Efficiency and the core in NTU games in partition function form.
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| Title: | Efficiency and the core in NTU games in partition function form. |
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| Authors: | Bimonte, Giovanna1 (AUTHOR) gbimonte@unisa.it, Senatore, Luigi1 (AUTHOR) lsenatore@unisa.it, Tramontano, Salvatore2 (AUTHOR) stramontano@unisa.it |
| Source: | Annals of Operations Research. Jan2026, Vol. 356 Issue 1, p123-134. 12p. |
| Subjects: | Partition functions, Externalities, Mathematical optimization, Game theory |
| Abstract: | The aim of this paper is to establish a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core in NTU games in partition function form, given an externality scheme f ∈ Ex (N) . We extend the notion of convexity to incorporate externality effects. By introducing a new concept of rationality, called collective rationality, we demonstrate the efficiency of the grand coalition N. We also identify a sufficient condition for the efficiency of the grand coalition using the property of individual superadditivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| Database: | Engineering Source |
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| Abstract: | The aim of this paper is to establish a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core in NTU games in partition function form, given an externality scheme f ∈ Ex (N) . We extend the notion of convexity to incorporate externality effects. By introducing a new concept of rationality, called collective rationality, we demonstrate the efficiency of the grand coalition N. We also identify a sufficient condition for the efficiency of the grand coalition using the property of individual superadditivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| ISSN: | 02545330 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s10479-024-06192-1 |
