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Securities Against Misrule : Juries, Assemblies, Elections

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Title: Securities Against Misrule : Juries, Assemblies, Elections
Description: Elster proposes a normative theory of collective decision making, inspired by Jeremy Bentham but not including his utilitarian philosophy. The central proposal is that in designing democratic institutions one should reduce as much as possible the impact of self-interest, passion, prejudice and bias on the decision makers, and then let the chips fall where they may. There is no independently defined good outcome that institutions can track, nor is there any way of reliably selecting good decision makers. In addition to a long initial chapter that surveys theories of collective decision making, notably social choice theory, and a chapter expounding and discussing Bentham's views, historical chapters on the jury, constituent assemblies and electoral systems develop and illustrate the main ideas. This work draws on a welter of case studies and historical episodes, from Thucydides and Plutarch to the present. It is also grounded in psychology, behavioral economics and law.
Authors: Jon Elster
Resource Type: eBook.
Subjects: Representative government and representation--Decision making, Group decision making, Abuse of administrative power--Prevention
Categories: BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Negotiating, FAMILY & RELATIONSHIPS / Interpersonal Relations
Database: eBook Collection (EBSCOhost)
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  – Type: ebook-pdf
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  Availability: 0
Header DbId: nlebk
DbLabel: eBook Collection (EBSCOhost)
An: 527881
RelevancyScore: 1051
AccessLevel: 6
PubType: eBook
PubTypeId: ebook
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  Data: Securities Against Misrule : Juries, Assemblies, Elections
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  Data: Elster proposes a normative theory of collective decision making, inspired by Jeremy Bentham but not including his utilitarian philosophy. The central proposal is that in designing democratic institutions one should reduce as much as possible the impact of self-interest, passion, prejudice and bias on the decision makers, and then let the chips fall where they may. There is no independently defined good outcome that institutions can track, nor is there any way of reliably selecting good decision makers. In addition to a long initial chapter that surveys theories of collective decision making, notably social choice theory, and a chapter expounding and discussing Bentham's views, historical chapters on the jury, constituent assemblies and electoral systems develop and illustrate the main ideas. This work draws on a welter of case studies and historical episodes, from Thucydides and Plutarch to the present. It is also grounded in psychology, behavioral economics and law.
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RecordInfo BibRecord:
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    Classifications:
      – Code: 302.3
        Scheme: ddc
        Type: prePub
    Languages:
      – Code: eng
        Text: English
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Representative government and representation--Decision making
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Group decision making
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Abuse of administrative power--Prevention
        Type: general
    Titles:
      – TitleFull: Securities Against Misrule : Juries, Assemblies, Elections
        Type: main
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          Name:
            NameFull: Jon Elster
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            NameFull: Jon Elster
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          Dates:
            – D: 01
              M: 01
              Type: published
              Y: 2013
            – D: 04
              M: 02
              Type: profile
              Y: 2014
          Identifiers:
            – Type: isbn-print
              Value: 9781107031739
            – Type: isbn-electronic
              Value: 9781107314689
          Titles:
            – TitleFull: Securities Against Misrule : Juries, Assemblies, Elections
              Type: main
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