Bibliographic Details
| Title: |
On the (In)Security of ElGamal in OpenPGP. |
| Authors: |
De Feo, Luca1 feo@zurich.ibm.com, Poettering, Bertram1 poe@zurich.ibm.com, Sorniotti, Alessandro1 aso@zurich.ibm.com |
| Source: |
Communications of the ACM. Jun2023, Vol. 66 Issue 6, p107-115. 9p. 1 Black and White Photograph, 2 Charts, 3 Graphs. |
| Subjects: |
Public key cryptography, Email security, Ciphers, Privacy, Logarithms |
| Abstract: |
Roughly four decades ago, Taher ElGamal put forward what is today one of the most widely known and best understood public key encryption schemes. ElGamal encryption has been used in many different contexts, chiefly among them by the OpenPGP email encryption standard. Despite its simplicity, or perhaps because of it, in reality there is a large degree of ambiguity on several key aspects of the cipher. Each library in the OpenPGP ecosystem seems to have implemented a slightly different "flavor" of ElGamal encryption. While-taken in isolation-each implementation may be secure, we reveal that in the interoperable world of OpenPGP, unforeseen cross-configuration attacks become possible. Concretely, we propose different such attacks and show their practical efficacy by recovering plaintexts and even secret keys. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
|
Copyright of Communications of the ACM is the property of Association for Computing Machinery and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) |
| Database: |
Engineering Source |
