Disinflation, External Vulnerability, and Fiscal Intransigence : Some Unpleasant Mundellian Arithmetic
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| Title: | Disinflation, External Vulnerability, and Fiscal Intransigence : Some Unpleasant Mundellian Arithmetic |
|---|---|
| Description: | This paper examines the policy challenges a country faces when it wants to both reduce inflation and maintain a sustainable external position. Mundell's (1962) policy assignment framework suggests that these two goals may be mutually incompatible unless monetary and fiscal policies are properly coordinated. Unfortunately, if the fiscal authority is unwilling to cooperate—a case of fiscal intransigence—central banks that pursue a disinflation on a ‘go it alone'basis will cause the country's external position to further deteriorate. A dynamic analysis shows that if the central bank itself lacks credibility in its inflation goal, it must rely even more on cooperation from the fiscal authority than otherwise. Echoing Sargent and Wallace's (1981) ‘unpleasant monetarist arithmetic,'in these circumstances, a ‘go it alone'policy may successfully stabilize prices and output, but only on a short-term basis. |
| Authors: | Tanner, Evan C. |
| Resource Type: | eBook. |
| Subjects: | Capitalism--Mathematical models, Macroeconomics--Mathematical models, Economic policy--Mathematical models, Economic development--Mathematical models, Fiscal policy--Mathematical models, Monetary policy--Mathematical models |
| Categories: | BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / Macroeconomics, BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / General, BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / International / Economics & Trade |
| Database: | eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) |
| FullText | Links: – Type: ebook-pdf Text: Availability: 0 |
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| Header | DbId: nlebk DbLabel: eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) An: 1529313 RelevancyScore: 1077 AccessLevel: 6 PubType: eBook PubTypeId: ebook PreciseRelevancyScore: 1077.00524902344 |
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| RecordInfo | BibRecord: BibEntity: Classifications: – Code: 339.50151 Scheme: ddc Type: prePub Languages: – Code: eng Text: English Subjects: – SubjectFull: Capitalism--Mathematical models Type: general – SubjectFull: Macroeconomics--Mathematical models Type: general – SubjectFull: Economic policy--Mathematical models Type: general – SubjectFull: Economic development--Mathematical models Type: general – SubjectFull: Fiscal policy--Mathematical models Type: general – SubjectFull: Monetary policy--Mathematical models Type: general Titles: – TitleFull: Disinflation, External Vulnerability, and Fiscal Intransigence : Some Unpleasant Mundellian Arithmetic Type: main BibRelationships: HasContributorRelationships: – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Tanner, Evan C. – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Tanner, Evan C. IsPartOfRelationships: – BibEntity: Dates: – D: 01 M: 01 Type: published Y: 2017 – D: 10 M: 10 Type: profile Y: 2018 Identifiers: – Type: isbn-print Value: 9781484300640 – Type: isbn-electronic Value: 9781484301203 Numbering: – Type: volume Value: 00017 Titles: – TitleFull: Disinflation, External Vulnerability, and Fiscal Intransigence : Some Unpleasant Mundellian Arithmetic Type: main |
| ResultId | 1 |