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On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design.

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Bibliographic Details
Title: On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design.
Authors: Anunrojwong, Jerry1 (AUTHOR) janunrojwong25@gsb.columbia.edu, Balseiro, Santiago R.1 (AUTHOR) srb2155@columbia.edu, Besbes, Omar1 (AUTHOR) ob2105@columbia.edu
Source: Operations Research. May/Jun2025, Vol. 73 Issue 3, p1659-1674. 16p.
Database: Business Source Ultimate
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ISSN:0030364X
DOI:10.1287/opre.2022.0428