Teacher Work Motivation in the Era of Extrinsic Incentives: Performance Goals and Pro-social Commitments in the Service of Equity.
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| Title: | Teacher Work Motivation in the Era of Extrinsic Incentives: Performance Goals and Pro-social Commitments in the Service of Equity. |
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| Alternate Title: | La motivación de los maestros para trabajar en la era de los incentivos extrínsecos: Objetivos de desempeño y compromisos pro-sociales al servicio de la equidad. Motivação dos professores para trabalhar na era dos incentivos extrínsecos extrínsecos: Metas de desempenho e compromissos pró-sociais ao serviço da equidade. |
| Authors: | Mintrop, Rick1 mintrop@berkeley.edu, Ordenes, Miguel1 miguel.ordenes@berkeley.edu |
| Source: | Education Policy Analysis Archives / Archivos Analíticos de Políticas Educativas / Arquivos Analíticos de Políticas Educativas. May2017, Vol. 25 Issue 43-52, p1-40. 40p. |
| Subject Terms: | *Teacher evaluation, *Job satisfaction of teachers, *Extrinsic motivation, Labor incentives, Pay for performance, Quality of service, Prosocial behavior, Commitment (Psychology) |
| Geographic Terms: | United States |
| Abstract (English): | Mindful of the withering of high-stakes accountability and disappointing data from pay for performance evaluations in the US, we ask why management by extrinsic incentives and organizational goal setting may have been far less powerful than designers of accountability and extrinsic incentive systems had expected. We explore how system-generated motives (e.g., attaining specific organizational goals, preventing sanctions, or garnering rewards) stack up against autonomously generated, intrinsic, or service motives.? We found through both quantitative and qualitative data that for teachers in the charter schools a constellation of public service motives predominated: diffuse pro-social commitments, ideologies of fairness and equity, a belief in the moral deservingness of deprived student populations in opposition to societal neglect, and identification with one's work as a personal calling. By comparison, monetary rewards were embraced as already deserved. Neither rewards, nor accountability, seemed to regulate behavior in a deep way. Prestige was not bestowed by official performance statuses within the accountability system, but flowed from judgments, personally communicated, by students, parents, or colleagues who had direct contact with teachers' work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Abstract (Spanish): | Conscientes de la decadencia de la rendición de cuentas y de la decepcionante evidencia de las evaluaciones de los sistemas de pago por desempeño en los EE.UU., nos preguntamos por qué la gestión mediante incentivos extrínsecos y por fijación de objetivos organizacionales ha sido menos poderosa de lo que los diseñadores habían esperado. Exploramos la forma en que los motivos generados por el sistema (e.g., alcanzar objetivos organizacionales específicos, prevenir sanciones u obtener recompensas) se acumulaban en contra de motivos generados de forma autónoma, intrínseca o de servicio. Usando datos cuantitativos y cualitativos, encontramos que para los maestros predominaba una constelación de motivos de servicio público: compromisos prosociales, ideologías de justicia y equidad, creencia en la dignidad moral de los estudiantes desfavorecidos y una tendencia a la identificación con el trabajo propio como un "llamado" personal. En comparación, las recompensas monetarias fueron aceptadas como si los maestros ya las merecieran y ni las recompensas ni la rendición de cuentas parecían regular el comportamiento de forma profunda. El prestigio no fue derivado del desempeño formal dentro del sistema de incentivos, sino que fluyó del juicio comunicado por estudiantes, padres o colegas que tuvieron contacto directo con el trabajo de los docentes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Abstract (Portuguese): | Ciente do declínio da prestação de contas e as provas decepcionante das avaliações dos sistemas de pagamento de desempenho nos EUA, nos perguntamos por que a ges tão por incentivos extrínsecos e definir objetivos organizacionais tem sido menos potente o que os designers tinham antecipado. Nós explorar como os motivos gerados pelo sistema (por exemplo, alcançar os objetivos organizacionais específicos, evitar sanções ou obter recompensas) empilhadas contra razões autonomamente gerados, intrínseca ou serviço. Usando dados quantitativos e qualitativos, descobrimos que para os professores dominadas por uma constelação de razões de serviço público: compromissos pró-sociais, ideologias de justiça e equidade, crença na dignidade moral de estudantes desfavorecidos e uma tendência a identificação com o trabalho como uma "chamada de" pessoal. Em comparação, as recompensas monetárias foram aceitos como se os professores e recompensas merecidas e nem responsabilidade nem regular o comportamento parecia profundamente. O prestígio foi derivada há incentivos de desempenho formais dentro do sistema, mas fluiu a partir da declaração por alunos, pais ou colegas que tiveram contato direto com o julgamento trabalho dos professores. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| Database: | Education Research Complete |
| Abstract: | Mindful of the withering of high-stakes accountability and disappointing data from pay for performance evaluations in the US, we ask why management by extrinsic incentives and organizational goal setting may have been far less powerful than designers of accountability and extrinsic incentive systems had expected. We explore how system-generated motives (e.g., attaining specific organizational goals, preventing sanctions, or garnering rewards) stack up against autonomously generated, intrinsic, or service motives.? We found through both quantitative and qualitative data that for teachers in the charter schools a constellation of public service motives predominated: diffuse pro-social commitments, ideologies of fairness and equity, a belief in the moral deservingness of deprived student populations in opposition to societal neglect, and identification with one's work as a personal calling. By comparison, monetary rewards were embraced as already deserved. Neither rewards, nor accountability, seemed to regulate behavior in a deep way. Prestige was not bestowed by official performance statuses within the accountability system, but flowed from judgments, personally communicated, by students, parents, or colleagues who had direct contact with teachers' work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| ISSN: | 10682341 |
| DOI: | 10.14507/epaa.25.2482 |
