View in EDS HTML Full Text PDF Full Text

Political Power of Italian Rectors: An Analysis of Recruitments in the Period 2001-2021

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Title: Political Power of Italian Rectors: An Analysis of Recruitments in the Period 2001-2021
Language: English
Authors: Alice Civera (ORCID 0000-0002-1611-7073), Diego D'Adda (ORCID 0000-0002-1683-1787), Michele Meoli (ORCID 0000-0002-9438-0782), Stefano Paleari (ORCID 0000-0001-6099-560X)
Source: Studies in Higher Education. 2024 49(7):1168-1193.
Availability: Routledge. Available from: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 530 Walnut Street Suite 850, Philadelphia, PA 19106. Tel: 800-354-1420; Tel: 215-625-8900; Fax: 215-207-0050; Web site: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
Peer Reviewed: Y
Page Count: 26
Publication Date: 2024
Document Type: Journal Articles
Reports - Research
Education Level: Higher Education
Postsecondary Education
Descriptors: Foreign Countries, College Presidents, Political Power, Personnel Policy, Educational Change, Resource Allocation, Personnel Management, Educational Administration
Geographic Terms: Italy
DOI: 10.1080/03075079.2023.2260420
ISSN: 0307-5079
1470-174X
Abstract: We examine the political power exerted by Italian rectors by investigating the preferential treatment received by the organisational subunits they belong to in terms of personnel resource allocation. During the rectors' mandate, their organisational subunits tend to grow significantly more (by [approximately]9%) than the others. The effect persists even after the implementation of the New public management-inspired policy - the Gelmini reform.
Abstractor: As Provided
Entry Date: 2024
Accession Number: EJ1431112
Database: ERIC
Full text is not displayed to guests.
FullText Links:
  – Type: pdflink
    Url: https://content.ebscohost.com/cds/retrieve?content=AQICAHj0k_4E0hTGH8RJwT4gCJyBsGNe_WN95AvKlDbXJGqwxwFjCSN3v5Vu0R9W27HxAObSAAAA4zCB4AYJKoZIhvcNAQcGoIHSMIHPAgEAMIHJBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHgYJYIZIAWUDBAEuMBEEDM1oeT2wPon8FTwNFgIBEICBm7SMCjBhVC76fT2o4_gySV5ga8ogf69Jmc2hpphtB02ZQmiOso3y79xxS5b01uo8h_61sf3dueZ93RCeoLl3ekFgb6Z0P8N0IfPNg4XwwO0QF0S7EsUq_sSjd-cSOAPWBSKFlXYAq8UhBvg56vB4gKVz_6mMabXrhAy8xHdxIL5o0ll7BUoGicoA62HyV0Bd8V2hyCYsKuHC8d0w
Text:
  Availability: 1
  Value: <anid>AN0178439966;she01jul.24;2024Jul17.05:25;v2.2.500</anid> <title id="AN0178439966-1">Political power of Italian rectors: an analysis of recruitments in the period 2001–2021 </title> <p>We examine the political power exerted by Italian rectors by investigating the preferential treatment received by the organisational subunits they belong to in terms of personnel resource allocation. During the rectors' mandate, their organisational subunits tend to grow significantly more (by ∼9%) than the others. The effect persists even after the implementation of the New public management-inspired policy – the Gelmini reform.</p> <p>Keywords: New public management; higher education reform; university resource allocation; rectors; political power</p> <hd id="AN0178439966-2">Introduction</hd> <p>Within organisations, allocating <bold>resources</bold> is a strategic and decisive process (Lepori, Usher, and Montauti [<reflink idref="bib33" id="ref1">33</reflink>]) through which internal power is defined and balanced (Pfeffer and Salancik [<reflink idref="bib38" id="ref2">38</reflink>]). According to <bold>resource dependency theory</bold>, the power of organisational actors is contingent on their control of critical resources, and traditionally, it has been concentrated in the hands of subunits (Pfeffer and Salancik [<reflink idref="bib38" id="ref3">38</reflink>]). For universities in particular, it is based on the subunits' ability to attract students and external funds (Salancik and Pfeffer [<reflink idref="bib42" id="ref4">42</reflink>]), their external linkages (Hills and Mahoney [<reflink idref="bib29" id="ref5">29</reflink>]; Provan, Beyer, and Kruytbosch [<reflink idref="bib40" id="ref6">40</reflink>]), their scientific eminence (Lodahl and Gordon [<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref7">34</reflink>]) and their relative size and position within the decision-making process (Freeman [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref8">24</reflink>]; Freeman and Hannan [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref9">25</reflink>]). This explained the traditional <bold>limited power of university leadership</bold> (Pfeffer and Salancik [<reflink idref="bib38" id="ref10">38</reflink>]) observed in the American context. The situation in Europe is more nuanced, as depending on national policies, university leadership may either exert limited power or enjoy a strong position within the organisation (Bleiklie, Enders, and Lepori [<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref11">4</reflink>]). In countries like Austria, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, <bold>mostly managerial roles are concentrated in leadership's hands</bold> (Bleiklie [<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref12">3</reflink>]; Bleiklie and Kogan [<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref13">6</reflink>]; Capano, Regini, and Turri [<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref14">12</reflink>]; Christensen, Gornitzka, and Maassen [<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref15">14</reflink>]; de Boer, Huismanb, and Meister-Scheytt [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref16">16</reflink>]; Donina, Meoli, and Paleari [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref17">20</reflink>]; Donina and Hasanefendic [<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref18">19</reflink>]; Donina and Paleari [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref19">21</reflink>]; Ekman, Lindgren, and Packendorff [<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref20">22</reflink>]; Frølich and Caspersen [<reflink idref="bib26" id="ref21">26</reflink>]; Kretek, Dragšić, and Kehm [<reflink idref="bib32" id="ref22">32</reflink>]). In some European countries, <bold>finances are also controlled by leadership</bold>, which negotiates the level of public budget with the state (Bleiklie, Enders, and Lepori [<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref23">4</reflink>]). With leadership being so predominant in Europe, a rector as the representative actor of university leadership should be the core organisational role to focus on to effectively investigate the resource allocation mechanisms. This is the first contribution of our work. In particular, we investigate whether rectors' interests affect the allocation process and to whom they decide to allocate resources. The results indicate that rectors do exercise their discretionary power to privilege the internal subunits that are closer to them.</p> <p>However, even in contexts where leadership holds high power, like in European countries, there are contingencies that may influence its discretionary implementation, as posited by contingency theory. Policy reforms inspired by the new public management (NPM) constitute the perfect setting for our analysis. Under the wave of the NPM rationale, beginning in the 1990s, European universities have been pressured to introduce hierarchical–bureaucratic models of governance (Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersson [<reflink idref="bib11" id="ref24">11</reflink>]), with the aim of making universities more accountable, transparent and efficient (Bleiklie et al. [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref25">5</reflink>]; Ferlie, Musselin, and Andresani [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref26">23</reflink>]). This has led to the formal strengthening of the university leadership managerial role (Bleiklie et al. [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref27">5</reflink>]), but since national policies strongly differ across countries, specific policy configurations and actions that each government implements may result in different levels of university leadership's political power. To this end, Italian universities are a convenient setting because they represent the European continental tradition, where higher education institutions are public, subject to regulatory interventions and highly dependent on the state in terms of resources (Bleiklie et al. [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref28">5</reflink>]; Ferlie, Musselin, and Andresani [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref29">23</reflink>]). Similar to the case of other European counterparts, an NPM-inspired reform, namely the Gelmini reform, was implemented in Italy in 2012, and studying its effects can lead to the derivation of some generalisable considerations. In Italy, the discretionary power of rectors gets stronger when resources are allocated for career promotions. This is the second contribution of our work.</p> <p>The third contribution concerns the fact that the empirical evidence so far has been largely based on individual case studies (Lepori, Usher, and Montauti [<reflink idref="bib33" id="ref30">33</reflink>]). Qualitative case studies do not allow us to perform an empirically robust analysis of the variations across individual organisations, time and national systems. In contrast, a quantitative approach facilitates this analysis but at the cost of the burdensome activity of data collection. Nevertheless, we followed the latter approach and analysed the entire population of 68 Italian public universities. We thereby investigated the evolution of their 241 leaders' political power, observed over two decades (2001–2021), to assess the leaders' influence on different aspects of their institutions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the largest existing dataset of university leaders.</p> <hd id="AN0178439966-3">Theoretical framework and hypotheses development</hd> <p>According to <bold>resource dependency theory</bold>, organisational actors' power depends on their ability to manage crucial resources (Pfeffer and Salancik [<reflink idref="bib38" id="ref31">38</reflink>]). Rectors are predominant within universities in terms of their influence on decision-making processes, including resource allocation mechanisms (Bleiklie et al. [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref32">5</reflink>]). Thus, it is interesting to investigate to whom a rector allocates resources and whether this decision is influenced by their personal interests.</p> <p>We rely on <bold>network theory</bold>, which has found widespread application in organisational studies within the higher education context. According to the extant literature on the topic, networks can confer university leaders with legitimacy, control of resources and alliances to influence decision-making processes (Rabovsky and Rutherford [<reflink idref="bib41" id="ref33">41</reflink>]). University leaders, depending on the actors participating in these alliances, may focus on increasing their influence over external resources or may direct their attention within the university (Bleiklie et al. [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref34">5</reflink>]). In the first case, network theory emphasises the relevance of university leadership's <bold>social relationships</bold> with key external audiences, such as politicians, research councils and university associations (Bleiklie et al. [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref35">5</reflink>]; Delmas and Toffel [<reflink idref="bib17" id="ref36">17</reflink>]; Rabovsky and Rutherford [<reflink idref="bib41" id="ref37">41</reflink>]). In the second case, <bold>network theory</bold> is adopted to study <bold>social relationships</bold> with key internal actors, for example, by giving powerful professors more autonomy and bargaining power (Rabovsky and Rutherford [<reflink idref="bib41" id="ref38">41</reflink>]; Stazyk and Goerdel [<reflink idref="bib44" id="ref39">44</reflink>]). Alliances within organisations are built among individuals sharing the same salient ideologies, values, attitudes and expectations (Henry, Lubell, and McCoy [<reflink idref="bib28" id="ref40">28</reflink>]). From a more psychological perspective, individuals normally seek information that provides support for the beliefs they already hold, in line with reinforcement or selective exposure theory (Rabovsky and Rutherford [<reflink idref="bib41" id="ref41">41</reflink>]). In the university context, the closest subunits for rectors are academics belonging to the same disciplinary area. They share research and educational interests, promotion and hiring procedures, evaluation criteria. In other words, they share the same identity, values and beliefs within a multifaceted organisation as a university. Moreover, rectors might benefit from favouring their own scientific units because these are individuals who are compliant with the rectors and from whom they can expect <bold>support</bold> (Donina, Meoli, and Paleari [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref42">20</reflink>]). Thus, in many European higher education systems, rectors are elected, and their own scientific units are their primary political supporters (Donina and Hasanefendic [<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref43">19</reflink>]). Therefore, we formulate the following:</p> <p>H1: Rectors benefit subunits belonging to their scientific discipline.</p> <p>However, the discretion in resource allocation derived from leadership power depends on the external environment. <bold>Contingency theory</bold> thus posits that organisational resources originate from their external environment (Pfeffer and Salancik [<reflink idref="bib39" id="ref44">39</reflink>]). According to the proponents of this theory, the external resources that an organisation depends on transform into a contingency that affects the organisation's internal structure (Donaldson [<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref45">18</reflink>]).</p> <p>Policy reforms inspired by NPM constitute the perfect example of contingencies shaping leadership's power. NPM policies were designed to liberate universities from direct state control and restructure them into hierarchical, rule-based institutions (Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersson [<reflink idref="bib11" id="ref46">11</reflink>]) through regulatory reforms (Donina, Meoli, and Paleari [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref47">20</reflink>]), market arrangements (Teixeira et al. [<reflink idref="bib45" id="ref48">45</reflink>]) and various evaluation systems (Bleiklie and Kogan [<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref49">6</reflink>]). Since the implementation of these policies, universities have been evaluated according to their performance and funds to be allocated accordingly.</p> <p>Although NPM reforms lead to a greater hierarchical–bureaucratic coordination with the <bold>formal strengthening of the university leadership managerial role</bold> (Bleiklie et al. [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref50">5</reflink>]), they also influence the structure of the university resource environment, and depending on the country under investigation, they might empower or disempower the leadership (Bleiklie et al. [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref51">5</reflink>]; Donina and Hasanefendic [<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref52">19</reflink>]). This depends on whether, according to Stazyk and Goerdel ([<reflink idref="bib44" id="ref53">44</reflink>]), <bold>the individual with the greatest power within the organisation is the one in charge of managing contingencies</bold>. Two eventualities could occur. In the first scenario, due to their frequent interactions with the external environment and their role in negotiating resources with the state, university leaders will wield the majority of the power (Bleiklie et al. [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref54">5</reflink>]; Stazyk and Goerdel [<reflink idref="bib44" id="ref55">44</reflink>]). Therefore, they continue to hold discretionary political power in resource allocation. In the second case, driven by the need for compliance with external pressures to receive necessary contingent resources, the leadership's discretionary power in allocating resources may be reduced, and leaders, instead of favouring their closer subunits, are forced to turn to other individuals or groups that are decisive in managing key contingencies (Bleiklie et al. [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref56">5</reflink>]; Stazyk and Goerdel [<reflink idref="bib44" id="ref57">44</reflink>]). These considerations, valid for several European countries, lead to the following hypotheses:</p> <p>H2a: Rectors benefit subunits belonging to their scientific discipline to a lesser extent after the implementation of NPM reforms.</p> <p>H2b: Rectors benefit subunits belonging to their scientific discipline to a greater extent after the implementation of NPM reforms.</p> <hd id="AN0178439966-4">Methodology</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0178439966-5">Institutional setting</hd> <p>This study aims to investigate the political power of Italian rectors in shaping resource allocation by assessing whether rectors tend to favour the disciplinary area they belong to, namely those organisational subunits in which there may be a higher concentration of power with respect to all others.</p> <p>In Italy, university governance structures were widely recognised as a concern in the 2000s (Donina, Meoli, and Paleari [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref58">20</reflink>]). Due to the large public debt, there was an urgent need to reduce public spending, which further pressurised higher education institutes to improve their efficiency, according to the NPM narratives (Donina, Meoli, and Paleari [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref59">20</reflink>]). In this context of financial distress and mistrust, the parliament passed Law 240 to reform the governance of universities – also known as the Gelmini reform, derived from the name of the minister at that time.</p> <p>The Gelmini reform strengthened the formal powers of rectors, in line with what occurred in other European countries (Musselin and Teixeira [<reflink idref="bib35" id="ref60">35</reflink>]; Broucker and De Wit [<reflink idref="bib10" id="ref61">10</reflink>]). The rector is the main decision-making body, the legal representative and fully responsible for political and strategic orientation as well as operational and managerial tasks. In most Italian state universities, since the implementation of the reform, rectors have been involved in appointing Administrative Board members; earlier, they were chosen by the academic community (Boffo, Moscati, and Dubois [<reflink idref="bib8" id="ref62">8</reflink>]). Therefore, the Administrative Board is now more tightly controlled by the rector (Donina, Meoli, and Paleari [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref63">20</reflink>]), also because the rector is its <emph>ex-officio</emph> member. The law, however, provides counterweights for this pivotal position. First, rectors are elected by law for a non-renewable six-year term. Furthermore, they can be dismissed from their assignment, not earlier than two years, through a no-confidence motion from the Senate, which has to be approved by the rector's electorate.</p> <p>In this article, we focus on recruitment, as human resources represent 60%–90% of the total resource allocation within Italian universities. Recruitment is an inflow of new resources, of which the most significant share is a result of 'freed' resources due to an outflow, namely (mainly) the retired personnel. It is a challenging area for the development of the higher education system, due to the difficulty in attracting and retaining talents (Cattaneo, Malighetti, and Paleari [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref64">13</reflink>]), scarce inter-organisational mobility (Abramo, D'angelo, and Di Costa [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref65">1</reflink>]), tendency to inbreed (Seeber and Mampaey [<reflink idref="bib43" id="ref66">43</reflink>]) and an overall scarcity of resources, resulting in low salaries and lack of incentives (Civera, Meoli, and Paleari [<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref67">15</reflink>]).</p> <p>In the Italian system, recruitment can be described as a repeated game in which the rector plays a pivotal role. In fact, allocation is achieved step-by-step through the following process. The rector along with the Administrative Board, which is the main decision-making body responsible for strategic decisions, establishes the level of resources to be allocated to each organisational unit. Each organisational unit creates a proposal on how to allocate the resources. If the rector disagrees, they can decide to deny recruitment to the organisational units. The organisational units are commonly identified by departments. One department can have multiple disciplines, which in Italy are named <emph>Settori Scientifico Disciplinari</emph> (henceforth SSDs), representing the scientific professional communities the academics belong to. In Italy, each scientist is classified into only one SSD. The selection and promotion criteria for the academic recruitment process rely heavily on the discipline (Pezzoni, Sterzi, and Lissoni [<reflink idref="bib37" id="ref68">37</reflink>]), which is also the case for other European countries (Spain, France and Germany, as outlined in Seeber and Mampaey [<reflink idref="bib43" id="ref69">43</reflink>]). To precisely consider changes in resource allocation, the SSD level is adopted.</p> <p>As an additional characteristic of the Italian higher education system, note that roughly half of the Italian universities own a hospital, which makes a discipline such as medicine more dominant compared to others in the election of rectors.[<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref70">1</reflink>]</p> <hd id="AN0178439966-6">Data</hd> <p>Our original dataset is composed of the entire population of Italian universities' faculty staff from 2001 to 2021 retrieved from MUR (the Italian Minister of University and Research), constituting a total of 1,271,649 observations for 57,802 individuals per year, on average. For each faculty member, we have collected information about their university affiliation, position and disciplinary area (SSD[<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref71">2</reflink>]). Using this dataset, we can track yearly changes in the faculty staff, such as new members, career progressions, transfers to other universities, retirements and resignations. Therefore, we can measure the (differential) allocation of resources in terms of faculty personnel between universities and between scientific areas within each university.</p> <p>We retrieved information about the identity of Italian rectors from university websites and newspapers, as well as from their mandate period and SSDs. We observed 241 rectors in 68 Italian public universities. The average length of their mandates changed from 8.6 years before the Gelmini reform to 5.8 years after the reform, due to the introduction of the single-mandate rule. Some rectors started their mandates before 2001, the first year of our time window, and for some of them, the mandates lasted over 20 years.</p> <p>To have a more homogeneous sample in terms of governance and rules, our analysis focused on public universities only.[<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref72">3</reflink>] In Appendix 1, we report the list of all public universities included in our analysis, their size in terms of faculty and the size variation over the period of observation. The dataset used in the estimations is aggregated at the SSD-university-year level and comprises 262,395 observations,[<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref73">4</reflink>] each identifying a single SSD within a university in each year from 2001[<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref74">5</reflink>] to 2021. To our knowledge, this is the most detailed existing dataset combining information about university leaders, the internal allocation of resources and the composition of personnel within the whole public university system.</p> <hd id="AN0178439966-7">Empirical analysis</hd> <p>In the empirical analysis, we look at different dependent variables, namely the size of the faculty staff (both in terms of absolute size and resource-weighted size), the number of new faculty members and the number of career progressions. For example, we observe the number of faculty members belonging to the SSD ING-IND/35 in [<emph>Author University</emph>] in 2021 and the composition in terms of assistant professors (tenured or not), associate professors and full professors.</p> <p>In the Italian university system, each of these academic ranks corresponds to an average cost measured in terms of '<emph>punti organico</emph>' (PO, i.e. personnel points). A full professor costs 1 PO, an associate professor costs 0.7 PO and an assistant professor costs 0.5 PO. This also means that a promotion from assistant to associate professor costs 0.2 PO, while from associate to full professor 0.3 PO. Hiring a full professor from another university requires 1 PO, while promoting an associate professor already employed in the university costs 0.3 PO. Similarly, hiring an associate professor from outside requires 0.7 PO, while for an internal promotion from assistant to associate professor, only 0.2 PO is required.</p> <p>The specification we use in the panel regression models is as follows:</p> <p>Graph</p> <p> <ephtml> <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mtable columnalign="right left" rowspacing=".5em" columnspacing="thickmathspace" displaystyle="true"><mtr><mtd /><mtd><msub><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">Y</mi></mrow><mrow><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">i</mi></mrow><mo>,</mo><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">j</mi></mrow><mo>,</mo><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">t</mi></mrow></mrow></msub><mo>=</mo><msub><mrow><mi>α</mi></mrow><mn>1</mn></msub><mo>+</mo><msub><mrow><mtext fontfamily="times">β</mtext></mrow><mn>1</mn></msub><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">recto</mi></mrow><msub><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">r</mi></mrow><mrow><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">i</mi></mrow><mo>,</mo><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">j</mi></mrow><mo>,</mo><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">t</mi></mrow></mrow></msub><mo>+</mo><msub><mrow><mtext fontfamily="times">β</mtext></mrow><mn>2</mn></msub><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">recto</mi></mrow><msub><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">r</mi></mrow><mrow><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">i</mi></mrow><mo>,</mo><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">j</mi></mrow><mo>,</mo><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">t</mi></mrow></mrow></msub><mo>∗</mo><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">post</mi></mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">_</mi><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">Gelmini</mi></mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">_</mi><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">refor</mi></mrow><msub><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">m</mi></mrow><mi>t</mi></msub></mtd></mtr><mtr><mtd /><mtd><mspace width="1em" /><mo>+</mo><msub><mrow><mtext fontfamily="times">β</mtext></mrow><mn>3</mn></msub><mi>exi</mi><msub><mi>t</mi><mrow><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">i</mi></mrow><mo>,</mo><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">j</mi></mrow><mo>,</mo><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">t</mi></mrow><mo>−</mo><mn>1</mn></mrow></msub><mo>+</mo><msub><mrow><mtext fontfamily="times">β</mtext></mrow><mn>4</mn></msub><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">Y</mi></mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">_</mi><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">inSSD</mi></mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">_</mi><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">outUN</mi></mrow><msub><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">I</mi></mrow><mrow><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">i</mi></mrow><mo>,</mo><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">j</mi></mrow><mo>,</mo><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">t</mi></mrow></mrow></msub><mo>+</mo><msub><mrow><mtext fontfamily="times">β</mtext></mrow><mn>5</mn></msub><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">Y</mi></mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">_</mi><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">inUNI</mi></mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">_</mi><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">outSS</mi></mrow><msub><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">D</mi></mrow><mrow><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">i</mi></mrow><mo>,</mo><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">j</mi></mrow><mo>,</mo><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">t</mi></mrow></mrow></msub></mtd></mtr><mtr><mtd /><mtd><mspace width="1em" /><mo>+</mo><msub><mrow><mi>μ</mi></mrow><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">i</mi></mrow></msub><mo>+</mo><msub><mrow><mi>μ</mi></mrow><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">j</mi></mrow></msub><mo>+</mo><msub><mrow><mi>μ</mi></mrow><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">t</mi></mrow></msub><mo>+</mo><msub><mrow><mi>ϵ</mi></mrow><mrow><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">i</mi></mrow><mo>,</mo><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">j</mi></mrow><mo>,</mo><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">t</mi></mrow></mrow></msub></mtd></mtr></mtable></math> </ephtml> (<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref75">1</reflink>)</p> <p>where <emph>i</emph>, <emph>j</emph> and <emph>t</emph> indicate the SSD, university and time index, respectively.</p> <p>Graph</p> <p> <ephtml> <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><msub><mi>Y</mi><mrow><mi>i</mi><mo>,</mo><mi>j</mi><mo>,</mo><mi>t</mi></mrow></msub></math> </ephtml> is either of the following:</p> <p></p> <ulist> <item> <emph>size</emph>: the number of faculty members</item> <p></p> <item> <emph>wsize</emph>: the number of faculty members weighted by PO</item> <p></p> <item> <emph>hirings</emph>: the number of new faculty members, including transfers from other universities</item> <p></p> <item> <emph>new_hirings</emph>: the number of new faculty members, excluding transfers from other universities</item> <p></p> <item> <emph>career_progressions</emph>: the number of career progressions</item> </ulist> <p>Our focal independent variable,</p> <p>Graph</p> <p> <ephtml> <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mi>recto</mi><msub><mi>r</mi><mrow><mi>i</mi><mo>,</mo><mi>j</mi><mo>,</mo><mi>t</mi></mrow></msub></math> </ephtml> , is a dummy equal to 1 when the rector of the university <emph>i</emph> belongs to the specific SSD in year <emph>t</emph>, and 0 otherwise.</p> <p>Graph</p> <p> <ephtml> <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mi>post</mi><mi mathvariant="normal">_Gelmini</mi><mi mathvariant="normal">_refor</mi><msub><mi>m</mi><mi>t</mi></msub></math> </ephtml> is a dummy equal to 1 when the Gelmini reform is already implemented (i.e. after 2012). We use this variable to assess whether the effects engendered by the rectorship changed after the reform.</p> <p>Graph</p> <p> <ephtml> <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mi>increasing</mi><mi mathvariant="normal">_uni</mi><mi mathvariant="normal">_resource</mi><msub><mi>s</mi><mrow><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">i</mi></mrow><mo>,</mo><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">t</mi></mrow></mrow></msub></math> </ephtml> is a dummy equal to 1 when the weighted size of the university <emph>i</emph> increases between year <emph>t-1</emph> and year <emph>t</emph>, and 0 otherwise.</p> <p>Graph</p> <p> <ephtml> <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mi>departure</mi><msub><mi>s</mi><mrow><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">i</mi></mrow><mo>,</mo><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">j</mi></mrow><mo>,</mo><mrow><mi mathvariant="normal">t</mi></mrow><mo>−</mo><mn>1</mn></mrow></msub></math> </ephtml> is the (natural logarithm of) the weighted number of faculty members (plus 1) that ceased to be employed in university <emph>i</emph> in SSD <emph>j</emph> in year <emph>t-1</emph>, including terminations, retirements and transfers to other universities or SSDs.</p> <p>Graph</p> <p> <ephtml> <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mi>Y</mi><mi mathvariant="normal">_inSSD</mi><mi mathvariant="normal">_outUN</mi><msub><mi>I</mi><mrow><mi>i</mi><mo>,</mo><mi>j</mi><mo>,</mo><mi>t</mi></mrow></msub></math> </ephtml> is the stock/flow of resources in the same SSD outside the focal university, which is meant to control for the dimension of (or flow of resources allocated to) the scientific area at the national level (e.g. the dimension of the ING-IND/35 SSD in all universities except [<emph>Author University</emph>]).</p> <p>Graph</p> <p> <ephtml> <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mi>Y</mi><mi mathvariant="normal">_inUNI</mi><mi mathvariant="normal">_outSS</mi><msub><mi>D</mi><mrow><mi>i</mi><mo>,</mo><mi>j</mi><mo>,</mo><mi>t</mi></mrow></msub></math> </ephtml> is the stock/flow of resources in the same university outside the focal scientific area. It is meant to control for the dimension of (or flow of resources allocated to) the university outside the focal SSD (e.g. the dimension of all other SSDs within [<emph>Author University</emph>] except ING-IND/35 SSD).</p> <p>Graph</p> <p> <ephtml> <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><msub><mi>μ</mi><mi>i</mi></msub><mo>,</mo><msub><mi>μ</mi><mi>j</mi></msub><mo>,</mo><msub><mi>μ</mi><mi>t</mi></msub></math> </ephtml> are error terms at the SSD, university and year levels, respectively, while</p> <p>Graph</p> <p> <ephtml> <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><msub><mi>ϵ</mi><mrow><mi>i</mi><mo>,</mo><mi>j</mi><mo>,</mo><mi>t</mi></mrow></msub></math> </ephtml> is the idiosyncratic error term.</p> <p>All variables except dummies are log-transformed.</p> <hd id="AN0178439966-8">Results</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0178439966-9">Descriptive statistics</hd> <p>Figure 1 presents the evolution of the stock of resources (<emph>size</emph> and <emph>wsize</emph>) in the entire Italian university system and in selected universities (reporting <emph>size</emph> only) in the last 21 years. The left figure shows that the stock of resources peaked in 2008, and then declined due to a turnover block (new resources were limited to 20% of the resources 'freed' by retirements). The Italian university system is historically characterised by expansion and contraction periods. In the period under scrutiny, we can roughly identify an expansion period from 2001 to 2008, followed by a contraction period from 2009 to 2017 (due to the block of turnover) and finally a mild growth period since 2018. Although the overall evolution is strongly related to external influence, there is some heterogeneity among universities in the dynamics of the level of resources. While some (e.g. Federico II) tend to be in line with the overall trend, some others have a positive trend (e.g. Università di Bergamo and Politecnico di Milano) and some an almost steady one (e.g. Università Politecnica delle Marche).</p> <p>Graph: Figure 1. Stock of resources, i.e. faculty members, in the whole Italian university system and, as an example, in few selected universities.</p> <p>Looking at the SSDs,[<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref76">6</reflink>] we can see significant differences in terms of dimension (Figure 2). For example, on 31st December 2021, the minimum dimension is 1 (CHIM/05) and the maximum is 937 (INF/01) faculty members in Italian universities. While we can see some changes in the ranking, most of the SSDs in the top positions in 2001 are still there in 2021, suggesting a strong path dependency. Looking at the bottom of the ranking, a similar inertia is supported, albeit less severe.</p> <p>Graph: Figure 2. Stock of resources (i.e. number of faculty members) by SSD in 2001 and 2021.</p> <p>The evolution of a few SSDs is influenced by (external) reorganisations, but the number of SSDs interested in these restructurings is extremely limited (e.g. MED/09). Please note that the number of SSDs has only minor changes in the period under scrutiny: it fluctuates between 365 and 371 from 2001 to 2010 and remains equal to 369 from 2011 onwards.</p> <p>A significant heterogeneity between SSDs is also observed in the absolute growth (Figure 3) in the last 21 years. Looking at the differences between 2001 and 2021, we can see some changes in the top SSDs in terms of the number of members, namely the rise of SSDs related to selected disciplines like computer science (i.e. INF/01 and ING-INF/05) and management/accounting (i.e. SECS-P/08 and SECS-P/07).</p> <p>Graph: Figure 3. Growth of resources (i.e. variation in the number of faculty members) by SSD from 2001 to 2021</p> <p>The correlation matrix is reported in Appendix 2. First, <emph>size</emph> and <emph>wsize</emph> are always extremely correlated, even when looking at the stock in the same SSD outside the focal university (* <emph>inSSD outUNI</emph>) or in other SSDs within the same university (* <emph>outSSD inUNI</emph>). Though <emph>hirings</emph>/<emph>new_hirings</emph> and <emph>career_progressions</emph> both represent flows of (new) resources, they are less correlated when looking at a single SSD within a specific university. This indicates that they are two alternative and competing uses of resources, and on average, limited resources are allocated to a single SSD within a specific university. This is not true at the focal university level (<emph>outSSD inUNI</emph>) or at the whole SSD level (<emph>inSSD outUNI</emph>), suggesting that the flow of new resources, irrespective of their use, is strongly related to the specific university and the specific SSD. The flow of resources (both <emph>new_hirings</emph> and <emph>career_progressions</emph>) is positively correlated with the dimension (<emph>size</emph> or <emph>wsize</emph>) of the focal university (<emph>inUNI</emph>) and that of the focal SSD (<emph>inSSD</emph>); in other words, there are more hirings and career progressions in bigger universities and larger SSDs. Our dummy variables <emph>rector</emph>, <emph>postGelmini</emph> and <emph>increasing_uni_resources</emph> are not highly correlated with the measures of resources at the SSD-university-year level. Not surprisingly, a slightly higher correlation is detected between the dummy <emph>increasing_uni_resources</emph> and the flow of resources at the SSD level, namely <emph>hirings</emph>, <emph>new_hirings</emph> and <emph>career_progressions</emph>.</p> <p>Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for all variables used in the regressions. The median number of faculty members belonging to a single SSD within a single university in a specific year is 2 (i.e. <emph>e</emph><sups>1.099</sups> - 1), while the average is 4.3. The median number of new hirings and career progressions is 0. The dummy rector is equal to one in 0.5% of the observations. The observations after the Gelmini reform, from 2012 on, are 47.6%, and in 51.2% of the observations, the resources at the university level show an increasing trend.</p> <p>Table 1. Summary statistics.</p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead valign="bottom"><tr><td /><td>Obs</td><td>Mean</td><td>SD</td><td>Median</td><td>Min</td><td>Max</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>(ln) size</td><td>262,395</td><td char=".">1.295</td><td char=".">0.843</td><td char=".">1.099</td><td char=".">0.000</td><td char=".">5.438</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) wsize</td><td>262,395</td><td char=".">1.083</td><td char=".">0.757</td><td char=".">0.993</td><td char=".">0.000</td><td char=".">4.978</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) hirings</td><td>262,395</td><td char=".">0.117</td><td char=".">0.294</td><td char=".">0.000</td><td char=".">0.000</td><td char=".">4.290</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) new_hirings</td><td>262,395</td><td char=".">0.102</td><td char=".">0.276</td><td char=".">0.000</td><td char=".">0.000</td><td char=".">4.290</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) career_progressions</td><td>262,395</td><td char=".">0.100</td><td char=".">0.275</td><td char=".">0.000</td><td char=".">0.000</td><td char=".">3.258</td></tr><tr><td>rector</td><td>262,395</td><td char=".">0.005</td><td char=".">0.071</td><td char=".">0.000</td><td char=".">0.000</td><td char=".">1.000</td></tr><tr><td>post_Gelmini</td><td>262,395</td><td char=".">0.476</td><td char=".">0.499</td><td char=".">0.000</td><td char=".">0.000</td><td char=".">1.000</td></tr><tr><td>increasing_uni_resources</td><td>262,395</td><td char=".">0.512</td><td char=".">0.500</td><td char=".">1.000</td><td char=".">0.000</td><td char=".">1.000</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) departures</td><td>262,395</td><td char=".">0.114</td><td char=".">0.291</td><td char=".">0.000</td><td char=".">0.000</td><td char=".">2.833</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) size_inSSD_outUNI</td><td>262,185</td><td char=".">4.850</td><td char=".">0.901</td><td char=".">4.898</td><td char=".">0.000</td><td char=".">7.052</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) wsize_inSSD_outUNI</td><td>262,185</td><td char=".">4.506</td><td char=".">0.899</td><td char=".">4.550</td><td char=".">0.000</td><td char=".">6.644</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) hirings_inSSD_outUNI</td><td>262,185</td><td char=".">1.763</td><td char=".">0.939</td><td char=".">1.792</td><td char=".">0.000</td><td char=".">4.977</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) new_hirings_inSSD_outUNI</td><td>262,185</td><td char=".">1.630</td><td char=".">0.939</td><td char=".">1.609</td><td char=".">0.000</td><td char=".">4.970</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) career_progressions_inSSD_outUNI</td><td>262,185</td><td char=".">1.541</td><td char=".">1.026</td><td char=".">1.609</td><td char=".">0.000</td><td char=".">4.331</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) size_outSSD_inUNI</td><td>260,852</td><td char=".">6.718</td><td char=".">0.862</td><td char=".">6.788</td><td char=".">0.000</td><td char=".">8.479</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) wsize_outSSD_inUNI</td><td>260,852</td><td char=".">6.370</td><td char=".">0.861</td><td char=".">6.444</td><td char=".">0.000</td><td char=".">8.129</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) hirings_outSSD_inUNI</td><td>260,852</td><td char=".">3.348</td><td char=".">1.130</td><td char=".">3.434</td><td char=".">0.000</td><td char=".">6.510</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) new_hirings_outSSD_inUNI</td><td>260,852</td><td char=".">3.159</td><td char=".">1.210</td><td char=".">3.296</td><td char=".">0.000</td><td char=".">6.436</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) career_progressions_outSSD_inUNI</td><td>260,852</td><td char=".">2.857</td><td char=".">1.569</td><td char=".">3.178</td><td char=".">0.000</td><td char=".">6.087</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <hd id="AN0178439966-10">Econometric models</hd> <p>In the econometric analysis, we resort to panel fixed effects (FE) models.[<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref77">7</reflink>] Please note that these models control for all time-invariant observed and unobserved characteristics at the university-SSD level, such as the average size or the (largely) time-invariant quality of the group. Though we do believe that the SSDs to which a rector belongs are likely to differ from those with no rectors (e.g. in terms of size or scientific quality), their characteristics are unlikely to change suddenly once (or right before) the rector is elected. Therefore, we believe that FE models are the most robust and reliable way to test our hypotheses.</p> <p>Our econometric results unanimously show that a rector's SSD tends to become bigger during their mandate, with respect to the level before. Table 2 reports an estimated effect of 8.3% on the number of faculty members and 8.9% on the level of resources. In other words, the rector's SSD becomes significantly larger during her mandate, on average. The rectors' effect on the flow of resources is positive as well, with an effect of approximately 3% on hiring and approximately 4% on career progression. Therefore, the first hypothesis is supported. Note that, since we observe the whole population of SSDs–universities, our regression coefficients are point values rather than interval estimates. However, we report the significance levels to indicate the external validity of our findings.</p> <p>Table 2. Estimating rector's effects – FE model.</p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead valign="bottom"><tr><td /><td>(1)</td><td>(2)</td><td>(3)</td><td>(4)</td><td>(5)</td></tr><tr><td /><td>(ln) size</td><td>(ln) wsize</td><td>(ln) hirings</td><td>(ln) new_hirings</td><td>(ln) career_progressions</td></tr><tr><td /><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>rector = 1</td><td char=".">0.083***</td><td char=".">0.089***</td><td char=".">0.031**</td><td char=".">0.027*</td><td char=".">0.040***</td></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.013)</td><td char=".">(0.013)</td><td char=".">(0.015)</td><td char=".">(0.014)</td><td char=".">(0.012)</td></tr><tr><td>L.(ln) departures</td><td char=".">−0.123***</td><td char=".">−0.119***</td><td char=".">0.009***</td><td char=".">0.003</td><td char=".">0.005*</td></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.007)</td><td char=".">(0.006)</td><td char=".">(0.003)</td><td char=".">(0.003)</td><td char=".">(0.003)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) size_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char=".">0.455***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.026)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) size_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char=".">0.566***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.037)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) wsize_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char="." /><td char=".">0.395***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.023)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) wsize_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char="." /><td char=".">0.511***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.038)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) hirings_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.025***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.003)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) hirings_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.065***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.005)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) new_hirings_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.025***</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.003)</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) new_hirings_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.057***</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.004)</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) career_progressions_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.034***</td></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.003)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) career_progressions_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.042***</td></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.003)</td></tr><tr><td>constant</td><td char=".">−4.688***</td><td char=".">−3.930***</td><td char=".">−0.148***</td><td char=".">−0.119***</td><td char=".">−0.073***</td></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.285)</td><td char=".">(0.277)</td><td char=".">(0.018)</td><td char=".">(0.015)</td><td char=".">(0.011)</td></tr><tr><td>N. observations</td><td>248551</td><td>248551</td><td>248551</td><td>248551</td><td>248551</td></tr><tr><td>N. universities</td><td>68</td><td>68</td><td>68</td><td>68</td><td>68</td></tr><tr><td>N. SSD#University groups</td><td>12495</td><td>12495</td><td>12495</td><td>12495</td><td>12495</td></tr><tr><td>R2</td><td>0.919</td><td>0.928</td><td>0.237</td><td>0.229</td><td>0.250</td></tr><tr><td>Year FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>SSD#University FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <p>1 Standard errors in parentheses.</p> <p>2 * <emph>p</emph> < 0.10, ** <emph>p</emph> < 0.05, *** <emph>p</emph> < 0.01.</p> <p>The weighted number of departures in the previous year negatively affects the size of the focal SSD, but part of the resources 'freed' by these departures appears to be allocated to the SSD in terms of both hirings and promotions. All our control variables indicate a positive association between the resources (either the stocks or the flows) at the university-SSD level and those at the SSD level (excluding the focal SSD), meaning that bigger SSDs tend to have more faculty members within the universities, on average. In addition, the resources at the university level (excluding the focal SSD) are positively associated with those at the university-SSD level. In other words, in bigger universities SSD groups are larger on average. The coefficients for resources in the same SSD outside the focal university (* <emph>inSSD outUNI</emph>) or in other SSDs within the same university (* <emph>outSSD inUNI</emph>) are interpretable as elasticities; therefore, we can directly compare their magnitudes. In most of our models, the estimated elasticity of the university resources is larger than that of the SSDs.</p> <p>Table 3 presents the results of a robustness check conducted to further control for the unobserved heterogeneity between SSDs.[<reflink idref="bib8" id="ref78">8</reflink>] As mentioned before, university-SSDs with a rector may differ with respect to those without any rector, on average. In Table 3, we perform the same analysis but on a sample composed of university-SSDs with a rector and matched university-SSDs without a rector. We perform a one-to-one matching in the year before the rector starts their mandate, estimating a propensity score based on the stock of resources (namely <emph>wsize</emph>) of the focal university-SSD in the previous three years, the stock of resources at the SSD level outside the focal university, the stock of resources at the university level excluding the focal SSD, the percentage of full professors within the focal university-SSD and year dummies. Each observation belonging to a university-SSD with a rector is matched to the closest observation belonging to a university-SSD without a rector based on the computed propensity score, with a caliper equal to 0.2, imposing an exact matching at the university-year level. We also restrict the observations to common support, resulting in 167 university-SSDs with a rector and 167 matched university-SSDs without a rector (ever). Table 3 further corroborates our previous findings, with a slightly lower magnitude of the effects but with the number of new faculty members becoming non-significant. [<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref79">9</reflink>]</p> <p>Table 3. estimating rector's effects – FE on a matched sample.</p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead valign="bottom"><tr><td /><td>(1)</td><td>(2)</td><td>(3)</td><td>(4)</td><td>(5)</td></tr><tr><td /><td>(ln) size</td><td>(ln) wsize</td><td>(ln) hirings</td><td>(ln) new_hirings</td><td>(ln) career_progressions</td></tr><tr><td /><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>rector = 1</td><td char=".">0.058***</td><td char=".">0.062***</td><td char=".">0.022</td><td char=".">0.019</td><td char=".">0.045***</td></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.014)</td><td char=".">(0.014)</td><td char=".">(0.017)</td><td char=".">(0.016)</td><td char=".">(0.016)</td></tr><tr><td>L.(ln) departures</td><td char=".">−0.067***</td><td char=".">−0.068***</td><td char=".">0.034*</td><td char=".">0.026</td><td char=".">0.025</td></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.010)</td><td char=".">(0.009)</td><td char=".">(0.017)</td><td char=".">(0.017)</td><td char=".">(0.015)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) size_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char=".">0.511***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.102)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) size_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char=".">0.540***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.057)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) wsize_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char="." /><td char=".">0.486***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.086)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) wsize_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char="." /><td char=".">0.514***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.047)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) hirings_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.038***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.010)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) hirings_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.127***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.010)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) new_hirings_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.040***</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.009)</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) new_hirings_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.113***</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.010)</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) career_progressions_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.058***</td></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.011)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) career_progressions_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.098***</td></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.008)</td></tr><tr><td>constant</td><td char=".">−4.085***</td><td char=".">−3.693***</td><td char=".">−0.234***</td><td char=".">−0.193***</td><td char=".">−0.152***</td></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.633)</td><td char=".">(0.495)</td><td char=".">(0.043)</td><td char=".">(0.039)</td><td char=".">(0.032)</td></tr><tr><td>N. observations</td><td>6478</td><td>6478</td><td>6478</td><td>6478</td><td>6478</td></tr><tr><td>N. universities</td><td>67</td><td>67</td><td>67</td><td>67</td><td>67</td></tr><tr><td>N. SSD#University groups</td><td>331</td><td>331</td><td>331</td><td>331</td><td>331</td></tr><tr><td>R2</td><td>0.943</td><td>0.945</td><td>0.336</td><td>0.327</td><td>0.349</td></tr><tr><td>Year FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>SSD#University FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <ulist> <item>3 Standard errors in parentheses.</item> <item>4 * <emph>p</emph> < 0.10, ** <emph>p</emph> < 0.05, *** <emph>p</emph> < 0.01.</item> </ulist> <p>In another estimation (not reported but available from the authors upon request), we exclude all university-SSDs without any rector, with a consequent drop in the number of SSD-university groups from 12,495 to 216. Again, the aim is to increase comparability between SSDs. The estimation results and the magnitude of the coefficients are in line with those presented in Table 2.</p> <p>We then focus on whether the Gelmini reform changed the effects of rectors on their SSDs. In Table 4, the effects on the stock of university-SSD resources (<emph>size</emph> and <emph>wsize</emph>) are similar before and after the reform, given the non-significant interaction term between the two variables <emph>rector</emph> and <emph>post_Gelmini_reform</emph>. A significant difference between the two subperiods arises when looking at the flow of resources in terms of career progression: the number of progressions within the rector's SSD is 8.4% higher than that observed for the data after 2012, while the effect before appears to be non-significantly different from 0. Hypotheses 2a and 2b are, therefore, only partially supported. The results are confirmed when restricting the sample to the university-SSDs with at least one rector and when looking at the matched sample (see Table 5), although there are some variations in the magnitude and significance of the effects.</p> <p>Table 4. Estimating rector's effects after the Gelmini reform – FE model.</p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead valign="bottom"><tr><td /><td>(1)</td><td>(2)</td><td>(3)</td><td>(4)</td><td>(5)</td></tr><tr><td /><td>(ln) size</td><td>(ln) wsize</td><td>(ln) hirings</td><td>(ln) new_hirings</td><td>(ln) career_progressions</td></tr><tr><td /><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>rector</td><td char=".">0.100***</td><td char=".">0.104***</td><td char=".">0.033</td><td char=".">0.028</td><td char=".">−0.006</td></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.022)</td><td char=".">(0.021)</td><td char=".">(0.020)</td><td char=".">(0.018)</td><td char=".">(0.018)</td></tr><tr><td>rector × post_Gelmini_reform</td><td char=".">−0.031</td><td char=".">−0.027</td><td char=".">−0.004</td><td char=".">−0.003</td><td char=".">0.084***</td></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.029)</td><td char=".">(0.029)</td><td char=".">(0.025)</td><td char=".">(0.023)</td><td char=".">(0.024)</td></tr><tr><td>L.(ln) departures</td><td char=".">−0.123***</td><td char=".">−0.119***</td><td char=".">0.009***</td><td char=".">0.003</td><td char=".">0.005</td></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.007)</td><td char=".">(0.006)</td><td char=".">(0.003)</td><td char=".">(0.003)</td><td char=".">(0.003)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) size_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char=".">0.455***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.026)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) size_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char=".">0.566***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.037)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) wsize_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char="." /><td char=".">0.395***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.023)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) wsize_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char="." /><td char=".">0.511***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.038)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) hirings_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.025***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.003)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) hirings_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.065***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.005)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) new_hirings_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.025***</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.003)</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) new_hirings_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.057***</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.004)</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) career_progressions_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.034***</td></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.003)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) career_progressions_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.042***</td></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.003)</td></tr><tr><td>constant</td><td char=".">−4.690***</td><td char=".">−3.931***</td><td char=".">−0.148***</td><td char=".">−0.119***</td><td char=".">−0.073***</td></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.285)</td><td char=".">(0.278)</td><td char=".">(0.018)</td><td char=".">(0.015)</td><td char=".">(0.011)</td></tr><tr><td>N. observations</td><td>248551</td><td>248551</td><td>248551</td><td>248551</td><td>248551</td></tr><tr><td>N. universities</td><td>68</td><td>68</td><td>68</td><td>68</td><td>68</td></tr><tr><td>N. SSD#University groups</td><td>12495</td><td>12495</td><td>12495</td><td>12495</td><td>12495</td></tr><tr><td>R2</td><td>0.919</td><td>0.928</td><td>0.237</td><td>0.229</td><td>0.250</td></tr><tr><td>Year FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>SSD#University FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <ulist> <item>5 Standard errors in parentheses.</item> <item>6 * <emph>p</emph> < 0.10, ** <emph>p</emph> < 0.05, *** <emph>p</emph> < 0.01.</item> </ulist> <p>Table 5. Estimating rector's effects after the Gelmini reform – FE model on a matched sample.</p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead valign="bottom"><tr><td /><td>(1)</td><td>(2)</td><td>(3)</td><td>(4)</td><td>(5)</td></tr><tr><td /><td>(ln) size</td><td>(ln) wsize</td><td>(ln) hirings</td><td>(ln) new_hirings</td><td>(ln) career_progressions</td></tr><tr><td /><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>rector</td><td char=".">0.042*</td><td char=".">0.043**</td><td char=".">−0.018</td><td char=".">−0.025</td><td char=".">−0.007</td></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.022)</td><td char=".">(0.021)</td><td char=".">(0.030)</td><td char=".">(0.030)</td><td char=".">(0.028)</td></tr><tr><td>rector × post_Gelmini_reform</td><td char=".">0.021</td><td char=".">0.026</td><td char=".">0.053</td><td char=".">0.058*</td><td char=".">0.069**</td></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.026)</td><td char=".">(0.025)</td><td char=".">(0.034)</td><td char=".">(0.033)</td><td char=".">(0.027)</td></tr><tr><td>L.(ln) departures</td><td char=".">−0.067***</td><td char=".">−0.068***</td><td char=".">0.034*</td><td char=".">0.026</td><td char=".">0.026*</td></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.010)</td><td char=".">(0.009)</td><td char=".">(0.017)</td><td char=".">(0.017)</td><td char=".">(0.015)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) size_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char=".">0.511***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.102)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) size_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char=".">0.540***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.057)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) wsize_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char="." /><td char=".">0.486***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.086)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) wsize_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char="." /><td char=".">0.514***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.047)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) hirings_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.038***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.010)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) hirings_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.127***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.010)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) new_hirings_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.040***</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.009)</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) new_hirings_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.113***</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.010)</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) career_progressions_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.058***</td></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.011)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) career_progressions_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.098***</td></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.008)</td></tr><tr><td>constant</td><td char=".">−4.084***</td><td char=".">−3.692***</td><td char=".">−0.234***</td><td char=".">−0.193***</td><td char=".">−0.152***</td></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.633)</td><td char=".">(0.496)</td><td char=".">(0.043)</td><td char=".">(0.039)</td><td char=".">(0.032)</td></tr><tr><td>N. observations</td><td>6478</td><td>6478</td><td>6478</td><td>6478</td><td>6478</td></tr><tr><td>N. universities</td><td>67</td><td>67</td><td>67</td><td>67</td><td>67</td></tr><tr><td>N. SSD#University groups</td><td>331</td><td>331</td><td>331</td><td>331</td><td>331</td></tr><tr><td>R2</td><td>0.943</td><td>0.945</td><td>0.336</td><td>0.327</td><td>0.349</td></tr><tr><td>Year FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>SSD#University FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <ulist> <item>7 Standard errors in parentheses.</item> <item>8 * <emph>p</emph> < 0.10, ** <emph>p</emph> < 0.05, *** <emph>p</emph> < 0.01.</item> </ulist> <p>As mentioned before, in the time window considered in our analysis, there are significant cycles of expansion and contraction of resources in the whole Italian university system. While we control for this phenomenon by using year fixed effects (equivalent to year dummies) and the resources at the university level (* <emph>outSSD_inUNI</emph>), the rector effect on SSD resources may vary in periods of increasing or decreasing resources. For example, a sudden injection of resources in the university may increase the decisional slack of the rector about resource allocation. In contrast, a substantial decrease in available resources may hinder any discretionary allocation of resources. Therefore, we check whether the effect of rectors is moderated by the fact that university resources are (most likely exogenously) increasing or decreasing. Tables 6 and 7 confirm that the effects of rectors on their own SSDs are strongly related to the fact that the focal university faces a period characterised by increasing or decreasing resources. While the rectors' SSDs become bigger during the mandate any time, the flows of resources directed to their SSDs for new faculty members' hirings and career progressions are much higher during the expansion periods (from +6.8% to +13.7%). In Table 7, whose estimates are characterised by more homogeneous samples in terms of SSD characteristics, the effect of rectors during the expansion periods is consistent though smaller in magnitude, both in terms of the stock and flow of resources, ranging from an additional 4.4% to 9%. Therefore, we find strong evidence that a significant portion of suddenly injected resources is likely allocated with more discretionary (and political) logic.</p> <p>Table 6. Estimating rector's effects in expansion periods – FE model.</p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead valign="bottom"><tr><td /><td>(1)</td><td>(2)</td><td>(3)</td><td>(4)</td><td>(5)</td></tr><tr><td /><td>(ln) size</td><td>(ln) wsize</td><td>(ln) hirings</td><td>(ln) new_hirings</td><td>(ln) career_progressions</td></tr><tr><td /><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>rector</td><td char=".">0.068***</td><td char=".">0.074***</td><td char=".">−0.041**</td><td char=".">−0.043***</td><td char=".">−0.022</td></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.013)</td><td char=".">(0.013)</td><td char=".">(0.015)</td><td char=".">(0.015)</td><td char=".">(0.014)</td></tr><tr><td>rector × increasing_uni_resources</td><td char=".">0.030**</td><td char=".">0.030***</td><td char=".">0.137***</td><td char=".">0.135***</td><td char=".">0.120***</td></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.011)</td><td char=".">(0.010)</td><td char=".">(0.014)</td><td char=".">(0.016)</td><td char=".">(0.022)</td></tr><tr><td>L.(ln) departures</td><td char=".">−0.123***</td><td char=".">−0.119***</td><td char=".">0.009***</td><td char=".">0.003</td><td char=".">0.005*</td></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.007)</td><td char=".">(0.006)</td><td char=".">(0.003)</td><td char=".">(0.003)</td><td char=".">(0.003)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) size_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char=".">0.455***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.026)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) size_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char=".">0.566***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.037)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) wsize_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char="." /><td char=".">0.395***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.023)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) wsize_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char="." /><td char=".">0.511***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.038)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) hirings_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.025***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.003)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) hirings_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.065***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.005)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) new_hirings_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.025***</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.003)</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) new_hirings_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.057***</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.004)</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) career_progressions_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.034***</td></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.003)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) career_progressions_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.042***</td></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.003)</td></tr><tr><td>constant</td><td char=".">−4.688***</td><td char=".">−3.930***</td><td char=".">−0.147***</td><td char=".">−0.118***</td><td char=".">−0.073***</td></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.285)</td><td char=".">(0.277)</td><td char=".">(0.018)</td><td char=".">(0.015)</td><td char=".">(0.011)</td></tr><tr><td>N. observations</td><td>248551</td><td>248551</td><td>248551</td><td>248551</td><td>248551</td></tr><tr><td>N. universities</td><td>68</td><td>68</td><td>68</td><td>68</td><td>68</td></tr><tr><td>N. SSD#University groups</td><td>12495</td><td>12495</td><td>12495</td><td>12495</td><td>12495</td></tr><tr><td>R2</td><td>0.919</td><td>0.928</td><td>0.238</td><td>0.230</td><td>0.250</td></tr><tr><td>Year FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>SSD#University FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <ulist> <item>9 Standard errors in parentheses.</item> <item>10 * <emph>p</emph> < 0.10, ** <emph>p</emph> < 0.05, *** <emph>p</emph> < 0.01.</item> </ulist> <p>Table 7. Estimating rector's effects in expansion periods – FE model on a matched sample.</p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead valign="bottom"><tr><td /><td>(1)</td><td>(2)</td><td>(3)</td><td>(4)</td><td>(5)</td></tr><tr><td /><td>(ln) size</td><td>(ln) wsize</td><td>(ln) hirings</td><td>(ln) new_hirings</td><td>(ln) career_progressions</td></tr><tr><td /><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>rector</td><td char=".">0.037**</td><td char=".">0.042***</td><td char=".">−0.017</td><td char=".">−0.024</td><td char=".">0.013</td></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.015)</td><td char=".">(0.015)</td><td char=".">(0.015)</td><td char=".">(0.016)</td><td char=".">(0.013)</td></tr><tr><td>rector × increasing_uni_resources</td><td char=".">0.045***</td><td char=".">0.044***</td><td char=".">0.082***</td><td char=".">0.090***</td><td char=".">0.068**</td></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.015)</td><td char=".">(0.013)</td><td char=".">(0.024)</td><td char=".">(0.022)</td><td char=".">(0.032)</td></tr><tr><td>L.(ln) departures</td><td char=".">−0.066***</td><td char=".">−0.068***</td><td char=".">0.035*</td><td char=".">0.027</td><td char=".">0.026*</td></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.010)</td><td char=".">(0.009)</td><td char=".">(0.017)</td><td char=".">(0.017)</td><td char=".">(0.015)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) size_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char=".">0.512***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.102)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) size_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char=".">0.536***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.056)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) wsize_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char="." /><td char=".">0.487***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.086)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) wsize_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char="." /><td char=".">0.511***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.046)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) hirings_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.038***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.009)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) hirings_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.124***</td><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.010)</td><td char="." /><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) new_hirings_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.040***</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.009)</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) new_hirings_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.110***</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.010)</td><td char="." /></tr><tr><td>(ln) career_progressions_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.058***</td></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.011)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) career_progressions_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">0.097***</td></tr><tr><td /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char="." /><td char=".">(0.008)</td></tr><tr><td>constant</td><td char=".">−4.068***</td><td char=".">−3.675***</td><td char=".">−0.225***</td><td char=".">−0.185***</td><td char=".">−0.150***</td></tr><tr><td /><td char=".">(0.630)</td><td char=".">(0.492)</td><td char=".">(0.042)</td><td char=".">(0.038)</td><td char=".">(0.032)</td></tr><tr><td>N. observations</td><td>6478</td><td>6478</td><td>6478</td><td>6478</td><td>6478</td></tr><tr><td>N. universities</td><td>67</td><td>67</td><td>67</td><td>67</td><td>67</td></tr><tr><td>N. SSD#University groups</td><td>331</td><td>331</td><td>331</td><td>331</td><td>331</td></tr><tr><td>R2</td><td>0.943</td><td>0.945</td><td>0.337</td><td>0.328</td><td>0.349</td></tr><tr><td>Year FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>SSD#University FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <ulist> <item>11 Standard errors in parentheses.</item> <item>12 * <emph>p</emph> < 0.10, ** <emph>p</emph> < 0.05, *** <emph>p</emph> < 0.01.</item> </ulist> <hd id="AN0178439966-11">Identification strategy and potential endogeneity issues</hd> <p>There may be multiple unobserved factors potentially affecting both the probability of an SSD 'having' a rector and the allocation of resources to that SSD. The validity of our identification strategy hinges on the strong path dependency of these factors. In fact, if they are relatively stable in time and with few 'jumps', we expect our empirical strategy to control for them, given the wide array of fixed effects. However, we adopt different strategies to explicitly consider factors that are deemed to be most relevant, such as the level of financial resources attracted and the scientific quality/prestige.</p> <p>For what concerns the level of financial resources attracted, an ideal measure would be the sum of contract research, consultancies and grants a specific SSD obtained externally in a specific year. Unfortunately, this level of disaggregation is almost never available, neither publicly nor at the university administrative level, especially for all 12,495 SSDs over 20 years.</p> <p>For what concerns the scientific quality and prestige of a single SSD, one option would be to examine the publication data of the entire Italian faculty staff in the last 20 years. However, we would have concerns about the comparability of different scientific sectors (bibliometric vs. non-bibliometric; journal-based vs. book-based), in other words, about how to compare, for example, genetics with Germanic philology. Another metric of prestige may be related to rankings. However, they are often at the university level, and Italian universities are increasingly being included in international ranking, though with limited variability in time (i.e. switching) in the last 20 years. In other words, our fixed effects strategy most likely already fully captures this dynamic.[<reflink idref="bib10" id="ref80">10</reflink>]</p> <p>As a proxy for financial resources, we decided to exploit the fact that STEM disciplines usually receive significantly more resources than non-STEM disciplines. A STEM indicator is strictly related to the AREA the SSDs belong to; therefore, it is not time invariant, and in principle, it should already be controlled for in our empirical exercise by the FE model at different levels.</p> <p>As a proxy for scientific quality, we decided to exploit the evaluation exercises performed by MUR, namely the evaluation called research quality evaluation (V<emph>alutazione Qualità della Ricerca</emph>, VQR). It was conducted in three waves (2004–2010, 2011–2014, and 2015–2019) and was explicitly aimed at comparing different universities and scientific areas to allocate a significant portion of the national funding to universities (namely <emph>Fondo di Finanziamento Ordinario</emph>, FFO). Even though there is variability between AREAs belonging to different universities, this variable again suffers from limited variability in time.</p> <p>Since the main concern about these factors is related to being relevant determinants of a rector's election, we decided to exploit our proxies of financial resources and scientific quality by directly looking at their effect on the probability of an elected rector belonging to a specific scientific group within a university. In particular, we estimated survival models, including a dummy related to the SSD belonging to STEM disciplines, <emph>d_STEM</emph>, and <emph>R</emph>, the main quality indicator in VQR evaluation, measured at the AREA level. Surprisingly, we found that neither of them is significantly related to the probability that a rector belongs to a specific SSD. In contrast, relevant factors are the SSD size and the number of full professors (positive effect) and the size of all other SSDs within the same university (negative effect). The results are reported in Table 8 in Appendix 3. This empirical exercise points to the election of rectors as being mainly related to size and ranking factors, with scientific quality and financial resources not appearing particularly relevant.[<reflink idref="bib11" id="ref81">11</reflink>]</p> <p>As an additional check, we decided to 'restrict' the observation period for the SSDs with a rector. In particular, we included observations related to (i) the focal mandate in which one of the professors of an SSD is a rector and (ii) the mandate immediately before. Restricting the observation window for SSDs with a rector should reduce concerns about some underlying factors that may change in a 20-year window. In other words, we would expect time-invariant factors to be even less relevant and thus our FE model to capture most of the unobserved heterogeneity potentially leading to an omitted variable bias. Indeed, our findings do not significantly change in these additional estimations.</p> <p>The previous models estimated on a matched sample also aim to reduce endogeneity concerns, for example, about rectors' SSDs being different from other SSDs In addition to increasing the comparability between SSDs, matching an SSD with a rector with the most similar one (in terms of the observed characteristics that affect the probability of having a group member elected as a rector) should also control for the unobserved determinants of both rector election and recruiting dynamics.</p> <hd id="AN0178439966-12">Additional robustness checks</hd> <p>As additional robustness tests, in part to overcome the issue of estimating the contemporaneous relation characterising FE models, we repeat our estimations at the SSD-university-mandate level. In other words, for both dependent and independent variables, we aggregate the resources considering the time window of each mandate. In particular, we compute an average of the variables indicating the stock of resources (<emph>size</emph> and <emph>wsize</emph>) and the sum of variables referring to the flow of new resources (<emph>hirings</emph>, <emph>new_hirings</emph> and <emph>career_progressions</emph>) over the mandate years. Note that the years of rectors' mandates are university-specific; therefore, the number of years can vary (especially before the Gelmini reform). FE models already control for the different lengths of the mandates, but we also added university-mandate fixed effects (equivalent to dummies) to further control for other potential sources of unobserved heterogeneity. Table 9 in Appendix 4 mimics the previous estimations at the university-SSD-mandate level by confirming the evidence of the models presented above. The estimated effect of the rectors is significant and equal to approximately 6.5–6.9% on the stock of resources of their SSD. The total number of new resources allocated to the rector's SSD in terms of new faculty members is approximately 8% more than those allocated to other SSDs, albeit not significant. Noteworthy, a significant +11.8% is the differential proportion of career promotions within a rector's SSD during their mandate.</p> <p>Finally, we estimate the effects of rectors on larger subunits within universities, namely the '<emph>aree disciplinari</emph>' (henceforth AREA, large disciplinary areas) in which the SSDs are organised. In Table 10 in Appendix 4, the unit of observation is the AREA-university-year. We find evidence of a significant positive impact of the rector on the stock of resources of the AREA they belong to (<emph>size</emph> and <emph>wsize</emph>), with a magnitude of approximately 4% and smaller with respect to the effects estimated for SSDs. The effects on the flow of new resources are positive but not significant, not even for career promotions. While the number of SSDs is 369, there are only 14 AREAs. For example, 42 SSDs are included in AREA 9 – information and industrial engineering (Appendix 5).</p> <hd id="AN0178439966-13">Discussion and conclusions</hd> <p>By looking at the patterns of resource allocation, our analysis advances our understanding of the role of the leadership's political power in public organisations, such as universities. We build on <bold>resource dependency</bold> theory (Pfeffer and Salancik [<reflink idref="bib39" id="ref82">39</reflink>]), arguing that the rector is the main actor in acquiring critical resources for their organisation. In line with Lepori et al.'s (2013) suggestions, our research design allows us to specifically quantify to whom the rectors allocate the resources and to what extent. We find that university rectors are prone to favour their closest group of interest (Henry, Lubell, and McCoy [<reflink idref="bib28" id="ref83">28</reflink>]), even after controlling for the relative size of the disciplinary unit compared to the national and institutional averages.</p> <p>Our results show that the discretionary power of rectors persists after the Gelmini reform, which, however, has no statistically significant effect in strengthening or hindering their political role. The rationale behind this may be the relevance of the academic guild in some processes related to resource allocation, although it is mostly determined by the rectors. Academics thus retain a strong voice in the recruitment of scientific staff, and the selection procedure after the Gelmini reform remains discipline-based. Although the number of disciplines has decreased from 370 to 190 (ministerial decree 159/2012), recruitment is still based on an evaluation panel constituted of eminent academics who are active in the discipline.</p> <p>Alongside the persisting influence of the academic community, a sound explanation for the limited increase in rectors' political power may be the increase in the number of monitoring and disciplining mechanisms. By requiring a two-thirds majority, the Gelmini reform enables the Academic Senate to file a no-confidence motion against the rector. If the motion is accepted by the three university estates that constitute the rector's electorate, the rector is terminated (Donina, Meoli, and Paleari [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref84">20</reflink>]). According to contingency theory, however, policy design and implementation are also strongly related to the general conditions affecting the system as a whole. In fact, after the Gelmini reform, similarly to other countries, Italy experienced an economic recession. Due to reduced government funding, the universities also underwent a profound resource contraction, leading to a significant decrease in their staff. Turnover 'freezing' largely contributed to this decline (for a comprehensive discussion, refer to Civera, Meoli, and Paleari [<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref85">15</reflink>]). In contrast, career promotions of internal members are preferred because they are less expensive than recruiting academic personnel from the outside, due to the aforementioned logic of PO.</p> <hd id="AN0178439966-14">Theoretical contributions</hd> <p>Our work contributes to several streams of literature.</p> <p>First, it advances our knowledge on the political power within organisations such as universities, which, according to resource dependency theory, was traditionally considered to be in the hands of influential subunits rather than the leadership (Pfeffer and Salancik [<reflink idref="bib38" id="ref86">38</reflink>]).</p> <p>Second, we contribute to the studies of network theory in universities by emphasising interaction with actors who are internal instead of external to the organisation (Bleiklie et al. [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref87">5</reflink>]; Rabovsky and Rutherford [<reflink idref="bib41" id="ref88">41</reflink>]) – specifically with those belonging to the same rectors' disciplinary area.</p> <p>Third, we investigate the effect of the Gelmini reform from the viewpoint of contingency theory by demonstrating that not all NPM reforms strengthen university leadership's power, but it depends on both how the policy is designed and the system as a whole. The introduction of monitoring mechanisms and performance evaluation, together with a significant decrease in the resources allocated to universities, prevent rectors from exerting their political power by limiting their room for manoeuvre.</p> <hd id="AN0178439966-15">Practical implications</hd> <p>In terms of the practical implications of this research, our findings hold relevance for various stakeholders involved in higher education institutions. First, policymakers should note that individual decision-making may prioritise personal preferences over the organisation's best interests. Consequently, it becomes essential to establish appropriate mechanisms that balance power and ensure that collective decision making aligns with the institution's objectives. Second, higher education institutions themselves should be cognizant of the need for internal supervision and power equilibrium. To achieve this, they can implement specific measures, such as appointing lay members to the board of directors and fostering diverse perspectives and expertise in the decision-making process. Finally, the academic communities within these institutions can benefit from a deeper understanding of the political dynamics that emerge when leaders are chosen through elections. In conclusion, this research sheds light on the intricacies of decision making within higher education institutions, highlighting the significance of striking a balance between individual preferences and collective organisational goals. By incorporating the insights gained from this study, stakeholders can work towards enhancing the overall effectiveness and governance of higher education institutions.</p> <hd id="AN0178439966-16">Limitations and future research</hd> <p>Starting from our findings, new venues for future research may be outlined.</p> <p>First, we focus on the relationship between rectors and the subunits belonging to their scientific discipline. However, considering that the disciplinary sector does not only coincide with the rector's scientific community but also represents a relevant part of their electoral base, it would be interesting to deepen the analysis by also considering the <bold>interaction with other subunits within the university</bold>, which may or may not be part of their voting base. Considering that universities often function as organisations with a predominantly political nature, where decisions result from power struggles among various actors or groups, analysing the interactions between rectors and the academic guild could offer valuable and intriguing insights. Similarly, it would be interesting to understand, in particular, how a rector is related to those who do not support their election but one of the other candidates to the rectorship. Thus, in addition to favouring their SSD (and voters), the elected rector may eventually penalise the opponent's coalition in terms of research allocation. Both these research areas require an individual-level analysis and considerable effort in new data collection, which are far beyond the scope of investigation in this study.</p> <p>Second, we test the effect of NPM reforms as a contingency influencing rectors' political power. Nonetheless, according to Bleiklie et al. ([<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref89">5</reflink>]) the contingencies that potentially affect universities may be numerous, for instance, the <bold>general characteristics of the university system</bold> (i.e. centralised vs. decentralised), the <bold>resource environment</bold> (e.g. the availability of financial and human resources, the resource allocation mechanisms through the core budget or formula-based and the relevance of third-party funds), the <bold>composition of decision-making bodies with universities</bold> (e.g. presence and relevance of lay members) and the <bold>national evaluation system</bold> (i.e. habilitation vs. tenure-track career progression). In this regard, following the rationales of NPM, a new evaluation system was implemented in parallel with the Gelmini reform. Academics are now increasingly assessed and promoted on the basis of their scientific activities, and universities receive a significant part of their funds according to different parameters, most of which are based on performance. The use of objective and explicit measures of performance at different organisation levels may have modified the internal resource allocation processes, reducing, but not annulling, the discretion on which some of the exercise of power hinges. These are aspects that most likely influence the discretion of rectors in the resource allocation process.</p> <p>Third, leadership perspectives, decisions and actions are influenced not only by the resources available in the environment, both internally and externally, but also by individual characteristics. Therefore, some individual traits to consider may be <bold>university leadership demographic characteristics, scientific profile and time spent in an organisation</bold> (Boden and Rowlands [<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref90">7</reflink>]; Breakwell and Tytherleigh [<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref91">9</reflink>]; Johnes and Virmani [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref92">31</reflink>]). High-profile rectors may have an attitude towards resource allocation which is different from those with a managerial perspective (Pearce [<reflink idref="bib36" id="ref93">36</reflink>]) and may tend to favour either their disciplinary unit or other subunits performing highly in terms of the research output and contracts (Lodahl and Gordon [<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref94">34</reflink>]; Salancik and Pfeffer [<reflink idref="bib42" id="ref95">42</reflink>]). Similarly, rectors who have been part of the organisation for a long time and have never moved in any other institution are more aware of the internal climate and dynamics and have had time to build their position and reputation within their organisations, creating consensus (Gouldner [<reflink idref="bib27" id="ref96">27</reflink>]). Inbred rectors can, therefore, sustain and secure the existing culture and tradition (Altbach, Yudkevich, and Rumbley [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref97">2</reflink>]; Hollingshead [<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref98">30</reflink>]) and may be considered legitimated to exercise a discretionary use of power.</p> <hd id="AN0178439966-17">Disclosure statement</hd> <p>No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).</p> <hd id="AN0178439966-18">Appendix 1: descriptive statistics on the Italian public universities included in the sample</hd> <p></p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead valign="bottom"><tr><td>University</td><td>Average faculty size</td><td>Average faculty size (weighted)</td><td>Faculty size in the last year</td><td>Faculty size (weighted) in the last year</td><td>First year</td><td>Last year</td><td>Variation in faculty size</td><td>Variation in faculty size (weighted)</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>BARI</td><td char=".">1639.3</td><td char=".">1121.0</td><td char=".">1510</td><td char=".">1018.1</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td>−128</td><td char=".">−155.7</td></tr><tr><td>BASILICATA</td><td char=".">313.6</td><td char=".">215.8</td><td char=".">318</td><td char=".">212.4</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">21</td><td char=".">5.4</td></tr><tr><td>BERGAMO</td><td char=".">304.0</td><td char=".">213.0</td><td char=".">405</td><td char=".">290.3</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">250</td><td char=".">176.8</td></tr><tr><td>BOLOGNA</td><td char=".">2939.1</td><td char=".">2088.7</td><td char=".">3000</td><td char=".">2183.0</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">76</td><td char=".">68.2</td></tr><tr><td>BRESCIA</td><td char=".">536.9</td><td char=".">379.0</td><td char=".">619</td><td char=".">451.4</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">224</td><td char=".">163.3</td></tr><tr><td>Ca' Foscari VENEZIA</td><td char=".">538.0</td><td char=".">391.7</td><td char=".">632</td><td char=".">458.8</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">107</td><td char=".">69.4</td></tr><tr><td>CAGLIARI</td><td char=".">1061.8</td><td char=".">728.6</td><td char=".">1004</td><td char=".">692.5</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td>−36</td><td char=".">−45.7</td></tr><tr><td>CAMERINO</td><td char=".">294.7</td><td char=".">202.8</td><td char=".">286</td><td char=".">205.3</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td>−5</td><td char=".">−0.6</td></tr><tr><td>CAMPANIA – L. VANVITELLI</td><td char=".">968.8</td><td char=".">665.9</td><td char=".">970</td><td char=".">700.0</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">102</td><td char=".">100.5</td></tr><tr><td>CASSINO e LAZIO MERIDIONALE</td><td char=".">301.4</td><td char=".">207.6</td><td char=".">259</td><td char=".">182.0</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td>−13</td><td char=".">−4.3</td></tr><tr><td>CATANIA</td><td char=".">1432.0</td><td char=".">1018.2</td><td char=".">1175</td><td char=".">852.2</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td>−296</td><td char=".">−199.5</td></tr><tr><td>CATANZARO</td><td char=".">219.5</td><td char=".">159.5</td><td char=".">293</td><td char=".">216.0</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">133</td><td char=".">101.0</td></tr><tr><td>CHIETI-PESCARA</td><td char=".">686.6</td><td char=".">486.4</td><td char=".">715</td><td char=".">522.0</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">125</td><td char=".">102.3</td></tr><tr><td>della CALABRIA</td><td char=".">761.5</td><td char=".">518.1</td><td char=".">798</td><td char=".">540.2</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">298</td><td char=".">181.6</td></tr><tr><td>FERRARA</td><td char=".">649.7</td><td char=".">460.3</td><td char=".">702</td><td char=".">508.1</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">32</td><td char=".">30.8</td></tr><tr><td>FIRENZE</td><td char=".">1980.8</td><td char=".">1430.0</td><td char=".">1722</td><td char=".">1221.4</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td>−530</td><td char=".">−434.5</td></tr><tr><td>FOGGIA</td><td char=".">329.2</td><td char=".">227.0</td><td char=".">388</td><td char=".">282.2</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">220</td><td char=".">165.3</td></tr><tr><td>GENOVA</td><td char=".">1446.6</td><td char=".">1032.0</td><td char=".">1311</td><td char=".">940.7</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td>−408</td><td char=".">−300.1</td></tr><tr><td>Gran Sasso Science Institute</td><td char=".">29.7</td><td char=".">20.8</td><td char=".">55</td><td char=".">39.7</td><td char=".">2016</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">54</td><td char=".">38.7</td></tr><tr><td>I.U.S.S. – PAVIA</td><td char=".">17.2</td><td char=".">13.4</td><td char=".">34</td><td char=".">24.4</td><td char=".">2006</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">29</td><td char=".">19.4</td></tr><tr><td>INSUBRIA</td><td char=".">361.6</td><td char=".">254.6</td><td char=".">391</td><td char=".">280.0</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">117</td><td char=".">79.3</td></tr><tr><td>L'AQUILA</td><td char=".">589.5</td><td char=".">422.3</td><td char=".">602</td><td char=".">435.2</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">21</td><td char=".">14.1</td></tr><tr><td>L'Orientale di NAPOLI</td><td char=".">239.9</td><td char=".">175.6</td><td char=".">223</td><td char=".">162.3</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td>−59</td><td char=".">−45.9</td></tr><tr><td>MACERATA</td><td char=".">268.6</td><td char=".">193.2</td><td char=".">277</td><td char=".">199.3</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">89</td><td char=".">52.1</td></tr><tr><td>Mediterranea di REGGIO CALABRIA</td><td char=".">270.9</td><td char=".">183.0</td><td char=".">266</td><td char=".">176.0</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">45</td><td char=".">22.6</td></tr><tr><td>MESSINA</td><td char=".">1238.8</td><td char=".">844.3</td><td char=".">1101</td><td char=".">773.6</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td>−255</td><td char=".">−146.6</td></tr><tr><td>MILANO</td><td char=".">2232.1</td><td char=".">1586.6</td><td char=".">2306</td><td char=".">1669.0</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">220</td><td char=".">136.0</td></tr><tr><td>MILANO-BICOCCA</td><td char=".">850.9</td><td char=".">595.4</td><td char=".">1031</td><td char=".">739.5</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">486</td><td char=".">335.2</td></tr><tr><td>MODENA e REGGIO EMILIA</td><td char=".">805.1</td><td char=".">581.7</td><td char=".">811</td><td char=".">597.7</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">88</td><td char=".">64.6</td></tr><tr><td>MOLISE</td><td char=".">273.3</td><td char=".">195.6</td><td char=".">287</td><td char=".">213.7</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">128</td><td char=".">103.8</td></tr><tr><td>Napoli Federico II</td><td char=".">2720.3</td><td char=".">1910.3</td><td char=".">2859</td><td char=".">2013.7</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">93</td><td char=".">35.3</td></tr><tr><td>PADOVA</td><td char=".">2210.8</td><td char=".">1573.7</td><td char=".">2376</td><td char=".">1707.5</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">215</td><td char=".">138.1</td></tr><tr><td>PALERMO</td><td char=".">1746.8</td><td char=".">1215.0</td><td char=".">1556</td><td char=".">1084.7</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td>−308</td><td char=".">−229.9</td></tr><tr><td>PARMA</td><td char=".">977.7</td><td char=".">692.5</td><td char=".">947</td><td char=".">675.6</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td>−102</td><td char=".">−71.5</td></tr><tr><td>Parthenope di NAPOLI</td><td char=".">281.3</td><td char=".">197.5</td><td char=".">343</td><td char=".">248.1</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">235</td><td char=".">167.2</td></tr><tr><td>PAVIA</td><td char=".">1014.3</td><td char=".">727.1</td><td char=".">903</td><td char=".">646.6</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td>−244</td><td char=".">−204.4</td></tr><tr><td>PERUGIA</td><td char=".">1120.3</td><td char=".">779.5</td><td char=".">961</td><td char=".">658.3</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td>−186</td><td char=".">−171.7</td></tr><tr><td>PIEMONTE ORIENTALE</td><td char=".">369.1</td><td char=".">264.7</td><td char=".">382</td><td char=".">273.9</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">81</td><td char=".">54.8</td></tr><tr><td>PISA</td><td char=".">1643.0</td><td char=".">1185.2</td><td char=".">1490</td><td char=".">1079.6</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td>−331</td><td char=".">−251.6</td></tr><tr><td>Politecnica delle MARCHE</td><td char=".">521.7</td><td char=".">372.4</td><td char=".">591</td><td char=".">430.1</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">147</td><td char=".">106.0</td></tr><tr><td>Politecnico di BARI</td><td char=".">317.4</td><td char=".">223.3</td><td char=".">329</td><td char=".">235.6</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">33</td><td char=".">23.8</td></tr><tr><td>Politecnico di MILANO</td><td char=".">1315.9</td><td char=".">945.5</td><td char=".">1503</td><td char=".">1103.8</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">438</td><td char=".">315.6</td></tr><tr><td>Politecnico di TORINO</td><td char=".">858.4</td><td char=".">615.3</td><td char=".">957</td><td char=".">713.5</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">159</td><td char=".">135.5</td></tr><tr><td>ROMA Foro Italico</td><td char=".">50.8</td><td char=".">34.6</td><td char=".">61</td><td char=".">43.0</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">48</td><td char=".">32.0</td></tr><tr><td>ROMA La Sapienza</td><td char=".">4090.7</td><td char=".">2837.3</td><td char=".">3508</td><td char=".">2451.3</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td>−1238</td><td char=".">−918.0</td></tr><tr><td>ROMA Tor Vergata</td><td char=".">1368.0</td><td char=".">946.7</td><td char=".">1249</td><td char=".">877.0</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">82</td><td char=".">56.9</td></tr><tr><td>ROMA TRE</td><td char=".">848.8</td><td char=".">631.8</td><td char=".">897</td><td char=".">677.8</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">208</td><td char=".">155.1</td></tr><tr><td>SALENTO</td><td char=".">668.7</td><td char=".">456.5</td><td char=".">595</td><td char=".">404.1</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td>−4</td><td char=".">−15.7</td></tr><tr><td>SALERNO</td><td char=".">932.2</td><td char=".">660.8</td><td char=".">1002</td><td char=".">736.5</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">281</td><td char=".">218.3</td></tr><tr><td>SANNIO di BENEVENTO</td><td char=".">179.8</td><td char=".">123.2</td><td char=".">209</td><td char=".">145.7</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">96</td><td char=".">63.7</td></tr><tr><td>SASSARI</td><td char=".">649.2</td><td char=".">459.4</td><td char=".">595</td><td char=".">420.1</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td>−34</td><td char=".">−31.0</td></tr><tr><td>Scuola IMT Alti Studi LUCCA</td><td char=".">23.6</td><td char=".">15.4</td><td char=".">41</td><td char=".">28.9</td><td char=".">2006</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">36</td><td char=".">26.4</td></tr><tr><td>Scuola Normale Superiore di PISA</td><td char=".">94.3</td><td char=".">63.7</td><td char=".">83</td><td char=".">60.5</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td>−27</td><td char=".">−10.8</td></tr><tr><td>Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna</td><td char=".">102.2</td><td char=".">73.5</td><td char=".">156</td><td char=".">114.1</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">110</td><td char=".">79.2</td></tr><tr><td>SIENA</td><td char=".">871.9</td><td char=".">623.6</td><td char=".">714</td><td char=".">511.0</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td>−188</td><td char=".">−158.0</td></tr><tr><td>SISSA – TRIESTE</td><td char=".">69.1</td><td char=".">55.2</td><td char=".">91</td><td char=".">74.6</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">41</td><td char=".">36.4</td></tr><tr><td>Stranieri di PERUGIA</td><td char=".">56.9</td><td char=".">37.8</td><td char=".">56</td><td char=".">40.8</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">11</td><td char=".">12.3</td></tr><tr><td>Stranieri di SIENA</td><td char=".">42.9</td><td char=".">29.3</td><td char=".">73</td><td char=".">50.3</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">53</td><td char=".">35.1</td></tr><tr><td>SUM – Ist. Italiano di SCIENZE UMANE FIRENZE</td><td char=".">7.6</td><td char=".">7.6</td><td char=".">6</td><td char=".">6.0</td><td char=".">2006</td><td char=".">2012</td><td>−1</td><td char=".">−1.0</td></tr><tr><td>TERAMO</td><td char=".">231.1</td><td char=".">157.0</td><td char=".">220</td><td char=".">155.9</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">48</td><td char=".">33.1</td></tr><tr><td>TORINO</td><td char=".">2052.5</td><td char=".">1440.9</td><td char=".">2153</td><td char=".">1535.6</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">104</td><td char=".">55.7</td></tr><tr><td>TRENTO</td><td char=".">572.9</td><td char=".">421.4</td><td char=".">735</td><td char=".">552.7</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">317</td><td char=".">241.5</td></tr><tr><td>TRIESTE</td><td char=".">786.4</td><td char=".">561.2</td><td char=".">659</td><td char=".">466.8</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td>−341</td><td char=".">−261.7</td></tr><tr><td>TUSCIA</td><td char=".">311.9</td><td char=".">225.3</td><td char=".">341</td><td char=".">238.2</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">43</td><td char=".">17.8</td></tr><tr><td>UDINE</td><td char=".">677.1</td><td char=".">484.3</td><td char=".">652</td><td char=".">467.9</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">28</td><td char=".">16.1</td></tr><tr><td>Università IUAV di VENEZIA</td><td char=".">181.1</td><td char=".">135.0</td><td char=".">162</td><td char=".">122.1</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td>−51</td><td char=".">−34.9</td></tr><tr><td>Urbino Carlo Bo</td><td char=".">365.7</td><td char=".">246.1</td><td char=".">344</td><td char=".">243.1</td><td char=".">2007</td><td char=".">2021</td><td>−108</td><td char=".">−64.6</td></tr><tr><td>VERONA</td><td char=".">723.8</td><td char=".">508.7</td><td char=".">793</td><td char=".">557.3</td><td char=".">2001</td><td char=".">2021</td><td char=".">212</td><td char=".">139.8</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <hd id="AN0178439966-19">Appendix 2: Correlation table</hd> <p></p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead valign="bottom"><tr><td>(1)</td><td>(2)</td><td>(3)</td><td>(4)</td><td>(5)</td><td>(6)</td><td>(7)</td><td>(8)</td><td>(9)</td><td>(10)</td><td>(11)</td><td>(12)</td><td>(13)</td><td>(14)</td><td>(15)</td><td>(16)</td><td>(17)</td><td>(18)</td><td>(19)</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><bold>(1)</bold></td><td>(ln) size</td><td char=".">1.00</td></tr><tr><td><bold>(2)</bold></td><td>(ln) wsize</td><td char=".">0.99</td><td char=".">1.00</td></tr><tr><td><bold>(3)</bold></td><td>(ln) hirings</td><td char=".">0.37</td><td char=".">0.37</td><td char=".">1.00</td></tr><tr><td><bold>(4)</bold></td><td>(ln) new_hirings</td><td char=".">0.36</td><td char=".">0.36</td><td char=".">0.94</td><td char=".">1.00</td></tr><tr><td><bold>(5)</bold></td><td>(ln) career_progressions</td><td char=".">0.35</td><td char=".">0.37</td><td char=".">0.20</td><td char=".">0.20</td><td char=".">1.00</td></tr><tr><td><bold>(6)</bold></td><td>rector</td><td char=".">0.07</td><td char=".">0.08</td><td char=".">0.04</td><td char=".">0.04</td><td char=".">0.04</td><td char=".">1.00</td></tr><tr><td><bold>(7)</bold></td><td>post_Gelmini_reform</td><td char=".">−0.01</td><td char=".">−0.02</td><td char=".">−0.04</td><td char=".">−0.03</td><td char=".">0.07</td><td char=".">0.00</td><td char=".">1.00</td></tr><tr><td><bold>(8)</bold></td><td>increasing_uni_resources</td><td char=".">−0.04</td><td char=".">−0.03</td><td char=".">0.18</td><td char=".">0.17</td><td char=".">0.17</td><td char=".">0.00</td><td char=".">−0.08</td><td char=".">1.00</td></tr><tr><td><bold>(9)</bold></td><td>(ln) departures</td><td char=".">0.41</td><td char=".">0.42</td><td char=".">0.15</td><td char=".">0.15</td><td char=".">0.13</td><td char=".">0.03</td><td char=".">−0.02</td><td char=".">−0.07</td><td char=".">1.00</td></tr><tr><td><bold>(10)</bold></td><td>(ln) size_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char=".">0.45</td><td char=".">0.45</td><td char=".">0.18</td><td char=".">0.17</td><td char=".">0.16</td><td char=".">0.05</td><td char=".">−0.03</td><td char=".">0.01</td><td char=".">0.19</td><td char=".">1.00</td></tr><tr><td><bold>(11)</bold></td><td>(ln) wsize_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char=".">0.45</td><td char=".">0.45</td><td char=".">0.18</td><td char=".">0.17</td><td char=".">0.16</td><td char=".">0.05</td><td char=".">−0.04</td><td char=".">0.03</td><td char=".">0.19</td><td char=".">1.00</td><td char=".">1.00</td></tr><tr><td><bold>(12)</bold></td><td>(ln) hirings_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char=".">0.30</td><td char=".">0.31</td><td char=".">0.26</td><td char=".">0.24</td><td char=".">0.21</td><td char=".">0.03</td><td char=".">−0.05</td><td char=".">0.30</td><td char=".">0.11</td><td char=".">0.68</td><td char=".">0.68</td><td char=".">1.00</td></tr><tr><td><bold>(13)</bold></td><td>(ln) new_hirings_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char=".">0.30</td><td char=".">0.30</td><td char=".">0.26</td><td char=".">0.25</td><td char=".">0.21</td><td char=".">0.03</td><td char=".">−0.04</td><td char=".">0.30</td><td char=".">0.11</td><td char=".">0.65</td><td char=".">0.65</td><td char=".">0.97</td><td char=".">1.00</td></tr><tr><td><bold>(14)</bold></td><td>(ln) career_progressions_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char=".">0.25</td><td char=".">0.26</td><td char=".">0.21</td><td char=".">0.19</td><td char=".">0.28</td><td char=".">0.03</td><td char=".">0.22</td><td char=".">0.32</td><td char=".">0.07</td><td char=".">0.55</td><td char=".">0.56</td><td char=".">0.65</td><td char=".">0.62</td><td char=".">1.00</td></tr><tr><td><bold>(15)</bold></td><td>(ln) size_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char=".">0.37</td><td char=".">0.37</td><td char=".">0.12</td><td char=".">0.12</td><td char=".">0.13</td><td char=".">−0.04</td><td char=".">−0.04</td><td char=".">−0.11</td><td char=".">0.17</td><td char=".">−0.14</td><td char=".">−0.14</td><td char=".">−0.11</td><td char=".">−0.10</td><td char=".">−0.11</td><td char=".">1.00</td></tr><tr><td><bold>(16)</bold></td><td>(ln) wsize_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char=".">0.37</td><td char=".">0.37</td><td char=".">0.12</td><td char=".">0.13</td><td char=".">0.13</td><td char=".">−0.04</td><td char=".">−0.05</td><td char=".">−0.10</td><td char=".">0.17</td><td char=".">−0.14</td><td char=".">−0.14</td><td char=".">−0.10</td><td char=".">−0.09</td><td char=".">−0.11</td><td char=".">1.00</td><td char=".">1.00</td></tr><tr><td><bold>(17)</bold></td><td>(ln) hirings_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char=".">0.23</td><td char=".">0.24</td><td char=".">0.26</td><td char=".">0.25</td><td char=".">0.21</td><td char=".">−0.02</td><td char=".">−0.07</td><td char=".">0.45</td><td char=".">0.08</td><td char=".">−0.09</td><td char=".">−0.09</td><td char=".">0.21</td><td char=".">0.22</td><td char=".">0.18</td><td char=".">0.62</td><td char=".">0.63</td><td char=".">1.00</td></tr><tr><td><bold>(18)</bold></td><td>(ln) new_hirings_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char=".">0.23</td><td char=".">0.23</td><td char=".">0.26</td><td char=".">0.25</td><td char=".">0.21</td><td char=".">−0.02</td><td char=".">−0.03</td><td char=".">0.43</td><td char=".">0.08</td><td char=".">−0.09</td><td char=".">−0.08</td><td char=".">0.22</td><td char=".">0.24</td><td char=".">0.18</td><td char=".">0.60</td><td char=".">0.61</td><td char=".">0.98</td><td char=".">1.00</td></tr><tr><td><bold>(19)</bold></td><td>(ln) career_progressions_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char=".">0.16</td><td char=".">0.16</td><td char=".">0.18</td><td char=".">0.17</td><td char=".">0.30</td><td char=".">−0.02</td><td char=".">0.21</td><td char=".">0.42</td><td char=".">0.04</td><td char=".">−0.08</td><td char=".">−0.08</td><td char=".">0.21</td><td char=".">0.22</td><td char=".">0.41</td><td char=".">0.43</td><td char=".">0.43</td><td char=".">0.66</td><td char=".">0.66</td><td char=".">1.00</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <hd id="AN0178439966-20">Appendix 3: The probability that the elected rector belongs to a specific SSD</hd> <p>Table 8. Estimating survival models on the time to the event about the rector being elected within an SSD</p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead valign="bottom"><tr><td>(1)</td><td>(2)</td><td>(3)</td></tr><tr><td>Cox</td><td>Exponential</td><td>Weibull</td></tr><tr><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>size</td><td char=".">0.970***</td><td char=".">1.080***</td><td char=".">0.678**</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.282)</td><td char=".">(0.269)</td><td char=".">(0.280)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) size_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char=".">−0.131</td><td char=".">−0.140</td><td char=".">0.146</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.125)</td><td char=".">(0.120)</td><td char=".">(0.143)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) size_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char=".">−1.154***</td><td char=".">−1.170***</td><td char=".">−0.874***</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.084)</td><td char=".">(0.078)</td><td char=".">(0.105)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) n_full_professors</td><td char=".">1.353***</td><td char=".">1.176***</td><td char=".">1.268***</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.254)</td><td char=".">(0.238)</td><td char=".">(0.247)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) n_associate_professors</td><td char=".">−0.273</td><td char=".">−0.278</td><td char=".">−0.240</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.178)</td><td char=".">(0.172)</td><td char=".">(0.174)</td></tr><tr><td>R (VQR @ AREA level)</td><td char=".">−0.900</td><td char=".">−0.765</td><td char=".">−0.185</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.561)</td><td char=".">(0.494)</td><td char=".">(0.515)</td></tr><tr><td>d_STEM (@ AREA level)</td><td char=".">0.167</td><td char=".">0.164</td><td char=".">0.212</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.189)</td><td char=".">(0.189)</td><td char=".">(0.187)</td></tr><tr><td>constant</td><td char=".">−0.971</td><td char=".">−45.463***</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.907)</td><td char=".">(1.214)</td></tr><tr><td>N. observations</td><td>191239</td><td>191239</td><td>191239</td></tr><tr><td>N. universities</td><td>67</td><td>67</td><td>67</td></tr><tr><td>N. SSD#University groups</td><td>12202</td><td>12202</td><td>12202</td></tr><tr><td>AIC</td><td>2139.066</td><td>−94.763</td><td>−81.588</td></tr><tr><td>BIC</td><td>2210.195</td><td>−13.472</td><td>−0.298</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <p>13 Standard errors in parentheses. * <emph>p</emph> < 0.10, ** <emph>p</emph> < 0.05, *** <emph>p</emph> < 0.01</p> <hd id="AN0178439966-21">Appendix 4: Robustness checks</hd> <p>Table 9. Estimating rector's effects – FE model at the SSD-university-mandate level</p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead valign="bottom"><tr><td>(1)</td><td>(2)</td><td>(3)</td><td>(4)</td><td>(5)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) size</td><td>(ln) wsize</td><td>(ln) hirings</td><td>(ln) new_hirings</td><td>(ln) career_progressions</td></tr><tr><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>rector</td><td char=".">0.065***</td><td char=".">0.069***</td><td char=".">0.075**</td><td char=".">0.080**</td><td char=".">0.118***</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.011)</td><td char=".">(0.012)</td><td char=".">(0.036)</td><td char=".">(0.038)</td><td char=".">(0.038)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) size_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char=".">0.479***</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.023)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) size_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char=".">−0.681***</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.187)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) wsize_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char=".">0.450***</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.022)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) wsize_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char=".">−0.780***</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.172)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) hirings_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char=".">0.177***</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.017)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) hirings_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char=".">−0.182***</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.019)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) new_hirings_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char=".">0.154***</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.017)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) new_hirings_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char=".">−0.129***</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.026)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) career_progressions_inSSD_outUNI</td><td char=".">0.167***</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.010)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) career_progressions_outSSD_inUNI</td><td char=".">−0.006</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.008)</td></tr><tr><td>constant</td><td char=".">3.778***</td><td char=".">4.220***</td><td char=".">0.896***</td><td char=".">0.643***</td><td char=".">−0.001</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(1.264)</td><td char=".">(1.100)</td><td char=".">(0.078)</td><td char=".">(0.121)</td><td char=".">(0.035)</td></tr><tr><td>N. observations</td><td>41090</td><td>41090</td><td>41090</td><td>41090</td><td>41090</td></tr><tr><td>N. universities</td><td>66</td><td>66</td><td>66</td><td>66</td><td>66</td></tr><tr><td>N. SSD#University groups</td><td>11712</td><td>11712</td><td>11712</td><td>11712</td><td>11712</td></tr><tr><td>R2</td><td>0.955</td><td>0.954</td><td>0.662</td><td>0.644</td><td>0.656</td></tr><tr><td>Mandate FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>SSD#University FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td char=".">Yes</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <ulist> <item>14 Standard errors in parentheses</item> <item>15 * <emph>p</emph> < 0.10, ** <emph>p</emph> < 0.05, *** <emph>p</emph> < 0.01.</item> </ulist> <p>Table 10. Estimating rector's effects on the resources of the (broader) disciplinary area – FE model at the AREA-university-year level.</p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead valign="bottom"><tr><td>(1)</td><td>(2)</td><td>(3)</td><td>(4)</td><td>(5)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) size</td><td>(ln) wsize</td><td>(ln) hirings</td><td>(ln) new_hirings</td><td>(ln) career_progressions</td></tr><tr><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td><td>b/se</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>rector</td><td char=".">0.042***</td><td char=".">0.041**</td><td char=".">0.025</td><td char=".">0.017</td><td char=".">0.012</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.013)</td><td char=".">(0.014)</td><td char=".">(0.020)</td><td char=".">(0.021)</td><td char=".">(0.007)</td></tr><tr><td>L.(ln) departures</td><td char=".">−0.012**</td><td char=".">−0.013**</td><td char=".">0.053***</td><td char=".">0.046***</td><td char=".">0.030*</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.005)</td><td char=".">(0.006)</td><td char=".">(0.010)</td><td char=".">(0.010)</td><td char=".">(0.017)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) size_inAREA_outUNI</td><td char=".">0.732***</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.159)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) size_outAREA_inUNI</td><td char=".">0.661***</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.090)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) wsize_inAREA_outUNI</td><td char=".">0.715***</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.130)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) wsize_outAREA_inUNI</td><td char=".">0.639***</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.085)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) hirings_inAREA_outUNI</td><td char=".">0.236***</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.064)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) hirings_outAREA_inUNI</td><td char=".">0.350***</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.027)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) new_hirings_inAREA_outUNI</td><td char=".">0.211***</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.061)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) new_hirings_outAREA_inUNI</td><td char=".">0.330***</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.025)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) career_progressions_inAREA_outUNI</td><td char=".">0.081**</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.029)</td></tr><tr><td>(ln) career_progressions_outAREA_inUNI</td><td char=".">0.317***</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(0.024)</td></tr><tr><td>constant</td><td char=".">−6.766***</td><td char=".">−6.329***</td><td char=".">−1.368***</td><td char=".">−1.168***</td><td char=".">−0.451***</td></tr><tr><td char=".">(1.308)</td><td char=".">(1.098)</td><td char=".">(0.341)</td><td char=".">(0.300)</td><td char=".">(0.131)</td></tr><tr><td>N. observations</td><td>16290</td><td>16290</td><td>16290</td><td>16290</td><td>16290</td></tr><tr><td>N. universities</td><td>67</td><td>67</td><td>67</td><td>67</td><td>67</td></tr><tr><td>N. Area#University groups</td><td>845</td><td>845</td><td>845</td><td>845</td><td>845</td></tr><tr><td>R2</td><td>0.982</td><td>0.985</td><td>0.690</td><td>0.675</td><td>0.708</td></tr><tr><td>Year FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Area#University FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <ulist> <item>16 Standard errors in parentheses</item> <item>17 * <emph>p</emph> < 0.10, ** <emph>p</emph> < 0.05, *** <emph>p</emph> < 0.01</item> </ulist> <hd id="AN0178439966-22">Appendix 5: List of SSDs in the AREA '9 – Information and industrial engineering'</hd> <p></p> <p> <ephtml> <table><thead valign="bottom"><tr><td>SSD</td><td>Description</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>ING-IND/01</td><td>Naval architecture</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/02</td><td>Ship structures and marine engineering</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/03</td><td>Flight mechanics</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/04</td><td>Aerospace structures and design</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/05</td><td>Aerospace equipments and systems</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/06</td><td>Fluid dynamics</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/07</td><td>Aerospace propulsion</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/08</td><td>Fluid machinery</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/09</td><td>Energy systems and power generation</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/10</td><td>Thermal engineering and industrial energy systems</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/11</td><td>Building physics and building energy systems</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/12</td><td>Mechanical and thermal measurements</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/13</td><td>Applied mechanics</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/14</td><td>Mechanical design and machine construction</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/15</td><td>Design methods for industrial engineering</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/16</td><td>Manufacturing technology and systems</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/17</td><td>Industrial mechanical plants</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/18</td><td>Nuclear reactor physics</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/19</td><td>Nuclear power plants</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/20</td><td>Nuclear measurements and instrumentation</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/21</td><td>Metallurgy</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/22</td><td>Materials science and technology</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/23</td><td>Applied physical chemistry</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/24</td><td>Fundamentals of chemical engineering</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/25</td><td>Chemical plants</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/26</td><td>Analysis, design and control of chemical processes</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/27</td><td>Chemical technologies</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/28</td><td>Excavation engineering and safety</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/29</td><td>Engineering of raw materials</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/30</td><td>Hydrocarbons and underground fluids</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/31</td><td>Electrical engineering</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/32</td><td>Power electronic converters, electrical machines and drives</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/33</td><td>Electrical power systems</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/34</td><td>Industrial bioengineering</td></tr><tr><td>ING-IND/35</td><td>Business and management engineering</td></tr><tr><td>ING-INF/01</td><td>Electronics</td></tr><tr><td>ING-INF/02</td><td>Electromagnetic fields</td></tr><tr><td>ING-INF/03</td><td>Telecommunications</td></tr><tr><td>ING-INF/04</td><td>Systems and control engineering</td></tr><tr><td>ING-INF/05</td><td>Information processing systems</td></tr><tr><td>ING-INF/06</td><td>Electronic and informatics bioengineering</td></tr><tr><td>ING-INF/07</td><td>Electric and electronic measurements</td></tr></tbody></table> </ephtml> </p> <ref id="AN0178439966-23"> <title> Notes </title> <blist> <bibl id="bib1" idref="ref65" type="bt">1</bibl> <bibtext> Thirty universities have a university hospital. In 27 universities with a university hospital, medicine is the largest scientific area.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib2" idref="ref71" type="bt">2</bibl> <bibtext> The number of SSDs underwent minor changes in the period under scrutiny: it fluctuated between 365 and 371 from 2001 to 2010 and remained equal to 369 from 2011 on.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib3" idref="ref12" type="bt">3</bibl> <bibtext> Though we collected data on non-state universities, these latter are characterised by significant differences in statutes, governance and rules.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib4" idref="ref11" type="bt">4</bibl> <bibtext> We included observations with the number of faculty members equal to 0 in a university-SSD but only if the same university-SSD had at least one member in another year of our time window. Excluding 0 members' university-SSDs made the observations drop to 224,253. In our "full sample" estimations, observations dropped to 260,646 due to the exclusion of singleton observations, resulting from the inclusion of multiple fixed effects.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib5" idref="ref25" type="bt">5</bibl> <bibtext> The year 2000 was excluded because of frequent missing information about the SSDs.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib6" idref="ref13" type="bt">6</bibl> <bibtext> Details of the classification system are provided here: https://<ulink href="http://www.miur.gov.it/settori-concorsuali-e-settori-scientifico-disciplinari">www.miur.gov.it/settori-concorsuali-e-settori-scientifico-disciplinari</ulink></bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib7" idref="ref77" type="bt">7</bibl> <bibtext> The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test rejects the null that the sample variance of the error term at the university-SSD level is equal to 0. In other words, a random effects model is preferable over a pooled OLS. In addition, a test of overidentifying restrictions was performed using the Stata routine <emph>xtoverid</emph> (an alternative and heteroschedastic- and cluster-robust version of the Hausman test). The test rejects the null that the overidentifying restrictions of the random effects model are valid, suggesting that the FE model is preferable.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib8" idref="ref62" type="bt">8</bibl> <bibtext> Given the use of FE models, our concerns are mostly related to the time-variant component of the unobserved heterogeneity between SSDs.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibl id="bib9" idref="ref79" type="bt">9</bibl> <bibtext> In another estimation (not reported but available from the authors upon request), we exclude all university-SSDs without any rector, with a consequent drop in the number of SSD-university groups from 12,495 to 216. Again, the aim is to increase comparability between SSDs. The estimation results are in line with those presented in Table 2.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> We tried including different measures related to ARWU and QS rankings. Besides being non-significant, their explanatory power seems limited.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> As an additional check (not reported but available from the authors upon request), we 'restrict' the observation period for the SSDs with a rector. In particular, we include observations related to (i) the focal mandate in which one of the professors of an SSD is a rector and (ii) the mandate immediately before. Restricting the observation window for SSDs with a rector should reduce concerns about some underlying factors that may change in a 20-year window. In other words, we would expect time-invariant factors to be even less relevant and thus our FE model to capture most of the unobserved heterogeneity potentially leading to an omitted variable bias. Indeed, our findings do not significantly change in these additional estimations. The previous models estimated on a matched sample also aim to reduce endogeneity concerns, for example, about rectors' SSDs being different from other SSDs In addition to increasing the comparability between SSDs, matching an SSD with a rector with the most similar one (in terms of the observed characteristics that affect the probability of having a group member elected as a rector) should also control for the unobserved determinants of both rector election and recruiting dynamics.</bibtext> </blist> </ref> <ref id="AN0178439966-24"> <title> References </title> <blist> <bibtext> Abramo, G., C. A. D'angelo, and F. Di Costa. 2022. " The Effect of Academic Mobility on Research Performance: The Case of Italy." Quantitative Science Studies 3 (2): 345 – 362. https://doi.org/10.1162/qss_a_00192.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Altbach, P. G., M. Yudkevich, and L. E. Rumbley. 2015. " Academic Inbreeding: Local Challenge, Global Problem." In Academic Inbreeding and Mobility in Higher Education: Global Perspectives, 1 – 17.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Bleiklie, I. 2014. " Comparing University Organizations Across Boundaries." Higher Education 67 (4): 381 – 391. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-013-9683-z.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Bleiklie, I., J. Enders, and B. Lepori. 2015. " Organizations as Penetrated Hierarchies: Environmental Pressures and Control in Professional Organizations." Organization Studies 36 (7): 873 – 896. https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840615571960.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Bleiklie, I., J. Enders, B. Lepori, and C. Musselin. 2011. " NPM, network governance and the university as a changing professional organization." In The Ashgate Research Companion to New Public Management, 161 – 176. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315613321-19.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Bleiklie, I., and M. Kogan. 2007. " Organization and Governance of Universities." Higher Education Policy 20 (4): 477 – 493. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.hep.8300167.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Boden, R., and J. Rowlands. 2020. " Paying the Piper: The Governance of Vice-Chancellors' Remuneration in Australian and UK Universities." Higher Education Research & Development, 1 – 15. https://doi.org/10.1080/07294360.2020.1841741.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Boffo, S., R. Moscati, and P. Dubois. 2006. Il governo dell'università: rettori e presidenti in Italia e in Francia. Guerini e Associati.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Breakwell, G. M., and M. Y. Tytherleigh. 2008. " UK University Leaders at the Turn of the 21st Century: Changing Patterns in Their Socio-Demographic Characteristics." Higher Education 56 (1): 109 – 127. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-007-9092-2.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Broucker, B., and K. De Wit. 2015. " New Public Management in Higher Education." In The Palgrave International Handbook of Higher Education Policy and Governance, 57 – 75. Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-45617-5_4</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Brunsson, N., and K. Sahlin-Andersson. 2000. " Constructing Organizations: The Example of Public Sector Reform." Organization Studies 21 (4): 721 – 746. https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840600214003.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Capano, G., M. Regini, and M. Turri. 2016. " Changing Governance in Universities: Italian Higher Education in Comparative Perspective." In Palgrave Studies in Global Higher Education, 1 – 179. https://doi.org/10.1080/21568235.2017.1362716.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Cattaneo, M., P. Malighetti, and S. Paleari. 2018. " The Italian Brain Drain: Cream and Milk." Higher Education 77 (4): 603 – 622. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-018-0292-8.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Christensen, T., Å Gornitzka, and P. Maassen. 2014. " Global Pressures and National Cultures." In University Adaptation in Difficult Economic Times, 30 – 51. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199989393.003.0003.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Civera, A., M. Meoli, and S. Paleari. 2021. " International Student Mobility: Onset for a Future Career or an Experiential Opportunity? " International Studies in Sociology of Education, https://doi.org/10.1080/09620214.2021.2007417.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> de Boer, H., J. Huismanb, and C. Meister-Scheytt. 2010. " Supervision in "Modern" University Governance: Boards Under Scrutiny." Studies in Higher Education 35 (3): 317 – 333. https://doi.org/10.1080/03075070903062849.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Delmas, M. A., and M. W. Toffel. 2008. " Organizational Responses to Environmental Demands: Opening the Black Box." Strategic Management Journal 29 (10): 1027 – 1055. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.701.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Donaldson, L. 2001. " The Contingency Theory of Organizations." In The Contingency Theory of Organizations. Sage.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Donina, D., and S. Hasanefendic. 2019. " Higher Education Institutional Governance Reforms in the Netherlands, Portugal and Italy: A Policy Translation Perspective Addressing the Homogeneous/Heterogeneous Dilemma." Higher Education Quarterly 73 (1): 29 – 44. https://doi.org/10.1111/hequ.12183.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Donina, D., M. Meoli, and S. Paleari. 2015. " Higher Education Reform in Italy: Tightening Regulation Instead of Steering at a Distance." Higher Education Policy 28 (2): 215 – 234. https://doi.org/10.1057/hep.2014.6.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Donina, D., and S. Paleari. 2019. " New Public Management: Global Reform Script or Conceptual Stretching? Analysis of University Governance Structures in the Napoleonic Administrative Tradition." Higher Education 78 (2): 193 – 219. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-018-0338-y.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ekman, M., M. Lindgren, and J. Packendorff. 2018. " Universities Need Leadership, Academics Need Management: Discursive Tensions and Voids in the Deregulation of Swedish Higher Education Legislation." Higher Education 75 (2): 299 – 321. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-017-0140-2.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Ferlie, E., C. Musselin, and G. Andresani. 2008. " The Steering of Higher Education Systems: A Public Management Perspective." Higher Education 56 (3): 325 – 348. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-008-9125-5.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Freeman, J. 1979. " Going to the Well: School District Administrative Intensity and Environmental Constraint." Administrative Science Quarterly 24 (1): 119. https://doi.org/10.2307/2989879.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Freeman, J., and M. T. Hannan. 1975. " Growth and Decline Processes in Organizations." American Sociological Review 40 (2): 215. https://doi.org/10.2307/2094346.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Frølich, N., and J. Caspersen. 2015. " Institutional Governance Structures." In The Palgrave International Handbook of Higher Education Policy and Governance, 379 – 397. Palgrave Macmillan UK.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Gouldner, A. W. 1957. " Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles.I." Administrative Science Quarterly 2 (3): 281. https://doi.org/10.2307/2391000.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Henry, A. D., M. Lubell, and M. McCoy. 2011. " Belief Systems and Social Capital as Drivers of Policy Network Structure: The Case of California Regional Planning." Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 21 (3): 419 – 444. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muq042.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Hills, F. S., and T. A. Mahoney. 1978. " University Budgets and Organizational Decision Making." Administrative Science Quarterly 23 (3): 454. https://doi.org/10.2307/2392420.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Hollingshead, A. B. 1938. " Ingroup Membership and Academic Selection." American Sociological Review 3 (6): 826. https://doi.org/10.2307/2084715.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Johnes, J., and S. Virmani. 2020. " Chief Executive Pay in UK Higher Education: The Role of University Performance." Annals of Operations Research 288 (2): 547 – 576. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-019-03275-2.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Kretek, P. M., Ž Dragšić, and B. M. Kehm. 2013. " Transformation of University Governance: On the Role of University Board Members." Higher Education 65 (1): 39 – 58. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-012-9580-x.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Lepori, B., J. Usher, and M. Montauti. 2013. " Budgetary Allocation and Organizational Characteristics of Higher Education Institutions: A Review of Existing Studies and a Framework for Future Research." Higher Education 65 (1): 59 – 78. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-012-9581-9.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Lodahl, J. B., and G. Gordon. 1972. " The Structure of Scientific Fields and the Functioning of University Graduate Departments." American Sociological Review 37 (1): 57. https://doi.org/10.2307/2093493.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Musselin, C., and P. N. Teixeira. 2014. Reforming Higher Education: Public Policy Design and Implementation. Springer.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Pearce, J. 2016. " Are you Overpaying Your Academic Executive Team? A Method for Detecting Unmerited Academic Executive Compensation." Tertiary Education and Management 22 (3): 189 – 201. https://doi.org/10.1080/13583883.2016.1181198.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Pezzoni, M., V. Sterzi, and F. Lissoni. 2012. " Career Progress in Centralized Academic Systems: Social Capital and Institutions in France and Italy." Research Policy 41 (4): 704 – 719. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2011.12.009.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Pfeffer, J., and G. R. Salancik. 1974. " Organizational Decision Making as a Political Process: The Case of a University Budget." Administrative Science Quarterly 19 (2): 135. https://doi.org/10.2307/2393885.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Pfeffer, J., and G. R. Salancik. 1978. " The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective." The Academy of Management Review, https://doi.org/10.2307/257794.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Provan, K. G., J. M. Beyer, and C. Kruytbosch. 1980. " Environmental Linkages and Power in Resource-Dependence Relations Between Organizations." Administrative Science Quarterly 25 (2): 200. https://doi.org/10.2307/2392452.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Rabovsky, T., and A. Rutherford. 2016. " The Politics of Higher Education: University President Ideology and External Networking." Public Administration Review 76 (5): 764 – 777. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12529.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Salancik, G. R., and J. Pfeffer. 1974. " The Bases and Use of Power in Organizational Decision Making: The Case of a University." Administrative Science Quarterly 19 (4): 453. https://doi.org/10.2307/2391803.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Seeber, M., and J. Mampaey. 2022. " How Do University Systems' Features Affect Academic Inbreeding? Career Rules and Language Requirements in France, Germany, Italy and Spain." Higher Education Quarterly 76 (1): 20 – 35. https://doi.org/10.1111/hequ.12302.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Stazyk, E. C., and H. T. Goerdel. 2011. " The Benefits of Bureaucracy: Public Managers' Perceptions of Political Support, Goal Ambiguity, and Organizational Effectiveness." Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 21 (4): 645 – 672. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muq047.</bibtext> </blist> <blist> <bibtext> Teixeira, P. N., B. Jongbloed, D. Dill, and A. Amaral. 2006. " Markets in Higher Education: Rhetoric or Reality? " In Higher Education Dynamics (Vol. 6), edited by P. Teixeira, B. Jongbloed, D. Dill, and A. Amaral. Springer Science & Business Media.</bibtext> </blist> </ref> <aug> <p>By Alice Civera; Diego D'Adda; Michele Meoli and Stefano Paleari</p> <p>Reported by Author; Author; Author; Author</p> </aug> <nolink nlid="nl1" bibid="bib33" firstref="ref1"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl2" bibid="bib38" firstref="ref2"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl3" bibid="bib42" firstref="ref4"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl4" bibid="bib29" firstref="ref5"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl5" bibid="bib40" firstref="ref6"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl6" bibid="bib34" firstref="ref7"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl7" bibid="bib24" firstref="ref8"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl8" bibid="bib25" firstref="ref9"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl9" bibid="bib12" firstref="ref14"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl10" bibid="bib14" firstref="ref15"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl11" bibid="bib16" firstref="ref16"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl12" bibid="bib20" firstref="ref17"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl13" bibid="bib19" firstref="ref18"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl14" bibid="bib21" firstref="ref19"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl15" bibid="bib22" firstref="ref20"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl16" bibid="bib26" firstref="ref21"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl17" bibid="bib32" firstref="ref22"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl18" bibid="bib11" firstref="ref24"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl19" bibid="bib23" firstref="ref26"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl20" bibid="bib41" firstref="ref33"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl21" bibid="bib17" firstref="ref36"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl22" bibid="bib44" firstref="ref39"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl23" bibid="bib28" firstref="ref40"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl24" bibid="bib39" firstref="ref44"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl25" bibid="bib18" firstref="ref45"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl26" bibid="bib45" firstref="ref48"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl27" bibid="bib35" firstref="ref60"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl28" bibid="bib10" firstref="ref61"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl29" bibid="bib13" firstref="ref64"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl30" bibid="bib43" firstref="ref66"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl31" bibid="bib15" firstref="ref67"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl32" bibid="bib37" firstref="ref68"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl33" bibid="bib31" firstref="ref92"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl34" bibid="bib36" firstref="ref93"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl35" bibid="bib27" firstref="ref96"></nolink> <nolink nlid="nl36" bibid="bib30" firstref="ref98"></nolink>
Header DbId: eric
DbLabel: ERIC
An: EJ1431112
AccessLevel: 3
PubType: Academic Journal
PubTypeId: academicJournal
PreciseRelevancyScore: 0
IllustrationInfo
Items – Name: Title
  Label: Title
  Group: Ti
  Data: Political Power of Italian Rectors: An Analysis of Recruitments in the Period 2001-2021
– Name: Language
  Label: Language
  Group: Lang
  Data: English
– Name: Author
  Label: Authors
  Group: Au
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Alice+Civera%22">Alice Civera</searchLink> (ORCID <externalLink term="https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1611-7073">0000-0002-1611-7073</externalLink>)<br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Diego+D'Adda%22">Diego D'Adda</searchLink> (ORCID <externalLink term="https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1683-1787">0000-0002-1683-1787</externalLink>)<br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Michele+Meoli%22">Michele Meoli</searchLink> (ORCID <externalLink term="https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9438-0782">0000-0002-9438-0782</externalLink>)<br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Stefano+Paleari%22">Stefano Paleari</searchLink> (ORCID <externalLink term="https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6099-560X">0000-0001-6099-560X</externalLink>)
– Name: TitleSource
  Label: Source
  Group: Src
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="SO" term="%22Studies+in+Higher+Education%22"><i>Studies in Higher Education</i></searchLink>. 2024 49(7):1168-1193.
– Name: Avail
  Label: Availability
  Group: Avail
  Data: Routledge. Available from: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 530 Walnut Street Suite 850, Philadelphia, PA 19106. Tel: 800-354-1420; Tel: 215-625-8900; Fax: 215-207-0050; Web site: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
– Name: PeerReviewed
  Label: Peer Reviewed
  Group: SrcInfo
  Data: Y
– Name: Pages
  Label: Page Count
  Group: Src
  Data: 26
– Name: DatePubCY
  Label: Publication Date
  Group: Date
  Data: 2024
– Name: TypeDocument
  Label: Document Type
  Group: TypDoc
  Data: Journal Articles<br />Reports - Research
– Name: Audience
  Label: Education Level
  Group: Audnce
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="EL" term="%22Higher+Education%22">Higher Education</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="EL" term="%22Postsecondary+Education%22">Postsecondary Education</searchLink>
– Name: Subject
  Label: Descriptors
  Group: Su
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Foreign+Countries%22">Foreign Countries</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22College+Presidents%22">College Presidents</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Political+Power%22">Political Power</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Personnel+Policy%22">Personnel Policy</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Educational+Change%22">Educational Change</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Resource+Allocation%22">Resource Allocation</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Personnel+Management%22">Personnel Management</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Educational+Administration%22">Educational Administration</searchLink>
– Name: Subject
  Label: Geographic Terms
  Group: Su
  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Italy%22">Italy</searchLink>
– Name: DOI
  Label: DOI
  Group: ID
  Data: 10.1080/03075079.2023.2260420
– Name: ISSN
  Label: ISSN
  Group: ISSN
  Data: 0307-5079<br />1470-174X
– Name: Abstract
  Label: Abstract
  Group: Ab
  Data: We examine the political power exerted by Italian rectors by investigating the preferential treatment received by the organisational subunits they belong to in terms of personnel resource allocation. During the rectors' mandate, their organisational subunits tend to grow significantly more (by [approximately]9%) than the others. The effect persists even after the implementation of the New public management-inspired policy - the Gelmini reform.
– Name: AbstractInfo
  Label: Abstractor
  Group: Ab
  Data: As Provided
– Name: DateEntry
  Label: Entry Date
  Group: Date
  Data: 2024
– Name: AN
  Label: Accession Number
  Group: ID
  Data: EJ1431112
PLink https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=eric&AN=EJ1431112
RecordInfo BibRecord:
  BibEntity:
    Identifiers:
      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1080/03075079.2023.2260420
    Languages:
      – Text: English
    PhysicalDescription:
      Pagination:
        PageCount: 26
        StartPage: 1168
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Foreign Countries
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: College Presidents
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Political Power
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Personnel Policy
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Educational Change
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Resource Allocation
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Personnel Management
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Educational Administration
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Italy
        Type: general
    Titles:
      – TitleFull: Political Power of Italian Rectors: An Analysis of Recruitments in the Period 2001-2021
        Type: main
  BibRelationships:
    HasContributorRelationships:
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Alice Civera
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Diego D'Adda
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Michele Meoli
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Stefano Paleari
    IsPartOfRelationships:
      – BibEntity:
          Dates:
            – D: 01
              M: 01
              Type: published
              Y: 2024
          Identifiers:
            – Type: issn-print
              Value: 0307-5079
            – Type: issn-electronic
              Value: 1470-174X
          Numbering:
            – Type: volume
              Value: 49
            – Type: issue
              Value: 7
          Titles:
            – TitleFull: Studies in Higher Education
              Type: main
ResultId 1