The Effects of Capped Piece-Rate Teacher Bonuses: Evidence from Advanced Placement. EdWorkingPaper No. 26-1456
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| Title: | The Effects of Capped Piece-Rate Teacher Bonuses: Evidence from Advanced Placement. EdWorkingPaper No. 26-1456 |
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| Language: | English |
| Authors: | Md Twfiqur Rahman, Annenberg Institute for School Reform at Brown University |
| Source: | Annenberg Institute for School Reform at Brown University. 2026. |
| Availability: | Annenberg Institute for School Reform at Brown University. Brown University Box 1985, Providence, RI 02912. Tel: 401-863-7990; Fax: 401-863-1290; e-mail: annenberg@brown.edu; Web site: https://annenberg.brown.edu/ |
| Peer Reviewed: | N |
| Page Count: | 65 |
| Publication Date: | 2026 |
| Document Type: | Reports - Research Numerical/Quantitative Data |
| Education Level: | High Schools Secondary Education |
| Descriptors: | Advanced Placement Programs, High School Teachers, Incentives, Teacher Salaries, Merit Pay, Equivalency Tests, Scores |
| Geographic Terms: | North Carolina |
| Abstract: | I study a proficiency-based incentive program that rewards Advanced Placement (AP) teachers a piece-rate for each student scoring 3 or higher on the standardized exam. Using student-course-level administrative data and exploiting both within- and across-teacher variation, I find the program increased the probability that an AP enrollment results in a score of 3 or higher by 2.4 percentage points. I further find no evidence of educational triage, as gains were concentrated at the top of the AP score distribution (4s and 5s). Teacher responses also varied systematically, indicating that the effectiveness of performance pay depends jointly on incentive strength and the nature of the task. |
| Abstractor: | As Provided |
| Entry Date: | 20260101 |
| Accession Number: | ED681904 |
| Database: | ERIC |
| Abstract: | I study a proficiency-based incentive program that rewards Advanced Placement (AP) teachers a piece-rate for each student scoring 3 or higher on the standardized exam. Using student-course-level administrative data and exploiting both within- and across-teacher variation, I find the program increased the probability that an AP enrollment results in a score of 3 or higher by 2.4 percentage points. I further find no evidence of educational triage, as gains were concentrated at the top of the AP score distribution (4s and 5s). Teacher responses also varied systematically, indicating that the effectiveness of performance pay depends jointly on incentive strength and the nature of the task. |
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