When cognition turns vicious: Heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology.
Saved in:
| Title: | When cognition turns vicious: Heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology. |
|---|---|
| Authors: | Samuelson, Peter L. (AUTHOR), Church, Ian M. (AUTHOR) |
| Source: | Philosophical Psychology. 2015, Vol. 28 Issue 8, p1095-1113. 19p. |
| Subjects: | Heuristic, Aristotelianism (Philosophy), Cognitive ability, Personality, Epistemic logic |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we explore the literature on cognitive heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology, specifically highlighting the two major positions--agent-reliabilism and agent-responsibilism (or neo-Aristotelianism)--as they apply to dual systems theories of cognition and the role of motivation in biases. We investigate under which conditions heuristics and biases might be characterized as vicious and conclude that a certain kind of intellectual arrogance can be attributed to an inappropriate reliance on Type 1, or the improper function of Type 2, cognitive processes. By the same token, the proper intervention of Type 2 processes results in the virtuous functioning of our cognitive systems (agent-reliabilism). Moreover, the role of motivation in attenuating cognitive biases and the cultivation of certain epistemic habits (a search for accuracy, being accountable for one's judgments, the use of rules of analysis, and exposure to differing perspectives) points to the tenets of agent-responsibilism in epistemic virtue. We identify the proper use of Type 2 cognitive processes and the habits of mind that attenuate biases as demonstrations of the virtue of intellectual humility. We briefly explore the nature of these habits and the contribution of personality traits, situational pressures, and training in their cultivation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Copyright of Philosophical Psychology is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) | |
| Database: | Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection |
|
Full text is not displayed to guests.
Login for full access.
|
|
| Abstract: | In this paper, we explore the literature on cognitive heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology, specifically highlighting the two major positions--agent-reliabilism and agent-responsibilism (or neo-Aristotelianism)--as they apply to dual systems theories of cognition and the role of motivation in biases. We investigate under which conditions heuristics and biases might be characterized as vicious and conclude that a certain kind of intellectual arrogance can be attributed to an inappropriate reliance on Type 1, or the improper function of Type 2, cognitive processes. By the same token, the proper intervention of Type 2 processes results in the virtuous functioning of our cognitive systems (agent-reliabilism). Moreover, the role of motivation in attenuating cognitive biases and the cultivation of certain epistemic habits (a search for accuracy, being accountable for one's judgments, the use of rules of analysis, and exposure to differing perspectives) points to the tenets of agent-responsibilism in epistemic virtue. We identify the proper use of Type 2 cognitive processes and the habits of mind that attenuate biases as demonstrations of the virtue of intellectual humility. We briefly explore the nature of these habits and the contribution of personality traits, situational pressures, and training in their cultivation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 09515089 |
| DOI: | 10.1080/09515089.2014.904197 |
