Deception Undermines the Stability of Cooperation in Games of Indirect Reciprocity.
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| Title: | Deception Undermines the Stability of Cooperation in Games of Indirect Reciprocity. |
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| Authors: | Számadó S; MTA-ELTE Theoretical Biology and Evolutionary Ecology Research Group, Pázmány Péter sétány, 1/c, H-1117, Budapest, Hungary.; MTA, Centre for Social Sciences, Országház u. 30. 1014, Budapest, Hungary., Szalai F; Engame Academy, Bajcsy-Zsilinszky u. 50, 1054, Budapest, Hungary., Scheuring I; MTA-ELTE Theoretical Biology and Evolutionary Ecology Research Group, Pázmány Péter sétány, 1/c, H-1117, Budapest, Hungary. |
| Source: | PloS one [PLoS One] 2016 Jan 29; Vol. 11 (1), pp. e0147623. Date of Electronic Publication: 2016 Jan 29 (Print Publication: 2016). |
| Publication Type: | Journal Article; Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't |
| Journal Info: | Publisher: Public Library of Science Country of Publication: United States NLM ID: 101285081 Publication Model: eCollection Cited Medium: Internet ISSN: 1932-6203 (Electronic) Linking ISSN: 19326203 NLM ISO Abbreviation: PLoS One Subsets: MEDLINE |
| Database: | MEDLINE Ultimate |
| ISSN: | 1932-6203 |
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| DOI: | 10.1371/journal.pone.0147623 |
