Dynamic Allocation and Pricing : A Mechanism Design Approach

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Title: Dynamic Allocation and Pricing : A Mechanism Design Approach
Description: A new approach to dynamic allocation and pricing that blends dynamic paradigms from the operations research and management science literature with classical mechanism design methods.Dynamic allocation and pricing problems occur in numerous frameworks, including the pricing of seasonal goods in retail, the allocation of a fixed inventory in a given period of time, and the assignment of personnel to incoming tasks. Although most of these problems deal with issues treated in the mechanism design literature, the modern revenue management (RM) literature focuses instead on analyzing properties of restricted classes of allocation and pricing schemes. In this book, Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu propose an approach to optimal allocations and prices based on the theory of mechanism design, adapted to dynamic settings.Drawing on their own recent work on the topic, the authors describe a modern theory of RM that blends the elegant dynamic models from the operations research (OR), management science, and computer science literatures with techniques from the classical mechanism design literature. Illustrating this blending of approaches, they start with well-known complete information, nonstrategic dynamic models that yield elegant explicit solutions. They then add strategic agents that are privately informed and then examine the consequences of these changes on the optimization problem of the designer. Their sequential modeling of both nonstrategic and strategic logic allows a clear picture of the delicate interplay between dynamic trade-offs and strategic incentives. Topics include the sequential assignment of heterogeneous objects, dynamic revenue optimization with heterogeneous objects, revenue maximization in the stochastic and dynamic knapsack model, the interaction between learning about demand and dynamic efficiency, and dynamic models with long-lived, strategic agents.
Authors: Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu
Resource Type: eBook.
Subjects: Pricing, Revenue management, Assignment problems (Programming)
Categories: BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / General
Database: eBook Collection (EBSCOhost)
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  – Type: ebook-pdf
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  Availability: 0
Header DbId: nlebk
DbLabel: eBook Collection (EBSCOhost)
An: 933957
RelevancyScore: 1057
AccessLevel: 6
PubType: eBook
PubTypeId: ebook
PreciseRelevancyScore: 1057.36352539063
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  Data: Dynamic Allocation and Pricing : A Mechanism Design Approach
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  Data: A new approach to dynamic allocation and pricing that blends dynamic paradigms from the operations research and management science literature with classical mechanism design methods.Dynamic allocation and pricing problems occur in numerous frameworks, including the pricing of seasonal goods in retail, the allocation of a fixed inventory in a given period of time, and the assignment of personnel to incoming tasks. Although most of these problems deal with issues treated in the mechanism design literature, the modern revenue management (RM) literature focuses instead on analyzing properties of restricted classes of allocation and pricing schemes. In this book, Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu propose an approach to optimal allocations and prices based on the theory of mechanism design, adapted to dynamic settings.Drawing on their own recent work on the topic, the authors describe a modern theory of RM that blends the elegant dynamic models from the operations research (OR), management science, and computer science literatures with techniques from the classical mechanism design literature. Illustrating this blending of approaches, they start with well-known complete information, nonstrategic dynamic models that yield elegant explicit solutions. They then add strategic agents that are privately informed and then examine the consequences of these changes on the optimization problem of the designer. Their sequential modeling of both nonstrategic and strategic logic allows a clear picture of the delicate interplay between dynamic trade-offs and strategic incentives. Topics include the sequential assignment of heterogeneous objects, dynamic revenue optimization with heterogeneous objects, revenue maximization in the stochastic and dynamic knapsack model, the interaction between learning about demand and dynamic efficiency, and dynamic models with long-lived, strategic agents.
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RecordInfo BibRecord:
  BibEntity:
    Classifications:
      – Code: 658.1554
        Scheme: ddc
        Type: prePub
    Languages:
      – Code: eng
        Text: English
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Pricing
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Revenue management
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Assignment problems (Programming)
        Type: general
    Titles:
      – TitleFull: Dynamic Allocation and Pricing : A Mechanism Design Approach
        Type: main
  BibRelationships:
    HasContributorRelationships:
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Alex Gershkov
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Benny Moldovanu
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Alex Gershkov
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Benny Moldovanu
    IsPartOfRelationships:
      – BibEntity:
          Dates:
            – D: 01
              M: 01
              Type: published
              Y: 2014
            – D: 08
              M: 01
              Type: profile
              Y: 2015
          Identifiers:
            – Type: isbn-print
              Value: 9780262028400
            – Type: isbn-electronic
              Value: 9780262327732
          Numbering:
            – Type: volume
              Value: 00009
          Titles:
            – TitleFull: Dynamic Allocation and Pricing : A Mechanism Design Approach
              Type: main
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