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The aim of belief and suspended belief.

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Title: The aim of belief and suspended belief.
Authors: Atkinson, C. J. (AUTHOR)
Source: Philosophical Psychology. May2021, Vol. 34 Issue 4, p581-606. 26p.
Subjects: Possibility, Attitude (Psychology)
Abstract: In this paper, I discuss whether different interpretations of the aim of belief – both the teleological and normative interpretations – have the resources to explain certain descriptive and normative features of suspended belief, or suspension. I argue that despite the recent efforts of theorists to extend these theories to account for suspension, they ultimately fail. The implication is that we must either develop alternative theories of belief that can account for suspension, or we must abandon the assumption that these theories ought to be able to account for suspension. To close, I briefly consider some of the reasons we have in favor of pursuing each of these options, and I suggest that it is worth exploring the possibility that suspension is best understood as its own attitude, independently of theories of belief's aim. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of Philosophical Psychology is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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  Data: In this paper, I discuss whether different interpretations of the aim of belief – both the teleological and normative interpretations – have the resources to explain certain descriptive and normative features of suspended belief, or suspension. I argue that despite the recent efforts of theorists to extend these theories to account for suspension, they ultimately fail. The implication is that we must either develop alternative theories of belief that can account for suspension, or we must abandon the assumption that these theories ought to be able to account for suspension. To close, I briefly consider some of the reasons we have in favor of pursuing each of these options, and I suggest that it is worth exploring the possibility that suspension is best understood as its own attitude, independently of theories of belief's aim. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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  Data: <i>Copyright of Philosophical Psychology is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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