An action-first account of episodic memory.
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| Title: | An action-first account of episodic memory. |
|---|---|
| Authors: | Springle, Alison (AUTHOR), Goldwasser, Seth (AUTHOR) |
| Source: | Philosophical Psychology. Jul2026, Vol. 39 Issue 5, p2232-2269. 38p. |
| Subjects: | Episodic memory, Intentionality (Philosophy), Cognition, Philosophy of mind, Recognition (Psychology), Recollection (Psychology) |
| Abstract: | Building off of a recent account of intentionality, the action-forward framework, we introduce a novel account of episodic memory and defend its plausibility as an account of such memory. According to our account, episodic remembering consists in acts of performative retelling of the remembering subject's initial experience of an event where such retelling activates connected capacities for perceptual recognition of the event and its constituents. When such acts are overt, the remembering subject expresses their memory, say, verbally, imagistically, through performance, etc., where doing so reactivates those recognitional capacities. When such acts are covert, the remembering subject merely activates capacities for such expressions without going on to overtly express where doing so reactivates the relevant recognitional capacities. In §2, we introduce two desiderata on accounts of episodic memory. In §3, we give an overview of the action-forward framework for intentionality. In §4, we introduce our account of episodic memory. In §5, we show how the account satisfies the desiderata. We conclude by saying how the account differs from standard accounts in the literature while retaining what we take to be their insights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Copyright of Philosophical Psychology is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) | |
| Database: | Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection |
| FullText | Text: Availability: 0 |
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| Header | DbId: pbh DbLabel: Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection An: 195034967 AccessLevel: 6 PubType: Academic Journal PubTypeId: academicJournal PreciseRelevancyScore: 0 |
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| RecordInfo | BibRecord: BibEntity: Identifiers: – Type: doi Value: 10.1080/09515089.2025.2544147 Languages: – Code: eng Text: English PhysicalDescription: Pagination: PageCount: 38 StartPage: 2232 Subjects: – SubjectFull: Episodic memory Type: general – SubjectFull: Intentionality (Philosophy) Type: general – SubjectFull: Cognition Type: general – SubjectFull: Philosophy of mind Type: general – SubjectFull: Recognition (Psychology) Type: general – SubjectFull: Recollection (Psychology) Type: general Titles: – TitleFull: An action-first account of episodic memory. Type: main BibRelationships: HasContributorRelationships: – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Springle, Alison – PersonEntity: Name: NameFull: Goldwasser, Seth IsPartOfRelationships: – BibEntity: Dates: – D: 01 M: 07 Text: Jul2026 Type: published Y: 2026 Identifiers: – Type: issn-print Value: 09515089 Numbering: – Type: volume Value: 39 – Type: issue Value: 5 Titles: – TitleFull: Philosophical Psychology Type: main |
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