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Rehashing the moral-conventional distinction: perceived harm marks the border.

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Title: Rehashing the moral-conventional distinction: perceived harm marks the border.
Authors: Sadek, Fatima H. (AUTHOR)
Source: Philosophical Psychology. May2026, Vol. 39 Issue 4, p1257-1278. 22p.
Subjects: Moral norms, Moral judgment, Social norms, Suffering, Cross-cultural differences
Abstract: Turiel and colleagues divided norms into two kinds: Moral norms and conventional norms. Moral norms are universal, concerned with welfare, justice, fairness, equality and/or rights, and rule/authority independent. Conventional norms are local, rule/authority dependent, and concerned with maintaining social coordination, preserving tradition, and avoiding punishment. This account has been challenged, and the existence of a crisp distinction remains debatable. In this paper, I defend a version of the moral/conventional distinction on the basis that people generally judge norms concerned with welfare violations as moral, and that they distinguish between the morality of the action and that of the agent. I argue that we can make sense of the mixed data because people differ in how they perceive harm. Harm perception, rather than "objective" harm, is the relevant variable in knowing how people judge norms. To illustrate this, I explore why people perceive norms differently and how the moral/conventional distinction is reflected not only between cultures, but within them too. This should prompt us to reimagine the moral/conventional distinction to account for this diversity in perceptions. Doing away with the distinction risks misrepresenting both inter- and intra-cultural diversity in perceptions of harm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of Philosophical Psychology is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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  Data: Rehashing the moral-conventional distinction: perceived harm marks the border.
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Moral+norms%22">Moral norms</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Moral+judgment%22">Moral judgment</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Social+norms%22">Social norms</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Suffering%22">Suffering</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Cross-cultural+differences%22">Cross-cultural differences</searchLink>
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  Data: Turiel and colleagues divided norms into two kinds: Moral norms and conventional norms. Moral norms are universal, concerned with welfare, justice, fairness, equality and/or rights, and rule/authority independent. Conventional norms are local, rule/authority dependent, and concerned with maintaining social coordination, preserving tradition, and avoiding punishment. This account has been challenged, and the existence of a crisp distinction remains debatable. In this paper, I defend a version of the moral/conventional distinction on the basis that people generally judge norms concerned with welfare violations as moral, and that they distinguish between the morality of the action and that of the agent. I argue that we can make sense of the mixed data because people differ in how they perceive harm. Harm perception, rather than "objective" harm, is the relevant variable in knowing how people judge norms. To illustrate this, I explore why people perceive norms differently and how the moral/conventional distinction is reflected not only between cultures, but within them too. This should prompt us to reimagine the moral/conventional distinction to account for this diversity in perceptions. Doing away with the distinction risks misrepresenting both inter- and intra-cultural diversity in perceptions of harm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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  Data: <i>Copyright of Philosophical Psychology is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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        Value: 10.1080/09515089.2024.2438796
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        Text: English
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      – SubjectFull: Social norms
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              Text: May2026
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