Does social rigidity predict cognitive rigidity? Profiles of socio-cognitive polarization.
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| Title: | Does social rigidity predict cognitive rigidity? Profiles of socio-cognitive polarization. |
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| Authors: | Salvi, Carola (AUTHOR), Iannello, Paola (AUTHOR), Cancer, Alice (AUTHOR), Cooper, Samuel E. (AUTHOR), McClay, Mason (AUTHOR), Dunsmoor, Joseph E. (AUTHOR), Antonietti, Alessandro (AUTHOR) |
| Source: | Psychological Research. Nov2023, Vol. 87 Issue 8, p2533-2547. 15p. 3 Charts, 2 Graphs. |
| Subjects: | Cognitive styles, Cognitive flexibility, Ambiguity tolerance, Political doctrines, Problem solving, Xenophobia |
| Abstract: | Recent research has proposed a relationship between rigid political ideologies and underlying 'cognitive styles'. However, there remain discrepancies in how both social and cognitive rigidity are defined and measured. Problem-solving, or the ability to generate novel ideas by exploring unusual reasoning paths and challenging rigid perspectives around us, is often used to operationalize cognitive flexibility. Thus, we hypothesized a relation between forms of social rigidity, including Socio-cognitive polarization (i.e., a factor capturing conservative political ideology, absolutism/intolerance of ambiguity, and xenophobia), bullshit receptivity (i.e., overestimating pseudo-profound statements), overclaiming (tendency to self-enhance), and cognitive rigidity (i.e., problem-solving). Our results showed differences in performance on problem-solving tasks between four latent profiles of social rigidity identified in our sample. Specifically, those low in socio-cognitive polarization, bullshit, and overclaiming (i.e., less rigid) performed the best on problem-solving. Thus, we conclude that social and cognitive rigidity may share an underlying socio-cognitive construct, wherein those who are more socially rigid are also more likely to be also cognitively rigid when processing non-social information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| Database: | Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection |
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| Abstract: | Recent research has proposed a relationship between rigid political ideologies and underlying 'cognitive styles'. However, there remain discrepancies in how both social and cognitive rigidity are defined and measured. Problem-solving, or the ability to generate novel ideas by exploring unusual reasoning paths and challenging rigid perspectives around us, is often used to operationalize cognitive flexibility. Thus, we hypothesized a relation between forms of social rigidity, including Socio-cognitive polarization (i.e., a factor capturing conservative political ideology, absolutism/intolerance of ambiguity, and xenophobia), bullshit receptivity (i.e., overestimating pseudo-profound statements), overclaiming (tendency to self-enhance), and cognitive rigidity (i.e., problem-solving). Our results showed differences in performance on problem-solving tasks between four latent profiles of social rigidity identified in our sample. Specifically, those low in socio-cognitive polarization, bullshit, and overclaiming (i.e., less rigid) performed the best on problem-solving. Thus, we conclude that social and cognitive rigidity may share an underlying socio-cognitive construct, wherein those who are more socially rigid are also more likely to be also cognitively rigid when processing non-social information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| ISSN: | 03400727 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s00426-023-01832-w |
