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Strong phenomenal intentionality theory and unconscious phenomenality.

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Title: Strong phenomenal intentionality theory and unconscious phenomenality.
Authors: Polák, Michal (AUTHOR)
Source: Philosophical Psychology. Feb2026, Vol. 39 Issue 2, p461-496. 36p.
Subjects: Subconsciousness, Dualism, Argument, Loss of consciousness, Act psychology
Abstract: The paper argues that a coherent strong Phenomenal Intentionality Theory (sPIT) needs to adopt the concept of unconscious phenomenality. sPIT is based on the thesis that phenomenal properties constitute intentional episodes. But if "constitutive" means that without these phenomenal properties, intentional episodes break down, then this poses a serious problem for so-called unconscious intentional occurrent episodes. The dilemma is that sPIT either preserves unconscious intentional states, but then must reject constitutiveness, or conversely, sPIT accepts constitutiveness but must acknowledge unconscious phenomenality. It is argued that the second option – i.e. accepting unconscious phenomenality – offers an interesting way to preserve sPIT. This counterintuitive solution is labeled a "dual model" here. Accepting the dual model not only as a conceptual possibility but as a factual case – supported by conceptual and empirical arguments – could be a plausible proposal for solving the dilemma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of Philosophical Psychology is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
Database: Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection
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  Data: Strong phenomenal intentionality theory and unconscious phenomenality.
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Polák%2C+Michal%22">Polák, Michal</searchLink> (AUTHOR)
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Philosophical+Psychology%22">Philosophical Psychology</searchLink>. Feb2026, Vol. 39 Issue 2, p461-496. 36p.
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Subconsciousness%22">Subconsciousness</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Dualism%22">Dualism</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Argument%22">Argument</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Loss+of+consciousness%22">Loss of consciousness</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Act+psychology%22">Act psychology</searchLink>
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  Data: The paper argues that a coherent strong Phenomenal Intentionality Theory (sPIT) needs to adopt the concept of unconscious phenomenality. sPIT is based on the thesis that phenomenal properties constitute intentional episodes. But if "constitutive" means that without these phenomenal properties, intentional episodes break down, then this poses a serious problem for so-called unconscious intentional occurrent episodes. The dilemma is that sPIT either preserves unconscious intentional states, but then must reject constitutiveness, or conversely, sPIT accepts constitutiveness but must acknowledge unconscious phenomenality. It is argued that the second option – i.e. accepting unconscious phenomenality – offers an interesting way to preserve sPIT. This counterintuitive solution is labeled a "dual model" here. Accepting the dual model not only as a conceptual possibility but as a factual case – supported by conceptual and empirical arguments – could be a plausible proposal for solving the dilemma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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  Data: <i>Copyright of Philosophical Psychology is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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        Value: 10.1080/09515089.2024.2413897
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      – Code: eng
        Text: English
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    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Subconsciousness
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Dualism
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Argument
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Loss of consciousness
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Act psychology
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      – TitleFull: Strong phenomenal intentionality theory and unconscious phenomenality.
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              Text: Feb2026
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              Y: 2026
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