexibility; They exhibit social adaptability (Hirsh, DeYoung, Xu, & Peterson, [<reflink idref="bib29" id="ref36">29</reflink>]), a commitment to egalitarian principles (Jost, Federico, & Napier, [<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref37">34</reflink>]), a willingness to embrace new experiences (Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, [<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref38">15</reflink>]), a propensity for seeking novelty (Carney et al., [<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref39">15</reflink>]), and a tendency toward unpredictable behavior (Tomkins, [<reflink idref="bib70" id="ref40">70</reflink>]). Conversely, conservatives tend to display cognitive rigidity, characterized by sustained impulse control (Clarkson et al., [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref41">16</reflink>]), adherence to societal norms (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, [<reflink idref="bib26" id="ref42">26</reflink>]), the perception of greater control over their actions, and resistance to change (Altemeyer, [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref43">1</reflink>]; Jost et al., [<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref44">34</reflink>]; Rigoni, Kühn, Gaudino, Sartori, & Brass, [<reflink idref="bib54" id="ref45">54</reflink>]). In line with this perspective, Karwowski et al. ([<reflink idref="bib35" id="ref46">35</reflink>]) found that perceived threat, like COVID‐19, increases social conservatism, right‐wing political support, and desire for control. While past scientific literature showed that liberals tend to exhibit higher levels of cognitive flexibility compared to conservatives, according to more recent evidence this phenomenon is revealed to be more closely associated with extremism rather than political partisanship <emph>per se</emph> (e.g., Zmigrod, [<reflink idref="bib77" id="ref47">77</reflink>]). Research findings indicate that individuals who hold extreme political views, whether on the liberal or conservative end of the spectrum, demonstrate greater cognitive inflexibility than those who adhere to more moderate positions (Diehl & Lee, [<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref48">18</reflink>]; Westen, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, & Hamann [<reflink idref="bib74" id="ref49">74</reflink>]; Zmigrod, [<reflink idref="bib76" id="ref50">76</reflink>]; Zmigrod, Rentfrow, & Robbins, [<reflink idref="bib80" id="ref51">80</reflink>]). While we cannot neglect the shift toward political polarization that characterized the last decade, we can speculate that these latter results highlight how cognitive flexibility may be a matter of the intensity of one's political beliefs rather than the specific ideological orientation.</p> <hd id="AN0187843380-3">COGNITIVE INFLEXIBILITY AND CRITICAL THINKING: A REVIEW OF RECENT STUDIES</hd> <p>Inflexibility, as a psychological construct, has been extensively investigated, as evidenced by the reviews conducted by Barron and Harrington ([<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref52">6</reflink>]), Batey and Furnham ([<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref53">7</reflink>]), Runco ([<reflink idref="bib59" id="ref54">59</reflink>]), and Baron, Isler, and Yilmaz ([<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref55">5</reflink>]). Despite the general consensus, discrepancies persist in the literature regarding the definition and measurement of a specific "cognitive style," as highlighted by studies such as those conducted by Davids ([<reflink idref="bib17" id="ref56">17</reflink>]), Eckhardt ([<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref57">20</reflink>]), Frenkel‐Brunswik ([<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref58">22</reflink>]), Kohn ([<reflink idref="bib37" id="ref59">37</reflink>]), O'Connor ([<reflink idref="bib48" id="ref60">48</reflink>]), and Vannoy ([<reflink idref="bib73" id="ref61">73</reflink>]). Thus, this question appears to still be open and poses particular interest regarding inflexible thinking and its relation to ideology. Most often, the scientific literature aiming at measuring inflexible attitudes relies on self‐report questionnaires (e.g., regarding political conservatism) and qualitative measurements rather than content‐neutral tests that assess cognitive rigidity (Onraet et al., [<reflink idref="bib49" id="ref62">49</reflink>]; Van Hiel, Onraet, Crowson, & Roets, [<reflink idref="bib72" id="ref63">72</reflink>]). Although widely adopted in the study of social inflexibility, the self‐report questionnaires used so far suffer from empirical limitations, such as the need for consistency, social desirability, and self‐perception, and often fail to assess the underlying cognitive architecture behind the expression of certain ideologies (Kruger & Dunning, [<reflink idref="bib38" id="ref64">38</reflink>]; Zmigrod, [<reflink idref="bib76" id="ref65">76</reflink>]). This could be misleading as it might conflate partisan alignment with extremism, dogmatism, or adherence to established doctrines. For example, a participant identifying as "strongly liberal" might be considered "extremist."</p> <p>To address these issues, a new wave of studies embraces an innovative perspective that replaces self‐assessment questionnaires as indicators of flexibility with empirical research using objective behavioral assessments to directly quantify cognitive flexibility through content‐neutral tasks, such as those used in creative problem solving. These tasks use neutral materials to investigate flexible thinking, thus providing a purely cognitive measure of flexible reasoning. As examined by Ionescu ([<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref66">31</reflink>]), there are various behavioral activities commonly used in cognitive neuroscientific research to operationalize cognitive flexibility in adults, including the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Grant & Berg, [<reflink idref="bib27" id="ref67">27</reflink>]), activity switching and optional shifting paradigms (Miyake & Friedman, [<reflink idref="bib46" id="ref68">46</reflink>]; Monsell, [<reflink idref="bib47" id="ref69">47</reflink>]), the Alternative Uses Task (AUT; Guilford, [<reflink idref="bib28" id="ref70">28</reflink>]), insight problems such as the Compound Remote Associate (CRA) problems (an adaptation of the classic RAT—Remote Associates Test—see Bowden & Jung‐Beeman, [<reflink idref="bib11" id="ref71">11</reflink>]), the Rebus puzzles (MacGregor & Cunningham, [<reflink idref="bib43" id="ref72">43</reflink>]), or induction activities (Shafto, Coley, & Vitkin, [<reflink idref="bib67" id="ref73">67</reflink>]). In these tests, the performance is measured through participant accuracy rates, reaction times, or the number and variety of responses provided to problems (see Table 1).</p> <p>1 Table Different Operationalizations of Cognitive Flexibility</p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead valign="bottom"><tr><th align="left">Cognitive flexibility operationalization</th><th align="left">Task</th><th align="left">Details</th></tr></thead><tbody valign="top"><tr><td align="left">Ability to shift between alternative tasks</td><td align="left">Task‐Switching Tasks</td><td align="left">Tasks that require participants to switch between two kinds of perceptual or cognitive features—such as indicating an arrow's direction or its color—allow researchers to measure the switching cost (in reaction times and/or accuracy rates), which is used as an indicator of flexibility</td></tr><tr><td align="left">Ability to shift behavior in response to environmental changes</td><td align="left">Set‐Shifting or Rule‐Switching Tasks (e.g. Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, Intra‐Extra Dimensional Set Shift Test)</td><td align="left">Typically quantified via accuracy on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test or the perseverative errors score, which indicates how often a participant continues to perseverate with the old non‐functional rule</td></tr><tr><td align="left">Ability to overcome habitual behavior, including intuitive or impulsive responses</td><td align="left">Habit acquisition and extinction tasks, reversal learning, or cognitive inhibition tasks (e.g. Go/No Go Tasks)</td><td align="left">The degree to which the participant struggles to extinguish a habit or to inhibit a pre‐learned response can be taken as a measure of their difficulties in disengaging and thinking flexibly</td></tr><tr><td align="left">Ability to generate diverse and divergent ideas</td><td align="left">Creativity—Divergent thinking tasks (e.g. Alternative Uses Test)</td><td align="left">Creativity tasks that invite participants to generate as many novel and unusual uses as possible for a common object within a set time limit. This task encapsulates the ability to move between different categories and dimensions as an indicator of flexibility (i.e., fluency, flexibility, elaboration, and originality)</td></tr><tr><td align="left">Ability to find convergent solutions to a problem</td><td align="left">Creativity—Convergent thinking tasks (e.g. Remote Associates Task, Rebus Puzzles and Anagrams)</td><td align="left">Tasks that assess a participant's ability to find remote associations between linked but distant concepts can be a proxy for flexibility (Remote Associates). They focus on finding a single, correct solution to a problem using existing knowledge often via restructuring. These tasks typically have a specific, predetermined answer and involve narrowing down possibilities to arrive at the most appropriate solution. Often used to study insight problem solving</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <p>It is crucial to note that several key studies in this field use tasks, such as the CRA and the AUT, which are traditionally used to measure creativity, problem solving, and cognitive flexibility. The CRA requires participants to find a word that can form a compound word or phrase with each of the three presented words. This task assesses the ability to form novel connections and switch between different semantic networks—a hallmark of both creativity and cognitive flexibility (e.g., Kenett, Anaki, & Faust, [<reflink idref="bib36" id="ref74">36</reflink>]; Luchini et al., [<reflink idref="bib42" id="ref75">42</reflink>]). The CRA has been often used to study insight problem solving, which often involves sudden reorganization of mental representations, and further illuminates the link between creative cognition and flexible thinking (Bowden & Jung‐Beeman, [<reflink idref="bib11" id="ref76">11</reflink>]; Salvi, [<reflink idref="bib62" id="ref77">62</reflink>]; Salvi, Costantini, Bricolo, Perugini, & Beeman, [<reflink idref="bib63" id="ref78">63</reflink>]). Similarly, the AUT, which asks participants to generate multiple novel uses for common objects, assesses divergent thinking and flexible associative thinking (e.g., Benedek, Könen, & Neubauer, [<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref79">9</reflink>]; Guilford, [<reflink idref="bib28" id="ref80">28</reflink>]; Runco & Acar, [<reflink idref="bib60" id="ref81">60</reflink>]). The use of these creativity‐linked tasks to assess cognitive flexibility in the context of political attitudes and belief in misinformation provides empirical support for the theoretical link between creative cognition and resistance to rigid, polarized thinking. This connection is central to our argument that creative problem‐solving abilities play a crucial role in how individuals process social and political information.</p> <p>Thus, recently scholars began using these content‐neutral measurements to investigate how cognitive flexibility is involved when individuals process social and political content. These new studies assessed the intricate associations between flexible and creative thinking, as measured with purely cognitive tasks, and aspects of social reasoning and polarization, including political partisanship, dogmatism, and xenophobia (e.g., Rollwage, Zmigrod, de‐Wit, Dolan, & Fleming, [<reflink idref="bib56" id="ref82">56</reflink>]; Salvi et al., [<reflink idref="bib64" id="ref83">64</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib65" id="ref84">65</reflink>]; Zmigrod, [<reflink idref="bib76" id="ref85">76</reflink>]; Zmigrod et al., [<reflink idref="bib80" id="ref86">80</reflink>]) as well as vaccine hesitancy, bullshit receptivity (Cancer et al., [<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref87">14</reflink>]; George & Mielicki, [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref88">25</reflink>]), and believing in fake news (Salvi et al., [<reflink idref="bib64" id="ref89">64</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib66" id="ref90">66</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib65" id="ref91">65</reflink>]).</p> <p>The results showed that individuals who score higher in cognitive flexibility in these tasks (thus are used to overcoming entrenched and stagnated viewpoints when solving problems), also consider alternative information in online environments. As a result, they are better at evaluating fake news and less likely to embrace dogmatic political and religious perspectives (Salvi et al., [<reflink idref="bib66" id="ref92">66</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib65" id="ref93">65</reflink>]; Zmigrod, [<reflink idref="bib76" id="ref94">76</reflink>]; Zmigrod et al., [<reflink idref="bib79" id="ref95">79</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib80" id="ref96">80</reflink>]). Why? Probably because when navigating digital information, individuals are constantly required to verify the reliability of sources to detect potential fake news. This process involves the motivation to seek alternative sources, going beyond the immediately available information, and requires the ability to manage the coexistence of different interpretations of reality. The tendency to categorize reality in a strictly dichotomous manner, indicative of mental inflexibility, makes it difficult to seek further sources of information and adapt one's view of reality based on the diverse and sometimes contradictory information received. This process is conversely supported by flexible thinking and creative cognition.</p> <p>Research conducted by Bronstein et al. ([<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref97">13</reflink>]), Pennycook and Rand ([<reflink idref="bib52" id="ref98">52</reflink>]), and Saltor et al. ([<reflink idref="bib61" id="ref99">61</reflink>]) underscores the idea that the ability to discern fake news is closely intertwined with one's critical thinking abilities and capacity for open‐minded thinking. This assertion has been substantiated by investigations into belief patterns regarding fake news, encompassing both political and COVID‐19‐related content. These recent findings revealed that better problem‐solving skills are predictive of accurately assessing news headlines as real or fake, and are associated with reduced gullibility in other forms, such as susceptibility to pseudo‐profound bullshit and overclaiming (Salvi et al., [<reflink idref="bib66" id="ref100">66</reflink>], [<reflink idref="bib65" id="ref101">65</reflink>]).</p> <p>In the study by Salvi et al. ([<reflink idref="bib66" id="ref102">66</reflink>]), which was conducted during the peak of the COVID‐19 pandemic in the US and Italy, one of the stronger predictors of believing and sharing fake news was Socio‐Cognitive Polarization (SCP), the aforementioned novel construct representing a tendency for inflexible thinking which extends to both cognitive and social reasoning. This characteristic not only delineates variations in viewpoints or outlooks but also encompasses how individuals assimilate information, interact with media, communicate with others, and formulate social assessments. More precisely, SCP is a cluster measure capturing conservative political ideology, absolutistic thinking/intolerance of ambiguity, and xenophobia: (a) conservative ideology is often associated with preferences toward certainty, simplicity and closure, and thus increases individuals' susceptibility to disinformation online (Jost, [<reflink idref="bib33" id="ref103">33</reflink>]); (b) absolutistic thinking indicates one's preference for rigid dichotomizations into fixed categories, which results in black‐and‐white thinking (Frenkel‐Brunswik, [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref104">23</reflink>]; Lauriola, Foschi, Mosca, & Weller, [<reflink idref="bib39" id="ref105">39</reflink>]; Stanley Budner, [<reflink idref="bib68" id="ref106">68</reflink>]). When faced with the evaluation of news, individuals with high levels of absolutistic thinking fail to explore additional resources to compare contradicting points of view (Edgerly, Mourão, Thorson, & Tham, [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref107">21</reflink>]), which, as a result, is likely to hinder the detection of fake news; (c) xenophobia, namely hostility and fear toward immigrants, is traditionally associated with dogmatism, ethnocentrism, and intolerance for ambiguity (Furnham & Marks, [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref108">24</reflink>]), and indeed was confirmed as a predictor of fake news belief. The SCP factor was calculated by clustering measures of conservatism (Conservative political ideology scale: Robinson, Shaver & Wrightsman, [<reflink idref="bib55" id="ref109">55</reflink>]; e.g., "I endorse many aspects of conservative political ideology"), absolutism (Multidimensional Attitude Toward Ambiguity Scale: Lauriola et al., [<reflink idref="bib39" id="ref110">39</reflink>]; e.g., "There's a right way and a wrong way to do almost everything"), and xenophobia (Xenophobia Scale: van der Veer et al., [<reflink idref="bib71" id="ref111">71</reflink>]; e.g., "I worry that immigrants may spread unusual diseases").</p> <p>Other than observing how SCP is a predictive indicator of the propensity to believe in fake news online, individuals with higher levels of SCP were also found to be more prone to overestimate pseudo‐profound statements (bullshit) and to overclaim (Salvi et al., [<reflink idref="bib66" id="ref112">66</reflink>]). These associations have been further explored in a later study (Salvi et al., [<reflink idref="bib65" id="ref113">65</reflink>]), using a latent profile analysis (LPA) approach. The results showed differences in performance on problem‐solving tasks, specifically Rebus puzzles, among four latent profiles. More precisely, individuals with low SCP, bullshit, and overclaiming scored the highest in creative problem solving, thus suggesting that social and cognitive flexibility may share an underlying socio‐cognitive construct, wherein those who are more socially inflexible are also more likely to be also cognitively inflexible when tested using content‐neutral tasks.</p> <p>Does the inclination of individuals with higher levels of inflexibility to uncritically accept online information necessitate a comprehensive examination of the political landscape from an integrated perspective? After all, exposure to political narratives plays a significant role in shaping political partisanship. As discussed above, cognitive flexibility was consistently found to be inversely correlated with rigid ideologies, such as nationalism (e.g., pro‐Brexit attitudes), religious beliefs, and receptivity to evidence (Van Hiel et al., [<reflink idref="bib72" id="ref114">72</reflink>]; Zmigrod, [<reflink idref="bib76" id="ref115">76</reflink>]; Zmigrod, Rentfrow, Zmigrod, & Robbins, [<reflink idref="bib81" id="ref116">81</reflink>]). In the attempt to better describe more nuanced facets of cognitive inflexibility in diverse political partisanships, Salvi et al. ([<reflink idref="bib64" id="ref117">64</reflink>]) found a positive association between political liberalism and the ability to solve CRA problems through insight, namely through relying on the sudden reorganization of the mental representation of the problem. Conversely, conservative participants showed no preference for either an insight or analytical (i.e., step‐by‐step) problem‐solving style (Salvi et al., [<reflink idref="bib64" id="ref118">64</reflink>]). No significant differences were found between liberals and conservatives when they restricted the analysis to problems solved via step‐by‐step, which is a gradual approach toward the solution and awareness of the steps involved. These early results revealed that liberals tend to use insight strategies more frequently than conservatives when tackling verbal problems. This perspective aligns with findings from various studies in behavioral, neuroscientific, and genetic fields, collectively suggesting that conservatives typically exhibit more structured and persevering cognitive styles, whereas liberals tend to demonstrate a less structured and adaptable cognitive approach (see Van Hiel et al., [<reflink idref="bib72" id="ref119">72</reflink>]). However, as anticipated in the Introduction, an alternative hypothesis has been proposed suggesting that mental inflexibility reflects partisan extremism across the whole political spectrum. In a study conducted in the U.S., Zmigrod et al. ([<reflink idref="bib81" id="ref120">81</reflink>]) confirmed a U‐shaped relationship between political partisanship and problem‐solving performance, using three independent tests of cognitive flexibility, namely the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, CRA, and AUT. Results showed that extreme political partisanship was related to lower levels of cognitive flexibility, regardless of political orientation (Zmigrod et al., [<reflink idref="bib81" id="ref121">81</reflink>]). These findings suggest that inflexible thinking used to process nonpolitical information is related to the extremity of partisan identity.</p> <p>The discrepancy between the last two studies may stem from the timing of their implementation, as one was conducted prior to Trump's election (Salvi et al., [<reflink idref="bib64" id="ref122">64</reflink>]) while the other took place afterward (Zmigrod et al., [<reflink idref="bib81" id="ref123">81</reflink>]). The shifting socio‐political landscape during these periods could have significantly influenced participants' attitudes and responses. Data indicate a notable increase in political polarization during the intervening years, marked by heightened ideological divisions and amplified partisan rhetoric. Consequently, individuals' perceptions and reactions to stimuli related to political issues may have been notably impacted, potentially contributing to variations in the observed outcomes between the studies.</p> <p>Besides, these studies indicate that problem‐solving ability is linked to social flexibility in the expression of political ideologies, along with a general inclination to question established norms and entertain alternative perspectives when reasoning. In addition, the consistency of these findings across various measures suggests a meaningful connection between creative problem‐solving abilities and social flexibility, particularly concerning the willingness to question established norms and explore alternative viewpoints.</p> <hd id="AN0187843380-4">IN PRACTICE</hd> <p>Among other points, this review highlights the crucial role of SCP in undermining the ability to critically think about and address complex contexts. Among others, the digital context emerges as of primary importance. In the current era of digital advancement, mastering the navigation and management of online environments is becoming progressively challenging. Having a good level of digital literacy—understood as basic computer skills and familiarity with online tools—is undoubtedly necessary, but not sufficient to navigate digital contexts competently and effectively. Rather, mastering critical skills and interpreting information is essential, as well as questioning assumptions to form informed opinions.</p> <p>As described, SCP turned out to be related to the tendency of believing in fake news, exactly because of its association with a rather limited inclination to critically evaluate information that contradicts preexisting beliefs, which leads, in turn, to accept fake news uncritically and makes it difficult to discern between accurate and false news. Additionally, in a sort of vicious circle, high levels of SCP can contribute to the spread of misinformation within online contexts. When individuals primarily interact with others who share their beliefs and attitudes, they may be exposed to a higher volume of false information that reinforces their existing biases. Within echo chambers, individuals surround themselves with like‐minded individuals and, consequently, are selectively exposed to information that confirms their preexisting beliefs (Jamieson & Cappella, [<reflink idref="bib32" id="ref124">32</reflink>]). Therefore, the so‐called "echo chamber effect" can create an environment where misinformation is more readily accepted and circulated without critical scrutiny, thus contributing to perpetuating polarization by reinforcing existing biases and preventing cross‐cutting exposure (Dubois & Blank, [<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref125">19</reflink>]; Jamieson & Cappella, [<reflink idref="bib32" id="ref126">32</reflink>]). Furthermore, the digital context is fertile ground for the phenomenon of filter bubbles, which an echo chambers produced by ranking algorithms that tailor content based on the user's past preferences, behaviors, and social connections, and therefore refer to a passive personalization of information without any active choice on the part of the individual. For those people who are already rooted in a polarized worldview, filter bubbles exacerbate the problem by reinforcing their existing biases and shielding them from alternative perspectives. As a result, filter bubbles can hinder individuals' ability to critically evaluate information and engage in meaningful discourse with those who hold different perspectives. When individuals are only exposed to content that aligns with their beliefs, they lack exposure to diverse viewpoints necessary for critical thinking and open‐mindedness. Hence, individuals may become even more polarized and develop rigid beliefs, as they are continuously exposed to content that confirms their worldview while being shielded from dissenting opinions (Barbera, Jost, Nagler, Tucker, & Bonneau, [<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref127">4</reflink>]; Boutyline & Willer, [<reflink idref="bib10" id="ref128">10</reflink>]). More broadly, polarization can yield notable ramifications for discourse and conflict, exacerbating challenges in fostering constructive dialogue concerning societal issues (Bail et al., [<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref129">3</reflink>]; Ross Arguedas et al., [<reflink idref="bib58" id="ref130">58</reflink>]). Indeed, polarization in digital spaces often leads to breakdowns in meaningful dialogue between individuals with differing viewpoints. Recent work by Beaudoin et al. ([<reflink idref="bib8" id="ref131">8</reflink>]) highlights the need for measuring lifelong digital technology use and its cognitive effects, including impacts on flexibility and creativity. This perspective suggests that long‐term engagement with digital technologies may shape cognitive processes in ways that influence how individuals navigate and process online information. Similarly, Rosen, Whaling, Carrier, Cheever, and Rokkum ([<reflink idref="bib57" id="ref132">57</reflink>]) have developed a comprehensive measure of various facets of technology use, providing a nuanced tool for assessing individual differences in this domain. These approaches underscore the importance of considering not just cognitive flexibility as a trait, but also how it may be shaped by an individual's history of technology interaction. These reflections highlight how the digital context represents an environment where the dangerously negative consequences of polarization and inflexibility can manifest very prominently (Xing, Zhang, Storey, & Koohang, [<reflink idref="bib75" id="ref133">75</reflink>]) and bi‐directionally. Thus, what appears evident is the strong need to identify methods and intervention strategies to minimize the potential negative consequences of polarization, while enhancing and increasing individuals' critical thinking abilities. Future research should explore how different patterns of technology use across the lifespan might moderate the relationship between cognitive flexibility and susceptibility to misinformation or polarized thinking. For instance, individuals with more diverse digital experiences might develop greater cognitive flexibility, while those with more limited or echo chamber‐like digital interactions might show reduced flexibility. Integrating measures of technology use and digital literacy into studies of cognitive flexibility and social cognition could provide a more comprehensive understanding of how individuals process information in our increasingly digital world.</p> <p>Promoting critical thinking requires the creation of media environments and content that enhance the development of flexibility and respectful communication among diverse perspectives. In educational contexts, such as schools for example, it is crucial to encourage students to explore a variety of viewpoints and diverse sources of information to promote a more balanced and in‐depth understanding of complex subjects. Promoting cognitive flexibility and critical thinking can help reduce dysfunctional behaviors, such as selective exposure, thus mitigating the influence of polarization on information consumption (Xing et al., [<reflink idref="bib75" id="ref134">75</reflink>]). In digital design contexts, insights from SCP advocate algorithmic transparency and the design of digital platforms to promote inclusivity and mitigate polarization. This may involve implementing features such as diverse content recommendations, transparency around algorithmic processes, and mechanisms for fostering civil discourse and diverse perspectives. Designing digital spaces and online communities that prioritize cooperation, collective problem solving and inclusivity can help counteract, or at least mitigate, the divisive effects of polarization. Encouraging constructive discourse, seeking common ground, and acknowledging the validity of different perspectives can help bridge divides and promote understanding across ideological lines (Xing et al., [<reflink idref="bib75" id="ref135">75</reflink>]).</p> <p>For example, fostering cognitive flexibility through creative problem‐solving exercises can yield significant benefits in combating SCP. Educational institutions could implement workshops centered on divergent thinking tasks, such as the AUT where students generate multiple novel uses for everyday objects. This approach enhances mental flexibility and encourages considering diverse perspectives. Similarly, introducing insight problem‐solving activities, like the CRA task, can train individuals to overcome mental sets and approach issues from unconventional angles. In digital environments, platforms could integrate creative challenges that prompt users to reframe contentious topics from multiple viewpoints before engaging in discussions. On a personal level, individuals can cultivate cognitive flexibility by regularly engaging in creative pursuits such as improvisational activities, free writing, or collaborative brainstorming sessions. These creativity‐focused interventions, when practiced consistently, could enhance cognitive flexibility, potentially leading to more nuanced information processing and reduced susceptibility to polarized thinking in our complex digital landscape.</p> <hd id="AN0187843380-5">CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS</hd> <p>This review explores the intricate interplay between cognitive flexibility and individuals' interactions with digital content, in assessing the veracity of information as well as taking polarized perspectives. In our discussion, we extend the concept of cognitive flexibility beyond the pure conception of creative cognition to encompass a broader framework for challenging entrenched viewpoints and fixed cognitive schemas. Through an analysis of recent experimental results on fake news and polarization, we elucidate the vital role of cognitive flexibility in fostering nuanced perspectives and mitigating SCP. Drawing on insights from the literature, we highlight the problem of how political polarization has been traditionally investigated via content‐dependent qualitative measurements to assess inflexible attitudes, particularly in the realm of political conservatism. We evidenced how these methods may fail to capture the underlying cognitive architecture behind certain ideologies, potentially leading to misinterpretation and conflating partisan alignment with extremism or dogmatism. Thus, we showcase results from a novel approach that adopts content‐neutral tasks, such as those commonly used in creative cognition research, which better grasp the cognitive architecture of cognitive rigidity isolating it from biasing content. Politics represent just one facet of the complex interplay of cognitive inflexibility, as exemplified by the phenomenon of the anti‐vaccine movement (e.g., Cancer et al., [<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref136">14</reflink>]) where even in the absence of a specific political context, low problem‐solving scores predicted polarized antivax perspectives through SCP. This suggests that politics may be just one of many manifestations of this mode of thinking, rather than its primary cause or sole domain. Indeed, the importance of exploring cognitive rigidity beyond the realm of politics may be an overlooked, yet significant, aspect in fully understanding this complex phenomenon.</p> <p>Further, we propose methodological strategies for combating misinformation and enhancing critical thinking skills in the digital era. As we navigate an era characterized by information abundance and complexity, the study of misinformation and its connection to cognitive flexibility provides a nuanced lens through which to comprehend and address the challenges of an increasingly interconnected and information‐saturated world. While platforms have a responsibility to mitigate the spread of misinformation, combat harmful content, and promote healthy online interactions, users bear a responsibility to engage thoughtfully and ethically in digital discourse, avoiding the perpetuation of polarizing rhetoric and actively contributing to a positive online environment through their actions and interactions.</p> <p>The recent findings reviewed in this article show how polarized attitudes, reflected in both cognitive and social reasoning, hinder a thoughtful and critical assessment of digital information. The research reviewed allows us to speculate that people who are more prone toward creative cognition are also able to overcome entrenched viewpoints since they became skilled at problem solving. Thus, the evidence presented highlights the potential efficacy of implementing training programs focused on problem‐solving skills and fostering creative cognition as strategies to mitigate the impact of SCP. By equipping individuals with the ability to critically evaluate information and approach issues from diverse perspectives, such interventions may contribute to reducing susceptibility to believing in fake news. Ultimately, investing in these educational initiatives holds promise for fostering more informed and discerning citizens in an increasingly polarized digital landscape.</p> <p>Our review focused primarily on studies that systematically investigated the relationship between creativity, cognitive flexibility, and social cognition using experimental paradigms. We specifically sought out research that used content‐neutral tasks traditionally used in creative cognition studies, such as the AUT, CRA‐like problems, and insight problem‐solving tasks. These were then examined in relation to measures of social and political attitudes. We used key databases including PsycINFO, Pubmed, Web of Science, and Google Scholar. Search terms combined creativity measures (e.g., "Alternative Uses Task", "Remote Associates Test", "Insight Problem Polving") with social cognition concepts (e.g., "political ideology", "fake news belief", "polarization"). While our search revealed a growing body of work in this area, the number of studies using these specific experimental paradigms in relation to social cognition remains limited. This highlights a significant gap in the literature and underscores the need for more research in this domain. With this review, we hope to encourage researchers to further investigate the relationship between creative cognition, as measured by established experimental tasks, and various aspects of social and political thinking.</p> <p>We acknowledge that our review is not exhaustive but aims to synthesize the available experimental evidence and stimulate further research in this promising area. Future systematic reviews could, and should, expand on this work by including a wider range of creativity measures and exploring potential moderating factors in the relationship between creative cognition and social attitudes.</p> <p>While the findings presented offer valuable insights, and cognitive flexibility generally appears beneficial in combating misinformation and polarization, in conclusion, it is crucial to consider potential limitations and opposite perspectives.</p> <p>While cognitive flexibility is generally a protective factor, it can be argued that excessive openness to all viewpoints might paradoxically leave individuals vulnerable to manipulation by forms and hierarchies imposing their orders in political and cultural landscapes (Levine, [<reflink idref="bib41" id="ref137">41</reflink>]). The concept of being "too open‐minded" raises questions about whether there is an optimal level of cognitive flexibility beyond which additional flexibility becomes counterproductive. Addressing the potential downsides of cognitive flexibility can therefore lead to a more nuanced understanding and better strategies for fostering resilience against misinformation. In a study by Salvi et al. ([<reflink idref="bib65" id="ref138">65</reflink>]) aiming to investigate the relationship between social and cognitive flexibility, the authors identified, within those people who are low in SCP, a subgroup with a tendency toward overclaiming knowledge and believing in pseudo‐profound statements, despite their low level of SCP. This subgroup, with mild SCP and high bullshit receptivity/overclaiming, demonstrates that excessive cognitive flexibility—a tendency toward "pseudo‐flexibility"—might lead individuals to give undue consideration to misguided or deceptive viewpoints and overestimate the profundity of nonsense statements. As the authors suggest, cognitive flexibility, while valuable, must be balanced with a healthy level of critical thinking to prevent falling prey to misinformation.</p> <p>Moreover, as illustrated in works like "Merchants of Doubt," the weaponization of doubt—often considered a hallmark of flexible thinking—by those seeking to deceive highlights the complex relationship between cognitive flexibility and resilience to misinformation (see Oreskes & Conway, [<reflink idref="bib50" id="ref139">50</reflink>]). Future research should explore these nuances, investigating potential negative outcomes associated with high levels of cognitive flexibility and seeking to define an optimal balance between flexibility and the ability to form stable, well‐founded beliefs.</p> <p>Furthermore, future research should address several critical questions raised by our review. Primarily, the causal relationship between cognitive inflexibility and SCP needs examination through mediation models. Is cognitive flexibility a unique predictor in these processes, or is it part of broader constructs like general intelligence? Experimental work, such as studies on temporarily inducing a creative mindset, could provide insights into potential causal links and intervention strategies. Additionally, longitudinal studies could illuminate the developmental trajectories of these relationships. By exploring these avenues, future research can deepen our understanding of how cognitive flexibility influences information processing in digital environments, potentially informing strategies to promote critical engagement with online content. It is essential to collect more evidence and expand investigations into additional realms of information processing beyond those explored in current studies. Replication of the data across diverse samples and contexts is crucial to establish the robustness and generalizability of the observed effects. Additionally, exploring neurological substrates and individual differences in cognitive processing could provide valuable insights into the underlying mechanisms contributing to SCP. By adopting a multidisciplinary approach and incorporating methodologies from neuroscience and psychology, researchers can uncover nuanced factors that influence belief formation and information processing, thus advancing our knowledge in this critical area.</p> <hd id="AN0187843380-6">FUNDING</hd> <p>This work did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not‐for‐profit sectors.</p> <hd id="AN0187843380-7">CONFLICT OF INTEREST</hd> <p>The authors declare no conflict of interest.</p> <hd id="AN0187843380-8">ETHICS INFORMATION</hd> <p>This review adheres to all ethical guidelines and standards applicable to scientific research.</p> <hd id="AN0187843380-9">DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</hd> <p>As this manuscript is a review, there are no primary data sets associated with it.</p> <ref id="AN0187843380-10"> <title> Footnotes </title> <blist> <bibl id="bib1" idref="ref43" type="bt">1</bibl> <bibtext> We would like to express our sincere gratitude to all the researchers whose work contributed to this review. We acknowledge the valuable insights and contributions from our colleagues and peers in the field.</bibtext> </blist> </ref> <ref id="AN0187843380-11"> <title> REFERENCES </title> <blist> <bibtext> Altemeyer, B. (1998). The other "authoritarian personality". Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 30 (C), 47 – 92 ; doi: 10.1016/S0065‐2601(08)60382‐2.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib2" idref="ref11" type="bt">2</bibl> <bibtext> Bago, B., Rand, D.G., & Pennycook, G. (2020). Fake news, fast and slow: Deliberation reduces belief in false (but not true) news headlines. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 149 (8), 1608.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib3" idref="ref129" type="bt">3</bibl> <bibtext> Bail, C.A., Argyle, L.P., Brown, T.W., Bumpus, J.P., Chen, H., Hunzaker, M.F., ... & Volfovsky, A. (2018). Exposure to opposing views on social media can increase political polarization. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 115 (37), 9216 – 9221.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib4" idref="ref127" type="bt">4</bibl> <bibtext> Barbera, P., Jost, J.T., Nagler, J., Tucker, J.A., & Bonneau, R. (2015). Tweeting from left to right. Psychological Science, 26 (10), 1531 – 1542 ; doi: 10.1177/0956797615594620.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib5" idref="ref55" type="bt">5</bibl> <bibtext> Baron, J., Isler, O., & Yilmaz, O. (2022). Actively open‐minded thinking and the political effects of its absence. PsyArXiv ; doi: 10.31234/osf.io/g5jhp.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib6" idref="ref52" type="bt">6</bibl> <bibtext> Barron, F., & Harrington, D.M. (1981). Creativity, intelligence, and personality. Annual Review of Psychology, 32 (1), 439 – 476 ; doi: 10.1146/annurev.ps.32.020181.002255.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib7" idref="ref53" type="bt">7</bibl> <bibtext> Batey, M., & Furnham, A. (2006). Creativity, intelligence, and personality: A critical review of the scattered literature. Genetic, Social, and General Psychology Monographs, 132 (4), 355 – 429 ; doi: 10.3200/MONO.132.4.355‐430.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib8" idref="ref131" type="bt">8</bibl> <bibtext> Beaudoin, M.E., Jones, K.M., Jerome, B., Martinez, D., George, T., & Pandža, N.B. (2024). Systematic research is needed on the potential effects of lifelong technology experience on cognition: A mini‐review and recommendations. Frontiers in Psychology, 15, 1335864.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib9" idref="ref79" type="bt">9</bibl> <bibtext> Benedek, M., Könen, T., & Neubauer, A.C. (2012). Associative abilities underlying creativity. Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, 6 (3), 273.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Boutyline, A., & Willer, R. (2017). The social structure of political echo chambers: Variation in ideological homophily in online networks. Political Psychology, 38 (3), 551 – 569.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Bowden, E.M., & Jung‐Beeman, M. (2003). Normative data for 144 compound remote associate problems. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 35 (4), 634 – 639 ; doi: 10.3758/bf03195543.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Britt, M.A., Rouet, J.F., Blaum, D., & Millis, K. (2019). A reasoned approach to dealing with fake news. Policy Insights From the Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 6 (1), 94 – 101.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Bronstein, M.V., Pennycook, G., Bear, A., Rand, D.G., & Cannon, T.D. (2019). Belief in fake news is associated with delusionality, dogmatism, religious fundamentalism, and reduced analytic thinking. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 8 (1), 108 – 117.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Cancer, A., Salvi, C., Antonietti, A., & Iannello, P. (2023). Not getting vaccinated? It is a matter of problem‐solving abilities and socio‐cognitive polarization. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 20 (3), 1721 ; doi: 10.3390/ijerph20031721.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Carney, D.R., Jost, J.T., Gosling, S.D., & Potter, J. (2008). The secret lives of liberals and conservatives: Personality profiles, interaction styles, and the things they leave behind. Political Psychology, 29 (6), 807 – 840 ; doi: 10.1111/j.1467‐9221.2008.00668.x.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Clarkson, J.J., Chambers, J.R., Hirt, E.R., Otto, A.S., Kardes, F.R., & Leone, C. (2015). The self‐control consequences of political ideology. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 112 (27), 8250 – 8253 ; doi: 10.1073/pnas.1503530112.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Davids, A. (1963). Psychodynamic and sociocultural factors related to intolerance of ambiguity. In R.W. White (Ed.), The study of lives (pp. 160 – 177). New York : Atherton Press.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Diehl, T., & Lee, S. (2022). Testing the cognitive involvement hypothesis on social media: News finds misperceptions, partisanship, and fake news credibility. Computers in Human Behavior, 128, 107121.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Dubois, E., & Blank, G. (2018). The echo chamber is overstated: The moderating effect of political interest and diverse media. Information, Communication and Society, 21 (5), 729 – 745.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Eckhardt, W. (1991). Authoritarianism. Political Psychology, 12, 97 – 124.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Edgerly, S., Mourão, R.R., Thorson, E., & Tham, S.M. (2020). When do audiences verify? How perceptions about message and source influence audience verification of news headlines. Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 97 (1), 52 – 71.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Frenkel‐Brunswik, E. (1948). A study of prejudice in children. Human Relations, 1, 295 – 306.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Frenkel‐Brunswik, E. (1951). Personality theory and perception. In R.R. Blake & G.V. Ramsey (Eds.), Perception: An approach to personality (pp. 356 – 419). New York : Ronald Press ; doi: 10.1037/11505‐013.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Furnham, A., & Marks, J. (2013). Tolerance of ambiguity: A review of the recent literature. Psychology, 4 (9), 717 – 728.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> George, T., & Mielicki, M.K. (2023). Bullshit receptivity, problem solving, and metacognition: Simply the BS, not better than all the rest. Thinking and Reasoning, 29 (2), 213 – 249.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Gosling, S.D., Rentfrow, P.J., & Swann, W.B. (2003). A very brief measure of the Big‐Five personality domains. Journal of Research in Personality, 37 (6), 504 – 528 ; doi: 10.1016/S0092‐6566(03)00046‐1.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Grant, D.A., & Berg, E. (1948). A behavioral analysis of degree of reinforcement and ease of shifting to new responses in a Weigl‐type card‐sorting problem. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 38 (4), 404.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Guilford, J.P. (1967). The nature of human intelligence (vol. 5). New York : McGraw Hill.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Hirsh, J.B., DeYoung, C.G., Xu, X., & Peterson, J.B. (2010). Compassionate liberals and polite conservatives: Associations of agreeableness with political ideology and moral values. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36 (5), 655 – 664 ; doi: 10.1177/0146167210366854.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Hollander, B.A. (2018). Partisanship, individual differences, and news media exposure as predictors of conspiracy beliefs. Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 95 (3), 691 – 713.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ionescu, T. (2012). Exploring the nature of cognitive flexibility. New Ideas in Psychology, 30 (2), 190 – 200.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Jamieson, K.H., & Cappella, J.N. (2008). Echo chamber: Rush Limbaugh and the conservative media establishment. New York : Oxford University Press.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Jost, J.T. (2017). Ideological asymmetries and the essence of political psychology. Political Psychology, 38 (2), 167 – 208.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Jost, J.T., Federico, C.M., & Napier, J.L. (2009). Political ideology: Its structure, functions, and elective affinities. Annual Review of Psychology, 60, 307 – 337 ; doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163600.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Karwowski, M., Kowal, M., Groyecka‐Bernard, A., Białek, M., Lebuda, I., Sorokowska, A., & Sorokowski, P. (2020). When in danger, turn right: Does Covid‐19 threat promote social conservatism and right‐wing presidential candidates? Human Ethology, 35, 37 – 48 ; doi: 10.22330/he/35/037‐048.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Kenett, Y.N., Anaki, D., & Faust, M. (2014). Investigating the structure of semantic networks in low and high creative persons. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 407.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Kohn, P.M. (1974). Authoritarianism, rebelliousness, and their correlates among British undergraduates. British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 13, 245 – 255.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Kruger, J., & Dunning, D. (1999). Unskilled and unaware of it: How difficulties in recognizing one's incompetence lead to inflated self‐assessments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77 (6), 1121 – 1134 ; doi: 10.1037/0022‐3514.77.6.1121.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Lauriola, M., Foschi, R., Mosca, O., & Weller, J. (2016). Attitude toward ambiguity: Empirically robust factors in self‐report personality scales. Assessment, 23 (3), 353 – 373 ; doi: 10.1177/1073191115577188.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Lazer, D.M., Baum, M.A., Benkler, Y., Berinsky, A.J., Greenhill, K.M., Menczer, F., & Zittrain, J.L. (2018). The science of fake news. Science, 359 (6380), 1094 – 1096.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Levine, C. (2015). Forms: Whole, rhythm, hierarchy, network. Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Luchini, S., Kenett, Y.N., Zeitlen, D.C., Christensen, A.P., Ellis, D.M., Brewer, G.A., & Beaty, R.E. (2023). Convergent thinking and insight problem solving relate to semantic memory network structure. Thinking Skills and Creativity, 48, 101277.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> MacGregor, J.N., & Cunningham, J.B. (2008). Rebus puzzles as insight problems. Behavior Research Methods, 40 (1), 263 – 268 ; doi: 10.3758/BRM.40.1.263.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Martin, M.M., & Rubin, R.B. (1995). A new measure of cognitive flexibility. Psychological Reports, 76 (2), 623 – 626.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Metzger, M.J., & Flanagin, A.J. (2013). Credibility and trust of information in online environments: The use of cognitive heuristics. Journal of Pragmatics, 59, 210 – 220.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Miyake, A., & Friedman, N.P. (2012). The nature and organization of individual differences in executive functions: Four general conclusions. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 21 (1), 8 – 14 ; doi: 10.1177/0963721411429458.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Monsell, S. (2003). Task switching. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7 (3), 134 – 140.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> O'Connor, P. (1952). Ethnocentrism, intolerance of ambiguity, and abstract reasoning ability. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 47, 526 – 530.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Onraet, E., Van Hiel, A., Dhont, K., Hodson, G., Schittekatte, M., & De Pauw, S. (2015). The association of cognitive ability with right‐wing ideological attitudes and prejudice: A meta‐analytic review. European Journal of Personality, 29, 599 – 621 ; doi: 10.1002/per.2027.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Oreskes, N., & Conway, E.M. (2010). Merchants of doubt: How a handful of scientists obscured the truth on issues from tobacco smoke to global warming. London : Bloomsbury Press.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Pennycook, G., & Rand, D.G. (2019a). Lazy, not biased: Susceptibility to partisan fake news is better explained by lack of reasoning than by motivated reasoning. Cognition, 188, 39 – 50.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Pennycook, G., & Rand, D.G. (2019b). Who falls for fake news? The roles of bullshit receptivity, overclaiming, familiarity, and analytic thinking. Journal of Personality, 88, 185 – 200 ; doi: 10.1111/jopy.12476.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Pennycook, G., & Rand, D.G. (2021). The psychology of fake news. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 25, 388 – 402 ; doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2021.02.007.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Rigoni, D., Kühn, S., Gaudino, G., Sartori, G., & Brass, M. (2012). Reducing self‐control by weakening belief in free will. Consciousness and Cognition, 21 (3), 1482 – 1490 ; doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2012.04.004.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Robinson, J.P., Shaver, P.R., & Wrightsman, L.S. (Eds.). (1999). Measures of political attitudes. New York : Academic Press.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Rollwage, M., Zmigrod, L., de‐Wit, L., Dolan, R.J., & Fleming, S.M. (2019). What underlies political polarization? A manifesto for computational political psychology. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 23 (10), 820 – 822.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Rosen, L.D., Whaling, K., Carrier, L.M., Cheever, N.A., & Rokkum, J. (2013). The media and technology usage and attitudes scale: An empirical investigation. Computers in Human Behavior, 29 (6), 2501 – 2511.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ross Arguedas, A., Robertson, C.T., Fletcher, R., & Nielsen, R.K. (2022). Echo chambers, filter bubbles, and polarisation: A literature review. Reuters Institute, University of Oxford. Available from: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/echo‐chambers‐filter‐bubbles‐andpolarisation‐literature‐review?s=09 [last accessed 19 January 2022].</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Runco, M.A. (2004). Personal creativity and culture. In L. Sing, A.N.N. Hui, & G.C. Ng (Eds.), Creativity: When East meets West (pp. 9 – 21). Singapore : World Scientific.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Runco, M.A., & Acar, S. (2012). Divergent thinking as an indicator of creative potential. Creativity Research Journal, 24 (1), 66 – 75.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Saltor, J., Barberia, I., & Rodríguez‐Ferreiro, J. (2023). Thinking disposition, thinking style, and susceptibility to causal illusion predict fake news discriminability. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 37 (2), 360 – 368.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Salvi, C. (2023). Markers of insight. In L.J. Ball & F. Vallée‐Tourangeau (Eds.), The Routledge international handbook of creative cognition (pp. 475 – 490). London : Routledge.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Salvi, C., Costantini, G., Bricolo, E., Perugini, M., & Beeman, M. (2015). Validation of Italian rebus puzzles and compound remote associate problems. Behavior Research Methods, 48, 664 – 685 ; doi: 10.3758/s13428‐015‐0597‐9.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Salvi, C., Cristofori, I., Grafman, J., & Beeman, M. (2016). The politics of insight. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 69 (6), 1064 – 1072 ; doi: 10.1080/17470218.2015.1136338.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Salvi, C., Iannello, P., Cancer, A., Cooper, S.E., McClay, M., Dunsmoor, J.E., & Antonietti, A. (2023). Does social rigidity predict cognitive rigidity? Profiles of socio‐cognitive polarization. Psychological Research, 87 (8), 2533 – 2547 ; doi: 10.1007/s00426‐023‐01832‐w.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Salvi, C., Iannello, P., Cancer, A., MacClay, M., Rago, S., Dunsmoor, J.E., & Antonietti, A. (2021). Going viral: How fear, socio‐cognitive polarization and problem‐solving influence fake news detection and proliferation during COVID‐19 pandemic. Frontiers in Communication, 5, 1 – 16 ; doi: 10.3389/fcomm.2020.562588.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Shafto, P., Coley, J.D., & Vitkin, A. (2007). Availability in category‐based induction. In A. Feeney & E. Heit (Eds.), Inductive reasoning: Experimental, developmental, and computational approaches (pp. 114 – 136). Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Stanley Budner, N.Y. (1962). Intolerance of ambiguity as a personality variable. Journal of Personality, 30 (1), 29 – 50.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Todd Maddox, W., & Markman, A.B. (2010). The motivation–cognition interface in learning and decision making. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 19 (2), 106 – 110.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Tomkins, S. (1963). Left and right: A basic dimension of ideology and personality. In R.W. White (Ed.), The study of lives: Essays on personality in honor of Henry A. Murray (pp. 388 – 411). New York : Atherton Press.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> van der Veer, K., Ommundsen, R., Yakushko, O., Higler, L., Woelders, S., & Hagen, K.A. (2011). Psychometrically and qualitatively validating a cross‐national cumulative measure of fear‐based xenophobia. Quality & Quantity, 47, 1429 – 1444 ; doi: 10.1007/s11135‐011‐9599‐6.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Van Hiel, A., Onraet, E., Crowson, H.M., & Roets, A. (2016). The relationship between right‐wing attitudes and cognitive style: A comparison of self‐report and behavioural measures of rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity. European Journal of Personality, 30 (6), 523 – 531 ; doi: 10.1002/per.2082.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Vannoy, J.S. (1965). The generality of cognitive complexity‐simplicity as a personality construct. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2, 385 – 396.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Westen, D., Blagov, P.S., Harenski, K., Kilts, C., & Hamann, S. (2006). Neural bases of motivated reasoning: An fMRI study of emotional constraints on partisan political judgment in the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 18 (11), 1947 – 1958 ; doi: 10.1162/jocn.2006.18.11.1947.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Xing, Y., Zhang, J.Z., Storey, V.C., & Koohang, A. (2024). Diving into the divide: A systematic review of cognitive bias‐based polarization on social media. Journal of Enterprise Information Management, 37 (1), 259 – 287.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Zmigrod, L. (2020). The role of cognitive rigidity in political ideologies: Theory, evidence, and future directions. Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences, 34, 34 – 39 ; doi: 10.1016/j.cobeha.2019.10.016.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Zmigrod, L. (2022). Susceptibility to violent extremism and cognitive rigidity: Registered replication, corroboration and open questions for criminological research and practice. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 27 (2), 170 – 176.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Zmigrod, L., Burnell, R., & Hameleers, M. (2023). The misinformation receptivity framework: Political misinformation and disinformation as cognitive Bayesian inference problems. European Psychologist, 28 (3), 173.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Zmigrod, L., Rentfrow, P.J., & Robbins, T.W. (2018). Cognitive underpinnings of nationalistic ideology in the context of Brexit. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 115, E4532 – E4540 ; doi: 10.1073/pnas.1708960115.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Zmigrod, L., Rentfrow, P.J., & Robbins, T.W. (2020). The partisan mind: Is extreme political partisanship related to cognitive inflexibility? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 149 (3), 407 – 418 ; doi: 10.1037/xge0000661.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Zmigrod, L., Rentfrow, P.J., Zmigrod, S., & Robbins, T.W. (2019). Cognitive flexibility and religious disbelief. Psychological Research, 83 (8), 1749 – 1759 ; doi: 10.1007/s00426‐018‐1034‐3.</bibtext> </blist> </ref> <aug> <p>By Paola Iannello; Alice Cancer; Leor Zmigrod; Alessandro Antonietti and Carola Salvi</p> <p>Reported by Author; Author; Author; Author; Author</p> </aug> <nolink nlid="nl1" bibid="bib14" firstref="ref1"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl2" bibid="bib66" firstref="ref2"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl3" bibid="bib65" firstref="ref3"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl4" bibid="bib77" firstref="ref4"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl5" bibid="bib79" firstref="ref5"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl6" bibid="bib58" firstref="ref9"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl7" bibid="bib78" firstref="ref10"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl8" bibid="bib12" firstref="ref12"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl9" bibid="bib18" firstref="ref13"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl10" bibid="bib40" firstref="ref14"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl11" bibid="bib53" firstref="ref15"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl12" bibid="bib13" firstref="ref17"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl13" bibid="bib61" firstref="ref20"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl14" bibid="bib45" firstref="ref21"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl15" bibid="bib30" firstref="ref22"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl16" bibid="bib51" firstref="ref25"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl17" bibid="bib64" firstref="ref29"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl18" bibid="bib76" firstref="ref30"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl19" bibid="bib31" firstref="ref32"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl20" bibid="bib44" firstref="ref33"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl21" bibid="bib69" firstref="ref34"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl22" bibid="bib29" firstref="ref36"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl23" bibid="bib34" firstref="ref37"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl24" bibid="bib15" firstref="ref38"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl25" bibid="bib70" firstref="ref40"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl26" bibid="bib16" firstref="ref41"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl27" bibid="bib26" firstref="ref42"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl28" bibid="bib54" firstref="ref45"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl29" bibid="bib35" firstref="ref46"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl30" bibid="bib74" firstref="ref49"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl31" bibid="bib80" firstref="ref51"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl32" bibid="bib59" firstref="ref54"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl33" bibid="bib17" firstref="ref56"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl34" bibid="bib20" firstref="ref57"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl35" bibid="bib22" firstref="ref58"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl36" bibid="bib37" firstref="ref59"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl37" bibid="bib48" firstref="ref60"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl38" bibid="bib73" firstref="ref61"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl39" bibid="bib49" firstref="ref62"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl40" bibid="bib72" firstref="ref63"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl41" bibid="bib38" firstref="ref64"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl42" bibid="bib27" firstref="ref67"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl43" bibid="bib46" firstref="ref68"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl44" bibid="bib47" firstref="ref69"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl45" bibid="bib28" firstref="ref70"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl46" bibid="bib11" firstref="ref71"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl47" bibid="bib43" firstref="ref72"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl48" bibid="bib67" firstref="ref73"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl49" bibid="bib36" firstref="ref74"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl50" bibid="bib42" firstref="ref75"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl51" bibid="bib62" firstref="ref77"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl52" bibid="bib63" firstref="ref78"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl53" bibid="bib60" firstref="ref81"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl54" bibid="bib56" firstref="ref82"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl55" bibid="bib25" firstref="ref88"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl56" bibid="bib52" firstref="ref98"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl57" bibid="bib33" firstref="ref103"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl58" bibid="bib23" firstref="ref104"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl59" bibid="bib39" firstref="ref105"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl60" bibid="bib68" firstref="ref106"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl61" bibid="bib21" firstref="ref107"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl62" bibid="bib24" firstref="ref108"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl63" bibid="bib55" firstref="ref109"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl64" bibid="bib71" firstref="ref111"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl65" bibid="bib81" firstref="ref116"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl66" bibid="bib32" firstref="ref124"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl67" bibid="bib19" firstref="ref125"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl68" bibid="bib10" firstref="ref128"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl69" bibid="bib57" firstref="ref132"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl70" bibid="bib75" firstref="ref133"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl71" bibid="bib41" firstref="ref137"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl72" bibid="bib50" firstref="ref139"></nolink>
Header DbId: eric
DbLabel: ERIC
An: EJ1483135
AccessLevel: 3
PubType: Academic Journal
PubTypeId: academicJournal
PreciseRelevancyScore: 0
IllustrationInfo
Items – Name: Title
  Label: Title
  Group: Ti
  Data: Creative Minds in a Polarized World
– Name: Language
  Label: Language
  Group: Lang
  Data: English
– Name: Author
  Label: Authors
  Group: Au
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Paola+Iannello%22">Paola Iannello</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Alice+Cancer%22">Alice Cancer</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Leor+Zmigrod%22">Leor Zmigrod</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Alessandro+Antonietti%22">Alessandro Antonietti</searchLink> (ORCID <externalLink term="https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7212-8076">0000-0002-7212-8076</externalLink>)<br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Carola+Salvi%22">Carola Salvi</searchLink> (ORCID <externalLink term="https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9312-7649">0000-0001-9312-7649</externalLink>)
– Name: TitleSource
  Label: Source
  Group: Src
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="SO" term="%22Journal+of+Creative+Behavior%22"><i>Journal of Creative Behavior</i></searchLink>. 2025 59(3).
– Name: Avail
  Label: Availability
  Group: Avail
  Data: Wiley. Available from: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030. Tel: 800-835-6770; e-mail: cs-journals@wiley.com; Web site: https://www.wiley.com/en-us
– Name: PeerReviewed
  Label: Peer Reviewed
  Group: SrcInfo
  Data: Y
– Name: Pages
  Label: Page Count
  Group: Src
  Data: 4
– Name: DatePubCY
  Label: Publication Date
  Group: Date
  Data: 2025
– Name: TypeDocument
  Label: Document Type
  Group: TypDoc
  Data: Journal Articles<br />Reports - Evaluative
– Name: Subject
  Label: Descriptors
  Group: Su
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Creative+Thinking%22">Creative Thinking</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Cognitive+Processes%22">Cognitive Processes</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Logical+Thinking%22">Logical Thinking</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Models%22">Models</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Misinformation%22">Misinformation</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Critical+Thinking%22">Critical Thinking</searchLink>
– Name: DOI
  Label: DOI
  Group: ID
  Data: 10.1002/jocb.1509
– Name: ISSN
  Label: ISSN
  Group: ISSN
  Data: 0022-0175<br />2162-6057
– Name: Abstract
  Label: Abstract
  Group: Ab
  Data: In today's digital milieu, characterized by pervasive media exposure, the intricate interplay between individual differences and cognitive processes has garnered significant scholarly interest. A notable facet of this interrelation pertains to the nexus between cognitive flexibility and individuals' engagement with online information. Recognized as essential for creative cognition, cognitive flexibility encompasses various facets of human reasoning vital for adapting to new information and challenging entrenched perspectives. This review expands the traditional "out-of-the-box" thinking paradigm beyond creative cognition to encompass a comprehensive reasoning framework that questions entrenched viewpoints and fixed cognitive schemas. By analyzing recent scholarly discussions on fake news and polarization, we underscore the pivotal role of cognitive flexibility in guiding individuals' critical navigation of the digital information landscape, promoting nuanced and less polarized perspectives. Introducing the concept of Socio-Cognitive Polarization, we elucidate how individuals with differing ideological backgrounds can exhibit escalating cognitive divisions and absolutist tendencies. Leveraging insights from existing literature, we present methodological strategies for combating misinformation and nurturing critical thinking to counteract the detrimental impact of deceptive narratives on societal discourse. This scholarly exposition advances the understanding of the challenges associated with misinformation dissemination and offers empirically grounded approaches for enhancing critical cognition in the digital era.
– Name: AbstractInfo
  Label: Abstractor
  Group: Ab
  Data: As Provided
– Name: DateEntry
  Label: Entry Date
  Group: Date
  Data: 2025
– Name: AN
  Label: Accession Number
  Group: ID
  Data: EJ1483135
PLink https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=eric&AN=EJ1483135
RecordInfo BibRecord:
  BibEntity:
    Identifiers:
      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1002/jocb.1509
    Languages:
      – Text: English
    PhysicalDescription:
      Pagination:
        PageCount: 4
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Creative Thinking
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Cognitive Processes
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Logical Thinking
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Models
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Misinformation
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Critical Thinking
        Type: general
    Titles:
      – TitleFull: Creative Minds in a Polarized World
        Type: main
  BibRelationships:
    HasContributorRelationships:
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Paola Iannello
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Alice Cancer
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Leor Zmigrod
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Alessandro Antonietti
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Carola Salvi
    IsPartOfRelationships:
      – BibEntity:
          Dates:
            – D: 01
              M: 09
              Type: published
              Y: 2025
          Identifiers:
            – Type: issn-print
              Value: 0022-0175
            – Type: issn-electronic
              Value: 2162-6057
          Numbering:
            – Type: volume
              Value: 59
            – Type: issue
              Value: 3
          Titles:
            – TitleFull: Journal of Creative Behavior
              Type: main
ResultId 1