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Value Differences between Generations in China: A Study in Shanghai

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Title: Value Differences between Generations in China: A Study in Shanghai
Language: English
Authors: Sun, Jiaming, Wang, Xun
Source: Journal of Youth Studies. Feb 2010 13(1):65-81.
Availability: Routledge. Available from: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 325 Chestnut Street Suite 800, Philadelphia, PA 19106. Tel: 800-354-1420; Fax: 215-625-2940; Web site: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
Peer Reviewed: Y
Page Count: 17
Publication Date: 2010
Document Type: Journal Articles
Reports - Research
Education Level: Adult Education
Descriptors: Social Change, Foreign Countries, Values, Performance Factors, Social Differences, Cognitive Structures, Age Differences, Predictor Variables, Community Surveys, Culture Conflict, Attitude Measures, Youth
Geographic Terms: China (Shanghai)
DOI: 10.1080/13676260903173462
ISSN: 1367-6261
Abstract: The 1990 World Values Survey demonstrated that industrialization promotes a shift from traditional to secular-rational values. Drawing data from a sample survey of 2,350 respondents in Shanghai, this study examines the impact of social change on people's values in China. Specifically, we are interested in (1) are there significant differences in values between different generations in China? (2) Do younger generations tend to have more modern values? (3) What are the main factors that affect the differences? The results show that the younger generations in China have already shifted from traditional values to modern values in a recent social transformation process. In addition, the younger generations tend to be more secular. They are more likely to regard self-development as the most important thing in life rather than making contributions to the country and society. Further, the younger generations are more individualistic than the old generations. They are more likely to live according to their own lifestyles regardless of what others think. Thus, they are less likely to follow the traditional collective ideology. Overall, the study shows significant generational gaps in value orientations in China. (Contains 1 note, 4 tables, and 5 figures.)
Abstractor: As Provided
Number of References: 30
Entry Date: 2010
Accession Number: EJ871585
Database: ERIC
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  Value: <anid>AN0047307434;36h01feb.10;2019Feb13.16:29;v2.2.500</anid> <title id="AN0047307434-1">Value differences between generations in China: a study in Shanghai. </title> <p>The 1990 World Values Survey demonstrated that industrialization promotes a shift from traditional to secular-rational values. Drawing data from a sample survey of 2,350 respondents in Shanghai, this study examines the impact of social change on people's values in China. Specifically, we are interested in (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref1">1</reflink>) are there significant differences in values between different generations in China? (<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref2">2</reflink>) Do younger generations tend to have more modern values? (<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref3">3</reflink>) What are the main factors that affect the differences? The results show that the younger generations in China have already shifted from traditional values to modern values in a recent social transformation process. In addition, the younger generations tend to be more secular. They are more likely to regard self-development as the most important thing in life rather than making contributions to the country and society. Further, the younger generations are more individualistic than the old generations. They are more likely to live according to their own lifestyles regardless of what others think. Thus, they are less likely to follow the traditional collective ideology. Overall, the study shows significant generational gaps in value orientations in China.</p> <p>Keywords: generation; youth culture</p> <p>Economic development, political transformation, and cultural change often go together in a coherent and even, to some extent, predictable pattern. For example, Inglehart ([<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref4">16</reflink>]) argues that once a society has embarked on industrialization a whole syndrome of related changes, from mass mobilization to diminishing differences in gender roles, is likely to occur. His 1990 World Values Survey demonstrated that industrialization promotes a shift from traditional to secular-rational values (Inglehart and Baker [<reflink idref="bib17" id="ref5">17</reflink>]).</p> <p>Following the same research direction, this study examines the impact of economic, political and social change on people's values in China. Specifically, we are interested in (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref6">1</reflink>) whether there are significant differences in values between different generations in China, (<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref7">2</reflink>) whether younger generations tend to have more modern values, and (<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref8">3</reflink>) the main factors that affect the differences. Presumably, the modernization process now occurring in China will have an impact on people's values, and an examination of the values of different generations is one way to study the impact.</p> <hd id="AN0047307434-2">Background</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0047307434-3">Theoretical framework</hd> <p>This study is informed by literature on age, generation, and values change. Age is one of the most basic social categories of human existence. In almost all societies, age is a primary factor for assigning roles, granting prestige and power, and influencing the individual's attitudes and behaviour. Moreover, the relationship among various age groups has significant consequences for societal stability and change (Braungart and Braungart [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref9">5</reflink>]).</p> <p>The concept of generation refers to an aggregate of people differentiated from others by their age. Generally speaking, a generation is an actuality sharing a community of experience and feeling (Mannheim [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref10">20</reflink>]). Thus, different generations could be shaped by different social experiences in their formative years. Different generations might have different values due to both varied life courses and historical settings of formative socialization.</p> <p>The word 'values' denotes a principle or quality generally considered to be good, beautiful, valuable, or desirable.</p> <p>The ancient Greeks were well aware of the significance of age for understanding human behaviour and politics. To the Greeks, life was divided into different stages having unique characteristics and interests. Youth overdo everything, it was noted, and require the steady direction of their elders. Thus, relations between age groups are seldom harmonious, and this has important consequences for society and politics. In industrialization, discontinuity between child and adult statuses becomes even more apparent, and the implications of human development and generational placement increase in importance (Feuer [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref11">13</reflink>], Nash [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref12">21</reflink>], Esler [<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref13">12</reflink>]).</p> <p>It has been a tradition for sociologists to study value changes between generations. Comte (1853/[<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref14">7</reflink>]) noted early that the duration of human life plays an important part in social evolution, as one generation gives way to another. Mannheim ([<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref15">20</reflink>]) considered youth to be a critical stage in the development of political and social attitudes. Each generation, as it comes of age, experiences a fresh contact with traditional values and principles. When social change is rapid, traditional ways may disappear or become outdated. In addition, it is widely believed that one of the most common, indeed almost inevitable, tendencies of modernization is the erosion of respect for the aged, and the fostering of a youth culture in which old age is viewed not as a venerable state, but rather as a dreadful condition to be approached with reluctance, or even horror (Inkeles and Smith [<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref16">18</reflink>]).</p> <p>Fornas ([<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref17">14</reflink>]) observed that every person's fundamental world-view is determined by the experiences of youth, with members of the same generation linked throughout life by bonds of mutual understanding that set them apart from others. In contemporary research, however, the term 'generations' has special meanings and uses. Abramson and Inglehart ([<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref18">1</reflink>]) argue that because of the differences in the formative socialization experience of post-World War II generations, younger generations, particularly those in Western Europe, are increasingly postmaterialist and that there has been a significant shift towards new value priorities in the advanced democracies because of intergenerational population replacement.</p> <p>From a methodological perspective, there are two particularly relevant approaches to understand value differences between generations. One is the life-course approach, which explains different attitudes and values based largely on life-cycle interpretations of human behaviour. The assumptions of the life-course approaches are that as individuals grow older, they undergo certain qualitative changes in physiology, cognitive functioning, emotional patterns, and needs. These bio-psychological changes occur over the lifespan and are considered to be sequential, irreversible, and, for the most part, universal. Some sociologists believed that a generation was a time when a new group of individuals reaches maturity and influences the character of social and political institutions (Braungart and Braungart [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref19">5</reflink>]).</p> <p>Another approach is the generation approach, which suggests that a generation in the same historical period would become aware of its uniqueness and indicate similar values in terms of social and political change. This is true of the Great Depression generation and the 1960s generation in the USA. This generation approach takes a historical generation perspective on why people in different generations represent unique patterns of social and political behaviour that converge on the exposure or experience of historical events (Braungart [<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref20">3</reflink>]). For example, people born today will probably learn more about technology in their first 20 years than the their grandparents learned in a lifetime (Schusky and Culbert [<reflink idref="bib26" id="ref21">26</reflink>]).</p> <p>Both arguments enlighten us to the theoretical possibility that value changes in generation patterns could be explained by both the life-course approach and the generations approach. In reality, it seems difficult to determine accurately what events and factors have an important influence on people's values change. Some sociologists generally focus very much on how the biological reality of age is socially structured. Other sociologists recognize that generations are a product of the interaction of biological and social factors, and that both cross-generation comparison and cross-society comparison could be used to determine which factor, either biological or social, has more influence on values change (Weick [<reflink idref="bib29" id="ref22">29</reflink>], Braungart and Braungart [<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref23">4</reflink>], Saleebey [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref24">25</reflink>]).</p> <hd id="AN0047307434-4">Generations in China after 1949</hd> <p>There has been a growing interest in studying generations in China in recent years among scholars from various disciplines. Cheng and Dai ([<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref25">6</reflink>]) concluded that the intergenerational mobility pattern has reflected the changing state policies in economic development. Li ([<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref26">19</reflink>]) studied the emerging 'fifth generation' of Chinese political leaders and demonstrated both the intergenerational shared characteristics and the intragenerational diversities among those leaders. By investigating 774 Chinese and 784 US managers and professionals, Egri and Ralston ([<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref27">9</reflink>]) found that the three new Chinese generations since 1949 were significantly more open to change and self-enhancement and less conservative and self-transcendent than the Republican Era generation.</p> <p>A number of studies specifically focused on the change of values among Chinese youth. Wang found 'a collective inferiority complex among the Chinese younger generation in viewing the relative status of China and the USA and a resulting dislocation of their cultural identities, manifested as national nihilism and a magnified, empty patriotism' (2006, p. 238). Yu ([<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref28">30</reflink>]) concluded that Chinese college students showed awakened individualism, heightened self-awareness, and a stronger sense of independence. [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref29">2</reflink>] documented an overwhelming concern of individual well-being and a certain neglect of other people's interests (1998). However, it is important to note that those studies only focused on college students. Thus, there is a need to conduct comparative studies among different generations to show the true value changes over time.</p> <p>Nevertheless, it appears that there is no consensus about how to define generations in China. Some simply divide the population into two categories: the older generation and the younger generation (Orville and Jorgensen [<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref30">22</reflink>]). Others describe the younger generation as a 'Me' or 'Lost' generation (Elegant [<reflink idref="bib10" id="ref31">10</reflink>], Dundon [<reflink idref="bib8" id="ref32">8</reflink>]). Erickson (2009) categorized Chinese generations after 1949 as 'Boomers' (born from 1946 to 1960/64), 'Generation X' (born from 1961/65 to 1979), and 'Generation Y' (born from 1980 to 1995).</p> <p>Braungart and Braungart concluded that each generation 'comes into existence' within a particular and social movement, with shared experience to provide some commonality in outlook (1986). Rogler ([<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref33">23</reflink>]) argued that cataclysmic events impose a stronger imprint on a coming-of-age group than on other age groups living through the same historical period. Following the same direction, we argue that the Chinese can be grouped into four generations in relation to four particular social movements in China after 1949: 'the Great Leap Forward', 'the Cultural Revolution', 'the beginning of economic reform', and 'the societal transition'. These four movements all exerted dramatic impact on different generations. As young people grew up in each distinctive historical and cultural environment, their formative socialization was different from that of people from the previous historical and cultural environment. Younger and older generations would express different values and attitudes to life goals and meanings.</p> <p>The Great Leap Forward was a failed political, economic, and social campaign from 1958 to 1961 aimed at rapidly transforming China from a primarily agrarian society into an industrial society under communism. Nevertheless, the overall climate of idealism, collectivism, heroism, and enthusiasm of the period certainly affected the youth then.</p> <p>The Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976 was a period of nationwide political, social and economic upheaval and chaos. Indoctrinated with heroism and idealism, millions of Chinese youth joined the Red Guards to safeguard the communist path and its leader, Chairman Mao. They were told to sacrifice their youth, material comforts and family life for the welfare of the country (Hung <emph>et al</emph>. [<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref34">15</reflink>]).</p> <p>The year 1978 marked 'the beginning of economic reform' in China. Since then, China has entered a period of institutional shift and rapid social and cultural changes. The transition from the rigid, planned economic system to a market-based economic system ushered the society into a brand new era. A survey conducted by the Chinese Communist Youth League and the National Student Federation in the cities of Shenzhen and Zhuhai in Guandong Province reported that the top three choices for 1,780 students were (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref35">1</reflink>) to be a millionaire, (<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref36">2</reflink>) to be the boss of a multinational corporation, and (<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref37">3</reflink>) to be a provincial or municipal leader. It is argued that value in a material sense has become a key indicator of worth (Rosen [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref38">24</reflink>]).</p> <p>'The societal transition' period started in 1992. Since then, Chinese society has experienced a total transformation, including changes in the economic system, political atmosphere, education and health-care systems, mass communication, traditional culture and daily life. In addition to internal pressures, the global connectivity also accelerated this transformation process. The drastic transition seems have created a dislocation of the cultural identities of Chinese youth (Wang [<reflink idref="bib28" id="ref39">28</reflink>]).</p> <hd id="AN0047307434-5">Research model and hypotheses</hd> <p>Based on previous research, we developed a two-dimensional model to illustrate the traditional and modern value orientations (Figure 1). In this model, the dimension of collectivism/individualism represents a scale from strong collectivism to strong individualism. Individualist values include self-interest, self-development, rational behaviour, self-expression, and so on. Collectivist values are the opposite. The dimension of ideology orientation/secular orientation represents a scale from strong ideology orientation to strong secular orientation. Secular orientation values have some sort of materialist orientation, more pragmatic, less idealistic, looking for a better way of life, etc., while ideology orientation values are the opposite.</p> <p>Graph: Figure 1. Two-dimensional typology: modern values vs traditional values.</p> <p>Our research hypotheses (H) are as follows:</p> <p></p> <ulist> <item> 1. H1: The younger the generation, the more likely to adopt modern social values.</item> <p></p> <item> 2. H2: The younger the generation, the more likely to be individualistic rather than collectivistic.</item> <p></p> <item> 3. H3: The younger the generation, the more likely to be secular rather than ideological.</item> <p></p> <item> 4. H4: Generation is the most important factor in predicting value orientation.</item> </ulist> <hd id="AN0047307434-6">Methodology</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0047307434-7">Research site</hd> <p>The data are from the Generation Gap Survey in Shanghai, China (Sun [<reflink idref="bib27" id="ref40">27</reflink>]). The survey was the first and largest sociological investigation ever conducted regarding attitudes, and value changes by age groups in Shanghai, China. The survey was conducted in the early 1990s when Chinese society had already begun to undergo rapid social transition.</p> <p>As China's largest commercial city, Shanghai has experienced remarkable changes in both the economic and cultural arenas since 1979. Generally speaking, there are two driving forces behind the changing cultural landscape in Shanghai. One is a domestic force, which stems from the market economic reforms. The other is an external force, which comes from economic globalization and Western cultural penetration. These two powerful forces affected all aspects of local society and brought about a new outlook in the Shanghai urban cultural landscape and its people. Market-based economic activities have unleashed the latent capacity of Shanghai's productive forces and individuals' aspirations. Foreign direct investments, coupled with the forces of globalization, had a stronger impact on Shanghai than on almost any other city in China. Western products and lifestyle not only affected the local economy but also influenced local cultural life. Cultural diffusion has strengthened local awareness and, to some extent, the adoption of Western cultural values.</p> <hd id="AN0047307434-8">Sample</hd> <p>Shanghai had a population of around 12 million in the early 1990s. The 15–69 age group accounted for more than 70 per cent of the total population. We used this group as our target population from which to select the sample. The study population includes people from a wide variety of age ranges. We drew a convenience sample for this study. The key for this sampling was to select respondents from all age groups and social and occupational categories. A total of 2,350 questionnaires were sent out and 2,180 were returned, with a response rate of 92.7 per cent. After discarding some invalid responses, 2,000 cases were used in our analysis. The characteristics of the respondents are listed in Table 1.</p> <p>Table 1. Characteristics of respondents.</p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead valign="bottom"><tr><td /><td>Frequency</td><td>Percentage</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Age cohorts</td></tr><tr><td> 14–18 (transition period generation)</td><td char=".">244</td><td char=".">12.2</td></tr><tr><td> 19–34 (economic reform generation)</td><td char=".">933</td><td char=".">46.65</td></tr><tr><td> 35–50 (Cultural Revolution generation)</td><td char=".">550</td><td char=".">27.5</td></tr><tr><td> 51 over (Great Leap Forward generation)</td><td char=".">263</td><td char=".">13.15</td></tr><tr><td> Missing</td><td char=".">10</td><td char=".">0.5</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td char=".">2,000</td><td char=".">100</td></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>Education</td></tr><tr><td> Below primary education</td><td char=".">15</td><td char=".">0.75</td></tr><tr><td> Primary school</td><td char=".">45</td><td char=".">2.25</td></tr><tr><td> Junior high school</td><td char=".">271</td><td char=".">13.55</td></tr><tr><td> High school or vocational school</td><td char=".">780</td><td char=".">39</td></tr><tr><td> College or university</td><td char=".">806</td><td char=".">40.3</td></tr><tr><td> Graduate school (master's degree or PhD)</td><td char=".">83</td><td char=".">4.15</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td char=".">2,000</td><td char=".">100</td></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>Marital status</td></tr><tr><td> Single</td><td char=".">918</td><td char=".">45.9</td></tr><tr><td> Married</td><td char=".">1,063</td><td char=".">53.15</td></tr><tr><td> Other</td><td char=".">17</td><td char=".">0.85</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td char=".">2,000</td><td char=".">100</td></tr><tr><td /><td /><td /></tr><tr><td>Gender</td></tr><tr><td> Male</td><td char=".">1,185</td><td char=".">59.25</td></tr><tr><td> Female</td><td char=".">815</td><td char=".">40.75</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td char=".">2,000</td><td char=".">100</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <hd id="AN0047307434-9">Measurement</hd> <p>In this study, independent variables are generation group, educational level, gender, and marital status. We define four generations that correspond to four different historical periods of youth socialization in China since 1949: the first generation of the Great Leap Forward (age 51 over), the generation of the Cultural Revolution (age 35–50), the generation of 'the beginning of economic reform' (age 19–34), and the generation of 'the societal transition' (age 14–18).</p> <p>A cross-generation comparison is particularly useful in describing the characteristics of all age groups in the sample. The large sample covers generations of people who were born in the different historic periods in China. We use this comparison for several reasons. First, each generation experienced particular social and historical setting. Second, previous studies show that, in China in particular, there are significant differences in values by age groups. For example, according to the World Values Survey (Inglehart [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref41">16</reflink>]), the distance score between the young and the old age groups in China was 19 points while in the USA, Britain, South Korea, and India, the difference between the same groups was 2–4 points.</p> <p>The dependent variables are values orientations toward life and job, role model, and lifestyle. Twenty-three questions were asked in the study to measure overall value orientation; that is, collectivism versus individualism and ideology versus secular orientation. We used factor analysis to group the variables into the overall value dimensions; that is, collectivism versus individualism. The score loading on each question indicates the contribution of particular items to a dimension, which comes from the correlation coefficient for the specific item to the dimension.</p> <p>The individualism orientation that includes modern values such as self-interest, self-development, rational behaviour, and self-expression is indicated by positive scores on the individualism/collectivism dimension. Collectivism, on the other hand, is indicated by negative scores. The secular orientation that includes material orientation, more pragmatism, less idealism, and looking for a better way of life, is indicated by positive scores on the secular/ideology dimension, and ideology orientation is indicated by negative scores. In general, modern values are indicated by more positive scores on individualism and secularism Table 2.</p> <p>Table 2. Score-loading on modern values and traditional values.</p> <p> <ephtml> <table><tbody><tr><td /><td>Score-loading on items of individualism/collectivism</td></tr><tr><td /><td /></tr><tr><td>0.75</td><td>I always live in accordance with my own style, regardless of what others think.</td></tr><tr><td>0.64</td><td>Compared with working hours, I believe leisure time is far more significant to me.</td></tr><tr><td>0.60</td><td>Life is just like a dream, so one should enjoy one's life now.</td></tr><tr><td>0.51</td><td>One should pursue the latest fashions of dress and hairstyle.</td></tr><tr><td>0.25</td><td>A self-employed job is more attractive than that of state-owned enterprises.</td></tr><tr><td>0.22</td><td>At present, going abroad is your best choice.</td></tr><tr><td>−0.55</td><td>One should specialize, and love and focus on one's current job.</td></tr><tr><td>−0.56</td><td>One of the principles of Lei Feng, 'it is a pleasure to help others', should be further enhanced.</td></tr><tr><td>−0.71</td><td>One should love one's work unit as one's own home.</td></tr><tr><td>−0.90</td><td>National needs are always superior to personal needs in choosing a job.</td></tr><tr><td>−0.95</td><td>Some flaws exist in the system of 'Da Guo Fan',<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn1" /> but it's safer and steadier.</td></tr><tr><td /><td /></tr><tr><td /><td>Score-loading on items of secular-orientation/ideology-orientation</td></tr><tr><td /><td /></tr><tr><td>0.80</td><td>'Be able to make and spend money' is a modern lifestyle.</td></tr><tr><td>0.56</td><td>Divorce is a normal social phenomenon.</td></tr><tr><td>0.46</td><td>Unemployment is a normal social phenomenon.</td></tr><tr><td>0.26</td><td>It is worth taking a high-risk but high-pay job.</td></tr><tr><td>0.14</td><td>If I had a huge amount of money, I would do nothing but enjoy my life.</td></tr><tr><td>0.08</td><td>The range of personal income should be broadened.</td></tr><tr><td>0.04</td><td>Earning money is much more important than pursuing knowledge and education.</td></tr><tr><td>−0.06</td><td>Nowadays, with money, I can do and get whatever I want.</td></tr><tr><td>−0.16</td><td>Those who do heavy manual labour are inferior.</td></tr><tr><td>−0.34</td><td>It is more important to find a well-reputed job than to make more money.</td></tr><tr><td>−0.58</td><td>Happiness belongs to those who are always complacent.</td></tr><tr><td>−0.80</td><td>Principles such as hard work and supporting a family by thrift should be further developed.</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <p>On the basis of the factors scores and the distribution of 'strongly agree' on each item among the four generations, the distance between different generations was computed. The overall numbers represent value orientations of four different generations.</p> <hd id="AN0047307434-10">Results</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0047307434-11">Modern values and traditional values</hd> <p>Regarding modern values (individualism and secular orientation), the third generation (age 19–34) had the highest score while the first generation (age 51 and over) had the lowest score. The distance on modern values between them is 95.2 points. Regarding traditional values (collectivism and ideology orientation), the third generation had the lowest score while the first generation had the highest score. The distance of traditional values between them is 125.1 points. Obviously, the younger generation revealed strong modern values. Conversely, the older generation showed strong traditional values Table 3.</p> <p>Table 3. Scores on modern and traditional values between four generations.</p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead valign="bottom"><tr><td>Generations</td><td>Modern value score</td><td>Generations</td><td>Traditional value score</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>14–18</td><td char=".">133.38</td><td char=".">14–18</td><td char=".">139.10</td></tr><tr><td>19–34</td><td char=".">145.24</td><td char=".">19–34</td><td char=".">84.00</td></tr><tr><td>35–50</td><td char=".">92.10</td><td char=".">35–50</td><td char=".">135.24</td></tr><tr><td>51 and over</td><td char=".">50.02</td><td char=".">51 and over</td><td char=".">209.11</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <p>Contrary to what we expected, the fourth generation (ages 14–18) had a high score on traditional values compared with the third and the second generations. We argue this is because Chinese schools still teach students about traditional values and ideas. Therefore, the answers from this age group tend to be more traditional.</p> <hd id="AN0047307434-12">Core value differences across generations</hd> <p>In this section we report some interesting and important specific differences across generations regarding their values of life, work, role model, and lifestyle. We selected four of the most relevant questions out of 23 questions listed in Table 2. Two of the questions measure secular/ideological value orientation while the other two measure the orientation of individualism/collectivism.</p> <p>Figure 2 shows the different ratings among different generations in terms of 'the most important thing in your life'. It shows a clear relationship between generations and the rating of importance of 'self-development' and 'political life'.</p> <p>Graph: Figure 2. Different generations' views of the most important thing in life.</p> <p>The percentage of people rating 'self-development' as the most important thing in life is the highest (40.98 per cent) among the youngest (fourth) generation, followed by the third generation (39.98 per cent) and then the second generation (20.73 per cent). The oldest (first) generation's rating is the lowest (14.83 per cent). The slope from high (40.98 per cent) to low (14.83 per cent) is easily apparent. It shows that the younger generations tend to be more secular oriented than the older generations. The percentage of people rating 'political life' as the most important thing in life follows the opposite pattern. The first generation has the highest score (38.2 per cent) while the fourth generation has the lowest score (8.61 per cent). It shows that the older generations tend to be more ideology oriented.</p> <p>Figure 2 also shows some significant value differences in 'enjoyment' and 'intimate friend' between generations. A similar response across generations to the 'family' item suggests that family is generally regarded as the core in Chinese people's life. It indicates the persistent emphasis on family as a prevalent value in Chinese society.</p> <p>Figure 3 reveals the value differences between generations about the purpose of their jobs. We can see two clear contrasting trends. The younger generations tend to regard 'self-achievement' as the most important purpose of their job. In contrast, the older generations tend to regard 'making contribution to the country' as the most important purpose of work. It indicates that younger people have markedly less traditional ideology than older people. Figure 3 shows that 56.3 per cent of the respondents from the first generation regarded 'making contribution to the country' as the main purpose of job while only 18.7 per cent of respondents from the third generation chose the same answer. Again, the percentage of the respondents from the fourth generation who chose the same category is a bit higher than the third generation. This is largely due to the fact that most of them are still students in junior or senior high school and are more idealistic. Regarding the question on 'self-achievement', the two younger generations (40.6 per cent, 41.9 per cent) rated it more important than the older generations (21.64 per cent, 14.83 per cent). It further confirms our argument that younger generations tend to be more secular than older generation.</p> <p>Graph: Figure 3. Different generations' views of the most important purpose of a job.</p> <p>A question about 'Lei Feng's spirit' was asked in the survey to measure whether respondents were collectively or individually oriented. Lei Feng, a soldier who died doing his duty in the 1960s, was an idealistic figure promoted by the Chinese government during the Great Leap Forward. Lei Feng's spirit represents a strong collectivist value orientation. Figure 4 shows the answers to the question from different generations. Although most of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that Lei Feng's spirit should be enhanced, there are significant differences between generations. For instance, more than half of the first generation chose 'strongly agree' when answering the question (59.7 per cent). Similarly, 45 per cent of the respondents from the second generation made the same choice. However, only a quarter of the third generation made the same choice (25.6 per cent). The different opinions on this value by the various generations reveal a drastic value shift from one era to another.</p> <p>Graph: Figure 4. Different generations' views of the idea of helping others.</p> <p>Another measure was adopted to see whether younger generations are more likely to adopt an individualistic value orientation. Figure 5 shows the answers from different generations to the particular questions about whether someone should live according to his or her own style regardless of what others think. More than half of the fourth generation (54.5 per cent) strongly agreed with this question, followed by almost half of the third generation (48.2 per cent). The first generation was least likely to strongly agree (21.7 per cent), followed by the second generation (38 per cent). This illustrates that modern values are much more influential on the younger generations than they are on the older generations. It seems that the younger generations are more likely to adopt an individualistic value orientation. Interestingly, Figure 5 shows that, for the first generation, there is a narrow margin between the positive and negative answers to the question. It indicates the resocialization of the older generation that took place, and that some of them adopted many modern values and a modern lifestyle during the social transformation.</p> <p>Graph: Figure 5. Live according to your own style regardless of what others think.</p> <hd id="AN0047307434-13">Multiple regression analysis</hd> <p>Table 4 shows the results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis. The dependent variable in the regression model is respondents' values of 'self-development' (SELFDEVE). We feel that this is a general measure of respondents' value orientation. We argue that if respondents believe self-development is most important in their life, we may assume that they are more individualistic and secular. If respondents believe self-development is least important in their life, we may assume that they are more collectivistic and idealistic. The importance of 'self-development' is measured on a 5-point ordinal scale, with 1 being 'not important' and 5 being 'very important'. In this study, we treat this ordinal scale from 1 to 5 as a continuous variable.</p> <p>Table 4. OLS regression models of self-development.</p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead valign="bottom"><tr><td /><td>Model 1</td><td>Model 2</td><td>Model 3</td><td>Model 4</td><td>Model 5</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td /><td /><td /><td /><td /><td /></tr><tr><td>INTERCEPT</td><td char=".">3.48***</td><td char=".">4.16***</td><td char=".">4.68***</td><td char=".">4.99***</td><td char=".">4.67***</td></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.00)</td><td char=".">(0.00)</td><td char=".">(0.00)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>AGE</td><td char=".">−0.02***</td><td char="." /><td char=".">−0.02***</td><td char=".">−0.02***</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">−0.03***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(−0.31)</td><td char="." /><td char=".">(−0.29)</td><td char=".">(−0.29)</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>EDUC</td><td char=".">0.17***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.16)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>ATTI</td><td char=".">0.17***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.15)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>GENERATION 3</td><td char="." /><td char=".">0.01</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>GENERATION 2</td><td char="." /><td char=".">−0.38***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>GENERATION 1</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">−0.82***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>MAR</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">−0.07</td><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(−0.04)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>UNPRI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">−0.88***</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(−0.08)</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>PRI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">−0.91***</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(−0.14)</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>MID</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">−0.66***</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(−0.23)</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>HIGH</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">−0.41***</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(−0.2)</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>COL</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">−0.19</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(−0.09)</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>MALE</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.17</td></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>MALE_AGE</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.00</td></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>N</td><td char=".">1974</td><td char=".">1977</td><td char=".">1977</td><td char=".">1977</td><td char=".">1456</td></tr><tr><td>R2</td><td char=".">0.160</td><td char=".">0.091</td><td char=".">0.100</td><td char=".">0.139</td><td char=".">0.092</td></tr><tr><td>R2 ADJ</td><td char=".">0.159</td><td char=".">0.089</td><td char=".">0.099</td><td char=".">0.137</td><td char=".">0.091</td></tr><tr><td>Note: Numbers in parentheses are standardized estimates.</td></tr><tr><td>***<italic>p <</italic> 0.0001; **<italic>p <</italic> 0.001; *<italic>p <</italic> 0.01.</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <p>Several important independent variables are included in the model, such as age, education, marital status, gender, and general social attitudes. Respondents' average age is 32.9. Education level was recoded into six categories. 'Incompletion of primary school' was coded as 1 while 'Graduate school' was coded as 6. Attitude (ATTI) indicates people who 'often talk with their friends about big issues of social and politics', with a scale of 1 (never) to 4 (often).</p> <p>Model 1 in Table 4 shows the result of the multiple-regression model of 'self-development' in terms of respondents' age, education level, and social and political attitudes. The result is as follows:</p> <p>Graph</p> <p>This means that, controlling for AGE and ATTI, there is a 0.17 increase in the value of SELFDEVE for every 1-unit increase in education level. By controlling for EDUC and ATTI, there will be 0.02 decrease in the value of SELFDEVE for every 1-unit increase in age. By controlling for AGE and EDUC, there will be a 0.16 increase in the value of SELFDEVE for every 1-unit increase in attitude level. The standardized estimates (the numbers in parentheses) give us a more accurate message about the difference of three independent variables. It shows that AGE is a much stronger influence on SELFDEVE than are EDU and ATTI. The <emph>p</emph> value for those three variables is 0.0001, which indicates that the relationships between the independent and dependent variables are highly statistically significant.</p> <p>Model 2 in Table 4 addresses the question of whether the values of SELFDEVE are significantly different among the four generations, using generation 4 (age 14–18) as the omitted category. The data show that generation 3 (age 19–34) is most likely to consider 'self-development' as the most important thing in life (the average value is 4.17) followed by generation 4 (the average value is 4.16). However, the difference between these two generations is not statistically significant. It indicates that there is not much difference between generation 3 and generation 4 in terms of value orientation on 'self-development'. The data also show that both generation 2 (age 35–50) and generation 1 (age 51 and over) have significantly lower values of SELFDEVE. The overall score of generation 2 on the question is 3.78 and the score for generation 1 is 3.34. It means that both generations are less likely to consider 'self-development' as the most important thing in life. The <emph>p</emph> values indicate that generations 2 and 1 are statistically different from generation 4.</p> <p>Overall, the younger generations, generation 4 and generation 3, have similar values of SELFDEVE. In contrast, generation 2 and generation 1, the older generations, have values of SELFDEVE that are similar to each other and different from the younger generations.</p> <p>Model 3 examines the impact of marital status (unmarried as the omitted category) on value differences between generations. The results indicate that age has a significant effect on the value of SELFDEVE, but marital status does not.</p> <p>Model 4 shows the impact of education on values of SELFDEVE. Education is treated as a dummy variable with graduate school education (master's degree or PhD) as the omitted category. The effect of age in predicting the value of SELFDEVE is still significant. A 1-year increase in age results in a −0.02 decrease in the value of SELFDEVE no matter what a person's education level is.</p> <p>The regression coefficients of the five dummy variables of education (UNPRI = incompletion of primary school, PRI = primary school, MID = junior high school, HIGH = senior high school or technical school, COL = college or university) are listed in Table 4. The regression coefficients represent the values of SELFDEVE between different educational levels, using graduate education as the base. For example, the regression coefficient for high-school education level (−0.41) represents the difference between senior high school and graduate school on the value of SELFDEVE regardless of age. The regression coefficient of college education (−0.19) indicates the difference on the values of SELFDEVE between graduate education and college education, regardless of age.</p> <p>Most of the regression coefficients are statistically significant except for college education (COL). It means that, controlling for age, educational levels do have significant effects on people's value of SELFDEVE except when we compare people with a graduate education and people with a college education. The standardized estimate tells us which item is a stronger influence on the value of SELFDEVE. As shown in the model, age has the largest negative number (−0.29) followed by and middle school (−0.23) and high school (−0.2).</p> <p>Model 5 is a regression model of a dichotomous variable of gender (using female as omitted category), age, and their interaction term MALE_AGE. The equation is SELFDEVE = 4.67 + 0.17 MALE – 0.03 AGE + 0.001 MALE_AGE.</p> <p>The regression coefficient of MALE (0.17) represents the difference on the value of SELFDEVE between male and female (controlling for age). It shows that there is no statistically significant difference between males and females.</p> <hd id="AN0047307434-14">Conclusions</hd> <p>The analyses show that there are significant value differences across generations in China. Dramatic historical and social changes, especially the recent shift from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy in a globalizing era, have forced people's values to change in China. Those changes have been reflected in the changes of the values of different generations.</p> <p>Several important conclusions can be drawn from this study. First, the results undoubtedly support our hypotheses. It seems that the younger generations in China have already shifted from traditional values to modern values, largely due to their own life experiences in the recent social transformation process. In addition, the younger generations, particularly the third generation (ages 19–34), tend to be more secular. They are more likely to regard self-development as the most important thing in life, more important than making contributions to the country and to society. Further, the younger generations are more individualistic than are the old generations. They are more likely to live according to their own lifestyles regardless of what others think, and they are less likely to follow the traditional collective ideology. Overall, the study shows significant generational gaps in value orientations in China.</p> <p>In addition, from cultural and historical perspectives, this study shows cultural values change over time, particularly over different historical periods in China. The four major social events in modern Chinese history have had tremendous influence on the formation of culture values. From the Great Leap Forward to 'the societal transition', China has been undergoing a transition to a post-socialist society, which is much like the shift from agrarian society to industrial society completed many years ago in most advanced industrial societies. The critical point of this shift was linked to a major decline in the role of religious belief (Inglehart and Baker [<reflink idref="bib17" id="ref42">17</reflink>], p. 49). In the case of China, it is the ideal of communism that has declined and caused a change of values.</p> <p>Further, although Chinese society is moving towards post-socialism, some spiritual concerns and traditional beliefs have persisted, such as family values. All four generations agree that 'family is important in people's life.' 'Reaching high social status' may be another prevailing social value because all four generations have given identical answers.</p> <p>Finally, the similarities and differences between youth in China and the world seem apparent. On one hand, materialistic ideologies arose with secular orientation in post-industrial societies, 'Thus, the rise of post-industrial society leads to a growing emphasis on self-expression' (Inglehart [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref43">16</reflink>], pp. 105–106). It was shown that youth in China have a strong self-expression and secular orientation. On the other hand, too much materialism and a lack of spirituality might be a problem for Chinese youth. The data in the World Value Survey show that 'materialist values' in China rank the highest (51 point) of any country in the world. For example, average materialistic scores in the USA is 16, Japan 29, South Korea 46, Britain 20, and India only 40 (Inglehart 1998, p. 465).</p> <p>To sum up, it is clear that younger generations in China have become more individualistic and secular than older generations. Our research provided further evidences to support Inglehart's argument about value changes worldwide. In addition, our findings have been confirmed by many recent studies in both the academic and non-academic worlds (Egri and Ralston [<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref44">9</reflink>], Hung <emph>et al.</emph> 2007, Wang [<reflink idref="bib28" id="ref45">28</reflink>], Elegant [<reflink idref="bib10" id="ref46">10</reflink>], Erickson [<reflink idref="bib11" id="ref47">11</reflink>]).</p> <p>It is important to note that China has gone through drastic changes since we conducted our survey in the early 1990s. Naturally, the value orientations of different generations may have changed accordingly. 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  Data: Value Differences between Generations in China: A Study in Shanghai
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  Data: Routledge. Available from: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 325 Chestnut Street Suite 800, Philadelphia, PA 19106. Tel: 800-354-1420; Fax: 215-625-2940; Web site: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
– Name: PeerReviewed
  Label: Peer Reviewed
  Group: SrcInfo
  Data: Y
– Name: Pages
  Label: Page Count
  Group: Src
  Data: 17
– Name: DatePubCY
  Label: Publication Date
  Group: Date
  Data: 2010
– Name: TypeDocument
  Label: Document Type
  Group: TypDoc
  Data: Journal Articles<br />Reports - Research
– Name: Audience
  Label: Education Level
  Group: Audnce
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="EL" term="%22Adult+Education%22">Adult Education</searchLink>
– Name: Subject
  Label: Descriptors
  Group: Su
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Social+Change%22">Social Change</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Foreign+Countries%22">Foreign Countries</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Values%22">Values</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Performance+Factors%22">Performance Factors</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Social+Differences%22">Social Differences</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Cognitive+Structures%22">Cognitive Structures</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Age+Differences%22">Age Differences</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Predictor+Variables%22">Predictor Variables</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Community+Surveys%22">Community Surveys</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Culture+Conflict%22">Culture Conflict</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Attitude+Measures%22">Attitude Measures</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Youth%22">Youth</searchLink>
– Name: Subject
  Label: Geographic Terms
  Group: Su
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22China+%28Shanghai%29%22">China (Shanghai)</searchLink>
– Name: DOI
  Label: DOI
  Group: ID
  Data: 10.1080/13676260903173462
– Name: ISSN
  Label: ISSN
  Group: ISSN
  Data: 1367-6261
– Name: Abstract
  Label: Abstract
  Group: Ab
  Data: The 1990 World Values Survey demonstrated that industrialization promotes a shift from traditional to secular-rational values. Drawing data from a sample survey of 2,350 respondents in Shanghai, this study examines the impact of social change on people's values in China. Specifically, we are interested in (1) are there significant differences in values between different generations in China? (2) Do younger generations tend to have more modern values? (3) What are the main factors that affect the differences? The results show that the younger generations in China have already shifted from traditional values to modern values in a recent social transformation process. In addition, the younger generations tend to be more secular. They are more likely to regard self-development as the most important thing in life rather than making contributions to the country and society. Further, the younger generations are more individualistic than the old generations. They are more likely to live according to their own lifestyles regardless of what others think. Thus, they are less likely to follow the traditional collective ideology. Overall, the study shows significant generational gaps in value orientations in China. (Contains 1 note, 4 tables, and 5 figures.)
– Name: AbstractInfo
  Label: Abstractor
  Group: Ab
  Data: As Provided
– Name: Ref
  Label: Number of References
  Group: RefInfo
  Data: 30
– Name: DateEntry
  Label: Entry Date
  Group: Date
  Data: 2010
– Name: AN
  Label: Accession Number
  Group: ID
  Data: EJ871585
PLink https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=eric&AN=EJ871585
RecordInfo BibRecord:
  BibEntity:
    Identifiers:
      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1080/13676260903173462
    Languages:
      – Text: English
    PhysicalDescription:
      Pagination:
        PageCount: 17
        StartPage: 65
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Social Change
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Foreign Countries
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Values
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Performance Factors
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Social Differences
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Cognitive Structures
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Age Differences
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Predictor Variables
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Community Surveys
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Culture Conflict
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Attitude Measures
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Youth
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: China (Shanghai)
        Type: general
    Titles:
      – TitleFull: Value Differences between Generations in China: A Study in Shanghai
        Type: main
  BibRelationships:
    HasContributorRelationships:
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Sun, Jiaming
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Wang, Xun
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            – D: 01
              M: 02
              Type: published
              Y: 2010
          Identifiers:
            – Type: issn-print
              Value: 1367-6261
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              Value: 1
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            – TitleFull: Journal of Youth Studies
              Type: main
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