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The Natural Resources Trap : Private Investment Without Public Commitment

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Title: The Natural Resources Trap : Private Investment Without Public Commitment
Description: Experts discuss the contractual instability resulting from commodity price volatility and its effect on private investment and public involvement.Volatility in commodity prices has been accompanied by perpetual renegotiation of contracts between private investors in natural resource production and the governments of states with mineral and energy wealth. When prices skyrocket, governments want a larger share of revenues, sometimes to the point of nationalization or expropriation; when prices fall, larger state participation becomes a burden and the private sector is called back in. Recent and newsworthy changes in the price of oil (which fell from an all-time high of $147 in mid-2008 to $40 by year's end) are notable for their speed and the steepness of their rise and fall, but the up-and-down pattern itself is not unusual. If the unpredictability of commodity prices is so predictable, why do contracts not allow for this with mechanisms that would provide a more stable commercial framework? In The Natural Resources Trap, top scholars address this question in terms of both theory and practice. Theoretical contributions range across a number of fields, from contract theory to public finance, and treat topics that include taxation, royalties, and expropriation cycles. Case studies examine experiences in the U.K., Bolivia, Argentina, Venezuela, and other parts of the world. ContributorsPhilippe Aghion, George-Marios Angeletos, Fernando Candia Castillo, Rafael di Tella, Juan Dubra, Eduardo Engel, Ramón Espinasa, Ronald Fischer, Jeffrey Frankel, Nicolás Gadano, Dieter Helm, William Hogan, Robert MacCulloch, Osmel Manzano, Francisco Monaldi, Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani, Erich Muehlegger, Fernando Navajas, Robert Pindyck, Lucía Quesada, Roberto Rigobon, Eduardo S. Schwartz, Federico Sturzenegger, Lawrence Summers, Laurence Tai, Michael Tomz, Anders B. Trolle, Louis T. Wells, Nils Wernerfelt, Mark L. J. Wright, Richard Zeckhauser, Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Authors: William Hogan, Federico Sturzenegger
Resource Type: eBook.
Subjects: Investments, Foreign, Public-private sector cooperation, Natural resources--Government policy, Natural resources--Law and legislation
Categories: BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Environmental Economics, POLITICAL SCIENCE / Essays
Database: eBook Collection (EBSCOhost)
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DbLabel: eBook Collection (EBSCOhost)
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RelevancyScore: 1031
AccessLevel: 6
PubType: eBook
PubTypeId: ebook
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  Data: The Natural Resources Trap : Private Investment Without Public Commitment
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  Data: Experts discuss the contractual instability resulting from commodity price volatility and its effect on private investment and public involvement.Volatility in commodity prices has been accompanied by perpetual renegotiation of contracts between private investors in natural resource production and the governments of states with mineral and energy wealth. When prices skyrocket, governments want a larger share of revenues, sometimes to the point of nationalization or expropriation; when prices fall, larger state participation becomes a burden and the private sector is called back in. Recent and newsworthy changes in the price of oil (which fell from an all-time high of $147 in mid-2008 to $40 by year's end) are notable for their speed and the steepness of their rise and fall, but the up-and-down pattern itself is not unusual. If the unpredictability of commodity prices is so predictable, why do contracts not allow for this with mechanisms that would provide a more stable commercial framework? In The Natural Resources Trap, top scholars address this question in terms of both theory and practice. Theoretical contributions range across a number of fields, from contract theory to public finance, and treat topics that include taxation, royalties, and expropriation cycles. Case studies examine experiences in the U.K., Bolivia, Argentina, Venezuela, and other parts of the world. ContributorsPhilippe Aghion, George-Marios Angeletos, Fernando Candia Castillo, Rafael di Tella, Juan Dubra, Eduardo Engel, Ramón Espinasa, Ronald Fischer, Jeffrey Frankel, Nicolás Gadano, Dieter Helm, William Hogan, Robert MacCulloch, Osmel Manzano, Francisco Monaldi, Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani, Erich Muehlegger, Fernando Navajas, Robert Pindyck, Lucía Quesada, Roberto Rigobon, Eduardo S. Schwartz, Federico Sturzenegger, Lawrence Summers, Laurence Tai, Michael Tomz, Anders B. Trolle, Louis T. Wells, Nils Wernerfelt, Mark L. J. Wright, Richard Zeckhauser, Jeromin Zettelmeyer
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Investments%2C+Foreign%22">Investments, Foreign</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Public-private+sector+cooperation%22">Public-private sector cooperation</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Natural+resources--Government+policy%22">Natural resources--Government policy</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Natural+resources--Law+and+legislation%22">Natural resources--Law and legislation</searchLink>
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      – Code: 333.7
        Scheme: ddc
        Type: prePub
    Languages:
      – Code: eng
        Text: English
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Investments, Foreign
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Public-private sector cooperation
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Natural resources--Government policy
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Natural resources--Law and legislation
        Type: general
    Titles:
      – TitleFull: The Natural Resources Trap : Private Investment Without Public Commitment
        Type: main
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      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: William Hogan
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            NameFull: Federico Sturzenegger
      – PersonEntity:
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            NameFull: William Hogan
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            NameFull: Federico Sturzenegger
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          Dates:
            – D: 01
              M: 01
              Type: published
              Y: 2010
            – D: 04
              M: 02
              Type: profile
              Y: 2014
          Identifiers:
            – Type: isbn-print
              Value: 9780262013796
            – Type: isbn-electronic
              Value: 9780262275538
          Titles:
            – TitleFull: The Natural Resources Trap : Private Investment Without Public Commitment
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