The place of Free Will: the freedom of the prisoner.
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| Title: | The place of Free Will: the freedom of the prisoner. |
|---|---|
| Authors: | Nichelli, Paolo F. (AUTHOR), Grafman, Jordan (AUTHOR) |
| Source: | Neurological Sciences. Mar2024, Vol. 45 Issue 3, p861-871. 11p. |
| Subjects: | Free will & determinism, Responsibility, Prisoners, Experimental design |
| Abstract: | Debates about the concept of Free Will date back to ancient times. About 40 years ago, Benjamin Libet designed an experiment showing that the conscious intention to move is preceded by a specific pattern of brain activation. His finding suggested that unconscious processes determine our decisions. Libet-style experiments have continued to dominate the debate about Free Will, pushing some authors to argue that the existence of Free Will is a mere illusion. We believe that this dispute is because we often measure Free Will using arbitrary human decisions rather than deliberate actions. After reviewing the definition of Free Will and the related literature, we conclude that the scientific evidence does not disprove the existence of Free Will. However, our will encounters several constraints and limitations that should be considered when evaluating our deeds' personal responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Copyright of Neurological Sciences is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) | |
| Database: | Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection |
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| Header | DbId: pbh DbLabel: Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection An: 175358996 AccessLevel: 6 PubType: Academic Journal PubTypeId: academicJournal PreciseRelevancyScore: 0 |
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| Items | – Name: Title Label: Title Group: Ti Data: The place of Free Will: the freedom of the prisoner. – Name: Author Label: Authors Group: Au Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Nichelli%2C+Paolo+F%2E%22">Nichelli, Paolo F.</searchLink> (AUTHOR)<br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Grafman%2C+Jordan%22">Grafman, Jordan</searchLink> (AUTHOR) – Name: TitleSource Label: Source Group: Src Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Neurological+Sciences%22">Neurological Sciences</searchLink>. Mar2024, Vol. 45 Issue 3, p861-871. 11p. – Name: Subject Label: Subjects Group: Su Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Free+will+%26+determinism%22">Free will & determinism</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Responsibility%22">Responsibility</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Prisoners%22">Prisoners</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Experimental+design%22">Experimental design</searchLink> – Name: Abstract Label: Abstract Group: Ab Data: Debates about the concept of Free Will date back to ancient times. About 40 years ago, Benjamin Libet designed an experiment showing that the conscious intention to move is preceded by a specific pattern of brain activation. His finding suggested that unconscious processes determine our decisions. Libet-style experiments have continued to dominate the debate about Free Will, pushing some authors to argue that the existence of Free Will is a mere illusion. We believe that this dispute is because we often measure Free Will using arbitrary human decisions rather than deliberate actions. After reviewing the definition of Free Will and the related literature, we conclude that the scientific evidence does not disprove the existence of Free Will. However, our will encounters several constraints and limitations that should be considered when evaluating our deeds' personal responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] – Name: AbstractSuppliedCopyright Label: Group: Ab Data: <i>Copyright of Neurological Sciences is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) |
| PLink | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=pbh&AN=175358996 |
| RecordInfo | BibRecord: BibEntity: Identifiers: – Type: doi Value: 10.1007/s10072-023-07138-4 Languages: – Code: eng Text: English PhysicalDescription: Pagination: PageCount: 11 StartPage: 861 Subjects: – SubjectFull: Free will & determinism Type: general – SubjectFull: Responsibility Type: general – SubjectFull: Prisoners Type: general – SubjectFull: Experimental design Type: general Titles: – TitleFull: The place of Free Will: the freedom of the prisoner. Type: main BibRelationships: HasContributorRelationships: – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Nichelli, Paolo F. – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Grafman, Jordan IsPartOfRelationships: – BibEntity: Dates: – D: 01 M: 03 Text: Mar2024 Type: published Y: 2024 Identifiers: – Type: issn-print Value: 15901874 Numbering: – Type: volume Value: 45 – Type: issue Value: 3 Titles: – TitleFull: Neurological Sciences Type: main |
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