Bibliographic Details
| Title: |
Dynamic Analysis of Evolutionary Game Considering the Evolution of Individual Sociability. |
| Authors: |
Zhang, Hongyu1 15166169297@163.com, Hu, Yuhan2 anshanhyh@163.com |
| Source: |
IAENG International Journal of Applied Mathematics. Mar2026, Vol. 56 Issue 3, p1123-1134. 12p. |
| Subjects: |
Prisoner's dilemma game, Sociability, Prosocial behavior, Evolutionary theories, Game theory, Reward (Psychology), Cooperation |
| Abstract: |
Cooperation, a cornerstone of both ancient and modern societies, is shaped by a range of factors, one of which is individual sociability. This study investigates the impact of individual sociability on cooperation by developing an evolutionary game theory model based on the Prisoner's Dilemma. The model involves the evolution of four strategies: Cooperation, Sociability Cooperation, Defection and Sociability Defection. It emphasizes that individuals employing sociability must bear additional costs to gain greater benefits in the game, while effectively using their social advantages among peers, thereby promoting mutually beneficial outcome for both individuals and groups. The results of this study suggest that within a population, skilled sociability not only enhances an individual's personal rewards, but also facilitates diverse partnerships to mitigate risks and thereby increase communal rewards collectively. Individuals with proficient sociability offer heightened opportunities and create stable cooperative environments, providing unique insights for real-life team management, economic cooperation, and game strategy analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| Database: |
Engineering Source |