Regulatory offsetting in advanced democracies.
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| Title: | Regulatory offsetting in advanced democracies. |
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| Authors: | Steinebach, Yves1 (AUTHOR) yves.steinebach@stv.uio.no, Hinterleitner, Markus2 (AUTHOR) markus.hinterleitner@unil.ch, Fernández‐i‐Marín, Xavier3 (AUTHOR) x.fernandez-i-marin@ub.edu |
| Source: | Public Administration Review. Sep/Oct2025, Vol. 85 Issue 5, p1398-1411. 14p. |
| Subject Terms: | *Government policy, Government regulation, Political systems, Government agencies, Legislative bodies |
| Company/Entity: | Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development |
| Abstract: | The growth of rules in modern democracies burdens citizens, businesses, and administrative bodies. To address this, many governments have implemented so‐called "regulatory offsetting schemes," requiring the removal of existing rules and regulations for each new one introduced. However, systematic knowledge on which countries have adopted these schemes and their specific designs remains lacking. Our study maps regulatory offsetting initiatives across OECD states and offers a first theoretical framework for understanding government adoption. While political and ideational factors influence the adoption of offsetting schemes, they do not explain their specific design. Offsetting schemes thus reflect the political tensions between advocates for an activist state and supporters of a more restrained government, with design being of secondary importance. These findings enhance our understanding of how governments and public administrations manage rule growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| Database: | Education Research Complete |
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| Abstract: | The growth of rules in modern democracies burdens citizens, businesses, and administrative bodies. To address this, many governments have implemented so‐called "regulatory offsetting schemes," requiring the removal of existing rules and regulations for each new one introduced. However, systematic knowledge on which countries have adopted these schemes and their specific designs remains lacking. Our study maps regulatory offsetting initiatives across OECD states and offers a first theoretical framework for understanding government adoption. While political and ideational factors influence the adoption of offsetting schemes, they do not explain their specific design. Offsetting schemes thus reflect the political tensions between advocates for an activist state and supporters of a more restrained government, with design being of secondary importance. These findings enhance our understanding of how governments and public administrations manage rule growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| ISSN: | 00333352 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/puar.13887 |
