Consequentialism and the boundary of morality.
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| Title: | Consequentialism and the boundary of morality. |
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| Authors: | Liu, Xiaofei (AUTHOR), Hong, Xiaoru (AUTHOR), Wang, Xiyang (AUTHOR) |
| Source: | Philosophical Psychology. Apr2020, Vol. 33 Issue 3, p351-368. 18p. |
| Subjects: | Ethics, Intuition, Right & wrong, Experimental philosophy |
| Abstract: | A series of our experimental studies show that some actions which consequentialists would treat as morally right or wrong were not regarded by ordinary people as a matter of morality. These results suggest that there is a divide between the moral and the non-moral that ordinary people intuitively believe in but that consequentialism seems unable to accommodate. We argue that the root of this conflict lies in the inclusion of non-moral value in the consequentialist theory of the good, which causes consequentialism to deny, in all cases involving primarily non-moral value, a moral/non-moral divide. We argue further that there is no good theoretical reason (other than that which motivates consequentialism) to think that such a divide is unjustified. Therefore, consequentialism faces a problem: any version of consequentialism that allows non-moral value into the theory of the good will be at odds with a substantial number of seemingly justified intuitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| Database: | Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection |
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| Abstract: | A series of our experimental studies show that some actions which consequentialists would treat as morally right or wrong were not regarded by ordinary people as a matter of morality. These results suggest that there is a divide between the moral and the non-moral that ordinary people intuitively believe in but that consequentialism seems unable to accommodate. We argue that the root of this conflict lies in the inclusion of non-moral value in the consequentialist theory of the good, which causes consequentialism to deny, in all cases involving primarily non-moral value, a moral/non-moral divide. We argue further that there is no good theoretical reason (other than that which motivates consequentialism) to think that such a divide is unjustified. Therefore, consequentialism faces a problem: any version of consequentialism that allows non-moral value into the theory of the good will be at odds with a substantial number of seemingly justified intuitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| ISSN: | 09515089 |
| DOI: | 10.1080/09515089.2020.1729975 |
