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The Behavior of Federal Judges : A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice

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Title: The Behavior of Federal Judges : A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice
Description: Judges play a central role in the American legal system, but their behavior as decision-makers is not well understood, even among themselves. The system permits judges to be quite secretive (and most of them are), so indirect methods are required to make sense of their behavior. Here, a political scientist, an economist, and a judge work together to construct a unified theory of judicial decision-making. Using statistical methods to test hypotheses, they dispel the mystery of how judicial decisions in district courts, circuit courts, and the Supreme Court are made.The authors derive their hypotheses from a labor-market model, which allows them to consider judges as they would any other economic actors: as self-interested individuals motivated by both the pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of their work. In the authors'view, this model describes judicial behavior better than either the traditional “legalist” theory, which sees judges as automatons who mechanically apply the law to the facts, or the current dominant theory in political science, which exaggerates the ideological component in judicial behavior. Ideology does figure into decision-making at all levels of the federal judiciary, the authors find, but its influence is not uniform. It diminishes as one moves down the judicial hierarchy from the Supreme Court to the courts of appeals to the district courts. As The Behavior of Federal Judges demonstrates, the good news is that ideology does not extinguish the influence of other components in judicial decision-making. Federal judges are not just robots or politicians in robes.
Authors: Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, Richard A. Posner
Resource Type: eBook.
Subjects: Judicial process--United States
Categories: LAW / Judicial Power, LAW / Courts, POLITICAL SCIENCE / American Government / Judicial Branch, POLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Ideologies / General
Database: eBook Collection (EBSCOhost)
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Header DbId: nlebk
DbLabel: eBook Collection (EBSCOhost)
An: 502795
RelevancyScore: 1051
AccessLevel: 6
PubType: eBook
PubTypeId: ebook
PreciseRelevancyScore: 1050.81640625
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  Data: The Behavior of Federal Judges : A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice
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  Data: Judges play a central role in the American legal system, but their behavior as decision-makers is not well understood, even among themselves. The system permits judges to be quite secretive (and most of them are), so indirect methods are required to make sense of their behavior. Here, a political scientist, an economist, and a judge work together to construct a unified theory of judicial decision-making. Using statistical methods to test hypotheses, they dispel the mystery of how judicial decisions in district courts, circuit courts, and the Supreme Court are made.The authors derive their hypotheses from a labor-market model, which allows them to consider judges as they would any other economic actors: as self-interested individuals motivated by both the pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of their work. In the authors'view, this model describes judicial behavior better than either the traditional “legalist” theory, which sees judges as automatons who mechanically apply the law to the facts, or the current dominant theory in political science, which exaggerates the ideological component in judicial behavior. Ideology does figure into decision-making at all levels of the federal judiciary, the authors find, but its influence is not uniform. It diminishes as one moves down the judicial hierarchy from the Supreme Court to the courts of appeals to the district courts. As The Behavior of Federal Judges demonstrates, the good news is that ideology does not extinguish the influence of other components in judicial decision-making. Federal judges are not just robots or politicians in robes.
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Lee+Epstein%22">Lee Epstein</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22William+M%2E+Landes%22">William M. Landes</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Richard+A%2E+Posner%22">Richard A. Posner</searchLink>
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Judicial+process--United+States%22">Judicial process--United States</searchLink>
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      – Code: 347.7314
        Scheme: ddc
        Type: prePub
    Languages:
      – Code: eng
        Text: English
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Judicial process--United States
        Type: general
    Titles:
      – TitleFull: The Behavior of Federal Judges : A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice
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            NameFull: Lee Epstein
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            NameFull: William M. Landes
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            NameFull: Richard A. Posner
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            NameFull: Lee Epstein
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            NameFull: William M. Landes
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          Dates:
            – D: 01
              M: 01
              Type: published
              Y: 2013
            – D: 04
              M: 02
              Type: profile
              Y: 2014
          Identifiers:
            – Type: isbn-print
              Value: 9780674049895
            – Type: isbn-electronic
              Value: 9780674067325
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              Value: 9780674070684
          Titles:
            – TitleFull: The Behavior of Federal Judges : A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice
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