The Effect of Mortality Salience on Implicit Bias
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| Title: | The Effect of Mortality Salience on Implicit Bias |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Authors: | Bradley, Kristopher I., Kennison, Shelia M., Burke, Amanda L. |
| Source: | Death Studies. 2012 36(9):819-831. |
| Availability: | Routledge. Available from: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 325 Chestnut Street Suite 800, Philadelphia, PA 19106. Tel: 800-354-1420; Fax: 215-625-2940; Web site: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals |
| Peer Reviewed: | Y |
| Physical Description: | |
| Page Count: | 13 |
| Publication Date: | 2012 |
| Document Type: | Journal Articles Reports - Research |
| Descriptors: | Association Measures, Cultural Differences, Moral Values, Essays, Comparative Analysis, Death, Racial Differences, Bias, African Americans, Whites, Correlation, Negative Attitudes, Social Bias, Attitude Measures |
| DOI: | 10.1080/07481187.2011.605987 |
| ISSN: | 0748-1187 |
| Abstract: | Previous research in terror management theory has shown that when individuals are reminded of their mortality, negative evaluations of out-group members increase. This previous research has used a variety of methods to investigate the change in attitudes toward out-group members. These methods generally permit participants time to consciously reflect during responding. In the present study, the authors hypothesized that reminding individuals of their mortality would increase implicit bias toward out-group members when measured with the Implicit Association Test (IAT). In the experiment, White participants were randomly assigned to complete a written essay about imagining their own death (i.e., mortality salience condition) or an essay regarding an upcoming exam (i.e., control condition), and then participants completed an evaluative IAT. The results revealed that participants who had been reminded of their mortality took longer to associate names of Black individuals with positive words when compared to a control group. The implications of these findings are considered. (Contains 1 figure.) |
| Abstractor: | As Provided |
| Number of References: | 39 |
| Entry Date: | 2012 |
| Accession Number: | EJ977715 |
| Database: | ERIC |
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| FullText | Links: – Type: pdflink Url: https://content.ebscohost.com/cds/retrieve?content=AQICAHj0k_4E0hTGH8RJwT4gCJyBsGNe_WN95AvKlDbXJGqwxwG_7Ec_G1oR6sDdbI4pwvfcAAAA4jCB3wYJKoZIhvcNAQcGoIHRMIHOAgEAMIHIBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHgYJYIZIAWUDBAEuMBEEDM1L-KJ87HzToPtDKwIBEICBmvpADEC4bBNelmkt6J5jQuddU3lRauKhdqPra-ZKsCMMWXgfyrzrjidDQJzjFORXjQYxo4DLfcYTFWx6YCJJvUEfqzujkQda-s7jAqhOi9gsM7rXbzqUgEtpb92GfFHohh9PtjsoSEXAX9sT9sJ7OfP7rH0YkDuzkKK3Zei_EBOwoocy0Zg2-e6vyyWiQPedy_6uC_o0n8bq23k= Text: Availability: 1 Value: <anid>AN0079469638;dea01oct.12;2019Mar30.06:29;v2.2.500</anid> <title id="AN0079469638-1">The Effect of Mortality Salience on Implicit Bias. </title> <p>Previous research in terror management theory has shown that when individuals are reminded of their mortality, negative evaluations of out-group members increase. This previous research has used a variety of methods to investigate the change in attitudes toward out-group members. These methods generally permit participants time to consciously reflect during responding. In the present study, the authors hypothesized that reminding individuals of their mortality would increase implicit bias toward out-group members when measured with the Implicit Association Test (IAT). In the experiment, White participants were randomly assigned to complete a written essay about imagining their own death (i.e., mortality salience condition) or an essay regarding an upcoming exam (i.e., control condition), and then participants completed an evaluative IAT. The results revealed that participants who had been reminded of their mortality took longer to associate names of Black individuals with positive words when compared to a control group. The implications of these findings are considered.</p> <p>In the last 20 years, a growing body of research has shown that reminding individuals of their mortality increases negative evaluations of out-group members (Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, &amp; Sacchi, [<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref1">9</reflink>]; Greenberg et al., [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref2">21</reflink>]; Nelson, Moore, Olivetti, &amp; Scott, [<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref3">19</reflink>]). These results provide support for terror management theory (TMT; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, &amp; Solomon, [<reflink idref="bib17" id="ref4">17</reflink>]; Solomon, Greenberg, &amp; Pyszczynski, [<reflink idref="bib39" id="ref5">39</reflink>]), which states that culture is the basis for which an individual obtains self-esteem and possible immortality. According to TMT, when individuals are reminded of their mortality they react in several ways to keep their self-esteem and their potential immortality intact. One way is to increase liking of similar others and to increase hostility toward dissimilar others. Prior studies investigating the effects mortality reminders on intergroup bias have typically used tasks that require conscious reflection. The present research investigated the possibility that reminders of mortality would also increase intergroup bias on a measure specifically designed to measure implicit attitudes such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, &amp; Schwartz, [<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref6">22</reflink>]).</p> <p>TMT is based on the writings of cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker (Becker, [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref7">5</reflink>]). Becker wrote that like all other animals, humans have a self-preservation instinct. Humans are unique though because they have the cognitive abilities to think about the future. This allows humans to imagine their own inevitable death. According to Becker, the realization that life could end at any moment causes a deep ever-present anxiety. TMT researchers have experimentally explored the concept that to alleviate this anxiety individuals invest in a cultural worldview (Greenberg, Solomon, &amp; Pyszczynski, [<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref8">19</reflink>]). These shared conceptions of reality provide an individual with an ordered meaningful universe. By meeting the standards of the worldview an individual obtains self-esteem. Self-esteem buffers the anxiety of eventual death by providing the individual with a sense of immortality whether it is literal in the form of a religious afterlife or symbolic in the form of contributing to a meaningful culture that will transcend the individual's lifetime.</p> <p>According to TMT, an issue with cultural worldviews is that they cannot be proven to be true because they are subjective by nature. The subjective nature of a cultural worldview can be bolstered by social consensus and then the cultural worldview can be used to promote self-esteem. Unfortunately, by strongly investing in a cultural worldview to obtain self-esteem and possible immortality, it is also necessary to believe that other cultural worldviews are inherently flawed. The existence of other cultural worldviews threatens the validity of the individual's worldview and consequently their self-esteem and immortality (Greenberg et al., [<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref9">19</reflink>]).</p> <p>To test this theory, TMT researchers reminded individuals of their mortality. This is referred to as <emph>mortality salience</emph> (MS; Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, &amp; Lyon, 1989). In the majority of TMT experiments individuals are reminded of their mortality by responding to two open-ended questions regarding the individuals' thoughts and emotions regarding their own mortality. Because cultural worldviews provide self-esteem and a buffer from death-related thoughts, reminders of mortality cause individuals to strongly cling to their worldview. Individuals that have been reminded of their mortality are more likely to defend their worldview by increasing liking for similar others and increasing hostility toward dissimilar others (Castano et al., [<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref10">9</reflink>]; Greenberg et al., [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref11">21</reflink>]; Nelson et al., [<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref12">19</reflink>]).</p> <p>Although there have been over 300 articles published that show individuals' attitudes and behaviors change after being reminded of mortality, one of the strongest effects of MS is an increase in intergroup bias. After an MS manipulation, White participants were more likely to sympathize with a White racist, and they also gave a shorter prison sentence to a White employer guilty of discrimination against a Black man (Greenberg, Schimel, Martens, Solomon, &amp; Pyszcznyski, [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref13">20</reflink>]). After an MS manipulation, Christians viewed Christians more positively than Jews and they viewed Jews more unfavorably than in a control condition. Participants also evaluated pro-American essays more favorably and anti-American essays more unfavorably after MS (Greenberg et al., [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref14">21</reflink>]). Participants were more likely to blame a Japanese car maker than an American car maker for a vehicle crash after the MS condition and were more likely to blame the company if it was a Japanese company than they were to blame the driver (Nelson et al., [<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref15">19</reflink>]). After MS, Italians were more likely to have a negative view of Germans (Castano et al., [<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref16">9</reflink>]); men were less receptive to pro-women courses at a university (Fritsche &amp; Jonas, [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref17">16</reflink>]); younger people were more likely to distance themselves from older people (Martens, Greenberg, Schimel, &amp; Landau, [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref18">25</reflink>]); and participants were more likely to show bias in a minimal group setting (Harmon-Jones, Greenberg, Solomon, &amp; Simon, [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref19">24</reflink>]). After MS, Iranian participants were more supportive of suicide bombers that attack the United States and American participants that identified themselves as politically conservative were more supportive of attacks that could kill thousands of innocent civilians in foreign countries if the attack resulted in the capture or death of Osama bin Laden (Pyszczynski et al., [<reflink idref="bib32" id="ref20">32</reflink>]).</p> <p>Several TMT studies have relied on technically explicit measures to investigate intergroup bias. Explicit measurements of intergroup bias include asking the participant to respond to a direct question. In previous intergroup bias TMT studies, participants are usually reminded of their mortality and then the participants are asked to rate an out-group target. For instance, in Greenberg et al. ([<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref21">21</reflink>]), Christian participants were reminded of their mortality and asked to read a profile of a Jewish person. They were then asked to respond to questions about the Jewish person's intelligence and if they would enjoy working with the Jewish person. Although these questions are indirect and subtle they do give the participant the opportunity to make a controlled and deliberate decision that could be altered due to social desirability and demand characteristic effects (Fazio &amp; Olson, [<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref22">15</reflink>]).</p> <p>Although the majority of TMT experiments have used explicit measurements for the dependent variable, MS also affects tasks that could be considered implicit in nature. For example, several TMT experiments have shown that after MS, individuals are more likely to complete a word stem fragment with a death-related word more often than a neutral word (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, &amp; Breus, [<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref23">18</reflink>]; Mikulincer &amp; Florian, [<reflink idref="bib27" id="ref24">27</reflink>]). As an example, individuals in the MS condition are more likely to complete the word fragment coff_ _ as "coffin" while individuals that have not been reminded of their mortality are more likely to complete the fragment with "coffee." Similarly, after reading a worldview threatening essay participants had quicker response latencies for death-related words (Schimel, Hayes, Williams, &amp; Jahrig, [<reflink idref="bib37" id="ref25">37</reflink>]). The combination of MS influencing explicit and subconscious attitudes predicts that MS would increase bias on a task specifically designed to measure implicit intergroup bias such as the IAT (Greenwald et al., [<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref26">22</reflink>]).</p> <p>Implicit bias is the most challenging form of bias, as affected individuals may be unaware of its existence. Although there are differences of opinion in what constitutes implicit (De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, &amp; Moors, [<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref27">14</reflink>]; Fazio &amp; Olson, [<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref28">15</reflink>]), for the purposes of this research, implicit should be understood as automatic or spontaneous responses that does not allow the participant time for introspection. One of the most widely used measures of implicit bias is the IAT (Greenwald et al., [<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref29">22</reflink>]). The IAT measures automatic associations. For example, individuals have been shown to associate "flower" and "pleasant" quicker than they can associate "insect" and "pleasant." In Greenwald et al., White participants can associate a name generally considered to be White with a pleasant word faster than they can associate a Black name with a pleasant word because there is a stronger associate strength between White and pleasant than there is with Black and pleasant (Greenwald et al., [<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref30">22</reflink>]). In other words, participants have faster response times to compatible pairings (White + positive/Black + negative) than incompatible pairings (Black + positive/White + negative). This difference in response time has been interpreted as participants having an implicit bias for compatible pairings. This implicit preference for White over Black has been subsequently replicated in several IAT publications (Baron &amp; Banaji, [<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref31">3</reflink>]; Cunningham, Preacher, &amp; Banaji, [<reflink idref="bib10" id="ref32">10</reflink>]; Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald, &amp; Banaji, [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref33">13</reflink>]; McConnell &amp; Leibold, [<reflink idref="bib26" id="ref34">26</reflink>]; Nosek, Banaji, &amp; Greenwald, [<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref35">30</reflink>]; Smith-McLallen, Johnson, Dovidio, &amp; Pearson, [<reflink idref="bib38" id="ref36">38</reflink>]).</p> <p>Given that MS increases intergroup bias on explicit measures and that it affects implicit attitudes such as death thought accessibility, it is predicted that MS should increase intergroup bias on a race IAT. This is important for several reasons. It would further understanding of the effects of MS. It is also important because of the ability of the IAT to predict intergroup behavior. In a meta-analysis it was shown that IAT had a stronger predictive validity on socially sensitive areas, especially in the area of intergroup bias when compared to explicit measures (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, &amp; Banaji, [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref37">23</reflink>]). Also if MS does increase bias on a race IAT it is possible that MS would increase bias on similar tasks such as weapon bias tasks, which show that individuals are more likely to associate guns with Black individuals (Payne, [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref38">31</reflink>]).</p> <p>In the present article, we report the results of a TMT experiment in which participants were randomly assigned either to perform an MS task or a control task before completing the IAT. In the IAT, participants responded to positive and negative words and names that are typically thought of as Black or White. It was predicted that because MS has profound effects on explicit measurements of intergroup bias, there may also be an increase in intergroup bias in a methodology specifically designed to measure implicit intergroup attitudes.</p> <hd id="AN0079469638-2">Method</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0079469638-3">Participants</hd> <p>We tested 82 participants (53 women and 29 men) who were enrolled in social science courses at a large mid-western university. All participants were naïve to the purpose of the study and received course credit for their participation.</p> <hd id="AN0079469638-4">Materials and Procedure</hd> <p>Participants first completed a survey in which they answered demographic questions. Participants in the MS group then responded to two open-ended questions: "Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you," and "Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you physically die and once you are physically dead" (Rosenblatt et al., [<reflink idref="bib35" id="ref39">35</reflink>]). Participants in the control group were asked to respond to questions regarding their next important exam.</p> <p>Participants were then seated at the computer and instructed to read the directions for the IAT which were displayed on the screen. This IAT was conducted using Inquisit software. The instructions stated that they would be involved in several word sorting tasks. A word or a name would appear in the middle of the screen and their task was to sort the word or name to its appropriate category as quickly as possible. The category labels appeared in the top left or top right side of the screen. The participants were instructed to sort the word or name to the category on the left side of the screen by pressing the "D" key and to sort the word or the name to the category on the right side of the screen by pressing the "K" key. The four possible categories were positive (e.g., Love, Cheer, Pleasure, Gentle, Gift, Honor), Negative (e.g., Crash, Filth, Grief, Evil, Rotten, Vomit), White (e.g., Harry, Alan, Justin, Ryan, Andrew, Jonathan), and Black (e.g., Leroy, Darnell, Tyree, Deion, Malik, Tyrone). These words and names were selected from Greenwald et al. ([<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref40">22</reflink>]), which have been used in numerous IAT experiments.</p> <p>This evaluative IAT contained seven blocks. Each block consisted of 48 trials. In Block 1, participants sorted the positive and negative words; and in Block 2, participants sorted the White and Black names. Blocks 3 and 4 combined the categories. To illustrate, on one side of the screen, the combined categories were "White" and "Positive" and on the other side of the screen the categories were "Black" and "Negative" which are referred to as compatible word pairs. In Block 5 participants sorted only Black and White names again, but during this Block the categories in the upper left and right side of the screen switched sides. In Blocks 6 and 7, "White" and "Negative" were combined on one side of the screen and "Black" and "Positive" were combined on the other side of the screen. This combination is referred to as incompatible judgment pairs. Half of the participants saw Blocks 3 and 4 first (compatible judgment pairs) and half of the participants saw Blocks 6 and 7 (incompatible judgment pairs) first.</p> <hd id="AN0079469638-5">Results</hd> <p>Responses from five African-American participants were excluded from the data analysis. Given that we were looking at implicit bias against Black individuals only data from White participants was analyzed which left 77 participants with an average age of 20.01. Responses from two participants were excluded because they did not follow instructions. Data from 75 remaining participants were analyzed. As with previous IAT experiments, a log transformation was conducted on the response latencies. Response latencies below 300 were recoded to 300. Response latencies above 3000 were recoded to 3000 (Greenwald et al., [<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref41">22</reflink>]). These results are displayed in Figure 1. A 2 (MS vs. Control) × 2 (Compatible Judgment Pairs vs. Incompatible Judgment Pairs) mixed analysis of variance revealed a significant interaction in response times between the MS and control groups, <emph>F</emph>(<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref42">2</reflink>, 73) = 5.77, <emph>p</emph> = .02, η<sups><emph>2</emph></sups> = .69. As predicted, additional analysis showed that response time with the incompatible judgment pairs (Black + positive/White + negative) was greater in the MS condition than in the control condition<emph>, F</emph>(<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref43">1</reflink>,<reflink idref="bib74" id="ref44">74</reflink>) = 4.12, <emph>p</emph> &lt; .05, η<sups><emph>2</emph></sups> = .05. Mean response times for the compatible judgment pairs were not significantly different between the control group and the MS group, <emph>F</emph> &lt; 1.</p> <p>Graph: FIGURE 1 Mean reaction time by condition in the experiment.</p> <p>Follow-up analysis showed that participants in the control group had a significantly longer response times for incompatible pairings (<emph>M</emph> = 913.83 milliseconds) than in the compatible pairings (<emph>M</emph> = 739.59 milliseconds), <emph>F</emph>(<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref45">1</reflink>, 37) = 44.26, <emph>p</emph> &lt; .001, η<sups><emph>2</emph></sups> = .55, replicating previous IAT experiments (Greenwald et al., [<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref46">22</reflink>]). Participants in the MS group had a significantly longer response time for incompatible pairings (<emph>M</emph> = 1020.72 milliseconds) than in the compatible pairings (<emph>M</emph> = 749.92 milliseconds), <emph>F</emph>(<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref47">1</reflink>, 36) = 78.31, <emph>p</emph> &lt; .001, η<sups><emph>2</emph></sups> = .69.</p> <hd id="AN0079469638-6">General Discussion</hd> <p>Previous TMT studies have shown that after MS hostility toward dissimilar others increases (Castano et al., [<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref48">9</reflink>]; Greenberg et al., [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref49">21</reflink>]; Nelson et al., [<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref50">19</reflink>]). The present results demonstrated that reminders of mortality can increase intergroup bias using a measurement specifically designed to detect implicit attitudes. These results suggest that after being reminded of mortality, individuals will show increased prejudice in tasks that require quick and spontaneous decisions. This increase in intergroup bias may be at a level that the individual is possibly not aware of and consequently cannot control. Present findings provide more evidence that MS causes an increase in intergroup bias when measured by the IAT. Participants in the MS condition had longer response times to incompatible pairings (Black + positive/White + negative) than participants in the control condition suggesting that participants in the MS condition showed an increase in implicit bias.</p> <p>One limitation of the IAT that has been discussed is whether the IAT measures intergroup bias or mere familiarity (Dasgupta, Greenwald, &amp; Banaji, [<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref51">12</reflink>]). This does not present a major issue for the present research. The present research shows that MS causes an increase in the incompatible pairings. Given the numerous previous TMT experiments that have shown that MS increases intergroup bias, it makes sense that MS is causing an increase in intergroup bias and not a decrease in the familiarity of names for Black individuals.</p> <p>One of the more troubling aspects of these results is the implications that the combination of mortality reminders and implicit bias could have on everyday behavior. Several IAT experiments have shown that high implicit bias reflects in social interactions and behavior (Amodio &amp; Devine, [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref52">1</reflink>]; Rudman &amp; Ashmore, [<reflink idref="bib36" id="ref53">36</reflink>]; McConnell &amp; Leibold, [<reflink idref="bib26" id="ref54">26</reflink>]). Previous experiments have shown that participants who demonstrate implicit bias on an IAT are more likely to expect a Black partner to score lower on academic tests and to sit farther away from the Black partner (Amodio &amp; Devine, [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref55">1</reflink>]). Participants with implicit bias have also self-reported that they make ethnically offensive jokes and comments, exclude individuals from social gatherings because of their ethnicity, engage in nonverbal hostility toward other ethnicities, and even engage in physically attacking individuals and their property because of their ethnicity. They were also more likely to cut budgets for out-group student organizations (Rudman &amp; Ashmore, [<reflink idref="bib36" id="ref56">36</reflink>]). In addition, participants were also more likely to exhibit negative social behavior during conversation with a Black individual if the participant had demonstrated implicit bias on the IAT (McConnell &amp; Leibold, [<reflink idref="bib26" id="ref57">26</reflink>]).</p> <p>Past IAT experiments have suggested that when an individual shows bias on an IAT it can reflect in their behavior. Previous TMT research has shown that the MS induction does not necessarily need to be a response to an essay question. The use of subliminal death primes (Arndt, Allen, &amp; Greenberg, [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref58">2</reflink>]), watching fatal accident footage (Nelson et al., [<reflink idref="bib28" id="ref59">28</reflink>]), responding to questions next to a funeral home (Pyszczynski et al., [<reflink idref="bib33" id="ref60">33</reflink>]), and reading about terrorist attacks (Das, Bushman, Bezemer, Kerkhof, &amp; Vermeulen, [<reflink idref="bib11" id="ref61">11</reflink>]) can have effects that are similar to responding to MS essays. Because we are reminded of death more frequently than we realize and the present research shows that it can change our implicit racial attitudes, the question becomes are there behavioral repercussions? When an individual is faced with a quick decision and thoughts of mortality are high, will the individual respond in a more racially biased fashion? This could be an important line of future research.</p> <p>The results may also illuminate how individuals may respond in a seemingly racially biased way in circumstances in which time is a factor and thoughts of death are high. For example, in recent years, there have been a series of controversial shootings by police officers that have resulted in the deaths of unarmed Black men such as Sean Bell, Amadou Diallo, and Oscar Grant (Rashbaum &amp; Baker, [<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref62">34</reflink>]; Barry &amp; Waldman, [<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref63">4</reflink>]; Bulwa, Buchanan, &amp; Yi, [<reflink idref="bib8" id="ref64">8</reflink>]). These quick, split-second decisions may be automatic in nature and are not under the complete control of the actor. Police officers and soldiers are among many who are often required to make split-second decisions about who is carrying a weapon and who is not while thoughts of mortality are present. In fact, one of the officers in the Diallo shooting remarked that he was afraid for his life. An officer at the Grant incident said that Mehserle said that Grant was "going for a gun" (Bulwa, [<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref65">7</reflink>]). Previous studies have shown that when a person has to make a quick decision on whether or not something is a weapon, the color of the person can influence the judgment, which is referred to as <emph>weapon bias</emph> (Payne, [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref66">31</reflink>]). The present research suggests that when one is reminded of death out-group bias can be increased in such a way that it affects implicit bias. This increase could help explain the tragic deaths of Bell, Diallo, Grant, and countless others. Preliminary research has been conducted that shows MS can influence responses on a weapon bias task (Bradley &amp; Kennison, 2012).</p> <p>In addition to police officers, soldiers may also be susceptible to implicit bias following death reminders. Indeed, soldiers exist in a world where threats of mortality are high. Because people dislike perceived out-groups even more when reminders of mortality are high, it is possible that innocent civilians could be accidently killed in situations similar to Diallo, Bell, and Grant. Also of note would be returning soldiers. Do they carry around the reminders of mortality with them every day? It is possible returning soldiers have higher death thought accessibility (Schimel et al., [<reflink idref="bib37" id="ref67">37</reflink>]) than the average individual. Would they be more likely to act in seemingly prejudiced ways because of a possibly higher death thought accessibility than the average person? Would they be more likely to vigorously defend their worldview in comparison to a civilian? These are interesting questions for future research that are currently being investigated by the authors.</p> <p>Future research may also further investigate ways to minimize the intergroup bias effects of MS especially for people that are in situations that call for quick decisions when threats of mortality are high. Studies have shown that the negative effects of MS can be decreased in an experimental setting (for a review, see Niesta, Fritsche, &amp; Jonas, [<reflink idref="bib29" id="ref68">29</reflink>]). Future directions could work to further disseminate the effects of MS and implicit attitudes to the general public. Future directions could also investigate ways to train special populations such as police officers and soldiers about the effects of MS and ways to possibly control these effects in real life settings.</p> <hd id="AN0079469638-7">Acknowledgments</hd> <p>The research was supported by the grant from National Science Foundation (BCS 0488968) award to Dr. Shelia M. Kennison and a Pre-doctoral National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship awarded to Kristopher I. Bradley. Portions of these data were presented at the 2009 annual meeting of the Southwestern Psychological Association.</p> <ref id="AN0079469638-8"> <title> References </title> <blist> <bibl id="bib1" idref="ref43" type="bt">1</bibl> <bibtext> Amodio, D., &amp; Devine, P. (2006). Stereotyping and evaluation in implicit racial bias: Evidence for independent constructs and unique effects on behavior. 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Chaney</p> <p>Reported by Author; Author; Author; Author</p> </aug> <nolink nlid="nl1" bibid="bib21" firstref="ref2"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl2" bibid="bib19" firstref="ref3"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl3" bibid="bib17" firstref="ref4"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl4" bibid="bib39" firstref="ref5"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl5" bibid="bib22" firstref="ref6"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl6" bibid="bib20" firstref="ref13"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl7" bibid="bib16" firstref="ref17"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl8" bibid="bib25" firstref="ref18"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl9" bibid="bib24" firstref="ref19"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl10" bibid="bib32" firstref="ref20"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl11" bibid="bib15" firstref="ref22"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl12" bibid="bib18" firstref="ref23"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl13" bibid="bib27" firstref="ref24"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl14" bibid="bib37" firstref="ref25"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl15" bibid="bib14" firstref="ref27"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl16" bibid="bib10" firstref="ref32"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl17" bibid="bib13" firstref="ref33"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl18" bibid="bib26" firstref="ref34"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl19" bibid="bib30" firstref="ref35"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl20" bibid="bib38" firstref="ref36"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl21" bibid="bib23" firstref="ref37"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl22" bibid="bib31" firstref="ref38"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl23" bibid="bib35" firstref="ref39"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl24" bibid="bib74" firstref="ref44"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl25" bibid="bib12" firstref="ref51"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl26" bibid="bib36" firstref="ref53"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl27" bibid="bib28" firstref="ref59"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl28" bibid="bib33" firstref="ref60"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl29" bibid="bib11" firstref="ref61"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl30" bibid="bib34" firstref="ref62"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl31" bibid="bib29" firstref="ref68"></nolink> |
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| Items | – Name: Title Label: Title Group: Ti Data: The Effect of Mortality Salience on Implicit Bias – Name: Language Label: Language Group: Lang Data: English – Name: Author Label: Authors Group: Au Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Bradley%2C+Kristopher+I%2E%22">Bradley, Kristopher I.</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Kennison%2C+Shelia+M%2E%22">Kennison, Shelia M.</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Burke%2C+Amanda+L%2E%22">Burke, Amanda L.</searchLink> – Name: TitleSource Label: Source Group: Src Data: <searchLink fieldCode="SO" term="%22Death+Studies%22"><i>Death Studies</i></searchLink>. 2012 36(9):819-831. – Name: Avail Label: Availability Group: Avail Data: Routledge. Available from: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 325 Chestnut Street Suite 800, Philadelphia, PA 19106. Tel: 800-354-1420; Fax: 215-625-2940; Web site: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals – Name: PeerReviewed Label: Peer Reviewed Group: SrcInfo Data: Y – Name: PhysDesc Label: Physical Description Group: PhysDesc Data: PDF – Name: Pages Label: Page Count Group: Src Data: 13 – Name: DatePubCY Label: Publication Date Group: Date Data: 2012 – Name: TypeDocument Label: Document Type Group: TypDoc Data: Journal Articles<br />Reports - Research – Name: Subject Label: Descriptors Group: Su Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Association+Measures%22">Association Measures</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Cultural+Differences%22">Cultural Differences</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Moral+Values%22">Moral Values</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Essays%22">Essays</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Comparative+Analysis%22">Comparative Analysis</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Death%22">Death</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Racial+Differences%22">Racial Differences</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Bias%22">Bias</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22African+Americans%22">African Americans</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Whites%22">Whites</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Correlation%22">Correlation</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Negative+Attitudes%22">Negative Attitudes</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Social+Bias%22">Social Bias</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Attitude+Measures%22">Attitude Measures</searchLink> – Name: DOI Label: DOI Group: ID Data: 10.1080/07481187.2011.605987 – Name: ISSN Label: ISSN Group: ISSN Data: 0748-1187 – Name: Abstract Label: Abstract Group: Ab Data: Previous research in terror management theory has shown that when individuals are reminded of their mortality, negative evaluations of out-group members increase. This previous research has used a variety of methods to investigate the change in attitudes toward out-group members. These methods generally permit participants time to consciously reflect during responding. In the present study, the authors hypothesized that reminding individuals of their mortality would increase implicit bias toward out-group members when measured with the Implicit Association Test (IAT). In the experiment, White participants were randomly assigned to complete a written essay about imagining their own death (i.e., mortality salience condition) or an essay regarding an upcoming exam (i.e., control condition), and then participants completed an evaluative IAT. The results revealed that participants who had been reminded of their mortality took longer to associate names of Black individuals with positive words when compared to a control group. The implications of these findings are considered. (Contains 1 figure.) – Name: AbstractInfo Label: Abstractor Group: Ab Data: As Provided – Name: Ref Label: Number of References Group: RefInfo Data: 39 – Name: DateEntry Label: Entry Date Group: Date Data: 2012 – Name: AN Label: Accession Number Group: ID Data: EJ977715 |
| PLink | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=eric&AN=EJ977715 |
| RecordInfo | BibRecord: BibEntity: Identifiers: – Type: doi Value: 10.1080/07481187.2011.605987 Languages: – Text: English PhysicalDescription: Pagination: PageCount: 13 StartPage: 819 Subjects: – SubjectFull: Association Measures Type: general – SubjectFull: Cultural Differences Type: general – SubjectFull: Moral Values Type: general – SubjectFull: Essays Type: general – SubjectFull: Comparative Analysis Type: general – SubjectFull: Death Type: general – SubjectFull: Racial Differences Type: general – SubjectFull: Bias Type: general – SubjectFull: African Americans Type: general – SubjectFull: Whites Type: general – SubjectFull: Correlation Type: general – SubjectFull: Negative Attitudes Type: general – SubjectFull: Social Bias Type: general – SubjectFull: Attitude Measures Type: general Titles: – TitleFull: The Effect of Mortality Salience on Implicit Bias Type: main BibRelationships: HasContributorRelationships: – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Bradley, Kristopher I. – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Kennison, Shelia M. – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Burke, Amanda L. IsPartOfRelationships: – BibEntity: Dates: – D: 01 M: 01 Type: published Y: 2012 Identifiers: – Type: issn-print Value: 0748-1187 Numbering: – Type: volume Value: 36 – Type: issue Value: 9 Titles: – TitleFull: Death Studies Type: main |
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