When Computers Fly, It Has to Be Right: Using SPARK for Flight Control of Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.

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Bibliographic Details
Title: When Computers Fly, It Has to Be Right: Using SPARK for Flight Control of Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.
Authors: Sward, Ricky E.1 ricky.sward@wavmax.com, Gerken, Mark1 mark.gerken@usafa.af.mil, Casey, Dan1 daniel.casey@ramstein.af.mil
Source: CrossTalk: The Journal of Defense Software Engineering. Sep2006, Vol. 19 Issue 9, p10-14. 5p. 3 Diagrams.
Subjects: SPARK (Computer program language), Computer software, Computer systems, Computer industry, Software failures, System failures
Geographic Terms: United States
Abstract: One approach to software assurance is to use an annotated language such as SPARK. For safety critical software programs such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicle flight control software, the risk of software failure demands high assurance that the software will perform its intended function. Using an example from work being done at the U.S. Air Force Academy, this article describes SPARK and the formal process of proving correctness of software implementations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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Database: Engineering Source
Description
Abstract:One approach to software assurance is to use an annotated language such as SPARK. For safety critical software programs such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicle flight control software, the risk of software failure demands high assurance that the software will perform its intended function. Using an example from work being done at the U.S. Air Force Academy, this article describes SPARK and the formal process of proving correctness of software implementations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
ISSN:21601577