Moral exemplars in education: a liberal account.

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Bibliographic Details
Title: Moral exemplars in education: a liberal account.
Authors: Croce, Michel1,2 michelcroce@edu.ulisboa.pt
Source: Ethics & Education. May2020, Vol. 15 Issue 2, p186-199. 14p.
Subject Terms: *Moral education, Example, Virtue, Ethics
People: Zagzebski, Linda
Abstract: This paper takes issue with the exemplarist strategy of fostering virtue development with the specific goal of improving its applicability in the context of education. I argue that, for what matters educationally, we have good reasons to endorse a liberal account of moral exemplarity. Specifically, I challenge two key assumptions of Linda Zagzebski's Exemplarist Moral Theory, namely that moral exemplars are exceptionally virtuous agents and that imitating their behavior is the main strategy for acquiring the virtues. I will introduce and discuss the notions of enkratic exemplars and injustice illuminators and show that we have good reasons to consider them moral exemplars although they fail to satisfy (either of) the key assumptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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Database: Education Research Complete
Description
Abstract:This paper takes issue with the exemplarist strategy of fostering virtue development with the specific goal of improving its applicability in the context of education. I argue that, for what matters educationally, we have good reasons to endorse a liberal account of moral exemplarity. Specifically, I challenge two key assumptions of Linda Zagzebski's Exemplarist Moral Theory, namely that moral exemplars are exceptionally virtuous agents and that imitating their behavior is the main strategy for acquiring the virtues. I will introduce and discuss the notions of enkratic exemplars and injustice illuminators and show that we have good reasons to consider them moral exemplars although they fail to satisfy (either of) the key assumptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
ISSN:17449642
DOI:10.1080/17449642.2020.1731658