Regulatory offsetting in advanced democracies.

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Title: Regulatory offsetting in advanced democracies.
Authors: Steinebach, Yves1 (AUTHOR) yves.steinebach@stv.uio.no, Hinterleitner, Markus2 (AUTHOR) markus.hinterleitner@unil.ch, Fernández‐i‐Marín, Xavier3 (AUTHOR) x.fernandez-i-marin@ub.edu
Source: Public Administration Review. Sep/Oct2025, Vol. 85 Issue 5, p1398-1411. 14p.
Subject Terms: *Government policy, Government regulation, Political systems, Government agencies, Legislative bodies
Company/Entity: Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development
Abstract: The growth of rules in modern democracies burdens citizens, businesses, and administrative bodies. To address this, many governments have implemented so‐called "regulatory offsetting schemes," requiring the removal of existing rules and regulations for each new one introduced. However, systematic knowledge on which countries have adopted these schemes and their specific designs remains lacking. Our study maps regulatory offsetting initiatives across OECD states and offers a first theoretical framework for understanding government adoption. While political and ideational factors influence the adoption of offsetting schemes, they do not explain their specific design. Offsetting schemes thus reflect the political tensions between advocates for an activist state and supporters of a more restrained government, with design being of secondary importance. These findings enhance our understanding of how governments and public administrations manage rule growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of Public Administration Review is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Public+Administration+Review%22">Public Administration Review</searchLink>. Sep/Oct2025, Vol. 85 Issue 5, p1398-1411. 14p.
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  Data: *<searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Government+policy%22">Government policy</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Government+regulation%22">Government regulation</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Political+systems%22">Political systems</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Government+agencies%22">Government agencies</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Legislative+bodies%22">Legislative bodies</searchLink>
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  Data: The growth of rules in modern democracies burdens citizens, businesses, and administrative bodies. To address this, many governments have implemented so‐called "regulatory offsetting schemes," requiring the removal of existing rules and regulations for each new one introduced. However, systematic knowledge on which countries have adopted these schemes and their specific designs remains lacking. Our study maps regulatory offsetting initiatives across OECD states and offers a first theoretical framework for understanding government adoption. While political and ideational factors influence the adoption of offsetting schemes, they do not explain their specific design. Offsetting schemes thus reflect the political tensions between advocates for an activist state and supporters of a more restrained government, with design being of secondary importance. These findings enhance our understanding of how governments and public administrations manage rule growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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  Label:
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  Data: <i>Copyright of Public Administration Review is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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        Value: 10.1111/puar.13887
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        Text: English
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            – D: 01
              M: 09
              Text: Sep/Oct2025
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              Y: 2025
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