Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants: Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools.

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Bibliographic Details
Title: Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants: Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools.
Authors: Leaver, Clare1 (AUTHOR) clare.leaver@bsg.ox.ac.uk, Ozier, Owen2 (AUTHOR) owen.ozier@williams.edu, Serneels, Pieter3 (AUTHOR) p.serneels@uea.ac.uk, Zeitlin, Andrew4 (AUTHOR) andrew.zeitlin@georgetown.edu
Source: American Economic Review. Jul2021, Vol. 111 Issue 7, p2213-2246. 34p.
Database: Business Source Ultimate
Description
ISSN:00028282
DOI:10.1257/aer.20191972