Bibliographic Details
| Title: |
Secure group key establishment revisited. |
| Authors: |
Bohli, Jens-Matthias1 bohli@ira.uka.de, González Vasco, María2 mariaisabel.vasco@urjc.es, Steinwandt, Rainer3 rsteinwa@fau.edu |
| Source: |
International Journal of Information Security. Jul2007, Vol. 6 Issue 4, p243-254. 12p. 3 Illustrations. |
| Subjects: |
Data protection, Computer security conferences, Public key infrastructure (Computer security), Data security, Database security, Computer network security |
| Abstract: |
We examine the popular proof models for group key establishment of Bresson et al. (LNCS 2248: 290–309, 2001; Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on computer and communications security (CCS-8), 2001) and point out missing security properties addressing malicious protocol participants. We show that established group key establishment schemes from CRYPTO 2003 and ASIACRYPT 2004 do not fully meet these new requirements. Next to giving a formal definition of these extended security properties, we prove a variant of the explored proposal from ASIACRYPT 2004 secure in this stricter sense. Our proof builds on the Computational Diffie Hellman (CDH) assumption and the random oracle model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| Database: |
Engineering Source |
