Joint Network-Centric and User-Centric Radio Resource Management in a Multicell System.

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Bibliographic Details
Title: Joint Network-Centric and User-Centric Radio Resource Management in a Multicell System.
Authors: Nan Feng1 vonnan@winlab.rutgers.edu, Siun-Chuon Mau1 siunmau@winlab.rutgers.edu, Mandayam, Narayan B.1 narayan@winlb.rutgers.edu
Source: IEEE Transactions on Communications. Jul2005, Vol. 53 Issue 7, p1114-1118. 5p.
Subjects: Netcentric computing, Information resources management, Game theory, Distributed computing, Stochastic information theory, Telecommunication
Abstract: A pricing mechanism to mediate (and allocate resources) between conflicting user and network objectives has been recently proposed by the authors in a single-cell system. Here, we extend the results to a multicell system, where the autonomous base station assignment and power control are formulated as a noncooperative game among users. The network prices the resources using two strategies: global pricing that maximizes the revenue, and minimax pricing that trades off the revenue for a more even resource allocation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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Database: Engineering Source
Description
Abstract:A pricing mechanism to mediate (and allocate resources) between conflicting user and network objectives has been recently proposed by the authors in a single-cell system. Here, we extend the results to a multicell system, where the autonomous base station assignment and power control are formulated as a noncooperative game among users. The network prices the resources using two strategies: global pricing that maximizes the revenue, and minimax pricing that trades off the revenue for a more even resource allocation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
ISSN:00906778
DOI:10.1109/TCOMM.2005.851629