Trading‐off monetary rewards as reinforcers to enhance task motivation and performance of publication in academia.
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| Title: | Trading‐off monetary rewards as reinforcers to enhance task motivation and performance of publication in academia. |
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| Authors: | Gaus, Nurdiana1 nurdiana.gaus@gmail.com, Jasruddin2, Saleh, Arifin3, Resnawaty, Risna4, Paramma, Muhammad Azwar1, Tanjung, Yurisna3 |
| Source: | Higher Education Quarterly. Oct2022, Vol. 76 Issue 4, p800-814. 15p. |
| Subject Terms: | *Adults, *Higher education, Rewards programs (Criminal investigation), Publications, Labor incentives |
| Abstract (English): | This paper aims to examine how an inappropriate traded‐off design scheme of monetary rewards as reinforcers to task motivation and performance can promote poor quality of publication in academia and create the potential 'hidden costs of rewards.' Six universities in the western and eastern regions of Indonesia were selected to investigate this issue, and 70 academics from different social science backgrounds were interviewed. Our research results show that the monetary rewards implemented by the Indonesian government only act as a trigger for the initial motivation and become a quantitative lever for journal publications, not a quality lever. Consequently, the quality of publication is still poor because of the low‐powered incentive schemes that are designed based on task‐completion, disregarding the 'synergistic effect' between the government's intentions and the academics' attributions. The implications of this study and recommendations to policymakers are provided in this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Abstract (Indonesian): | Paper ini bertujuan untuk mengkaji bagaimana skema desain penghargaan uang sebagai penguat untuk motivasi kerja dan kinerja yang didesain secara tidak tepat dapat menghasilkan kinerja dan kualitas publikasi yang buruk di universitas dan mengakibatkan terjadinya 'hidden cost of rewards'. Sebanyak enam universitas dari wilayah barat dan Timur Indonesia dipilih untuk mengkaji masalah ini, dan sebanyak 70 akademisi dari bidang ilmu sosial yang berbeda diwawancara. Hasil penelitian kami menunjukkan bahwa skema penghargaan uang yang diterapkan oleh pemerintah Indonesia bekerja sebagai pendogkrak motivasi awal bagi akademisi untuk lebih produktif dalam melakukan riset dan publikasi dan menjadi alat pengungkit jumlah tapi bukan kualitas. Akibatnya, kualitas publikasi masih sangat rendah disebabkan oleh skema insentif yang bersifat rendah kekuatannya yang mana didesain berdasarkan pada peneyelesaian tugas, mengesampingkan efek sinergitas antara maksud pemerintah dan atribusi yang diberikan oleh akademisi. terhadap maksud tersebut. Implikasi dari penelitian ini dan rekomendasi pada pembuat kebijakan disediakan didalam paper ini. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| Database: | Education Research Complete |
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| Abstract: | This paper aims to examine how an inappropriate traded‐off design scheme of monetary rewards as reinforcers to task motivation and performance can promote poor quality of publication in academia and create the potential 'hidden costs of rewards.' Six universities in the western and eastern regions of Indonesia were selected to investigate this issue, and 70 academics from different social science backgrounds were interviewed. Our research results show that the monetary rewards implemented by the Indonesian government only act as a trigger for the initial motivation and become a quantitative lever for journal publications, not a quality lever. Consequently, the quality of publication is still poor because of the low‐powered incentive schemes that are designed based on task‐completion, disregarding the 'synergistic effect' between the government's intentions and the academics' attributions. The implications of this study and recommendations to policymakers are provided in this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| ISSN: | 09515224 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/hequ.12350 |
