Regret in durable‐good monopoly.

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Title: Regret in durable‐good monopoly.
Authors: Kostadinov, Rumen1 (AUTHOR) kostadir@mcmaster.ca
Source: Theoretical Economics. May2026, Vol. 21 Issue 2, p615-667. 53p.
Database: Mathematics Source
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        Value: 10.3982/TE6066
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        Text: English
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              Text: May2026
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