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Moral, conventional, personal: reasons for action as dimensions of normativity.

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Title: Moral, conventional, personal: reasons for action as dimensions of normativity.
Authors: Li, Leon (AUTHOR), Grueneisen, Sebastian (AUTHOR)
Source: Philosophical Psychology. Feb2026, Vol. 39 Issue 2, p646-665. 20p.
Subjects: Normativity (Ethics), Ethics, Conformity, Incentive (Psychology), Subjectivity
Abstract: Human life is infused with different kinds of normativity (e.g. instrumental, epistemic, conventional, moral). Different theorists have proposed vastly differing views on how to conceptualize the different kinds of normativity. Whereas social domain theorists have asserted that moral, conventional, and personal kinds of normativity constitute distinct thematic domains and are viewed as such even by young children, other theorists have denied that moral and nonmoral kinds of normativity are thematically distinguishable. The current paper proposes a third approach that may show a way out of the controversy. Instead of viewing normative issues as belonging to one or more distinct thematic domains, it would be more accurate, both philosophically and psychologically speaking, to recognize that any given action may be grounded in multiple, non-exclusive reasons for action. Moral, conventional, and personal reasons for action may be defined in terms of what one believes one can respectively justify to all rational interlocutors, particular social partners, and oneself. The three kinds of reasons for action may accordingly be visualized as dimensions of normativity that together comprise a three-dimensional coordinate "space of reasons." To illustrate the dimensions approach, 16 examples are given of actions whose values vary independently on each of the three dimensions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of Philosophical Psychology is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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  Data: Moral, conventional, personal: reasons for action as dimensions of normativity.
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Li%2C+Leon%22">Li, Leon</searchLink> (AUTHOR)<br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Grueneisen%2C+Sebastian%22">Grueneisen, Sebastian</searchLink> (AUTHOR)
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Normativity+%28Ethics%29%22">Normativity (Ethics)</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Ethics%22">Ethics</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Conformity%22">Conformity</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Incentive+%28Psychology%29%22">Incentive (Psychology)</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Subjectivity%22">Subjectivity</searchLink>
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  Data: Human life is infused with different kinds of normativity (e.g. instrumental, epistemic, conventional, moral). Different theorists have proposed vastly differing views on how to conceptualize the different kinds of normativity. Whereas social domain theorists have asserted that moral, conventional, and personal kinds of normativity constitute distinct thematic domains and are viewed as such even by young children, other theorists have denied that moral and nonmoral kinds of normativity are thematically distinguishable. The current paper proposes a third approach that may show a way out of the controversy. Instead of viewing normative issues as belonging to one or more distinct thematic domains, it would be more accurate, both philosophically and psychologically speaking, to recognize that any given action may be grounded in multiple, non-exclusive reasons for action. Moral, conventional, and personal reasons for action may be defined in terms of what one believes one can respectively justify to all rational interlocutors, particular social partners, and oneself. The three kinds of reasons for action may accordingly be visualized as dimensions of normativity that together comprise a three-dimensional coordinate "space of reasons." To illustrate the dimensions approach, 16 examples are given of actions whose values vary independently on each of the three dimensions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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  Data: <i>Copyright of Philosophical Psychology is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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