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Dynamic Analysis of Evolutionary Game Considering the Evolution of Individual Sociability.

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Title: Dynamic Analysis of Evolutionary Game Considering the Evolution of Individual Sociability.
Authors: Zhang, Hongyu1 15166169297@163.com, Hu, Yuhan2 anshanhyh@163.com
Source: IAENG International Journal of Applied Mathematics. Mar2026, Vol. 56 Issue 3, p1123-1134. 12p.
Subjects: Prisoner's dilemma game, Sociability, Prosocial behavior, Evolutionary theories, Game theory, Reward (Psychology), Cooperation
Abstract: Cooperation, a cornerstone of both ancient and modern societies, is shaped by a range of factors, one of which is individual sociability. This study investigates the impact of individual sociability on cooperation by developing an evolutionary game theory model based on the Prisoner's Dilemma. The model involves the evolution of four strategies: Cooperation, Sociability Cooperation, Defection and Sociability Defection. It emphasizes that individuals employing sociability must bear additional costs to gain greater benefits in the game, while effectively using their social advantages among peers, thereby promoting mutually beneficial outcome for both individuals and groups. The results of this study suggest that within a population, skilled sociability not only enhances an individual's personal rewards, but also facilitates diverse partnerships to mitigate risks and thereby increase communal rewards collectively. Individuals with proficient sociability offer heightened opportunities and create stable cooperative environments, providing unique insights for real-life team management, economic cooperation, and game strategy analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of IAENG International Journal of Applied Mathematics is the property of International Association of Engineers (IAENG) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
Database: Engineering Source
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  Data: Dynamic Analysis of Evolutionary Game Considering the Evolution of Individual Sociability.
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Zhang%2C+Hongyu%22">Zhang, Hongyu</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo><i> 15166169297@163.com</i><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Hu%2C+Yuhan%22">Hu, Yuhan</searchLink><relatesTo>2</relatesTo><i> anshanhyh@163.com</i>
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22IAENG+International+Journal+of+Applied+Mathematics%22">IAENG International Journal of Applied Mathematics</searchLink>. Mar2026, Vol. 56 Issue 3, p1123-1134. 12p.
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Prisoner's+dilemma+game%22">Prisoner's dilemma game</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Sociability%22">Sociability</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Prosocial+behavior%22">Prosocial behavior</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Evolutionary+theories%22">Evolutionary theories</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Game+theory%22">Game theory</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Reward+%28Psychology%29%22">Reward (Psychology)</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Cooperation%22">Cooperation</searchLink>
– Name: Abstract
  Label: Abstract
  Group: Ab
  Data: Cooperation, a cornerstone of both ancient and modern societies, is shaped by a range of factors, one of which is individual sociability. This study investigates the impact of individual sociability on cooperation by developing an evolutionary game theory model based on the Prisoner's Dilemma. The model involves the evolution of four strategies: Cooperation, Sociability Cooperation, Defection and Sociability Defection. It emphasizes that individuals employing sociability must bear additional costs to gain greater benefits in the game, while effectively using their social advantages among peers, thereby promoting mutually beneficial outcome for both individuals and groups. The results of this study suggest that within a population, skilled sociability not only enhances an individual's personal rewards, but also facilitates diverse partnerships to mitigate risks and thereby increase communal rewards collectively. Individuals with proficient sociability offer heightened opportunities and create stable cooperative environments, providing unique insights for real-life team management, economic cooperation, and game strategy analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
– Name: AbstractSuppliedCopyright
  Label:
  Group: Ab
  Data: <i>Copyright of IAENG International Journal of Applied Mathematics is the property of International Association of Engineers (IAENG) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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        Text: English
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        PageCount: 12
        StartPage: 1123
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      – SubjectFull: Prisoner's dilemma game
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Sociability
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Prosocial behavior
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      – SubjectFull: Evolutionary theories
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      – SubjectFull: Game theory
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      – SubjectFull: Reward (Psychology)
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      – SubjectFull: Cooperation
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              Text: Mar2026
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              Y: 2026
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