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A strengthened ethical version of Moore's Paradox? Lived paradoxes of self-loathing in psychosis and neurosis.

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Title: A strengthened ethical version of Moore's Paradox? Lived paradoxes of self-loathing in psychosis and neurosis.
Authors: Read, Rupert (AUTHOR)
Source: Philosophical Psychology. Feb2012, Vol. 25 Issue 1, p133-141. 9p.
Subjects: Moore's paradox, Psychoses, Neuroses, Jacobson, Anne, Finkelstein, David, Delusions, Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951
Abstract: Wittgenstein once remarked: “nobody can truthfully say of himself that he is filth. Because if I do say it, though it can be true in a sense, this is not a truth by which I myself can be penetrated: otherwise I should either have to go mad or change myself.” This has an immediate corollary, previously unnoted: that it may be true that someone is simply filth—a rotten person through and through—and also true that they don’t believe that they are filth (or, in a certain sense, that they do), but that it is absurd or means nothing to say “I’m filth.” Even considering the possibility seriously already prevents it from being true of one that one is (simply) filth. You just can't say “I'm filth” and mean it. In the act of saying it, it is already untrue. Nor can you even say and mean it: “it may be true that I’m filth,” and it still be true that you are filth. This paper considers cases of delusional belief and of depressive self-loathing in which people may find themselves believing things along the lines of “I’m filth.” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of Philosophical Psychology is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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  Data: A strengthened ethical version of Moore's Paradox? Lived paradoxes of self-loathing in psychosis and neurosis.
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  Data: Wittgenstein once remarked: “nobody can truthfully say of himself that he is filth. Because if I do say it, though it can be true in a sense, this is not a truth by which I myself can be penetrated: otherwise I should either have to go mad or change myself.” This has an immediate corollary, previously unnoted: that it may be true that someone is simply filth—a rotten person through and through—and also true that they don’t believe that they are filth (or, in a certain sense, that they do), but that it is absurd or means nothing to say “I’m filth.” Even considering the possibility seriously already prevents it from being true of one that one is (simply) filth. You just can't say “I'm filth” and mean it. In the act of saying it, it is already untrue. Nor can you even say and mean it: “it may be true that I’m filth,” and it still be true that you are filth. This paper considers cases of delusional belief and of depressive self-loathing in which people may find themselves believing things along the lines of “I’m filth.” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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  Data: <i>Copyright of Philosophical Psychology is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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        Value: 10.1080/09515089.2011.569913
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        Text: English
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      – SubjectFull: Moore's paradox
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Psychoses
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      – SubjectFull: Neuroses
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      – SubjectFull: Delusions
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      – SubjectFull: Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951
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              Text: Feb2012
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