View in EDS

Measuring the effects of managed care on physicians' perceptions of their personal financial incentives.

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Title:	Measuring the effects of managed care on physicians' perceptions of their personal financial incentives.
Authors:	Mitchell JM (AUTHOR), Hadley J (AUTHOR), Sulmasy DP (AUTHOR), Bloche JG (AUTHOR)
Source:	Inquiry (00469580). Summer2000, Vol. 37 Issue 2, p134-145. 12p.
Abstract:	Using data from the 1997 Resurvey of Young Physicians (N = 1,549), this study examines whether several measures of physicians' contractual arrangements with health plans are associated with their perceptions of overall financial incentives to either decrease or increase the volume of services to patients. Results indicate the following factors were significantly associated with an increased likelihood of reporting an incentive to decrease services: a gatekeeper arrangement with a compensation incentive; the perception of a high risk of plan deselection for physicians with high costs; the perception that referrals received depended on the costs of care provided; communication prohibiting or discouraging the disclosure to patients of the physician's financial relationship with the health plan; receiving capitation payments from at least one plan; and employment in a health maintenance organization. Being compensated on a fee-for-service basis or receiving a salary with incentive or bonus provisions (compared to straight salary) were associated with an increased likelihood of reporting an incentive to increase services to patients. Physicians' overall methods of compensation had a relatively small impact on their perceived financial incentives compared to other statistically significant factors. Our findings suggest that physicians' self-reported, overall personal financial incentives within their practices are a valid summary measure of the heterogeneous mix of specific financial arrangements faced by most physicians. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
	Copyright of Inquiry (00469580) is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
Database:	Education Research Complete

Description
Abstract:	Using data from the 1997 Resurvey of Young Physicians (N = 1,549), this study examines whether several measures of physicians' contractual arrangements with health plans are associated with their perceptions of overall financial incentives to either decrease or increase the volume of services to patients. Results indicate the following factors were significantly associated with an increased likelihood of reporting an incentive to decrease services: a gatekeeper arrangement with a compensation incentive; the perception of a high risk of plan deselection for physicians with high costs; the perception that referrals received depended on the costs of care provided; communication prohibiting or discouraging the disclosure to patients of the physician's financial relationship with the health plan; receiving capitation payments from at least one plan; and employment in a health maintenance organization. Being compensated on a fee-for-service basis or receiving a salary with incentive or bonus provisions (compared to straight salary) were associated with an increased likelihood of reporting an incentive to increase services to patients. Physicians' overall methods of compensation had a relatively small impact on their perceived financial incentives compared to other statistically significant factors. Our findings suggest that physicians' self-reported, overall personal financial incentives within their practices are a valid summary measure of the heterogeneous mix of specific financial arrangements faced by most physicians. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
ISSN:	00469580