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Evidence for an Asymmetric Switch Cost in State Creativity

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Title: Evidence for an Asymmetric Switch Cost in State Creativity
Language: English
Authors: Robert A. Cortes (ORCID 0000-0003-1106-9452), Mafalda C. B. Peña, Richard J. Daker, Griffin A. Colaizzi, Adam E. Green
Source: Creativity Research Journal. 2024 36(4):629-639.
Availability: Routledge. Available from: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 530 Walnut Street Suite 850, Philadelphia, PA 19106. Tel: 800-354-1420; Tel: 215-625-8900; Fax: 215-207-0050; Web site: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
Peer Reviewed: Y
Page Count: 11
Publication Date: 2024
Sponsoring Agency: National Science Foundation (NSF)
Contract Number: DRL1420481
DRL1848181
DRL1920653
Document Type: Journal Articles
Reports - Research
Education Level: Higher Education
Postsecondary Education
Descriptors: Undergraduate Students, Creativity, Verbs, Cognitive Processes, Creative Thinking, Perception, Learning Processes, Experience, Stimuli, Time Factors (Learning), Time on Task, Context Effect, Performance Factors, Resistance to Change, Conceptual Tempo
DOI: 10.1080/10400419.2023.2212999
ISSN: 1040-0419
1532-6934
Abstract: The role of top-down control in divergent creativity remains heavily debated. An outstanding question about the state dynamics of creativity concerns acute shifts between heightened and lowered creative states. Particularly, do transitions between creative states incur a "switch cost" as observed in other domains of cognition? Prior research showed that asymmetric switch costs are often incurred such that reaction time is asymmetrically slower when participants switch from a task involving more top-down control to a task involving less top-down control. We tested the hypothesis that frequent acute transitions from creativity-cued responding (associated with heightened creative state) to uncued responding (associated with lowered creative state) would incur an asymmetric switch cost such that uncued responding would be disproportionately impacted by state changes. We utilized the "thin slices" verb generation task in a task-switching paradigm. Consistent with the hypothesis of asymmetric switch costs in shifts between creative states, we observed a substantial switch cost when switching from creativity-cued trials to uncued trials, but no switch cost when switching from uncued trials to creativity-cued trials. These findings provide indirect evidence that heightened creative states may require substantially more top-down control than lowered creative states, supporting the theory that divergent creativity requires increased top-down control.
Abstractor: As Provided
Entry Date: 2024
Accession Number: EJ1444258
Database: ERIC
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  Value: <anid>AN0180329817;7lo01oct.24;2024Oct21.05:28;v2.2.500</anid> <title id="AN0180329817-1">Evidence for an Asymmetric Switch Cost in State Creativity </title> <sbt id="AN0180329817-2">Introduction</sbt> <p>The role of top-down control in divergent creativity remains heavily debated. An outstanding question about the state dynamics of creativity concerns acute shifts between heightened and lowered creative states. Particularly, do transitions between creative states incur a "switch cost" as observed in other domains of cognition? Prior research showed that asymmetric switch costs are often incurred such that reaction time is asymmetrically slower when participants switch from a task involving more top-down control to a task involving less top-down control. We tested the hypothesis that frequent acute transitions from creativity-cued responding (associated with heightened creative state) to uncued responding (associated with lowered creative state) would incur an asymmetric switch cost such that uncued responding would be disproportionately impacted by state changes. We utilized the "thin slices" verb generation task in a task-switching paradigm. Consistent with the hypothesis of asymmetric switch costs in shifts between creative states, we observed a substantial switch cost when switching from creativity-cued trials to uncued trials, but no switch cost when switching from uncued trials to creativity-cued trials. These findings provide indirect evidence that heightened creative states may require substantially more top-down control than lowered creative states, supporting the theory that divergent creativity requires increased top-down control.</p> <p>Creativity is a highly-valued ability across a wide array of domains including science, business, education, and industry (World Economic Forum, [<reflink idref="bib74" id="ref1">74</reflink>]). Extensive research has characterized the cognitive processes involved in creativity (Beaty, Cortes, Zeitlen, Weinberger, & Green, [<reflink idref="bib8" id="ref2">8</reflink>]; Beaty, Silvia, Nusbaum, Jauk, & Benedek, [<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref3">12</reflink>]; Benedek & Fink, [<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref4">15</reflink>]; Cortes, Weinberger, Daker, & Green, [<reflink idref="bib27" id="ref5">27</reflink>]; Green et al., [<reflink idref="bib38" id="ref6">38</reflink>]; Lee & Therriault, [<reflink idref="bib50" id="ref7">50</reflink>]), however, the role of top-down control in divergent creativity remains heavily debated (Benedek, Franz, Heene, & Neubauer, [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref8">16</reflink>]; Benedek, Jauk, Sommer, Arendasy, & Neubauer, [<reflink idref="bib17" id="ref9">17</reflink>]; Chrysikou, [<reflink idref="bib23" id="ref10">23</reflink>]; Edl, Benedek, Papousek, Weiss, & Fink, [<reflink idref="bib28" id="ref11">28</reflink>]; Palmiero, Fusi, Crepaldi, Borsa, & Rusconi, [<reflink idref="bib62" id="ref12">62</reflink>]). Here, we define top-down control as the executive attentional processes that direct the deployment of cognitive resources to achieve a certain goal (Benedek, Bergner, Könen, Fink, & Neubauer, [<reflink idref="bib14" id="ref13">14</reflink>]; Buschman & Miller, [<reflink idref="bib21" id="ref14">21</reflink>]; Corbetta & Shulman, [<reflink idref="bib25" id="ref15">25</reflink>]; Posner, [<reflink idref="bib64" id="ref16">64</reflink>]). Cognitive accounts of divergent creativity suggest that coming up with creative ideas requires top-down control to inhibit common or uncreative prepotent responses (Beaty, Silvia, Nusbaum, Jauk, & Benedek, [<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref17">12</reflink>]; Benedek & Fink, [<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref18">15</reflink>]; Palmiero, Fusi, Crepaldi, Borsa, & Rusconi, [<reflink idref="bib62" id="ref19">62</reflink>]). This notion is supported by several studies, which have reported a positive association between greater top-down control and greater divergent creative ability (Benedek, Franz, Heene, & Neubauer, [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref20">16</reflink>]; Benedek, Jauk, Sommer, Arendasy, & Neubauer, [<reflink idref="bib17" id="ref21">17</reflink>]; Edl, Benedek, Papousek, Weiss, & Fink, [<reflink idref="bib28" id="ref22">28</reflink>]; Palmiero, Fusi, Crepaldi, Borsa, & Rusconi, [<reflink idref="bib62" id="ref23">62</reflink>]; Zabelina & Robinson, [<reflink idref="bib78" id="ref24">78</reflink>]).</p> <p>This debate is further complicated by a host of studies, which find no significant association between divergent creativity and top-down control (Burch, Hemsley, Pavelis, & Corr, [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref25">20</reflink>]; Green & Williams, [<reflink idref="bib41" id="ref26">41</reflink>]; Stavridou & Furnham, [<reflink idref="bib71" id="ref27">71</reflink>]). On a theoretical level, much of the extant research is based on associating individual differences and does not provide a clear basis for mechanistic interpretation, i.e., to determine whether top-down control is involved in the act of thinking creatively. It is possible that individuals with high top-down control capacity often also have high creative ability, both of which are likely to co-occur with high intelligence (Beaty, Silvia, Nusbaum, Jauk, & Benedek, [<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref28">12</reflink>]; Benedek & Fink, [<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref29">15</reflink>]), but this does not necessarily indicate that those individuals employ top-down control during divergent creative thinking. To more directly address whether divergent creativity involves top-down control, an experimental design is needed. The few experimental studies that have included manipulations to decrease top-down control have yielded mixed results: alcohol consumption had no effect on AUT performance (Benedek, Panzierer, Jauk, & Neubauer, [<reflink idref="bib18" id="ref30">18</reflink>]), exhaustion of top-down control resources led to increased fluency on the AUT (Radel, Davranche, Fournier, & Dietrich, [<reflink idref="bib66" id="ref31">66</reflink>]), and reducing top-down control via a dual-task design led to decreased fluency in a creative problem solving task (Camarda et al., [<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref32">22</reflink>]). These contradictory behavioral findingsin particular, the studies by Radel, Davranche, Fournier, and Dietrich ([<reflink idref="bib66" id="ref33">66</reflink>]) and Camarda et al. ([<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref34">22</reflink>]) showing opposite effects of reduced top-down control on the fluency of creative ideas, necessitate further experimental research to investigate the role of top-down control in creative cognition.</p> <p>Within these studies, creativity is most commonly studied as a trait-level phenomenon (Beaty, Benedek, Silvia, & Schacter, [<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref35">7</reflink>]; Green, [<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref36">34</reflink>]; Guilford, [<reflink idref="bib42" id="ref37">42</reflink>]; Prabhakaran, Green, & Gray, [<reflink idref="bib65" id="ref38">65</reflink>]). However, creativity also varies as a state within individuals, and understanding the dynamics of state creativity may be especially important for understanding the role of top-down control in creativity. Recent research has begun to characterize creativity as a state-level phenomenon that can be consciously augmented (Green, [<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref39">34</reflink>]; Green, Cohen, Kim, & Gray, [<reflink idref="bib36" id="ref40">36</reflink>]; Nusbaum, Silvia, & Beaty, [<reflink idref="bib61" id="ref41">61</reflink>]; Tempest & Radel, [<reflink idref="bib72" id="ref42">72</reflink>]; Weinberger, Iyer, Green, & Runco, [<reflink idref="bib73" id="ref43">73</reflink>]). Extensive evidence has confirmed that individuals of all levels of trait creativity can consciously augment their state creativity (i.e., deliberately produce more creative responses) on a variety of creativity tasks when prompted with explicit cues to "think creatively" (Green, Cohen, Kim, & Gray, [<reflink idref="bib36" id="ref44">36</reflink>]; Nusbaum, Silvia, & Beaty, [<reflink idref="bib61" id="ref45">61</reflink>]; Prabhakaran, Green, & Gray, [<reflink idref="bib65" id="ref46">65</reflink>]; Weinberger, Iyer, & Green, [<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref47">34</reflink>]). Although this "thinking cap" effect (Green et al., [<reflink idref="bib40" id="ref48">40</reflink>]; Tempest & Radel, [<reflink idref="bib72" id="ref49">72</reflink>]) has been thoroughly established, the precise mechanisms and dynamics of this phenomenon have not been fully characterized. An outstanding question is whether shifts in creative state entail shifts in top-down control – in other words, do heightened creative states require more top-down control than lowered creative states?</p> <p>A key indicator of shifts in top-down control between task sets is the presence of a "switch cost" (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref50">1</reflink>]). Here, the task set is defined as the configuration of cognitive processes required to respond to a set of task-relevant stimuli (Monsell, [<reflink idref="bib58" id="ref51">58</reflink>]), and switch costs are defined as impaired performance (i.e. longer reaction times) in switch trials compared with non-switch trials (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref52">1</reflink>]). A particularly informative switch-cost phenomenon is the "asymmetric switch cost" (ASC; Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref53">1</reflink>]). ASC occurs in task designs that require switching between two tasks (e.g., task A and task B), such that switching from task A to task B has a switch cost (i.e., significantly slower reaction times than non-switch B-B trials) but switching from task B to task A does not have a switch cost (i.e., no significant difference in reaction times between B-A trials compared to A-A; Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref54">1</reflink>]). The ASC phenomenon has been replicated extensively in the Stroop color-word task, as well as other cognitive tasks (Allport & Wylie, [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref55">2</reflink>]; Ellefson, Shapiro, & Chater, [<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref56">30</reflink>]; Meuter & Allport, [<reflink idref="bib56" id="ref57">56</reflink>]; Philipp, Gade, & Koch, [<reflink idref="bib63" id="ref58">63</reflink>]), though ASC are not always present in task switching paradigms (Yeung & Monsell, [<reflink idref="bib77" id="ref59">77</reflink>]).</p> <p>ASC represents a well-validated, experimental tool for testing whether top-down control is greater in one task set than another. Allport et al., (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref60">1</reflink>]) originally suggested that the ASC is a signature of increased top-down control in task A compared to task B, such that the residual shift costs carried over to task B (i.e., longer response times) reflect persisting top-down control involved in the task set for task A (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref61">1</reflink>]; Schuch & Koch, [<reflink idref="bib69" id="ref62">69</reflink>]). While top-down control appears to underlie ASC in many contexts, subsequent work has suggested that mechanisms underlying this phenomenon may not be homogenous. For example, some computational models (Yeung & Monsell, [<reflink idref="bib77" id="ref63">77</reflink>]) explain the phenomenon in terms of task activation strength/familiarity, modeling the ASC as a priming-based effect which benefits from task repetition. More recent research provides support for this theory by highlighting the role of both inhibition (i.e., suppression) and enhancement (i.e., increased salience) of task sets in different instances of ASC, depending on the types of task demands (Sikora & Roelofs, [<reflink idref="bib70" id="ref64">70</reflink>]). Specifically, Sikora and Roelofs ([<reflink idref="bib70" id="ref65">70</reflink>]) found that ASC between tasks, which differed in the length of the responses (i.e., one word vs. full sentence) involved inhibition of the more cognitively demanding task set (i.e., responding with a full sentence), whereas ASC in the color-word tasks involved attentional enhancement of the more cognitively demanding task set (i.e., color-naming). Furthermore, the sequential difficulty account (Schneider & Anderson, [<reflink idref="bib68" id="ref66">68</reflink>]) suggests that the asymmetry arises from impaired performance after a difficult trial regardless of whether the task switches or repeats (and in the case of a repeat there is not even task switching present).</p> <p>A useful paradigm for investigating the dynamics of shifts in creative state is the "thin slices" verb generation task, a divergent creative thinking task in which participants are presented with nouns and given a brief response period to generate a verb that is related to the noun (Green, [<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref67">34</reflink>]; Prabhakaran, Green, & Gray, [<reflink idref="bib65" id="ref68">65</reflink>]). Creative performance on the task can be quantified with semantic distance using latent semantic analysis (Green, [<reflink idref="bib35" id="ref69">35</reflink>]; Green, Cohen, Raab, Yedibalian, & Gray, [<reflink idref="bib37" id="ref70">37</reflink>]; Prabhakaran, Green, & Gray, [<reflink idref="bib65" id="ref71">65</reflink>]). Multiple studies (Green, [<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref72">34</reflink>]; Nusbaum, Silvia, & Beaty, [<reflink idref="bib61" id="ref73">61</reflink>]; Weinberger, Iyer, Green, & Runco, [<reflink idref="bib73" id="ref74">73</reflink>]), have replicated the "thinking cap" effect in this task, that is, the finding that participants produce more creative (more semantically distant) responses on the creativity-cued trials than on the uncued trials. This task paradigm allows for measurement of changes in state creativity on an acute time scale, with a high volume of trials, making it particularly well-suited to examine whether shifts in creative state entail shifts in top-down control.</p> <p>Here, we investigated whether there was an ASC in the "thin slices" verb generation task. Within this divergent creative thinking task, participants switched back and forth between generating creativity-cued verb responses and uncued verb responses. This allowed us to investigate whether an ASC would be observed when switching between creativity-cued and uncued trials. Previous paradigms measuring ASC (e.g., the Stroop color-word task) (MacLeod, [<reflink idref="bib52" id="ref75">52</reflink>]) have generally involved switches between qualitatively different tasks and/or switches between presentations of different stimuli (Allport & Wylie, [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref76">2</reflink>]; Ellefson, Shapiro, & Chater, [<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref77">30</reflink>]; Meuter & Allport, [<reflink idref="bib56" id="ref78">56</reflink>]; Philipp, Gade, & Koch, [<reflink idref="bib63" id="ref79">63</reflink>]). In the present study, the task did not change between cued and uncued conditions, and the stimuli remained nearly identical – the only difference was the ink color of the words for cueing purposes (which was counterbalanced across all participants).</p> <p>The present study allowed us to test predictions that arise from competing accounts of the involvement of top-down control in divergent creativity. One account suggests that divergent creativity requires increased top-down control to inhibit common or uncreative prepotent responses (Beaty, Silvia, Nusbaum, Jauk, & Benedek, [<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref80">12</reflink>]; Benedek & Fink, [<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref81">15</reflink>]). An opposing theory suggests that divergent creativity involves lessened top-down control, thus allowing ideas to flow more freely (Martindale, [<reflink idref="bib53" id="ref82">53</reflink>]). We hypothesized that there would be an ASC for heightened creative states, such that shifting from creativity-cued trials to uncued trials would entail a significant switch cost (i.e., longer reaction time than non-switch trials), but that shifting from uncued trials to creativity-cued trials would not incur a switch cost. This would indicate that heightened creative states (i.e., creativity-cued trials) involved more top-down control than lowered creative states (i.e., uncued trials), thus supporting the account that divergent creativity requires increased top-down control (Beaty, Benedek, Silvia, & Schacter, [<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref83">7</reflink>]; Beaty, Silvia, Nusbaum, Jauk, & Benedek, [<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref84">12</reflink>]; Benedek & Fink, [<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref85">15</reflink>]; Benedek, Franz, Heene, & Neubauer, [<reflink idref="bib16" id="ref86">16</reflink>]; Edl, Benedek, Papousek, Weiss, & Fink, [<reflink idref="bib28" id="ref87">28</reflink>]; Zabelina & Robinson, [<reflink idref="bib78" id="ref88">78</reflink>]). Alternatively, evidence of ASC for lowered creative states would indicate that heightened creative states actually involved less top-down control than lowered creative states, thus supporting the account that divergent creativity requires lessened top-down control (Chrysikou et al., [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref89">24</reflink>]; Martindale, [<reflink idref="bib53" id="ref90">53</reflink>]; Reverberi, Toraldo, D'Agostini, & Skrap, [<reflink idref="bib67" id="ref91">67</reflink>]). Finally, evidence of no switch costs incurred when shifting between creative states (in either direction) would indicate that heightened creative states did not involve substantially more top-down control than lowered creative states – this result would fall in line with several studies finding no association between top-down control and divergent creativity (Burch, Hemsley, Pavelis, & Corr, [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref92">20</reflink>]; Green & Williams, [<reflink idref="bib41" id="ref93">41</reflink>]; Stavridou & Furnham, [<reflink idref="bib71" id="ref94">71</reflink>]).</p> <hd id="AN0180329817-3">Materials and methods</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0180329817-4">Participants</hd> <p>Participants were 54 undergraduate students at XXXX who participated in research for credit in the XXXX. Nine participants were dropped from analysis due to technical problems with the microphone recording device. Responses and response times were not recorded for five participants because they did not speak loudly enough into the microphone – these were some of the earlier participants in the study; subsequent participants were reminded more directly and frequently to speak loudly into the microphone. The Chronos equipment failed to properly record the onset of the voice responses for four participants. Specifically, the onset of the response was recorded as the offset of the response, which resulted in incorrect RTs and failure to record the actual verb response. This resulted in a final sample of 45 participants (28 Female, 17 males; mean age = 20.11 years, SD = 1.54; 46.7% Caucasian, 31.1% Asian, 15.6% African American, 6.7% Hispanic). Informed written consent was obtained for all participants in accordance with the XXXX Institutional Review Board. An <emph>a priori</emph> power analysis revealed that the a sample size of 40 was required to achieve 95% power to detect a medium effect size (<emph>f</emph> =.15) (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, [<reflink idref="bib31" id="ref95">31</reflink>])—the final sample (<emph>N</emph> = 45) exceeded this minimum threshold.</p> <hd id="AN0180329817-5">Procedure</hd> <p>Participants completed the "thin slices" verb generation task as part of a larger study that included five additional cognitive tasks. All six cognitive tasks were completed in a single testing session lasting roughly 3 h, the order of the tasks was randomized and counterbalanced evenly across all participants. Mandatory five-minute breaks were provided between each task to combat fatigue. Afterwards, participants completed a demographics survey.</p> <hd id="AN0180329817-6">"Thin Slices" verb generation task</hd> <p>We utilized the "thin slices" verb generation task (Figure 1; Prabhakaran, Green, & Gray, [<reflink idref="bib65" id="ref96">65</reflink>]) and slightly modified it to closely mirror the Stroop color-word task in order to test for an ASC (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref97">1</reflink>]; Jensen & Rohwer, [<reflink idref="bib44" id="ref98">44</reflink>]; MacLeod, [<reflink idref="bib52" id="ref99">52</reflink>]). It is called the "thin slices" task because it was designed to measure instances of creativity over short durations, originally for use in fMRI designs (Prabhakaran, Green, & Gray, [<reflink idref="bib65" id="ref100">65</reflink>]); the "thin slices" term alludes to similar forms of short-duration measurement used in social psychology (e.g., Ambady & Rosenthal, [<reflink idref="bib3" id="ref101">3</reflink>]). In order to best measure the effects of potential carryover top-down control from previous trials (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref102">1</reflink>]), the trial order was deliberately designed to create an equal number of switches and non-switches between creativity-cued trials and uncued trials, response time was limited to 5 s, and the experiment advanced to the next trial immediately after participants finished giving their response. On each trial, participants were presented with a noun and given up to 5 s to respond verbally with a verb that was related to the noun (task duration: approximately 7–8 min). Participants were instructed to respond with verbs in the infinitive form (e.g., "to run") to standardize responses across participants. Half of the trials were shown in an ink color that indicated participants should "think creatively when coming up with their response" (this text color was the creativity cue), and the other half of the trials were shown in a different ink color that indicated no creativity cue. Paradigms measuring ASC have generally involved switches between qualitatively different tasks and/or switches between presentations of (or attention to) different stimuli (Allport & Wylie, [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref103">2</reflink>]; Ellefson, Shapiro, & Chater, [<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref104">30</reflink>]; Meuter & Allport, [<reflink idref="bib56" id="ref105">56</reflink>]; Philipp, Gade, & Koch, [<reflink idref="bib63" id="ref106">63</reflink>]); however, the present study involves switching between the same noun stimuli – the only difference was the ink color of the words and the associated cue paired with that color. The ink colors were different for every participant, such that two of three colors (red, yellow, blue) were randomly assigned to creativity-cued trials and uncued trials (e.g., for participant X, red ink meant creativity-cued, yellow ink meant uncued; for participant Y, blue ink meant creativity-cued, and red ink meant uncued). This was done to avoid any color-specific influence on the effect of the creativity cue (Mehta & Zhu, [<reflink idref="bib55" id="ref107">55</reflink>]). These colors were verified to be distinguishable in all forms of colorblindness using a standardized color blindness tool (<ulink href="http://www.color-blindness.com/coblis-color-blindness-simulator/">http://www.color-blindness.com/coblis-color-blindness-simulator/</ulink>). Before beginning the task, participants received instruction on the task procedure, including which ink colors referred to the creativity-cued trials and the uncued trials, and were asked to speak clearly and loudly into the microphone. They then completed 20 practice trials of the "thin slices" verb generation task.</p> <p>Graph: Figure 1. "Thin Slices" Verb Generation Task for Uncued and Cued Trials.</p> <p>The task was designed with 161 total trials divided equally into 4 main trial types that varied on two dimensions: 1) whether there was a creativity cue and 2) whether there was a task switch from the previous trial. The first trial was not included in analyses as it did not have a preceding trial and could not be classified as a switch or a no-switch trial, thus only 160 trials were considered in analyses. The four trial types (40 trials of each type) were as follows: cued-cued, uncued-cued, uncued-uncued, and cued-uncued, where the first word represents the trial type for the previous trial, and the second word indicates the trial type for the current trial. There was a fixed order of trial conditions across all participants (e.g., the third trial for all participants was cued-uncued), but the specific nouns that populated each trial were displayed to participants were different for each participant, such that 161 of 361 total nouns from a normed database (Balota et al., [<reflink idref="bib5" id="ref108">5</reflink>]) were shown to each participant. This random selection was done to avoid word-specific effects (Kenett, [<reflink idref="bib45" id="ref109">45</reflink>]). Each noun was 1 to 3 syllables, shown in all caps, and varied in terms of the constraint imposed on the verb response; for review, see (Barch, Braver, Sabb, & Noll, [<reflink idref="bib6" id="ref110">6</reflink>]; Prabhakaran, Green, & Gray, [<reflink idref="bib65" id="ref111">65</reflink>]). Half of the nouns in every trial type were considered low constraint (i.e., nouns for which an above-median number of distinct verb responses were observed in the source data set, such as "iron"), and the other half were considered high constraint (i.e. nouns with fewer commonly provided responses, such as "pony").</p> <p>Each noun was presented using E-Prime Studio 2.0 on a 60 Hz monitor. Participants spoke their responses aloud into a Chronos microphone, which automatically recorded their response time. The primary measure of performance was reaction time (RT) in milliseconds, which was recorded as the trial onset to offset of a participant's response to each noun; at the offset of a participant's response to a noun, Chronos sent a trigger to the E-Prime file to advance to the next trial. Missing responses were recorded as the maximum possible response time (5000 ms). No further preprocessing was conducted on RT data. Participants' responses were later transcribed from the digital voice recordings. The second measure of performance was the semantic distance of each verb to the presented noun, as calculated via the SemDis factor score derived from five major semantic corpi (Beaty & Johnson, [<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref112">9</reflink>]). Semantic distance is a well-validated, quantitative measurement that is reliably associated with originality (but not fluency) in verbal creativity tasks (Beaty & Johnson, [<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref113">9</reflink>]; Green, [<reflink idref="bib35" id="ref114">35</reflink>]; Green, Kraemer, Fugelsang, Gray, & Dunbar, [<reflink idref="bib39" id="ref115">39</reflink>]; Heinen & Johnson, [<reflink idref="bib43" id="ref116">43</reflink>]; Kenett, [<reflink idref="bib46" id="ref117">46</reflink>]). The SemDis factor score is centered at 0, such that lower values indicate less semantically distant and higher values indicate more semantically distant (Beaty & Johnson, [<reflink idref="bib9" id="ref118">9</reflink>]).</p> <hd id="AN0180329817-7">Statistical analyses</hd> <p>All main statistical analyses were computed in SPSS 27 (IBM Corp, [<reflink idref="bib26" id="ref119">26</reflink>]).</p> <hd id="AN0180329817-8">Results</hd> <p></p> <hd id="AN0180329817-9">Reaction time</hd> <p>A 2 (Cuing: creativity-cued, uncued) x 2 (Switching: switch, non-switch) within-subjects ANOVA revealed a main effect of Cue (<emph>F</emph><subs>1,44</subs> = 31.02, <emph>P</emph> <.001, <emph>η</emph><sups>2</sups>=.41), indicating that response times were significantly longer in the creativity-cued trials than the uncued trials. This replicates the effect of creativity-cueing on response time observed in previous studies (Green et al., [<reflink idref="bib40" id="ref120">40</reflink>]; Prabhakaran, Green, & Gray, [<reflink idref="bib65" id="ref121">65</reflink>]). Additionally, the model identified a main effect of Switch (<emph>F</emph><subs>1,44</subs> = 21.93, <emph>P</emph> <.001, <emph>η</emph><sups>2</sups>=.33), indicating that response times were significantly longer in the switch trials than the non-switch trials. Critically, the model revealed a significant Cuing x Switching interaction (<emph>F</emph><subs>1,44</subs> = 5.37, <emph>P</emph> =.025, <emph>η</emph><sups>2</sups>=.11), indicating that response times were significantly different for switch uncued versus non-switch uncued trials, but not for switch creativity-cued trials vs. non-switch creativity-cued trials (Figure 2). Planned paired t-tests confirmed that this interaction was due to a significant effect of Switching on the uncued trials (<emph>t</emph><subs>(<reflink idref="bib44" id="ref122">44</reflink>)</subs> = 5.14, <emph>P</emph> <.001, <emph>d</emph> =.77), such that switch uncued trials (uncued trials preceded by a creativity-cued trial) had significantly longer reaction times (<emph>M</emph> = 2.54 seconds, <emph>SD</emph>=.42) than non-switch uncued trials (uncued trials preceded by an uncued trial; <emph>M</emph> = 2.37 seconds, <emph>SD</emph>=.38). By contrast, there was not a significant effect of switch in the creativity-cued trials (<emph>t</emph><subs>(<reflink idref="bib44" id="ref123">44</reflink>)</subs> = 1.39, <emph>P</emph> =.17, <emph>d</emph> =.21), i.e., switch creativity-cued trials (creativity-cued trials preceded by an uncued trial) did not show significantly longer reaction times (<emph>M</emph> = 2.77 s, <emph>SD</emph>=.52) than non-switch creativity-cued trials (creativity-cued trials preceded by a creativity-cued trial; <emph>M</emph> = 2.72 s, <emph>SD</emph>=.50). The data thus indicate an ASC.</p> <p>Graph: Figure 2. Effect of Switching on Response Time in Uncued and Cued Verb Generation Trials.</p> <hd id="AN0180329817-10">Semantic distance analyses (exploratory)</hd> <p>We did not have strong theoretical predictions concerning ASC effects on semantic distance, as prior literature on ASC is limited to response time. All analyses of semantic distance were thus considered exploratory. A 2 (Cueing: creativity-cued, uncued) x 2 (Switching: switch, non-switch) within-subjects ANOVA revealed a main effect of Cue (<emph>F</emph><subs>1,44</subs> = 22.32, <emph>P</emph> <.001, <emph>η</emph><sups>2</sups>=.34), indicating that semantic distance was significantly higher in the creativity-cued trials than the uncued trials, replicating the effect of creativity-cueing on semantic distance found in prior work (Green et al., [<reflink idref="bib40" id="ref124">40</reflink>]; Prabhakaran, Green, & Gray, [<reflink idref="bib65" id="ref125">65</reflink>]). There was no main effect of Switching (<emph>F</emph><subs>1,44</subs> = 1.56, <emph>P</emph> =.22, <emph>η</emph><sups>2</sups>=.03), indicating that semantic distance was not significantly different in the switch trials than in the non-switch trials. Lastly, there was not a significant Cueing x Switching interaction (<emph>F</emph><subs>1,44</subs>=.03, <emph>P</emph> =.86, <emph>η</emph><sups>2</sups>=.001), indicating no significant difference in semantic distance for switch versus non-switch in either creativity-cued trials or uncued trials (Figure 3).</p> <p>Graph: Figure 3. Effect of switching on semantic distance in Uncued and Cued Verb Generation Trials.</p> <hd id="AN0180329817-11">Discussion</hd> <p>The present study tested competing predictions about the role of top-down control in divergent creativity by experimentally investigating whether there was an ASC for the conscious augmentation of creative state in the "thin slices" verb generation task (Prabhakaran, Green, & Gray, [<reflink idref="bib65" id="ref126">65</reflink>]), a measure of divergent creativity. The results supported the hypothesis of an ASC for heightened creative states: there was a significant switch cost when switching from creativity-cued trials to uncued trials, but no switch cost when switching from uncued trials to creativity-cued trials. Given that extensive research in the switch cost literature indicates that ASC reflect greater top-down control in the switched-from task than the switched-to task (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref127">1</reflink>]; Arbuthnott, [<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref128">4</reflink>]; Yeung & Monsell, [<reflink idref="bib76" id="ref129">76</reflink>]), these results provide indirect evidence that a heightened creative state (i.e., creativity-cued trials) may require more top-down control than lowered creative states (i.e., uncued trials). Therefore, the present results support the contemporary cognitive and neural accounts that highlight the role of top-down control and its associated brain regions (e.g., prefrontal cortex, executive control network) in divergent creativity (Beaty, Silvia, Nusbaum, Jauk, & Benedek, [<reflink idref="bib12" id="ref130">12</reflink>]; Benedek & Fink, [<reflink idref="bib15" id="ref131">15</reflink>]; Palmiero, Fusi, Crepaldi, Borsa, & Rusconi, [<reflink idref="bib62" id="ref132">62</reflink>]). This finding and interpretation applies first and foremost to the kind of creativity measured by the present task: divergent verbal production. In the context of the "thin slices" verb generation task, top-down control is likely to help participants more effectively suppress common or uncreative prepotent responses as they search their semantic networks to find a creative verb response (e.g. "Is 'to sit' a creative enough answer for chair? No? Don't say it then.;" Kenett, [<reflink idref="bib45" id="ref133">45</reflink>]; Mednick, [<reflink idref="bib54" id="ref134">54</reflink>]). The present findings do not support the opposing theory that suggests divergent creativity involves lessened top-down control (Chrysikou et al., [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref135">24</reflink>]; Martindale, [<reflink idref="bib53" id="ref136">53</reflink>]; Reverberi, Toraldo, D'Agostini, & Skrap, [<reflink idref="bib67" id="ref137">67</reflink>]), and do not align with several previous studies, which found no association between divergent creativity and top-down control (Burch, Hemsley, Pavelis, & Corr, [<reflink idref="bib20" id="ref138">20</reflink>]; Green & Williams, [<reflink idref="bib41" id="ref139">41</reflink>]; Stavridou & Furnham, [<reflink idref="bib71" id="ref140">71</reflink>]).</p> <p>Beyond divergent creativity, the present results also deepen our understanding of state creativity and its dynamics. Although the "thinking cap" effect has been well-replicated (Green, [<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref141">34</reflink>]; Nusbaum, Silvia, & Beaty, [<reflink idref="bib61" id="ref142">61</reflink>]; Weinberger, Iyer, Green, & Runco, [<reflink idref="bib73" id="ref143">73</reflink>]), the mechanisms and dynamics of state creativity remain relatively underexplored, as compared to trait creativity. This study provides new evidence for increased top-down control in heightened state creativity compared to lowered state creativity, specifically in the context of a divergent word generation task. The present evidence also indicates that augmenting creative state has carry-over effects that impede performance on subsequent uncued responding. This was previously untested to our knowledge, and has relevance to future studies in which creative state is acutely manipulated. Furthermore, much of the existing switch cost literature utilizes paradigms that switch between two different tasks (e.g., color naming vs. word naming in the Stroop paradigm) or between two different kinds of stimuli (e.g., more complex math problems vs. less complex math problems) (Allport & Wylie, [<reflink idref="bib2" id="ref144">2</reflink>]; Ellefson, Shapiro, & Chater, [<reflink idref="bib30" id="ref145">30</reflink>]; Meuter & Allport, [<reflink idref="bib56" id="ref146">56</reflink>]; Philipp, Gade, & Koch, [<reflink idref="bib63" id="ref147">63</reflink>]). It is also worth noting that not all task switching paradigms demonstrate ASC (Yeung & Monsell, [<reflink idref="bib76" id="ref148">76</reflink>]), ostensibly because the difference in cognitive demands is not sufficiently large. Furthermore, our findings are also in line with other task switching paradigms, such as the negative priming paradigm in the field of reasoning and problem solving as they both involve inhibitory control to perform a task, ultimately reflecting top-down control processes, despite the theoretical underlying cognitive and stimuli differences (Lanoë et al., [<reflink idref="bib49" id="ref149">49</reflink>]; Lubin et al., [<reflink idref="bib51" id="ref150">51</reflink>]). In the current research, we compared two ways of completing the same task, and used nearly identical stimuli – the only difference between creativity-cued and uncued trials was the ink color of the words. These findings indicate that this dynamic shift (i.e., augmenting creative state) constitutes a meaningful shift in task set (i.e., enough to induce an ASC) qualitatively similar to the effects of making the stimulus itself more difficult to process or doing a completely different task.</p> <p>Results also indicated that semantic distance was significantly higher in the creativity-cued trials than the uncued trials, replicating the effect of creativity-cueing on semantic distance-based creative performance measures found in prior work (Green, [<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref151">34</reflink>]; Green, Cohen, Kim, & Gray, [<reflink idref="bib36" id="ref152">36</reflink>]; Prabhakaran, Green, & Gray, [<reflink idref="bib65" id="ref153">65</reflink>]). Exploratory analyses found no asymmetric patterns in regard to semantic distance, however no strong conclusions can be drawn about "costs" to semantic distance on uncued trials, as participants were not attempting to be creative on uncued trials – therefore lower semantic distance would not necessarily reflect impaired performance. In addition, semantic distance measures a different aspect of performance than reaction time, and only reaction time has been previously linked to ASC (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, [<reflink idref="bib1" id="ref154">1</reflink>]; Arbuthnott, [<reflink idref="bib4" id="ref155">4</reflink>]; Yeung & Monsell, [<reflink idref="bib76" id="ref156">76</reflink>]).</p> <p>Similar to the contradictory behavioral findings on the role of top-down control in creativity (Camarda et al., [<reflink idref="bib22" id="ref157">22</reflink>]; Radel, Davranche, Fournier, & Dietrich, [<reflink idref="bib66" id="ref158">66</reflink>]), several neuroimaging studies have provided inconclusive results. For instance, many brain-based investigations have found that higher divergent creative ability is associated with increased recruitment of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and the executive control network (Beaty et al., [<reflink idref="bib10" id="ref159">10</reflink>]; Beaty, Benedek, Silvia, & Schacter, [<reflink idref="bib7" id="ref160">7</reflink>]; Beaty, Cortes, Zeitlen, Weinberger, & Green, [<reflink idref="bib8" id="ref161">8</reflink>]; Beaty, Seli, & Schacter, [<reflink idref="bib11" id="ref162">11</reflink>]; Boccia, Piccardi, Palermo, Nori, & Palmiero, [<reflink idref="bib19" id="ref163">19</reflink>]; Ellamil, Dobson, Beeman, & Christoff, [<reflink idref="bib29" id="ref164">29</reflink>]; Gonen-Yaacovi et al., [<reflink idref="bib33" id="ref165">33</reflink>]; Wu et al., [<reflink idref="bib75" id="ref166">75</reflink>]), both of which are key neural substrates of top-down control (Miller & Cohen, [<reflink idref="bib57" id="ref167">57</reflink>]). Furthermore, lesions to the PFC impair generation of creative ideas (Bendetowicz et al., [<reflink idref="bib13" id="ref168">13</reflink>]). Opposing accounts suggest that creativity involves lessened top-down control, putatively enabling ideas to flow more freely (Martindale, [<reflink idref="bib53" id="ref169">53</reflink>]). This suggestion draws on studies indicating that a "hypofrontal" brain state (i.e., deactivation of the PFC), induced either via inhibitory brain stimulation (e.g., cathodal tDCS or theta burst TMS) over PFC (Chrysikou et al., [<reflink idref="bib24" id="ref170">24</reflink>]; Kleinmintz et al., [<reflink idref="bib47" id="ref171">47</reflink>]) or lesions to PFC (Reverberi, Toraldo, D'Agostini, & Skrap, [<reflink idref="bib67" id="ref172">67</reflink>]), leads to improved performance on some divergent creativity tasks. However, the fact that the PFC and executive control network support other functions besides top-down control (such as working memory and attention; Miller & Cohen, [<reflink idref="bib57" id="ref173">57</reflink>]; Niendam et al., [<reflink idref="bib60" id="ref174">60</reflink>])) makes it even more challenging to draw clear conclusions about the role of top-down control in divergent creativity from neuroimaging studies alone. For all these reasons, the present evidence provides valuable experimental evidence for the role of increased top-down control during divergent creativity – these findings align with prior neuroimaging evidence implicating the role of top-down control-associated brain regions (e.g. frontopolar cortex; (Gilbert et al., [<reflink idref="bib32" id="ref175">32</reflink>]; Koechlin, Ody, & Kouneiher, [<reflink idref="bib48" id="ref176">48</reflink>]) in state creativity (Green, [<reflink idref="bib34" id="ref177">34</reflink>]; Green, Cohen, Raab, Yedibalian, & Gray, [<reflink idref="bib37" id="ref178">37</reflink>]).</p> <hd id="AN0180329817-12">Limitations</hd> <p>The present study is limited in several ways. First, the conclusions drawn from the present evidence are limited to the task at hand, which emphasized the divergence/novelty/open-ended component of creativity – participants were prompted to generate verb responses with minimal constraint on what constituted an appropriate response (only that the verb should be related to the noun in some way). The "thin slices" task is notably different from the Alternative Uses Task (a prominent measure of divergence; Guildford, 1967), in that it requires a single response on a short time-scale (up to 5 s), whereas the AUT often allows for many responses over a longer duration of time (up to 3 min)—coming up with one response in the "thin slices" task may require more top-down control than freely generating responses in the AUT. Future research should explore whether the magnitude of the asymmetric switch cost effect is associated with performance on other divergent creative measures (e.g., AUT). Beyond divergent creativity, the present results may not extend to creative state augmentation in other domains of creativity (e.g., visual, convergent, analogical)—future research should attempt to replicate the present results across different creativity tasks. Second, although much of the literature has examined the role of top-down control in creativity using neuroscience, the present study does not contain neuroimaging data – future research should explore the neural differences between task conditions to better understand the asymmetric switch cost for creativity found in the present study. Third, the present interpretation rests on the notion that top-down control is the primary cognitive process that supports the asymmetric switch cost effect, however the exact nature of this effect remains somewhat debated. As discussed in the introduction, the asymmetric switch costs in the present results may involve other cognitive processes besides top-down control, such as attentional enhancement of the uncued task-set rather than inhibition of cued task-set (Sikora & Roelofs, [<reflink idref="bib70" id="ref179">70</reflink>]), the retrieval of stimulus-response rules of the uncued condition (Monsell, [<reflink idref="bib59" id="ref180">59</reflink>]), or working memory exhaustion by the creativity-cued condition (Schneider & Anderson, [<reflink idref="bib68" id="ref181">68</reflink>]). Therefore, the interpretation that the present results provide evidence for increased top-down control in heightened state creativity compared to lowered state creativity is indirect and hypothetical in nature.</p> <hd id="AN0180329817-13">Conclusions</hd> <p>The role of top-down control in divergent creativity remains heavily debated. An outstanding question about the state dynamics of creativity concerns acute shifts between heightened and lowered creative states. In the present study, we utilized the "thin slices" verb generation task and observed a substantial switch cost when switching from creativity-cued trials to uncued trials, but no switch cost when switching from uncued trials to creativity-cued trials. These findings provide indirect evidence that heightened creative states may require substantially more top-down control than lowered creative states, supporting the theory that divergent creativity requires increased top-down control.</p> <hd id="AN0180329817-14">Acknowledgments</hd> <p>This research was supported by grants to AEG from the National Science Foundation [DRL-1420481, DRL-1848181, DRL-1920653]. RAC is additionally supported by a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship and by the Patrick Healy Graduate Fellowship from Georgetown University.</p> <hd id="AN0180329817-15">Disclosure statement</hd> <p>The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any financial interests or benefits that could arise from its direct application.</p> <hd id="AN0180329817-16">Data availability statement</hd> <p>All data and stimuli are fully available on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/cg3z9/).</p> <ref id="AN0180329817-17"> <title> References </title> <blist> <bibl id="bib1" idref="ref50" type="bt">1</bibl> <bibtext> Allport, A., Styles, E. A., & Hsieh, S. (1994). Shifting attentional set: Exploring the dynamic control of tasks. In C. U & M. Moscovitch (Eds.), Attention and performance XV: Conscious and nonconscious information processing (pp. 421 – 452). 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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Undergraduate+Students%22">Undergraduate Students</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Creativity%22">Creativity</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Verbs%22">Verbs</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Cognitive+Processes%22">Cognitive Processes</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Creative+Thinking%22">Creative Thinking</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Perception%22">Perception</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Learning+Processes%22">Learning Processes</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Experience%22">Experience</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Stimuli%22">Stimuli</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Time+Factors+%28Learning%29%22">Time Factors (Learning)</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Time+on+Task%22">Time on Task</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Context+Effect%22">Context Effect</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Performance+Factors%22">Performance Factors</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Resistance+to+Change%22">Resistance to Change</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Conceptual+Tempo%22">Conceptual Tempo</searchLink>
– Name: DOI
  Label: DOI
  Group: ID
  Data: 10.1080/10400419.2023.2212999
– Name: ISSN
  Label: ISSN
  Group: ISSN
  Data: 1040-0419<br />1532-6934
– Name: Abstract
  Label: Abstract
  Group: Ab
  Data: The role of top-down control in divergent creativity remains heavily debated. An outstanding question about the state dynamics of creativity concerns acute shifts between heightened and lowered creative states. Particularly, do transitions between creative states incur a "switch cost" as observed in other domains of cognition? Prior research showed that asymmetric switch costs are often incurred such that reaction time is asymmetrically slower when participants switch from a task involving more top-down control to a task involving less top-down control. We tested the hypothesis that frequent acute transitions from creativity-cued responding (associated with heightened creative state) to uncued responding (associated with lowered creative state) would incur an asymmetric switch cost such that uncued responding would be disproportionately impacted by state changes. We utilized the "thin slices" verb generation task in a task-switching paradigm. Consistent with the hypothesis of asymmetric switch costs in shifts between creative states, we observed a substantial switch cost when switching from creativity-cued trials to uncued trials, but no switch cost when switching from uncued trials to creativity-cued trials. These findings provide indirect evidence that heightened creative states may require substantially more top-down control than lowered creative states, supporting the theory that divergent creativity requires increased top-down control.
– Name: AbstractInfo
  Label: Abstractor
  Group: Ab
  Data: As Provided
– Name: DateEntry
  Label: Entry Date
  Group: Date
  Data: 2024
– Name: AN
  Label: Accession Number
  Group: ID
  Data: EJ1444258
PLink https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=eric&AN=EJ1444258
RecordInfo BibRecord:
  BibEntity:
    Identifiers:
      – Type: doi
        Value: 10.1080/10400419.2023.2212999
    Languages:
      – Text: English
    PhysicalDescription:
      Pagination:
        PageCount: 11
        StartPage: 629
    Subjects:
      – SubjectFull: Undergraduate Students
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Creativity
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Verbs
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Cognitive Processes
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Creative Thinking
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Perception
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Learning Processes
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Experience
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Stimuli
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Time Factors (Learning)
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Time on Task
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Context Effect
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Performance Factors
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Resistance to Change
        Type: general
      – SubjectFull: Conceptual Tempo
        Type: general
    Titles:
      – TitleFull: Evidence for an Asymmetric Switch Cost in State Creativity
        Type: main
  BibRelationships:
    HasContributorRelationships:
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Robert A. Cortes
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Mafalda C. B. Peña
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Richard J. Daker
      – PersonEntity:
          Name:
            NameFull: Griffin A. Colaizzi
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          Name:
            NameFull: Adam E. Green
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          Dates:
            – D: 01
              M: 01
              Type: published
              Y: 2024
          Identifiers:
            – Type: issn-print
              Value: 1040-0419
            – Type: issn-electronic
              Value: 1532-6934
          Numbering:
            – Type: volume
              Value: 36
            – Type: issue
              Value: 4
          Titles:
            – TitleFull: Creativity Research Journal
              Type: main
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