NEC Electronics
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| Title: | NEC Electronics |
|---|---|
| Description: | Why do shares in NEC Electronics, a publicly listed subsidiary of Japan conglomerate NEC trade at a discount to their fundamental value? Can Perry Capital, a U.S. hedge fund, restructure this subsidiary and generate significant returns? This case provides students with an opportunity to analyze Perry's decision to invest in NEC Electronics. In doing so, it asks for the reasons that NEC might take actions that destroy value and shift value away from NECE's minority shareholders. The events covered allow for a discussion of how ownership concentration constrains restructuring alternatives, how hedge fund investors might confront controlling shareholders, and how the mispricing of agency costs can give rise to ownership structures that allow for minority shareholder expropriation. |
| Authors: | C. Fritz Foley, James Quinn, Robin Greenwood |
| Resource Type: | eBook. |
| Categories: | BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / General |
| Database: | eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) |
| FullText | Links: – Type: ebook-pdf Text: Availability: 0 |
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| Header | DbId: nlebk DbLabel: eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) An: 2308942 RelevancyScore: 1018 AccessLevel: 6 PubType: eBook PubTypeId: ebook PreciseRelevancyScore: 1018.08020019531 |
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| Items | – Name: Title Label: Title Group: Ti Data: NEC Electronics – Name: Abstract Label: Description Group: Ab Data: Why do shares in NEC Electronics, a publicly listed subsidiary of Japan conglomerate NEC trade at a discount to their fundamental value? Can Perry Capital, a U.S. hedge fund, restructure this subsidiary and generate significant returns? This case provides students with an opportunity to analyze Perry's decision to invest in NEC Electronics. In doing so, it asks for the reasons that NEC might take actions that destroy value and shift value away from NECE's minority shareholders. The events covered allow for a discussion of how ownership concentration constrains restructuring alternatives, how hedge fund investors might confront controlling shareholders, and how the mispricing of agency costs can give rise to ownership structures that allow for minority shareholder expropriation. – Name: Author Label: Authors Group: Au Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22C%2E+Fritz+Foley%22">C. Fritz Foley</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22James+Quinn%22">James Quinn</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Robin+Greenwood%22">Robin Greenwood</searchLink> – Name: TypePub Label: Resource Type Group: TypPub Data: eBook. – Name: SubjectBISAC Label: Categories Group: Su Data: <searchLink fieldCode="ZK" term="%22BUSINESS+%26+ECONOMICS+%2F+General%22">BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / General</searchLink> |
| PLink | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=nlebk&AN=2308942 |
| RecordInfo | BibRecord: BibEntity: Languages: – Code: eng Text: English Titles: – TitleFull: NEC Electronics Type: main BibRelationships: HasContributorRelationships: – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: C. Fritz Foley – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: James Quinn – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Robin Greenwood – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: C. Fritz Foley – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: James Quinn – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Robin Greenwood IsPartOfRelationships: – BibEntity: Dates: – D: 01 M: 01 Type: published Y: 2008 Titles: – TitleFull: NEC Electronics Type: main |
| ResultId | 1 |