Evolutionary dynamics of finite populations in games with polymorphic fitness equilibria.

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Bibliographic Details
Title: Evolutionary dynamics of finite populations in games with polymorphic fitness equilibria.
Authors: Ficici SG; Department of Computer Science, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA 02454, USA. sevan@eecs.harvard.edu, Pollack JB
Source: Journal of theoretical biology [J Theor Biol] 2007 Aug 07; Vol. 247 (3), pp. 426-41. Date of Electronic Publication: 2007 Mar 12.
Publication Type: Journal Article; Research Support, U.S. Gov't, Non-P.H.S.
Journal Info: Publisher: Elsevier Country of Publication: England NLM ID: 0376342 Publication Model: Print-Electronic Cited Medium: Print ISSN: 0022-5193 (Print) Linking ISSN: 00225193 NLM ISO Abbreviation: J Theor Biol Subsets: MEDLINE
Database: MEDLINE Ultimate
Description
ISSN:0022-5193
DOI:10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.03.004