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Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation

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Title: Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation
Description: Honesty in voting, it turns out, is not always the best policy. Indeed, in the early 1970s, Allan Gibbard and Mark Satterthwaite, building on the seminal work of Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, proved that with three or more alternatives there is no reasonable voting system that is non-manipulable; voters will always have an opportunity to benefit by submitting a disingenuous ballot. The ensuing decades produced a number of theorems of striking mathematical naturality that dealt with the manipulability of voting systems. This 2005 book presents many of these results from the last quarter of the twentieth century, especially the contributions of economists and philosophers, from a mathematical point of view, with many new proofs. The presentation is almost completely self-contained, and requires no prerequisites except a willingness to follow rigorous mathematical arguments. Mathematics students, as well as mathematicians, political scientists, economists and philosophers will learn why it is impossible to devise a completely unmanipulable voting system.
Authors: Alan D. Taylor
Resource Type: eBook.
Subjects: Voting--Mathematical models, Social choice--Mathematical models, Political science--Mathematical models, Game theory
Categories: POLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Process / Campaigns & Elections
Database: eBook Collection (EBSCOhost)
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  – Type: ebook-pdf
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Header DbId: nlebk
DbLabel: eBook Collection (EBSCOhost)
An: 132322
RelevancyScore: 998
AccessLevel: 6
PubType: eBook
PubTypeId: ebook
PreciseRelevancyScore: 998.4384765625
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  Data: Honesty in voting, it turns out, is not always the best policy. Indeed, in the early 1970s, Allan Gibbard and Mark Satterthwaite, building on the seminal work of Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, proved that with three or more alternatives there is no reasonable voting system that is non-manipulable; voters will always have an opportunity to benefit by submitting a disingenuous ballot. The ensuing decades produced a number of theorems of striking mathematical naturality that dealt with the manipulability of voting systems. This 2005 book presents many of these results from the last quarter of the twentieth century, especially the contributions of economists and philosophers, from a mathematical point of view, with many new proofs. The presentation is almost completely self-contained, and requires no prerequisites except a willingness to follow rigorous mathematical arguments. Mathematics students, as well as mathematicians, political scientists, economists and philosophers will learn why it is impossible to devise a completely unmanipulable voting system.
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      – Code: 324.6015193
        Scheme: ddc
        Type: prePub
    Languages:
      – Code: eng
        Text: English
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Voting--Mathematical models
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Social choice--Mathematical models
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Political science--Mathematical models
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Game theory
        Type: general
    Titles:
      – TitleFull: Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation
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            NameFull: Alan D. Taylor
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          Dates:
            – D: 01
              M: 01
              Type: published
              Y: 2005
            – D: 04
              M: 02
              Type: profile
              Y: 2014
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            – Type: isbn-print
              Value: 9780521810524
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              Value: 9780511115387
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            – TitleFull: Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation
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