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Contrastive Reasons

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Title: Contrastive Reasons
Description: Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. Work on reasons has become central to several areas of philosophy, but besides a couple of exceptions, this view has not been discussed. Contrastive Reasons makes the case that this is a mistake. Snedegar develops three kinds of arguments for contrastivism. First, contrastivism gives us the best account of our ordinary discourse about reasons. Second, contrastivism best makes sense of widespread ideas about what reasons are, including the idea that they favor the things they are reasons for and the idea that they involve the promotion of certain kinds of objectives. Third, contrastivism has attractive applications in different areas of normative philosophy in which reasons are important. These include debates in normative ethics about whether better than might be intransitive and debates in both epistemology and practical reasoning about the rationality of withholding or suspending belief and intention.
Authors: Justin Snedegar
Resource Type: eBook.
Subjects: Normativity (Ethics), Contrast (Philosophy), Reasoning, Reason
Categories: PHILOSOPHY / Ethics & Moral Philosophy
Database: eBook Collection (EBSCOhost)
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  – Type: ebook-epub
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PubType: eBook
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  Data: Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. Work on reasons has become central to several areas of philosophy, but besides a couple of exceptions, this view has not been discussed. Contrastive Reasons makes the case that this is a mistake. Snedegar develops three kinds of arguments for contrastivism. First, contrastivism gives us the best account of our ordinary discourse about reasons. Second, contrastivism best makes sense of widespread ideas about what reasons are, including the idea that they favor the things they are reasons for and the idea that they involve the promotion of certain kinds of objectives. Third, contrastivism has attractive applications in different areas of normative philosophy in which reasons are important. These include debates in normative ethics about whether better than might be intransitive and debates in both epistemology and practical reasoning about the rationality of withholding or suspending belief and intention.
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      – Code: 153.43
        Scheme: ddc
        Type: prePub
    Languages:
      – Code: eng
        Text: English
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Normativity (Ethics)
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Contrast (Philosophy)
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Reasoning
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      – SubjectFull: Reason
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      – TitleFull: Contrastive Reasons
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            NameFull: Justin Snedegar
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            – D: 01
              M: 01
              Type: published
              Y: 2017
            – D: 20
              M: 03
              Type: profile
              Y: 2017
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              Value: 9780198785934
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              Value: 9780191089039
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              Value: 9780191089046
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