The New‐Meaning Objection: A Reply to Nicolò D'Agruma.
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| Title: | The New‐Meaning Objection: A Reply to Nicolò D'Agruma. |
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| Authors: | Devitt, Michael1 (AUTHOR) mdevitt@gc.cuny.edu, Porot, Nicolas2 (AUTHOR) |
| Source: | Cognitive Science. Jan2025, Vol. 49 Issue 1, p1-7. 7p. |
| Subject Terms: | Objections (Evidence), Semantics methodology, Vignettes, Argument |
| Abstract: | In our paper, "The reference of proper names" (2018), we raised and rebutted the "New‐Meaning" objection to our methodology. Our rebuttal rested on theoretical considerations and experimental results. In "Do the Gödel vignettes involve a new descriptivist meaning?", Nicolò D'Agruma provides an interesting argument against our theoretical considerations (but does not address the experimental evidence). Our present paper argues against D'Agruma. So, our original rebuttal of the objection still stands. We offer further evidence against the objection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| Database: | Education Research Complete |
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