Trading-Off Monetary Rewards as Reinforcers to Enhance Task Motivation and Performance of Publication in Academia
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| Title: | Trading-Off Monetary Rewards as Reinforcers to Enhance Task Motivation and Performance of Publication in Academia |
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| Language: | English |
| Authors: | Gaus, Nurdiana (ORCID |
| Source: | Higher Education Quarterly. Oct 2022 76(4):800-814. |
| Availability: | Wiley. Available from: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030. Tel: 800-835-6770; e-mail: cs-journals@wiley.com; Web site: https://www.wiley.com/en-us |
| Peer Reviewed: | Y |
| Page Count: | 15 |
| Publication Date: | 2022 |
| Document Type: | Journal Articles Reports - Research |
| Education Level: | Higher Education Postsecondary Education |
| Descriptors: | Foreign Countries, College Faculty, Faculty Publishing, Rewards, Motivation, Incentives, Economic Factors |
| Geographic Terms: | Indonesia |
| DOI: | 10.1111/hequ.12350 |
| ISSN: | 0951-5224 1468-2273 |
| Abstract: | This paper aims to examine how an inappropriate traded-off design scheme of monetary rewards as reinforcers to task motivation and performance can promote poor quality of publication in academia and create the potential 'hidden costs of rewards.' Six universities in the western and eastern regions of Indonesia were selected to investigate this issue, and 70 academics from different social science backgrounds were interviewed. Our research results show that the monetary rewards implemented by the Indonesian government only act as a trigger for the initial motivation and become a quantitative lever for journal publications, not a quality lever. Consequently, the quality of publication is still poor because of the low-powered incentive schemes that are designed based on task-completion, disregarding the 'synergistic effect' between the government's intentions and the academics' attributions. The implications of this study and recommendations to policymakers are provided in this paper. |
| Abstractor: | As Provided |
| Entry Date: | 2022 |
| Accession Number: | EJ1351112 |
| Database: | ERIC |
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| Abstract: | This paper aims to examine how an inappropriate traded-off design scheme of monetary rewards as reinforcers to task motivation and performance can promote poor quality of publication in academia and create the potential 'hidden costs of rewards.' Six universities in the western and eastern regions of Indonesia were selected to investigate this issue, and 70 academics from different social science backgrounds were interviewed. Our research results show that the monetary rewards implemented by the Indonesian government only act as a trigger for the initial motivation and become a quantitative lever for journal publications, not a quality lever. Consequently, the quality of publication is still poor because of the low-powered incentive schemes that are designed based on task-completion, disregarding the 'synergistic effect' between the government's intentions and the academics' attributions. The implications of this study and recommendations to policymakers are provided in this paper. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 0951-5224 1468-2273 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/hequ.12350 |
