View in EDS

Stakeholder Strategies and Cooperation for Rural Water Supply Security in China.

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Title: Stakeholder Strategies and Cooperation for Rural Water Supply Security in China.
Authors: Sun, Yong1,2 (AUTHOR), Lin, Yuling1 (AUTHOR), Huang, Huimin1 (AUTHOR), Shen, Mou3 (AUTHOR) 15929923676@163.com
Source: Water & Environment Journal. Feb2026, Vol. 40 Issue 1, p103-116. 14p.
Subjects: Rural water supply, Water security, Stakeholder analysis, Cooperation, Water quality monitoring, Game theory
Geographic Terms: China
Abstract: Based on the Chinese context, this study uses evolutionary game theory to analyse the factors affecting rural water supply security, modelling regulators, water suppliers and farmers as players to explore the feasibility of effective cooperation mechanisms. Key findings include the following: (1) Eight stable equilibrium strategies exist under certain conditions. (2) Increased net benefits from active regulation lead regulators to enforce rules more rigorously, with higher penalties enhancing their willingness. (3) Water suppliers are more likely to adopt stringent safety measures when the benefits of providing safe water increase, thereby reducing the need for regulatory intervention. (4) Farmers are more inclined to monitor water quality when participation benefits increase, prompting utilities to enhance safety. Therefore, policymakers should strengthen regulatory frameworks to encourage stakeholder participation and establish effective communication and collaboration mechanisms. This study's novelty lies in applying evolutionary game theory to multi‐stakeholder interactions in rural water supply, promoting cooperation and improving management strategies. Summary: This study models stakeholder interactions using evolutionary game theory to enhance rural water supply security.Effective regulation requires the collaborative efforts of regulatory agencies, suppliers and farmers.Enhanced regulatory benefits encourage safer water supply practices.Penalties for non‐compliance and brand reputation motivate firms to ensure water supply safety.Farmers' monitoring activities are influenced by their perceived gains and risks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of Water & Environment Journal is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
Database: Engineering Source
Description
Abstract:Based on the Chinese context, this study uses evolutionary game theory to analyse the factors affecting rural water supply security, modelling regulators, water suppliers and farmers as players to explore the feasibility of effective cooperation mechanisms. Key findings include the following: (1) Eight stable equilibrium strategies exist under certain conditions. (2) Increased net benefits from active regulation lead regulators to enforce rules more rigorously, with higher penalties enhancing their willingness. (3) Water suppliers are more likely to adopt stringent safety measures when the benefits of providing safe water increase, thereby reducing the need for regulatory intervention. (4) Farmers are more inclined to monitor water quality when participation benefits increase, prompting utilities to enhance safety. Therefore, policymakers should strengthen regulatory frameworks to encourage stakeholder participation and establish effective communication and collaboration mechanisms. This study's novelty lies in applying evolutionary game theory to multi‐stakeholder interactions in rural water supply, promoting cooperation and improving management strategies. Summary: This study models stakeholder interactions using evolutionary game theory to enhance rural water supply security.Effective regulation requires the collaborative efforts of regulatory agencies, suppliers and farmers.Enhanced regulatory benefits encourage safer water supply practices.Penalties for non‐compliance and brand reputation motivate firms to ensure water supply safety.Farmers' monitoring activities are influenced by their perceived gains and risks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
ISSN:17476585
DOI:10.1111/wej.70015