What is the Nature of "Internal Content" Prior to Attentional Selection?

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Bibliographic Details
Title: What is the Nature of "Internal Content" Prior to Attentional Selection?
Authors: Morris, Adam (AUTHOR), Braver, Todd (AUTHOR)
Source: Psychological Inquiry. Oct-Dec2022, Vol. 33 Issue 4, p280-284. 5p.
Subjects: Cognitive therapy, Observation (Psychology), Inattentional blindness, Recollection (Psychology), Control (Psychology), Subliminal perception, Mental representation
Abstract: Amir and Bernstein are clear that, once the representations are attended to, they enter working memory. The "Activation" Interpretation The second interpretation that Amir and Bernstein draw on is that the internal representations were I latent i before being attended to. Amir and Bernstein (this issue) develop an ambitious model that seeks to fill this gap and account for how internal attention integrates information from working memory, emotional states, and contextual demands to select among cognitive representations. In particular, in Amir and Bernstein's model it is unclear what the nature is of the internal representations before they are attended to. [Extracted from the article]
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Database: Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection
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Abstract:Amir and Bernstein are clear that, once the representations are attended to, they enter working memory. The "Activation" Interpretation The second interpretation that Amir and Bernstein draw on is that the internal representations were I latent i before being attended to. Amir and Bernstein (this issue) develop an ambitious model that seeks to fill this gap and account for how internal attention integrates information from working memory, emotional states, and contextual demands to select among cognitive representations. In particular, in Amir and Bernstein's model it is unclear what the nature is of the internal representations before they are attended to. [Extracted from the article]
ISSN:1047840X
DOI:10.1080/1047840X.2022.2149196